**CURRICULUM VITAE**

**DERK PEREBOOM** April 2024

Susan Linn Sage School of Philosophy

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**Education:**

B.A., 1978: Calvin College, Philosophy

 M.A., 1979: University of California, Los Angeles, Philosophy

 Ph.D., 1985: University of California, Los Angeles, Philosophy

Ph.D. Dissertation: *Kant on Concept and Intuition*; Committee: Robert M. Adams, chair, Tyler Burge, Jean Hampton, David W. Smith, Amos Funkenstein

**Employment:**

University of Vermont, 1985–2007

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, 1985–91

Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, 1991–97

Professor, Department of Philosophy, 1997–2007

 Chair, Department of Philosophy, 1997–2007

 Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, 2004–05

Cornell University, 2007–

Professor, Sage School of Philosophy, 2007–

 Acting Chair, Sage School of Philosophy, 2008–09

 Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy and Ethics, 2013–

 Stanford H. Taylor '50 Chair of the Sage School of Philosophy, 2013-18

 Senior Associate Dean for the Arts and Humanities, College of Arts and Sciences, 2018–

Visiting Assistant Professor, UCLA, Summer 1987

 Visiting Associate Professor, UCLA, Winter 1993

 Visiting Associate Professor, Yale University, Spring 1995

Program Visitor, Centre for Consciousness, RSSS, Australian National Univ. Fall 2005

Visiting Professor, Central European University, Budapest, July 2009 and July 2010

Visiting Professor, Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies, Summer Seminar in Riga, July 2016

**AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION**

Free will and moral responsibility

 Philosophy of mind

 History of early modern philosophy, especially Kant

 Philosophy of religion

**PUBLICATIONS**

**BOOKS**

**Authored:**

 *Living without Free Will*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

 Reprinted sections:

pp. 69–88, as “Empirical Objections to Agent–Causal Libertarianism,” in *Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will,* Vol. III, John Martin Fischer, ed., London: Routledge, 2005.

pp. 111–16, as part of “Source Incompatibilism,” in *Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will,* Vol. II, John Martin Fischer, ed., London: Routledge, 2005.

pp. 90–100 and 199–207, as “Revising the Reactive Attitudes,” in *Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment,"* Michael McKenna and Paul Russell, eds., Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2008.

*Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

 Reprinted section:

pp. 9–28, as “The Knowledge Argument and Introspective Inaccuracy,” in *Consciousness and the Mind–Body Problem: Essential Readings*, Torin Alter and Robert Howell, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

*Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Reprinted as 生命中的自由意志能动性和意义, translated into Mandarin Chinese by Ke Zhang, Nanjing: Yilin Press, 2022.

*Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

*Free Will*, Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press, 2022.

**Co–authored:**

*Four Views on Free Will*, co–authored with Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, and Manual Vargas, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007; second, revised edition, John Wiley & Sons, 2024.

Reprinted as *Cuatro perspectivos sobre libertad*, tr. Inés Echavarría, Gabriela Polit, and Ricardo Restrepo, Madrid, Spain: Marcial Pons, 2013.

*Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction*, co–authored with Michael McKenna, London: Routledge, 2016.

*Moral Responsibility Reconsidered,* co-authored with Gregg D. Caruso, Cambridge Elements Series, Cambridge University Press, 2022.

**Edited:**

*Existentialism: Basic Writings*, co-edited with Charles Guignon, an anthology, with introductions, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995; second (expanded) edition, 2001.

*Free Will*, an anthology, with introduction, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, first edition, 1997; second (expanded) edition, 2009.

*The Rationalists*, an anthology, with introduction, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.

*Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes, and Free Will*, co-edited with Maureen Sie, a collection of articles, with introduction, London: Routledge, 2015.

*Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society*, co-edited with Elizabeth Shaw and Gregg Caruso, a collection of articles, with introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

*The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility*, co-edited with Dana Kay Nelkin, a collection of articles, with introduction, New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.

**ARTICLES**

**Scholarly articles:**

"Kant on Intentionality," *Synthèse* 77, 1988: 321–52.

"Kant on Justification in Transcendental Philosophy," *Synthèse* 85, 1990: 25–54.

"Mathematical Expressibility, Perceptual Relativity, and Secondary Qualities," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 22, 1991: 63–88.

"Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist," *Synthèse* 88, 1991: 341–358.

“Kant’s Amphiboly,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 73, 1991: 50–70.

"Is Kant's Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent?" *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 8, 1991: 357–72.

with Hilary Kornblith, "The Metaphysics of Irreducibility," *Philosophical Studies* 63, 1991: 125–45.

Reprinted in *Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology*, John Heil, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

"Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, 1994: 315–29.

"Stoic Psychotherapy in Descartes and Spinoza," *Faith and Philosophy* 11, 194: 592–625.

Reprinted in *Spinoza:* *Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers,* vol. 1, Genevieve Lloyd, ed.; London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 149–84.

"Determinism *Al Dente*," *Noûs* 29, 1995: 21–45.

Reprinted in *Free Will*, Derk Pereboom, ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, first edition, 1997, pp. 242–72; second edition, 2009, pp. 307–37.

Reprinted in *O Svobodni Volji* (*About Free Will*), Danilo Šuster, ed., translated into Slovenian, Maribor: Zalozba Aristej Slovenia, 2007.

Reprinted in *Arguing about Metaphysics*, Michael Rea, ed., London: Routledge, 2009.

Reprinted in *Vétkek és Választások* (*Vices and Choices*), Anna Réz, ed., translated into Hungarian by Tibor Bárány, Budapest: Gondolat, 2013.

"Self–Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction," *Synthèse* 103, 1995: 1–42.

"Conceptual Structure and the Individuation of Content," *Philosophical Perspectives* (*Noûs* supplement) 9, 1995: 401–26.

"Kant on God, Evil, and Teleology," *Faith and Philosophy* 13, 1996: 508–33.

 “Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 14 (*Noûs* supplement), 2000: 119–37.

Reprinted in part as "The Explanatory Irrelevance of Alternative Possibilities," in *Free Will*, Robert Kane, ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, pp. 111–24.

 “Robust Nonreductive Materialism,” *Journal of Philosophy* 99, 2002: 499–531.

Reprinted in *The Philosophers’ Annual* 25, 2002, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2004.

"Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities," in *Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities*, Michael McKenna and David Widerker, eds*.,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 185–99.

Reprinted in *Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will,* Book II, as part of “Source Incompatibilism,” John Martin Fischer, ed.; London: Routledge, 2005.

 “Meaning in Life without Free Will,” *Philosophic Exchange* 33, 2002–3: 18–34.

“Is Our Conception of Agent–Causation Incoherent?” *Philosophical Topics* 32, 2004: 275–86.

“Free Will, Evil, and Divine Providence,” in *God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion*, Andrew Chignell and Andrew Dole, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 77–98.

Reprinted in *Arguing about Religion*, Kevin Timpe, ed., London: Routledge, 2009.

“Defending Hard Incompatibilism,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 29, 2005: 228–47.

"Kant on Transcendental Freedom," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 73, 2006: 537–67.

“A Hard–Line Reply to the Multiple–Case Manipulation Argument,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 77, 2008: 160–70.

“A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation,” *Journal of Ethics* 12, 2008: 287–307.

"Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again," in Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008, pp. 1–33.

“Consciousness and Introspective Inaccuracy," in *Appearance, Reality, and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert M. Adams*, L. M. Jorgensen and Samuel Newlands, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 156–87.

“Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals,” *Philosophical Studies* 144, 2009: 21–33.

“Further Thoughts about a Frankfurt–Style Argument,” *Philosophical Explorations* 12, 2009: 109–18.

“Free Will, Love and Anger,” *Ideas y Valores* 141, 2009: 5–25.

“Structuralism, Anti–Structuralism, and Objectivity,” *Philosophic Exchang*e 40, 2009–10: 45–59.

“Free Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Robert Kane, ed., second edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 407–24.

“Theological Determinism and Divine Providence,” in *Molinism: The Contemporary Debate*, Ken Perszyk, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 262–79.

“Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility, and the Timing Objection,” *Philosophical Issues* 22, 2012: 298–315.

“Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation,” in *Blame: Its Nature and Norms*, Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 189–206.

“Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will,” in *The Philosophy of Free Will: Selected Contemporary Readings*, Paul Russell and Oisin Deery, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 421–49.

Reprinted in *Quanto Siamo Responsabili? Filosofia, Neuroscienze e Società (How Responsible are we? Philosophy, Neuroscience, and Society),* Mario De Caro, Andrea Lavazza, and Giuseppe Sartori, eds., as “*Lo Scetticismo Ottimistico su Libertà e Responsabilità*,” translated into Italian, Turin: Codice Edizione, 2013, pp. 127–56.

Reprinted in *Логос* (*Logos*) 5 (2016): 59–102, translated into Russian by Polina Hanova as “Оптимистичный скептицизм относительно свободы воли.”

Reprinted in *Grundkurs Willensfreiheit*, Sven Walter, ed., translated into German as "Willensfreiheit – Ein optimistischer Skeptizismus," Mentis, 2018, pp. 323–45.

“Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment,” in *The Future of Punishment*, Thomas Nadelhoffer, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 49–78.

 “Skepticism about Free Will,” in *Exploring the Illusion of Free Will*,” Gregg Caruso, ed., Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2013, pp. 19–39.

“Moral Responsibility without Desert,” in *Free Will and Moral Responsibility*, Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette, eds., Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press 2013, pp. 213–28.

“Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties,” in *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind*, Uriah Kriegel, ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 40–69.

with Gunnar Björnsson, “Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing”, in *Moral Psychology*, v. 4, Walter Sinnott–Armstrong, ed., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014, pp. 27–35.

 “The Dialectic of Selfhood and the Significance of Free Will,” in *Libertarian Free Will: Essays for Robert Kane*, David Palmer, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 161–75.

 “The Material Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness,” in *The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Science and Theory*, Steven Miller, ed., Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2015, pp. 418–32.

“The Phenomenology of Agency and Deterministic Agent Causation,” in *Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology: Essays in Honor of Charles Guignon,* Hans Pedersen and Megan Altman, eds.,New York:Springer, 2015, pp. 277–94.

“A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat from Causal Determination,” *The Nature of Moral Responsibility*, Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna and Angela Smith, eds., Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 281–96.

“Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties,” in *Russellian Monism*, Torin Alter and Yujin Nagawasa, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 300–23.

 “Omissions and the Different Senses of Responsibility,” in *Agency and Moral Responsibility*, Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya, and Sergi Rosell, New York: Palgrave–Macmillan, 2015, pp. 179–91.

 “Libertarianism and Theological Determinism,” in *Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns*, Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe, eds., Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 112–31.

“Anti–Reductionism, Anti–Rationalism, and the Material Constitution of the Mental,” in *Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground*, Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett, eds., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 85–102.

“Illusionism and Anti–Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 23, 2016: 172–85.

“Theological Determinism and the Relationship with God,” in *Free Will and Classical Theism,* Hugh J. McCann, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 201–19.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility* 4, David Shoemaker, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 121–40.

“Responsibility, Agency, and the Disappearing Agent Objection,” *Le Libre–Arbitre, approches contemporaines*, Jean–Baptiste Guillon (ed.), Paris, Collège de France, 2017: 1–18.

with Gregg Caruso, “Hard Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life,” in *Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience*, Gregg D. Caruso and Owen Flanagan, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 193–223.

Reprinted in *Siamo Davvero Liberi?* (*Are We Really Free?*), 2nd edition, Mario De Caro, Andrea Lavazza, and Giuseppe Sartori, eds., translated into Italian by Andrea Lavazza as "Lo Scetticismo sulla Libertà e un Nuovo Esistenzialismo,” Turin: Codice Edizione, 2019.

“Honderich on Freedom, Determinism, and Meaning in Life,” in *Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Freedom, and Humanity*, G. D. Caruso, ed., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 143–58.

 “Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta–Problem of Consciousness,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 26, 2019: 182–93.

“Free Will Skepticism and Prevention of Crime,” in *Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society*, Gregg Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw, and Derk Pereboom, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 99–115.

“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” *Neuroethics* 13, 2020: 87–97.

“Constitution, Nonreductivism, and Emergence,” in *Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes from the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker*, Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin J. Corcoran, eds., London and New York: Routledge, 2020, pp. 95–113.

“Forgiveness as Renunciation of Moral Protest,” in *Forgiveness and its Moral Dimensions*, Michael McKenna, Dana Kay Nelkin, and Brandon Warmke, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 83–100.

“Undivided Forward–Looking Moral Responsibility,” *The Monist* 104, 2021: 484-97.

“A Forward–Looking Account of Self–Blame,” in *Self Blame* *and Moral Responsibility*, Andreas Carlsson, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, pp. 77­–93.

with Torin Alter, “Russellian Monism and Structuralism about Physics,” *Erkenntnis* 88 (4), 2023: 1409-28

with Colin McLear, "Kant on Transcendental Freedom, Priority Monism, and the Structure of Intuition,” in *The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation and Significance of Kant's Theory of Freedom*, Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany, eds.,

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 39-63.

"Retributivism and the Relevance of Metaphysics to Practice," in *Freedom, Responsibility, and Value; Essays in Honor of John Martin Fischer*, Taylor W. Cyr, Andrew Law, and Neal A. Tognazzini, eds., New York and London: Routledge, 2023, pp. 95-113.

**Articles in encyclopedias and handbooks:**

"Early Modern Philosophical Theology," in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion*, second edition, Philip Quinn, and Charles Taliaferro, eds., Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 103–10; second edition revised version (with Paul Draper as additional editor), 2010, pp. 114–23.

"Materialism," in the *Encyclopedia of Empiricism*, Don Garrett, ed., Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1996, pp. 236–43.

"Free Will," in the *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, 2nd edition, Lawrence and Charlotte Becker, eds., Garland Press, 2001, Volume 1, pp. 571–74.

“Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, Robert Kane, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 477–88.

 Reprinted in *Philosophy: The Big Questions*, Ruth J. Sample, Charles W. Mills, and James P. Sterba, eds., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 257–66.

Reprinted in *Critical Concepts in Philosophy: Free Will,* Book IV, John Martin Fischer, ed.; London: Routledge, 2005.

“The Problem of Evil,” *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion,* William E. Mann, ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004, pp. 148–70.

"Nonreductive Physicalism," in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, second edition, Donald M. Borchert, editor–in–chief, New York: Macmillan, 2005.

"The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions," in *A Companion to Kant*, Graham Bird, ed., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2006, pp. 154–68.

“Kant’s Transcendental Arguments,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2009; revised 2013, 2018.

“Philosophical Conceptions of Free Will,” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, Byron Kaldis, ed., SAGE Publications, 2013.

“Free Will,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*, Roger Crisp, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 606–37.

“A Defense without Free Will,” in *The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil*, D. Howard–Snyder and J. McBrayer, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 441–55.

with Andrew Chignell, “Natural Theology and Natural Religion” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2015; revised 2020.

“Transcendental Arguments,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology*, John Hawthorne, Herman Cappelen and Tamar Szabó Gendler, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 444–62.

with Gunnar Björnsson, “Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy*, Wesley Buckwalter and Justin Sytsma, eds., Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2016, pp. 142–57.

“Skeptical Views about Free Will,” in *The Routledge Companion to Free Will and Moral Responsibility*, Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe, and Neil Levy, eds., London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 121–35.

“Love and Freedom,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love*, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

“Criminal Punishment and Free Will,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 63–76.

 with Torin Alter, “Russellian Monism,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2019.

with Gregg Caruso, “A Non–Punitive Alternative to Retributive Punishment,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Science of Punishment*, London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 355–65.

Reprinted in *Diritto Penale e Uomo*, translated into Italian by Susanna Arcieri as “Un'Alternativa Non Punitiva alla Punizione Retributive,” 2020.

“Causation,” in *The Cambridge Kant Lexicon*, Julian Wuerth, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 98–101.

“Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples,” *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility*, Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 157–78.

with Michael McKenna, “Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism,” *The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility*, Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 179–202.

“Hard Determinism and Meaning in Life,” *The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life*, Iddo Landau, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. 173-88.

“Meaning in Life and Free Will Skepticism,” *The Wiley Companion to Free Will*, Joseph Campbell, Kristin Mickelson, and Alan White, eds., John Wiley and Sons, 2023, pp. 464-76.

“Self-Defense Theories,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Punishment*, Jesper Ryberg, ed., Oxford; Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2024.

**Book review essays, book symposium contributions, and commentaries:**

"On Bilgrami's "Belief and Meaning," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998: 621–26.

Comments on Robert J. Anderson, “From Hegel back to Kant: Levinas and the Future of Philosophy,” *Phenomenological Inquiry* 2000, 24: 59-64

"Assessing Kant's Master Argument," a review essay on Robert Howell's *Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Kantian Review* 5, 2001: 90–102.

"On Baker's *Persons and Bodies*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 64, 2002, pp. 616–23.

“Reasons Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism; Reflections on John Martin Fischer’s *My Way*,” *Philosophical Books* 47, 2006: 198–212.

“On Mele’s *Free Will and Luck*,” *Philosophical Explorations* 10, 2007: 163–72.

with Andrew Chignell, “Kant’s Theory of Causation and its Eighteenth Century German Background,” review essay on Eric Watkins, *Kant* *and the Metaphysics of Causality*, and *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background and Source Materials*, *Philosophical Review* 119, 2010: 565–91.

“On John Fischer’s *Our Stories*,” *Philosophical Studies* 158, 2012: 523–28.

 “Précis of *Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism*,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 86, 2013, pp. 715–27, and “Replies to Daniel Stoljar, Robert Adams, and Lynne Baker,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 86, 2013, pp. 753–64.

“The Disappearing Agent Objection to Event–Causal Libertarianism,” a commentary on Mark Balaguer’s *Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem*, *Philosophical Studies* 169.1, 2014: 59–69.

Responses to John Martin Fischer and Dana Nelkin (on my *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life*), *Science, Religion, and Culture* 1, 2014: 218–25.

“A Libertarian Account of Primal Sin,” a commentary on Kevin Timpe, *Free Will in Philosophical Theology,* in *Science, Religion, and Culture* 2, 2016 (online).

“A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life*,” *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 11, 2017: 617–36.

“Response to Daniel Dennett on Free Will Skepticism,” *Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia* 8, 2017: 259–65.

“On Carolina Sartorio’s *Causation and Free Will*,” *Philosophical Studies* 175 (6), 2018: 1535–43.

“Self–Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s *Wrongs and Crimes*,” *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 13, 2019: 439–54.

“What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?” a response to Michael McKenna, “The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert,” *The Journal of Ethics* 23 (3), 2019: 257–64.

“Non-Free General Deterrence,” a comment on Gregg Caruso, *Rejecting Retributivism*, *Journal of Legal Philosophy* 46 (2), 2021, pp. 149-54.

**Book reviews:**

of Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will, Ethics* 111, 2000, p. 426.

of Randolph Clarke, *Libertarian Accounts of Free Will*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74, 2007: 269–72.

 of John Martin Fischer, *My Way*, *Ethics* 117, 2007: 754–57.

 of William Rowe, *Can God Be Free?, Philosophical Review* 118, 2009: 121–27.

of Ishtiyaque Haji, *Reason’s Debt to Freedom*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, March 2013.

of Steven Horst, *Laws, Mind, and Free Will*, *Metascience*, March 2014.

with Leigh Vicens, of Kevin Timpe, *Free Will in Philosophical Theology*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, April 2015.

of Alfred Mele, *Aspects of Agency*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, June 2018.

of Christian List, *Why Free Will is Real*, *Criminal Law and Philosophy* 17: 229-34, 2023.

**Articles in textbooks for undergraduates:**

"Questions of Philosophy," in *A Community of Voices*, W. Biddle and T. Fulwiler, eds., New York: Macmillan, 1991, pp. 210–23.

Introductions to the sections on Locke, Leibniz, and Berkeley, in *Classics of Western Philosophy*, 4th edition. Steve Cahn, ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995; introductions to the sections on Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kierkegaard, in *Classics of Western Philosophy*, 5th edition. Steve Cahn, ed., Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998; and 6th edition, 2002.

“Why We Have No Free Will and Can Live Without It,” in *Reason and Responsibility*, 13th edition, Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer Landau, eds., Belmont, Wadsworth, 2007, pp. 464 77; 14th edition, 2010, pp, 457–70; revised, 15th edition, 2014, pp. 443–56; 16th edition, 2016, pp. 491–503.

Reprinted as “A Defense of Free Will Skepticism,” (a shortened 15th edition version) in *The Truth about the World: Basic Readings in Philosophy*, James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, eds., New York: McGraw–Hill, 2011.

 “No Free Will,” in *Philosophy for Us*, Lenny Clapp, ed., San Diego: Cognella, 2018, pp. 39–49.

**Papers presented, 2016–**

“Information Integration Theory and the Hard Problem of Consciousness,” Moscow State University, Russia, January 2016.

“Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will,” Moscow State University, Russia, January 2016.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” University of California, San Diego, January 2016.

“Information Integration Theory and the Hard Problem of Consciousness,” University of Notre Dame, February 2016.

“Resisting the Practice of Holding Morally Responsible (in the Ultimate, Basic Desert Sense),” Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, March 2016.

“Consciousness, the Conceivability Argument, and Anti–Structuralism about the Physical,” University of Toronto, April 2016.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” Davidson College, April 2016.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” University of Vermont, May 2016.

“Defending the Protection and Reintegration Model,” Cornell University, Justice without Retribution Conference, June 2016.

“The Structure and Force of Manipulation Arguments,” University of Edinburgh, Manipulation Arguments Conference, July 2016.

“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” University of Gothenburg, Sweden, Moral Responsibility Conference, August 2016.

“Event–Causation, Luck, and the Disappearing Agent Objection,” Collège de France, Paris, Free Will and Causation Conference, September 2016.

“Consciousness, the Conceivability Argument, and Anti–Structuralism about the Physical,” University of California, Riverside, October 2016.

“Why We Have No Free Will and Can Live Without It,” West Virginia University, November 2016.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” University of Rochester, December 2016.

“Consciousness, the Conceivability Argument, and Anti–Structuralism about the Physical,” University of Delaware, March 2017.

“Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” Rutgers University, Moral Responsibility Workshop, April 2017.

“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, Seattle, April 2017.

“Responsibility, Agency, and the Disappearing Agent Objection,” Oxford University, May 2017.

“Kant, Transcendental Freedom, and Moral Faith,” Merton College, Oxford University, Kant and Freedom Workshop, May 2017.

“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” University of Ghent, Justice without Retribution Conference, June 2017.

“What is the Free Will Debate About, and What Is its Structure?,” “Can Free Will Be Rescued Given a Naturalistic View of Human Beings?,” and “Can Human Society Function without the Belief in Free Will?” Renmin University, Beijing, July 2017.

“What’s Required for a Physical Account of Consciousness?” University of Miami, January 2018.

“Accountability, Response Dependence, and the Reactive Attitudes,” American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, San Diego, March 2018.

“Spinoza, Free Will, and the Legacy of the Radical Enlightenment,” Free University, Amsterdam, April 2018.

“Nudging and Different Conceptions of Moral Responsibility,” Free University, Amsterdam, April 2018.

“Spinoza, Free Will, and the Legacy of the Radical Enlightenment,” Baruch College, City University of New York, April 2018.

“Blame without Anger, Ethics without Demand,” University of California, Riverside, May 2018.

“Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta–Problem of Consciousness,” City University of New York Graduate Center, October 2018.

“Lynne Baker on Nonreductivism, Constitution, and Causal Exclusion,” American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, New York, January 2019.

“Responsibility, Anger, and Protest,” University of Calgary, May 2019.

“Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism,” and “Responsibility, Regret, and Protest,” Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, July 2019.

“Moral Responsibility, Self–Defense, and Killing Innocent Threats,” Conversations on War Workshop, Montenegro, September 2019.

“A Forward–Looking Account of Self–Blame,” University of Oslo, September 2019.

with Torin Alter, “Russellian Monism and Structuralism about Physics,” American Philosophical Association Central Division Meetings, Chicago, February 2020.

*Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions*; six sessions, University of Arizona; “Challenges to Retribution,” “Blame as Moral Protest,” and “Defensive Harm and Measured Aggression,” “Contending with Criminal Wrongdoing,” “Forgiveness as Renunciation of Moral Protest,” “Love and Free Will,” and “Religion and Hope,” November and December 2020.

with Torin Alter, “Russellian Monism and Structuralism about Physics,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Louisville, December 2020.

“Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions: Crime and Free Will,” University of Warwick, UK, January 2021.

“Undivided Forward–Looking Moral Responsibility,” Moral Psychology Colloquium, Cornell University, May 2021.

“Undivided Forward–Looking Moral Responsibility,” Italian Society for Neuroethics, University of Milan, May 2021.

“Undivided Forward–Looking Moral Responsibility,” Online Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, August 2021

Forward-Looking Responsibility, Moral Anger, and the Backfire Effect,” Agency and Responsibility Research Group, September 2021

“Why We Have No Free Will and Can Live Without It,” Peking University (Beida), October 2021.

“Anti-Physicalist Arguments from the Nature of Consciousness and the Russellian Monist Response,” “Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties,” and “The Prospects of Physicalist Russellian Monism and the Need for Introspective Inaccuracy,” University of Pavia, October and November 2021.

“Blame as Moral Protest,” Keynote Address for the Annual FSU Graduate Student Conference, Florida State University, February 2022.

“Blame as Moral Protest,” Moscow State University, November 2022.

“Retributivism and the Relevance of Metaphysics to Practice,” University of Arizona, December 2022.

“Free Will, Blame, and Anger,” John Dewey Lecture, University of Vermont, January 2023

“Retributivism and the Relevance of Metaphysics to Practice,” University of Vermont, January 2023

“Blame Italian Style and the Ability to Do Otherwise,” Morality and Meaning: A Conference in Honor of Susan Wolf, Rice University, April 2023.

“Styles of Blame and Social Equilibria,” University of Wisconsin, Madison, November 2023.

“Styles of Blame and Cross-Cultural Equilibria,” VinUni, Hanoi, Vietnam, April 2024.

**Comments, Responses, and Discussions, 2016–**

Responses to commentary on my *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life* by Randolph Clarke, Justin Coates, and Laura Ekstrom, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, April 2016.

Comments on Carolina Sartorio’s *Free Will and Causation*, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meetings, January 2017.

“Skepticism about Moral Responsibility,” Conversations on War Workshop, Seville, Spain, September 2018.

Comments on Kristin Mickelson, “The Master Multiple–Case Manipulation Argument,” University of Gothenburg, Sweden, October 2018.

“Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,” Logos Society, Cornell University, December 2019.

“Kant on Things in Themselves and Intrinsic Properties,” Logos Society, Cornell University, October 2020.

“Philosophy and Free Will,” St. Norbert College, November 2020.

“Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism,” University of California, Riverside, February 2021.

“Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence,” Logos Society, Cornell University, October 2021.

Discussion of *Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions*, California Polytechnic Institute, Pomona, October 2022.

“Hard Incompatibilism,” workshop on the 2nd edition of *Four Views on Free Will*, University of California, Riverside, March 2024.

Comments on Torin Alter’s *The Matter of Consciousness*, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings, March 2024.

**Awards:**

“Robust Nonreductive Materialism” selected by *The Philosophers’ Annual* as one of the ten best articles in philosophy published in 2002.

Phi Beta Kappa Membership, 2005

Dean’s Lecture Award for Outstanding Scholar and Teacher, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Vermont, 2006

Merrill Presidential Scholar Outstanding Educator Award, Cornell, 2014

Merrill Presidential Scholar Outstanding Educator Award, Cornell, 2015

Prize for Philosophy, Italian Society for Neuroethics, 2021

**SERVICE**

**SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION**

**Editorial Boards**

*The Philosophical Review*

*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Subject Editor for Philosophy of Action: Free Will

*Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*

**Reviewer: Book manuscripts:**

 Broadview Press

Cambridge University Press

Cornell University Press

MIT Press
Oxford University Press

Princeton University Press
Rowman and Littlefield Press

St. Martin's Press

University of Notre Dame Press

**Reviewer: Articles:**

*American Philosophical Quarterly*

*Analysis*

*Analytic Philosophy*

*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*

*British Journal for the History of Philosophy*

*Canadian Journal of Philosophy*

*Criminal Law and Philosophy*

*Critica*

*Dialectica*

*Dialogue*

*Erkenntnis*

*Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*

*Ethics*

*European Journal of Philosophy*

*Faith and Philosophy*

*History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis*

*Inquiry*

*Irish Theological Quarterly*

*Journal of the American Philosophical Association*

*Journal of Consciousness Studies*

*Journal of Controversial Ideas
Journal of Ethics*

*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*

*Journal of the History of Philosophy*

*Journal of Philosophical Research*

*Journal of Philosophy*

*Journal of Value Inquiry*

*Kantian Review*

*Law and Philosophy*

*Mind*

*Noûs*

*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*

*Philosophia*

*Philosophical Papers*

*Philosophical Psychology*

*Philosophical Quarterly*

*Philosophical Review*
*Philosophical Studies*
*Philosophers’ Imprint*

*Philosophy East and West*

*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

*Ratio*

*Res Philosophica*

*Review of Philosophy and Psychology*

*Science, Religion, and Culture*

*Social Theory and Practice*

*Sophia
Synthèse*

*Theoria*

*Theory and Psychology*

*Thought*

*Topoi*

**UNIVERSITY SERVICE**

**At the University of Vermont,** 1985–2007:

Committee for Review of the Chair of the Department of Philosophy, 1987

University of Vermont/Lane Series Film Program, Faculty Advisor, 1988–91

Academic Standing Committee, College of Arts and Sciences, 1990–94

European Studies Committee, 1991–2007, Interim Director, 1993–94

Search Committee for the Chair of the Department of Classics (Chair), 1992

Committee for the Review of the Buckham Scholarship Program, 1995–96

Search Committee for the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, 1995–96

Committee for Review of the Dean of the College of Agriculture, 1997

Chair of the Department of Philosophy, 1997–2007

Search Committee for the Chair of the Department of English (Chair), 1999

Committee for Review of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, 2002

Search Committee for the Chair of the Department of Sociology, 2003

Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, 2004–05

James Marsh Professors–at–Large Committee, 2005–07

Committee for Review of the Department of Political Science, 2006

**At Cornell University,** 2007–:

**University Service:**

 Organizational Workforce Development Advisory Committee, 2015–22

 Travel Expense Editorial Committee, 2017–19

 Olin/Uris Libraries Planning Study Executive Committee, 2019–20

 Credit Hour Policy Implementation Working Group, 2021–22

**College of Arts and Sciences Service:**

 Advisory Committee to the Dean on the Budget Crisis, 2008–09

Mellon Faculty Seminar, co–leader, 2009–10

Ad hoc tenure committees, 2010 (1), 2011 (1), 2013 (1)

Olin Uris Research Collections Committee, 2010–18; co–chair, 2012–18

College Admissions, Spring 2016; Spring 2017; Spring 2018

Arts and Humanities Taskforce (CIVIC), 2016–18

Curriculum Review Committee, 2017–18

Senior Associate Dean for the Arts and Humanities, 2018–

**Department of Philosophy Service:**

 Standing Committee for Faculty Recruitment, 2007–18

 Faculty Search Committee (co–chair), 2007–08

 Editor, *Philosophical Review*, Spring 2008

 Acting Chair, Sage School of Philosophy, 2008–09

 Graduate Student Admissions Committee, 2008–09, 2009–10, 2010–11

 Editor–in–Chief, *Philosophical Review*, Spring 2010

 Director of Graduate Studies, 2010–11

 Director of Undergraduate Studies, Fall 2011

 Editor, *Philosophical Review*, 2012–13

 Chair, Sage School of Philosophy, 2013–18

 Faculty Search Committee, 2017–18