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KANT ON CONCEPT AND INTUITION

University of California, Los Angeles

PH.D. 1985

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
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
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Works Cited

Abbreviations for Kant's works:

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is cited in the traditional way: 'A' indicates the first edition, 'B' indicates the second edition. The following is a list of abbreviations for texts used in this paper:

- Ak Immanuel Kant, Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Koenigliche Akademie der Wissenschaften and its successors, (Berlin: George Reimer (subsequently W. de Gruyter), 1902-). All references to Ak VIII are quotations from Henry Allison's translation of On a Discovery in The Kant Eberhard Controversy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973). References to Ak II are from the translation of the Inaugural Dissertation in Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, translated by G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1968).
- GH Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated with an introduction and notes by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).
- Logic Immanuel Kant, Kant's Logic, translated by R. S. Hartman and W. Schwartz, (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts, 1974).
- JZ Immanuel Kant, Briefe, edited and introduced by Juergen Zehbe (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970).
- Proleg. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, the Paul Carus translation extensively revised by James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977).
- Z Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, Arnulf Zweig, editor, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).

Abbreviations for other works cited:

- Ad George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, edited, with an introduction by Robert M. Adams, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979).
- AG Rene Descartes, Descartes Philosophical Writings,

translated and edited by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach, (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971).

- DM Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics in L and W below.
- Essay John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by P. H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
- G Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, edited by C. J. Gerhard, 7 vols., (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90).
- Gr Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Textes Inedits, edited by Gaston Grua, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948).
- HR Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
- K Rene Descartes, Descartes, Philosophical Letters, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). Reprinted: (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
- L Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated and edited, with an introduction, by Leroy E. Loemker, second edition, (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969).
- New Essays Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
- Principles George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982)..
- QQ John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, translated by Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
- S David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Eric Steinberg, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1977).

- ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1964).
- Treatise David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1978).
- W Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz Selections, edited by Philip P. Wiener, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951).

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Kant on Concept and Intuition

by

Derk Pereboom

Doctor of Philosophy

University of California, Los Angeles, 1985

Professor Robert M. Adams, Chair

This dissertation is an interpretation of Kant's theory of mental representation, and an attempt to elucidate this theory by viewing it from both historical and contemporary perspectives. After an exposition of Kant's notions of intuition, sensation, and concept, I argue that the theory as a whole can be seen as an Aristotelian reaction against Leibnizian rationalism and Humean empiricism and naturalism. As in Aristotelian theories, Kant argues that there are two distinct types of mental representation, and two distinct types of processes involved in cognition.

I construe the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy as a series of arguments against Hume for the thesis that our mental repertoire contains conceptual as well as passively received representations. The division of the anti-Humean arguments I find to be most fruitful is the division into arguments from above and

arguments from below. I find it illuminating to view several aspects of Kant's anti-Humean arguments from the perspective of contemporary concerns in the theory of intentionality. Some of Kant's contentions against Hume can be seen as an attempt to resist a tendency to redescribe intentional relations so that the resulting description is extensional. Kant can be viewed as trying to preserve the idea that sentences describing intentional relations from the perspective of the subject are irreducibly intensional.

I argue that the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled 'The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection' together with portions of a later work, On a Discovery, contain an argument against Leibniz or the Leibnizians of Kant's day for the thesis that nonconceptual elements, as well as concepts, are required for the cognition of physical objects. Questions arise here about the relation between Kant's views on this issue and modern studies of indexicality. My view is that Kant can be construed as providing a theory about what underlies the irreducibly indexical element in our cognitions of physical objects. Kant's idea of passive receptivity, closely tied to the notion of what the experience of a quality is like, is relevant to this, as is the notion of an external or relational quality developed in the Amphiboly.

Introduction

Kant's theory of mental representation is distinctive in the modern period in that it appeals to two fundamental sorts of mental representations, those which are passively received and those associated with the activity of the understanding. Those representations associated with activity Kant calls concepts (Begriffe). Sensations (Empfindungen) are passively received; sometimes Kant calls the passively received matter of experience intuition (Anschauung). More typically, as I will argue, 'intuition' refers to ordinary representations of particular objects, which are constructed by means of concepts out of representations that are ultimately passively received. Chapter 1 is a discussion of these various types of Kantian mental representations.

Kant's theory of mental representation was developed against a historical background. Of the prominent philosophers, the most significant ones in this background are Hume and Leibniz. In the second and third chapters I focus on Kant's relationship to these two philosophers, focussing on two issues for comparison and contrast in either case. In Chapter 2, I focus on the issues dividing Kant and Hume concerning the activity and passivity of mind and the intentionality of sense perception. Kant's view that besides passively received matter there must be actively contributed content in our experience is an Aristotelian reaction against Humean naturalism and empiricism. Kant is also anti-Humean in his view on the intentionality of sense perception; whereas on Hume's position

(and on the position of most of the modern philosophers) we do not immediately perceive objects that are external to us in that they are in space, on Kant's view we do. The intuition that we have immediate perceptions of external objects is highly significant for Kant, and it, too, is arguably an Aristotelian intuition. It should be mentioned that Kant is also indebted to Hume in various respects; one of these is his atomism about the manifold of intuition, which is, as it is in Hume, the explanatory starting point for the theory of mental representation.

In Chapter 3 I examine two central issues in the philosophical relationship between Kant and Leibniz, the issue of a priori concepts and that of phenomenalism. Kant is both indebted to and reacting against Leibniz as well. Kant's theory of a priori concepts is clearly influenced by the rationalist tradition in general and by Leibniz's views in particular, although Kant's theory differs from Leibniz's in several important ways. On Kant's view, the most significant of these is that besides a priori concepts, intellectual representations, passively received matter is required in order for the sort of experience we have to be possible. Kant's phenomenalism is also in the Leibnizian tradition; it differs from British phenomenisms in significant respects, one of them being that on Kant's position external objects, even though they are appearances, are not just collections of sensations or perceptions, nor are sentences about them analyzable into sentences about sensations or perceptions. But although Kant's phenomenalism is broadly speaking Leibnizian, it differs in that for Kant there is a kind of ultimacy

that phenomenal objects in space and time have that they don't have on Leibniz's view.

At this point I proceed to Kant's arguments, in Chapter 4-7, for the fact that concepts are required for the kind of experience we have, and in Chapter 8 for the thesis that passively received matter is necessary for us to have an experience which includes cognitions of objects. Chapter 4 is an analysis of two of the notions which are pivotal for Kant's anti-Humean arguments, the notions of the a priori and that of the transcendental. I argue that the notion of the a priori is primarily genetic and not justificatory for Kant, although interesting justificatory concepts may be linked to the genetic notion of a priori knowledge. The notion of the transcendental, I suspect, designates the idea of a point of view, a point of view from which we can see or acquire knowledge of the mode and extent to which the self contributes to experience. The transcendental point of view is contrasted with the empirical, which is the ordinary, and also the scientific point of view.

In Chapter 4 I also argue that transcendental philosophy is not a priori in the strict justificatory sense. If it were such then Kant would not differ very deeply from Leibniz on the possibility of a priori metaphysics, while it is clear that Kant sees himself to be opposed to Leibniz on this issue. Transcendental philosophy, on my interpretation, appeals to general facts about experience like intentionality, certain types of regularity, and self-consciousness. It is not empirical in that it appeals to particular observations or

particular experimental data, but the relevant general facts about experience are derived from experience nonetheless.

In Chapters 5 through 7, I exposit and critically discuss the anti-Humean arguments for the applicability of concepts which have their source in the self. These arguments are to be found mainly in the Transcendental Deduction and in the Second Analogy, in the Critique of Pure Reason. The most fruitful division of these arguments is into arguments from above and arguments from below. The arguments from above, which I consider in Chapter 7, proceed from a premise about self-consciousness, whereas the arguments from below, which occupy Chapter 5 and 6, proceed from premises about the general nature of our experience of objects.

Although Chapter 6 deals with certain arguments from below, its main topic is Kant's theory of intentionality. Here I argue that there is an interesting sense in which Kant's theory of intentionality, as opposed to others of the modern period, is in a significant sense not extensionalist. I argue that this is motivated partly by Kant's idea that perception of external objects is immediate, and also that his resistance to extensionalist theory can be explained in part by his resistance to naturalism.

Chapter 8 deals with Kant's arguments against Leibniz that intellectual representations alone will not yield the kinds of cognitions of objects which our experience contains. In the Critique of Pure Reason these arguments are to be found primarily in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection. The arguments in the Amphiboly are embellished to a limited extent in the Prolegomena, and

significantly in Kant's essay directed against Eberhard, published in 1790, entitled On a Discovery According to Which Any New Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One. These arguments are interesting, at least from a historical point of view, although they haven't received much attention. Kant's view is of contemporary interest in that his anti-Leibnizian position reveals significant insights as to what might explain irreducible indexicality in experience.

Chapter 1: The System of Mental Representations.

'Vorstellung' is the German word in Kant's writings which Kemp-Smith translates as 'representation'. There is a good reason for translating it in this way; in A320=B376, in the Stufenleiter passage, Kant gives the Latin 'repraesentatio' as an equivalent to 'Vorstellung'. One should not be misled by this terminology into thinking that all Vorstellungen represent in the sense of representing something beyond themselves; Kant thinks of sensations as Vorstellungen even though he believes that they don't represent anything beyond themselves (A320=B376). I suspect that Kant thinks of all mental states as Vorstellungen, as representations in his sense.

What follows is a characterization of the three main sorts of mental representations, intuitions, sensations, and concepts. Of these three, intuitions and concepts are most prominent in Kant's writings, but in order to grasp Kant's system it is also important to understand his notion of sensation.

I. Intuition

Kant usually characterizes intuitions by contrasting them with concepts; while intuitions are representations that are immediate, singular, and passively received, concepts are mediate, general, and associated with mental activity (A19=B33, A50=B74, A68=B93, A320=B377). Whereas these contrasts do indicate that intuitions are of particulars and that at least no conscious mental activity is required to produce them, the characterization yet remains quite

vague. This has resulted in disagreements among commentators on the precise nature of Kantian intuitions. In particular, some have held that intuitions are ordinary, conscious representations of particulars, others have held that they are theoretically posited representations that logically precede synthesis, while yet others have held that the term 'intuition' has both of these uses in Kant's writings.¹ I would like to argue for the latter view, which is also Sellars's position on the issue. He presents this interpretation in chapter 1 of his Science and Metaphysics, where he says that according to Kant there is

...Kant applies the term 'intuition to both the representations which are formed by the synthesizing activity of the productive imagination and the purely passive representations of receptivity which are the 'matter' (A86; B108) which the productive imagination takes into account. 2

All three characterizations of intuition, immediacy, singularity, and passive reception, can be interpreted to fit both ordinary representations of particulars and theoretical pre-synthetic representations. First, Kant presents intuitions as immediate:

Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to the object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of the representation of it. (A68=B93)

For Kant representation is mediate if it is or includes judgment or thought, which are acts of applying concepts (A68=B93). Roughly, the concepts represent mediately in that all by themselves they could not count as cognitions of objects but require some other cognition to

complete the cognition. The picture becomes complex when one discovers that the terms 'judgment' and 'thought' can have different meanings or Kant. On the one hand, he uses these terms to denote ordinary conscious thought and judgment. Relative to this notion of judgment, intuitions as immediate representations turn out to be conscious representations of present particulars. From the ordinary point of view, it seems plausible to think of our representations of particular objects, processes, and events which are present, that is, with which one is in some kind of causal contact, as somehow preceding and being material for our conscious thought about them, although this needs some discussion.

On the other hand, Kant often calls both the process of synthesis as well as ordinary conscious thought, judgment or thought. Relative to this notion of judgment, intuitions, if they are to be genuinely immediate, can no longer be ordinary representations of particulars, since according to Kant ordinary representations of particulars are a product of the understanding's synthesizing activity. The only kinds of representations that in any sense precede synthesis are a theoretical posit, namely the chaotic data that somehow originate in the things-in-themselves, and possibly pure intuitions. On this interpretation it is not completely clear how an intuition can be a representation which is in immediate relation to an object; there is certainly no full-fledged object to which intuition in this sense can be related. But one might say that the objects to which intuitions are immediately related are the atomistic data themselves, the content of intuitions on this interpretation of

'intuition'. There may be room in Kant for using the term 'object' in this way. In the Second Analogy he says:

Everything, every representation even, in so far as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word 'object' ought to signify in respect of appearances when these are viewed not in so far as they are (as representations) objects, but only in so far as they stand for an object. (A189-90=B234-5)

The very notion of such a representation has sometimes been called into question, so one has to be careful here. What I want to stress is that Kant is committed to thinking of these representations as theoretically postulated entities which are used to explain ordinary conscious experience, not as mental contents introspectible all by themselves. For Kant all organization must be due to some kind of activity; organization in our experience is due to synthetic activity (e.g. B129-30). Since synthesis is a kind of organization or formation, there has to be something which is formed or organized. Consequently it follows that Kant must posit a "manifold" disorganized, chaotic, representations which somehow precede synthesis. What would such representations be like? Kant in fact has to say that such representations cannot be introspected or even imagined in isolation from concepts, for he thinks, on the one hand, that all conscious experience is already synthesized by means of concepts, and also that concepts are means by which representations are brought to a unitary consciousness (e.g. B141). Of course Kant would want to say that we can introspect these pre-synthetic representation in the sense that we can introspect the result after they are synthesized. But furthermore, we might get an idea of what

an "experience" consisting solely of theoretical, pre-synthetic representations is like from the confused visual experience one sometimes has when one first opens one's eyes after being asleep. But such experience is at least partially conceptualized; Kant's completely unstructured manifold is the limiting case.

The second characterization of Kantian intuitions is that they are singular as opposed to general:

...an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. (A320=B376-7)

This characterization fits both of the above interpretations of the notion of intuition. According to neither of these interpretations is an intuition a general representation or a universal in any sense. Ordinary representations of particulars are of ordinary objects, processes, and events and one might think of the theoretical, pre-synthetic representations as particular atoms of colour, sound, taste etc. in consciousness. It is important to note here that the term 'single' may be ambiguous. In the above passage 'singular' and 'particular' would seem to be interchangeable. But by saying that intuitions are singular Kant might also be saying that intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars must be of only one object, process or event, and/or that intuitions as theoretical, pre-synthetic representations are single as opposed to collections of atoms of colour, taste, sound, smell, or feeling. Kant may also have a temporal thesis in mind, at least with respect to the pre-synthetic

representations. In the Second Analogy Kant seems to suggest that the representations to be synthesized are momentary, and that any connection of representations over time require the activity of mind (e.g. B233; see also A99).

The third distinction between concepts and intuitions is that intuitions are associated with receptivity or with what is passively received, while concepts are associated with activity. Whereas the first two characterizations of intuition are supposed to be essential to the notion, this one isn't, as Hintikka points out.³ God has intuitions that are actively produced (see e.g. B145); possibly Kant intends this third characterization to be limited to our intuitions or to our intuitions and to intuitions of creatures like us. But it's not clear that it makes sense to say that our pure intuitions have a passively received element, although Kant says that they are sensible and links the sensible with what is passively received (B147, see A68=B93 quote below). Moreover, he apparently believes that the mind is also responsible for the organization in the pure representations of space and time:

But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold [of their own], and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold...This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories (B160-1; cf. A99)

This would seem to indicate that also with respect to these representations, something organizable had to precede the organization, although it's hard to imagine what it would be like, let

alone whether it is passively received. Possibly only our empirical intuitions are associated with what is passively received. The following are two quotes which present this third characterization:

Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. (A68=B93)

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. (A50=B74; see also A19-B33, and A68=B93).

Even in this case the characterization can somewhat plausibly be thought to be consistent with both notions of intuition. It seems to me that the natural interpretation from the point of view of Kant's entire theory is that only theoretical, pre-synthetic representations fit this characterization, that is, only these representations are genuinely passively received. It takes synthetic activity to produce our ordinary representations of present particulars, so strictly speaking it isn't possible to make this notion of intuition comport with the characterization of intuitions as passively received. But there might be a sense in which this third characterization applies to our representations of particular objects, processes, and events. Even though Kant theoretically posits a synthesizing activity to explain the organization in experience, he would acknowledge that from

the naive, ordinary point of view it typically seems to us that we passively take in our ordinary representations of particulars. Kant says that we are scarcely ever conscious of synthesizing activity (A78=B103), therefore he must have held that for the most part, consciousness of mental activity begins when we think about ordinary representations of particulars. Thus, although from the point of view of Kant's entire theory one would think that only theoretically posited, pre-synthetic intuitions could be genuinely passively received, from the naive, ordinary point of view one might think that ordinary representations of particulars are passively received.

Thus it seems that all three central characterizations of the notion of intuition are compatible both with intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars and with intuitions as theoretically posited, pre-synthetic representations. I would now like to argue that the term 'intuition' is used both ways in the Critique. First of all, in the Stufenleiter passage (A319-20=B376-7), in which Kant presents a series of terms for representations along with definitions in order to remedy what he considers to be the misuse of the term 'idea', Kant classes intuition as a species of Erkenntnis, to which he appends what he considers to be its Latin equivalent, cognitio. Rolf George disputes Kemp-Smith's translation of this term as 'knowledge', citing the fact that at Kant's time the term 'Erkenntnis' didn't have quite so strong an epistemological connotation, but rather was used to denote a representation of an object.⁴ I think that it would sometimes be better to translate it as 'cognition', which captures this idea that the term as used by Kant often has psychological rather

than epistemological force. The following is a case in which something like this alternative translation appears to be demanded:

If truth consists in agreement of Erkenntnis with its object, that object must thereby be distinguished from other objects; for Erkenntnis is false, if it does not agree with the object to which it is related...(A58=B83)

But even with this qualification, it is doubtful that Kant would think of theoretically posited, pre-synthetic representations as instances of Erkenntnis. Yet it must be noted that there is a significant problem with using the Stufenleiter passage as an indication of what Kant himself thought about intuitions. The stated purpose of the passage is to provide a list of terms for mental representations so that the term 'idea' won't be used to indicate "any and every species of representation". It is not therefore guaranteed that Kant would define each term in the way he himself would most like to see it used. There is evidence that the definitions don't correspond to his own preferences; he here also characterizes a concept as a species of Erkenntnis whereas it is consistently his own view that a concept could never amount to an Erkenntnis all by itself.

Nevertheless, in the following four passages it is indisputable that Kant is thinking of intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars, rather than as theoretically posited, pre-synthetic representations, elements of the manifold to be unified:

The manifold in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible. (B143, first emphasis mine)

A manifold, contained in an intuition which I call mine, is represented, by means of the synthesis of the

understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self consciousness. (B144, emphasis mine).

I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. (B135)

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. (A79=B104/5)

These passages indicate that intuitions are made up of synthesized representations; and it seems correct to assume that the idea underlying them is that pre-synthetic representations, those contained in the manifold, are combined by the mind to produce representations of particulars--intuitions. But there are also instances in which Kant seems to use the term 'intuition' in the other way. First, although it is not entirely clear that the following two quotations from the second edition present such instances, I strongly suspect that they do:

...that which, as representation, can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, is intuition...(B67)

That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled to intuition. (B132)

Kant could be using the term 'thought' to indicate ordinary conscious thought here, but one should wonder whether this is so. Both passages occur in contexts in which Kant is discussing highly theoretical notions; the doctrine of synthesis is being discussed in the context of the latter passage. But again, I don't think that one could rest a

case on these passages. There are, however, places where things are not quite so ambiguous. Consider the following excerpts:

(A) Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. (A51=B75)

(B) Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only when they are employed in conjunction. When we separate them, we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions--in both cases, representations which we are not in a position to apply to any determinate object. (A258=B314)

One might try to interpret passage (A) to be about intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars. Maybe what Kant means is that to have genuine knowledge of particulars, you have to have consciously thought about them to a certain extent. Possibly the first few sentences of the section in which (A) is found suggest this interpretation as well:

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity for receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. (A50=B74)

Kant implies here that through intuition an object is given to us.

But the sense in which an object is given to us through intuition must

also be consistent with the fact that Kant here also links intuition with receptivity for impressions. I think that this indicates that what Kant is saying in passage (A) is that representations that are purely passively received, that have not been formed by mental activity at all, are blind, that is, cannot yield knowledge, let alone constitute ordinary representations of particulars. Synthesis by means of concepts is first required. Passage (B) must be interpreted along these lines. Here Kant says that apart from concepts, intuitions can't even determine objects, so Kant could not be using the term 'intuition' here to signify an ordinary representation of a particular. Thus in this instance, by 'intuitions' I think he must mean ultimately passively received, pre-synthetic, chaotic representations.

It seems, therefore, that there is indeed an ambiguity in the use of the term 'intuition' in the Critique. It might be suggested that one of the uses is preferred, and that Kant merely slips into the other, but there is evidence from Kant's correspondence with his trusted correspondent, J.S. Beck, that this is not so. Having noticed this same ambiguity in the use of the term 'intuition' in the Critique, he asks Kant to make a choice between the two interpretations in two letters, one written on November 11, 1791, and the other on May 31, 1792. He doesn't get an informative reply to the first, but to the second he receives a more illuminating answer. The relevant passage in Beck's first letter is the following:

The Critique calls "intuition" a representation that relates immediately to the object. But in fact, a representation does not become objective until it is

subsumed under the categories. Since intuition similarly acquires its objective character only by means of the application of the categories to it, I am in favour of leaving out that definition of "intuition" that refers to it as a representation relating to objects. I find in intuition nothing more than a manifold accompanied by consciousness (or by the unique "I think"), a manifold determined by the latter, in which there is as such no relation to an object...I distinguish concepts from intuitions by the fact that they are thoroughly determinate. For both intuitions and concepts acquire objectivity only after the activity of judgment subsumes them under pure concepts of the understanding. (Z 180-81).

Here Beck suggests that Kant adopt the position that the term 'intuition' not be used to denote an objective representation, which I take to be the same as an ordinary representation of a particular, since he thinks that it would be better to think of intuitions as not yet synthesized through the categories. I suspect that Beck has the idea that from the point of view of Kant's whole theory, ordinary representations of particulars are not genuinely immediate because mediating representations, namely concepts, are contained in them. One strange thing about his proposal is that he also holds that one should think of intuition as being accompanied by the unique "I think," which according to Kant is only possible if the categories have been applied, since categories are modes in which representations are thought by the transcendental self, the I of 'I think' (B143). In Kant's reply there doesn't seem to be any explicit consideration of Beck's suggestion, but he does write about the concept/intuition distinction, echoing the "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" theme (Z 184). The relevant passage in Beck's second letter is the following:

It seems to me that one ought not to define "intuition", in the Transcendental Aesthetic, as "a representation immediately related to an object" or as a representation that arises when the mind is affected by the object. For not until the Transcendental Logic can it be shown how we arrive at objective representations. The fact that there are pure intuitions also rules out such a definition. I really do not err when I say: intuition is a thoroughly determinate representation in relation to a given manifold. (Z 190-91)

This objection is basically the same one as in the former letter, except for the fact that Beck seems to change his mind about the determinacy of intuitions. This is somewhat puzzling, since Beck does not indicate that he thinks he has changed his mind about anything. I would say that it is only an apparent change of mind; in the first letter he wants to suggest that intuition is not determinate with respect to an object whereas in the second he suggests that intuition is determinate with respect to a manifold. By this I suspect he means that all that is apprehended in the intuition is determinate, as opposed to say, a conceptual representation of a horse, in which all of the characteristics of what is apprehended, like the horse's genetic structure or its location, may not be determinate in the representation. This is Kant's reply:

As for your definition of intuition as a thoroughly determinate representation in respect to a given manifold, I would have nothing further to add except this: the thorough determination here must be understood as objective, not merely as existing in the subject (since it is impossible for us to know all determinations of the object of an empirical intuition). For then the definition would only say that an intuition is the representation of a given unit. (Z 193)

Although Kant professes to agree with Beck's suggestion, he is nevertheless maintains that intuitions are objective representations in some sense, although from the above passage it is difficult to tell what this sense is. One gets the feeling that he doesn't really care to decide the issue that Beck raises, a feeling which becomes stronger when one reads on in the paragraph, where one finds the following:

It seems to me sound not to spend too much time on the most subtle dissecting of elementary representations, for they become sufficiently clear in the following discussion. (Z 194)

The sense one gets from this remark is that Kant is admitting a deficiency in his classification of representations, a deficiency which doesn't concern him all that much. He proposes that Beck discover what types of representations his theory contains from the discussion that concerns these representations. In the discussion of the Critique it seems that both kinds of representation are employed, so possibly we should conclude nothing more than that it is unfortunate that Kant at least from time to time uses the term 'intuition' to apply to the theoretical, pre-synthetic representations alongside the more frequent application of the term to ordinary representations of particulars.

The latter use of this term is the one which has the deeper historical roots. The earliest ancestor of this use of 'intuition' that I could find is John Duns Scotus's notion of intuitive cognition. In contradistinction to his abstractive cognitions, to which the existence of any one particular is irrelevant, Scotus's intuitive cognitions are cognitions "of a present object as present and of an

existing object as existing" (QQ 6.19). Scotus also clearly means to say that an intuitive cognition must be caused by something existent and present (QQ 6.20). Abstractive cognitions are presumably cognitions of propositions like '1+1=2' or 'A whale is a mammal.' In the latter case it may be that some relevant object is existent and present, but it need not be. Intuitive cognitions are such that it must be the case that the cognized object is existent and present when the cognition is occurring. From this characterization it is clear that Scotus's notion of intuitive cognition has an epistemological aspect and that it is not purely psychological; the epistemological notions of knowledge and truth are central to it and moreover it would seem that two people could be in the same psychological state while one was having an intuitive cognition and the other not. Kant's notion of intuition, I think, differs from Scotus's in this respect. Kantian intuitions aren't necessarily of objects that are existent and present.

William of Ockham adopted Scotus's idea of intuitive cognition and amended and developed it in several respects, but under his auspices it didn't undergo a revolutionary revision.⁵ One might wonder why such a notion appealed to Scotus and Ockham and not to their predecessors; the answer might lie partly in the fact that Scotus and Ockham, like other Franciscans of that time, were interested in making psychology more empirically plausible than it had been. According to the Platonic and Aristotelian psychologies which preceded Scotus's, all knowledge is of or by means of forms and forms are universals. How we know particulars consequently becomes a

difficult philosophical problem; one only needs to see how Aquinas tried to deal with it.⁶ Yet from the point of view of common sense and experience, it doesn't seem that it should be a problem; that we apprehend and have knowledge of particulars shouldn't cause deep difficulties. Thus someone who is interested in making psychology empirically plausible might feel justified in positing cognitions of particulars as basic, while rejecting a metaphysics according to which such representations are philosophically problematic.

In Rule III of his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes introduces the term intuition, and self-consciously disregarding earlier definitions, gives the term a meaning which is decidedly epistemological and divorced from the notion of cognition of particulars:

By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand. Or, what comes to the same thing, intuition is the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, and springs from the light of reason alone; it is more certain than deduction itself, in that it is simpler, though deduction, as we have noted above, cannot by us be erroneously conducted. Thus each individual can mentally have intuition of the fact that he exists, and that he thinks; that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single superficies, and so on. Facts of such a kind are far more numerous than many people think, disdaining as they do to direct their attention upon such simple matters.

But in case anyone may be put out by this new use of the term intuition and of other terms which in the following pages I am similarly compelled to dis sever from their current meaning, I here make the general announcement that I pay no attention to the way in which particular terms have of late been employed in

the schools, because it would have been difficult to employ the same terminology while my theory was wholly different. All that I take note of is the meaning of the Latin of each word, when, in cases where an appropriate term is lacking, I wish to transfer to the vocabulary that expresses my own meaning those that I deem most suitable. (HR I 7)

The main similarity between a Cartesian intuition and a Scotist intuitive cognition is that when one has either, the truth of what is cognized is guaranteed. But in the case of the Cartesian intuition what is supposed, at least typically, to be guaranteed is the truth not necessarily of a cognition of a particular, but of what we would think to be propositions, and not always of the "this object exists here" type. Among the examples in the above passage only the cognition 'that I exist' might count as a Scotist intuitive cognition; the cognition of geometrical truths would not. An interesting fact about Cartesian intuition is that it is an epistemological notion while in a sense also being a notion which is fully psychological. In contradistinction to Scotus's notion, it's not possible that two people be in the same psychological state while one is having a Cartesian intuition and the other is not. Descartes's notion of intuition is designed for a foundationalist project; from nothing but introspectible features of a Cartesian intuition one can tell that the proposition represented is true. The foundationalist needs to bridge the gap between the psychological and the epistemological; for Descartes, this is the role intuition plays, at least in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.

Locke has a notion of intuition or intuitive knowledge which, as far as I can see, is much like Descartes's:

For if we will reflect on our own ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Two. Such kind of Truths, the Mind perceives at the first sight of the Ideas together by bare Intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea; and this kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this Intuition, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge, which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater Certainty, than to know that any Idea in his Mind is such, as he perceives it to be; and that two Ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shews only that he has a Mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this Intuition, that in the next degree of Knowledge, which I call Demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the Connexions of the intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty. (Essay IV, ii, 1)

Like Descartes's, Locke's notion of intuition is not all that closely tied to the notion of a cognition of a particular (which is not to say, of course, that there are not other Cartesian and Lockean notions which more closely resemble Scotus's intuitive cognitions), and it too has an essential role in the foundationalist project. The phenomenological feel which is intrinsic to intuition is a guarantee

of the truth of what is apprehended; Locke picturesquely likens this phenomenological feel to bright sunshine.

Descartes's notion of intuition is closely related to that of a clear and distinct idea (to me they seem to amount to the same thing). This is also true of Leibniz's notion of intuitive knowledge, but for him the focus shifts from clear and distinct perception of truths to clarity and distinctness of concepts:

When a concept is very complex, we certainly cannot think simultaneously of all the concepts which compose it. But when this is possible, or at least insofar as it is possible, I call the knowledge intuitive. There is no other knowledge than intuitive of a distinct primitive concept..." (Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, L292)

"And when my mind grasps all the primitive ingredients of a concept at once and distinctly, it possesses an intuitive knowledge. This is very rare, since for the most part human knowledge is merely either confused or suppositive. (DM 23, L319)

Leibniz's notion of the intuitive seems even further removed from the Scotist notion than Descartes's is. A guarantee that what is intuited is true is no longer central to the notion as Leibniz defines it, although he doubtlessly did think that intuitive knowledge is in fact true. Rather, what marks intuitive knowledge is the possession of a complete and distinct analysis of a concept. The concept may of course be of an object, but having intuitive knowledge of a concept of an object wouldn't seem to guarantee that the object is existent and present.

The German Leibnizian metaphysicians also employed the notion of intuitive cognition or knowledge. In Baumgarten's Metaphysica, from which Kant taught even after he published The Critique of Pure Reason,

there is a notion of intuitive cognition which seems to be like Leibniz's, but which is quite difficult to decipher (Metaphysica §620). Christian Wolff, on the other hand, has a Leibnizian element in his definition of intuitive cognition, but it is accompanied by a clear indication of Scotism. In his Psychologia Empirica he gives the following definition of intuitive cognition:

A cognition which ends in the very intuition of ideas is called intuitive (intuitiva), or we are said to know a thing (rem) intuitively in so far as we are conscious of the idea we have of it. (Psychologia Empirica §286)

This definition is quite vague, but we can say that it is Leibnizian insofar as it defines an intuition as the apprehension of (possibly primitive) ideas. But on the other hand there is no mention of the apprehension of all the primitive ingredients of a concept or an idea. Significantly, Wolff also states that we can know things intuitively; after giving the above definition he proceeds by adducing two examples of things of which we can have intuitive cognitions. One is a Cartesian example, a triangle, while the other is, somewhat surprisingly, a tree. And the only conditions he appears to place on my having an intuitive cognition of a tree is that the tree be present and that I see it:

e.g. While I am intuiting (looking at) a tree that is present and am conscious of the things that I comprehend in that view (obtusus), I have an intuitive cognition of the tree. If I represent to myself a triangle by the power of imagination as if it were traced on a tablet or a triangular stick [construction], and if I am conscious of this figure, I cognize the triangle intuitively. (Psychologia Empirica §286)

This doesn't seem to be the Cartesian-Lockean or the Leibnizian notion of intuitive cognition; rather, it looks a lot like the notion of Scotus and Ockham. Descartes and Locke probably wouldn't have adduced such an example, and again there appears to be no Leibnizian requirement of maximal conceptual clarity. Wolff's apparent reversion to a medieval tradition here is partly explained by the fact that this medieval tradition was preserved in the German universities, while at the same time the great modern German philosophers were not adverse to scholastic ideas in the way that the British and French moderns were. Leibniz wrote works like the New System, in which his attitude towards scholasticism was very conciliatory, and Wolff and Kant were university academics.

Thus Kant's use of 'intuition' to denote an ordinary representation of a particular is the one which fits in best with some historical use of this and related terms. It is like the Scotist notion in that such Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and possibly in that they are (relatively) immediate and passively received, conditions which are related to the Scotist requirement that intuitive cognitions be caused by something existent and present. For cognitions of particulars are typically immediate and passively received just because they are caused by the existent, present particulars of which they are cognitions. I don't think, however, that this Kantian notion of intuition is even as epistemological as Scotus's in that the existence and presence of the object of the intuition aren't necessary to it, and it is surely not as epistemological as Descartes's, Locke's, or Leibniz's. For Kant says

that we can have intuitive representations which do not involve the real existence of the things of which they are representations, for instance in "dreams and delusions". (B278) In his classification of mental representations it appears to be cognitive psychology, rather than epistemology, which interests him.

Although Kant's use of the term 'intuition' to denote theoretically posited, pre-synthetic representations doesn't conform to some historical precedent as well as the other use does, it is not completely alien to precedent either. We have seen how Kant's characterization of intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars is not very different from the medieval notion of intuition. Yet whereas intuition as an ordinary representation of a particular is immediate, singular, and passively received in us from the naive, ordinary, point of view, the other type of intuition is immediate, singular, and passively received in us from the point of view of Kant's theory of synthesis. The former type of intuition meets the criteria from the point of view of everyday experience, the latter type meets the criteria from the standpoint of an explanatory account of that experience. Consequently this latter notion of intuition conforms to historical precedent, but the criteria are "re-applied" from a particular theoretical standpoint. In addition, abstracting from the term 'intuition' itself, Kant's theoretical notion of intuition also has some precedents in the theories of his predecessors. Leon Barnhart and Margaret Wilson suggest that Leibniz's notion of petites perceptions, the elements which constitute the infinite complexity in any conscious perception of ours, is such a

precedent.⁷ There may be a historical link between Kant and Leibniz here, but Kant's motivation for positing pre-synthetic representations isn't the same as Leibniz's motivation for positing petites perceptions. Leibniz had metaphysical reasons for believing that all substances are infinitely complex, and that perceptions of substances express those substances. Since for one thing to express another means that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of the one thing and the elements of the other, it follows that perceptions are infinitely complex (see Ch. 3). Petites perceptions are the elements of this infinite complexity. Kant, by contrast, never suggests that substances are infinitely complex, nor does he ever endorse Leibniz's theory of expression.

But there is another motive, which may have had influence on Leibniz as well, which I think better explains Kant's postulation of pre-synthetic representations. A long tradition of atomism, which is historically linked to empiricism, sought to explain complex things in terms of smaller parts and particles and relationships between them. One central atomist idea is that the structure of any complex thing consists of and is explained by organization of parts that are continuously less complex as they become smaller and smaller. This is undoubtedly an extremely attractive model for explanation; much of modern science adheres to it. Although such a model had influence in psychology for centuries, Hume was the first philosopher who fairly self-consciously developed a psychological theory along these lines (Treatise pp. 12-13, cf. Enquiry S8). Our naive, ordinary, experience is supposed to be explained in terms of atomistic, relatively

disorganized impressions and ideas and relations of association among them. Kant, I want to suggest, had the same model in mind. To be sure, he attempts to refute Hume's notion that the principles of association suffice to explain the organization of our mental representations--this is a major part of the project at the transcendental deduction--but he nevertheless adopts Hume's starting point for explanation. Kant also begins his explanatory account of our conscious experience by positing a mental world of atomistic, discrete, momentary, disorganized representations.

I have already alluded to the fact that Kant thinks that we have pure as well as empirical intuitions. It seems clear that an empirical intuition functions as the paradigm case of an intuition, for Kant finds it necessary to provide arguments for the conclusion that our representations of space and time are indeed intuitions. This involves proving that our representations of space and time are singular and immediate (A24=B39ff, A31=B47ff). As we've already seen, it is not clear whether Kant thinks that pure intuitions are passively received, but he does hold that conscious pure intuitions also contain a manifold that has been synthesized (e.g. B160-1, B160n). What the manifold of a pure intuition might be like is, however, extremely difficult to imagine. Possibly this manifold consists of spatial and temporal points, but it is not clear that the notion of unorganized spatial and temporal points makes any sense.

II. Sensations

Although it probably isn't correct to say that there are two distinct notions of sensation in the Critique, it is at least true that sensations have two different roles, or that the notion of sensation appears in two different places in the system. On the one hand, sensation plays a role which is closely related to the notion of intuition as material for synthesis. As we will soon see, Kant sometimes refers to sensation as the matter of experience and at the beginning of the introduction in A he states:

Experience is, beyond all doubt, the first product to which our understanding gives rise, in working up the raw material of sensible impressions (sinnliche Empfindungen). (A1)

This "working up" sounds very much like synthesis, so Kant may be saying here that experience is synthesized out of sensations -- Empfindungen. However, the parallel passage in B inspires caution:

There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions (sinnliche Eindrücke) into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? (B1)

Again, the notion of "working up" (combining, separating) sounds like synthesis, but what is synthesized are not sensations (Empfindungen), but impressions (Eindrücke). Possibly this indicates that Kant was wary of thinking of pre-synthetic representations as sensations. On the other hand, the difference between the first and the second

editions here may be purely stylistic; after all he does seem to speak of the impressions as being produced by objects affecting the senses.

Sensations also appear in their more usual role as conscious representations which are a means by which spatio-temporal objects are represented (and possibly merely temporal objects, i.e. selves and their states):

Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time. (B147)

These sensations are our conscious awarenesses of colours and sounds, tastes etc. The picture which best seems to make sense of these two roles of sensation is as follows: Chaotic, pre-synthetic sensations are in some way the very same as the conscious sensations which are in a sense representations of spatio-temporal and possibly just temporal objects. The relevant difference between the two is that the first is disorganized and the second has been organized by the mind; yet the second is constituted by the same stuff as the first. An alternative interpretation is that the first kind of sensation has no relation to the second, that the first isn't sensation in any ordinary sense at all. This is neither suggested by Kant's language, nor does it present much of an intelligible picture, so I don't think it's what Kant meant. Yet there are problems for the picture I suggest, as we will soon see.

These problems emerge from one of the features of Kant's characterization of sensation, which one can notice in Kant's most explicit definition of sensation at the beginning of the Aesthetic.

Here he defines sensation as "...the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it..." (A20=B34). At least a twofold characterization of sensation is suggested here: sensation is passively received from some object, and a subjective effect an object has on a mind. As is the case for several of Kant's descriptions of sensation, we can't tell whether the object which affects the faculty of representation is supposed to be a thing-in-itself, or an object of ordinary experience, or whether Kant had both in mind. As for the second feature, sensation in both roles is undoubtedly subjective in some way or other, but it is clear that Kant believes that all sensations as conscious representations, whether they be like pains or like colors, are subjective in a very strong sense. This is what causes the problems. Kant is an anti-realist about the sensations that are awarenesses of secondary qualities; he thinks that secondary quality sensations are not representations of anything in phenomena, but are only "changes in the subject" (A29=B45).

...these other representations...belong merely to the subjective constitution of our manner of sensibility, for instance of sight, hearing, and touch, as in the case of sensations of colours, sounds, and heat, which since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves yield knowledge of any object, least of all any a priori knowledge. (B44)

Since secondary quality sensations are mere changes in the subject, they don't, at least in any direct manner, represent anything in what we really experience; they don't directly present us with real elements of the phenomenal world. Consequently Kant believes that secondary quality sensation doesn't directly contribute to knowledge

of the phenomenal world. Intuitions do directly contribute to such knowledge:

It is especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge which belongs to intuition--feeling of pleasure and pain, and the will, not being knowledge, are excluded--contains nothing but mere relations, namely, of locations in an intuition (extension), of change of location (motion), and of laws according to which this change is determined (moving forces). (B66-7)

All that we know in matter is merely relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward only in a comparative sense), but among these relations some are self-subsistent and permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object. The fact that, if I abstract from these relations, there is nothing more left for me to think does not rule out the concept of a thing as appearance... (A285=B341, see also A277=B333)

Kant seems to be saying here that intuitions do contribute to knowledge of the phenomenal world, because they, probably in either sense of 'intuition', include representations of primary qualities. I don't think that Kant is saying that intuitions don't include secondary quality sensations--otherwise he wouldn't make a point in the first passage above of excluding pleasure and pain from that in knowledge which belongs to intuition, and not excluding secondary quality sensation. Kant may think of intuition as sensations to which at the very least the spatial and temporal forms of intuition have been applied; possibly he thinks of the spatial form of intuition as giving a primary quality structure to a secondary quality chaos.

One problem that emerges from this characterization is that it seems paradoxical to hold that sensations are both material for synthesis and non-veridical conscious representations, or mental

states which do not represent at all. For it would seem that Kant could have no reason to say that sensations present the real in a more deficient way than any other type of representation. Since objects are so to speak made of sensations, how could sensations not represent the real in those objects?

It seems to me that Kant's de facto position on this issue is that sensation is the basic matter for experience considered phenomenologically but that it does not directly contribute to knowledge of phenomenal objects or appearances themselves. (I take it that for Kant the term 'appearance' as it is most often used by him and the term 'phenomenal object' are coreferential.) This may seem strange since one would expect anyone who believes that ordinary objects are appearances to identify ordinary objects with that which is phenomenologically experienced. But I think that this is in fact Kant's position, or at least that it follows from what he says, and that he holds it in order to maintain the scientific theory of objects according to which ordinary objects of experience really have no secondary qualities, the primary quality objects causing secondary qualities in subjects. Perhaps the explanation for Kant's accepting this theory is just that it was part of his cultural milieu, or perhaps his motivation was more reasoned; he may have thought that secondary qualities couldn't be fully real because they are not measurable in the way that primary qualities are, or because they aren't susceptible to conceptual definition in the way that primary qualities are. Whatever may be behind it, on Kant's view the phenomenal object seems to be an abstraction from experience in that

it is never experienced as it really is. Yet I think that he wants to say that it is the object of which we have experience, and that it is the cause of our phenomenological experience.

The big picture that Kant intends one to get from this must be something like the following: On the one hand everyday experience consists of intuitions, which have ordinary particulars as their intentional objects. These intuitions have been synthesized out of basic pre-synthetic representations, which Kant sometimes also calls intuitions and sometimes sensations, the difference possibly being that the forms of intuitions are considered to have been applied to intuitions in this sense but not to sensations in this sense. One might think of this account, which involves the notion of synthesis, as the transcendental account of experience. But within the phenomenal world of experience Kant also wants to provide scientific causal explanations, not only causal explanations of interactions between spatio-temporal objects, but also of causal interactions between empirical minds and spatio-temporal objects. Thus Kant, adopting the scientific view of his day, explains our experiences of spatio-temporal objects in terms of causal interactions between empirical minds and objects which lack secondary qualities. We might say that this is part of the internal account of our experience, since it is an account which is internal to the world which is presented to our consciousness in intuitions of ordinary particulars.

Another problem is suggested by this big picture: One might wonder whether the transcendental and the internal accounts are compatible with one another. What sense, after all, would it make to

say that phenomenal objects which lack secondary qualities are presented in intuitions as their real intentional objects if we, from the phenomenological point of view, cannot be said to have any experiences of objects which lack secondary qualities? Another aspect of the problem here concerns the question as to where the objects which lack secondary qualities might be if there is no clear sense in which they are in minds and if the only objects which are extramental are the aspatial, atemporal things in themselves. From where, for instance, do these objects cause secondary quality sensations in our minds? It appears that there is a significant problem here which is caused by Kant's conflicting aspirations. On the other hand, if Kant were an anti-realist, in the way that Berkeley was, about internal scientific accounts, if he would consider them to be worthwhile for the sake of prediction, but not for the sake of truth, then the problem might have a solution. On such a view Kant would not be saying that there in any sense really are phenomenal objects which lack secondary qualities, he would just be saying that such objects are theoretical entities which are intrinsic to a valuable predictive theory. But Kant is not a scientific anti-realist; he holds, for instance, that we could have an intuition of an entity as theoretical as magnetic matter if only our senses were more refined (A226=B273).

Nevertheless, it is important to notice that Kant's denigration of secondary quality sensations may be somewhat mitigated. In the passages quoted below, Kant seems to contradict what he says in other places we've come across, since in these passages sensation is

associated with the matter of knowledge, not merely with the matter of experience:

(C) ...experience contains two very dissimilar elements, namely the matter of knowledge [obtained] from the senses, and a certain form for the ordering of this matter, [obtained] from the inner source of the pure intuition and thought which, on occasion of the sense-impressions, are first brought into action and yield concepts. (A86=B118)

(D) Sensation may be entitled the matter of sensible knowledge. (A50=B74)

Looking more closely at passage (C), however, one notices that Kant doesn't identify sensation with the matter of knowledge, rather he says that the matter of knowledge is obtained from the senses. Here Kant isn't saying that sensation actually is the matter of something, but he says that sensation is the source of matter. Possibly he means to say the same in passage (D), but was somewhat careless. It is important to note that, among the passages in which sensation and matter are linked, there is generally a consistent division between those in which sensation and matter are identified and those in which the link is different. Contrast the following three examples of apparent identification of sensation and matter:

For reality is bound up with sensation, the matter of experience, not with that form of relation in regard to which we can, if we so choose, resort to a playful inventiveness. (A223=B270)

If [the concept of a thing] stands in connection with perception, that is, with sensation as matter supplied by the senses, and through perception is determined by means of the understanding, the object is actual. (A234=B286) 8

But if [space and time] are only sensible intuitions, in which we determine all objects merely as appearances, then the form of intuition (as a

subjective property of sensibility) is prior to all matter (sensations); space and time come before all appearances and before all data of experience, and indeed are what make the latter possible. (A267=B323)

with these passages:

The possibility of the objects of the senses is a relation of these objects to our thought, in which something (namely the empirical form) can be thought a priori, while that which constitutes the matter, reality in the [field of] appearance (that which corresponds to sensation), must be given, since otherwise it could not even be thought, nor its possibility represented. (A581=B609)

....in the [field of] appearance, in terms of which all objects are given us, there are two elements, the form of intuition (space and time), which can be known and determined completely a priori, and the matter (the physical element) or content--the latter signifying something which is met with in space and time and which therefore contains an existent [Dasein] corresponding to sensation. (A723=B751)

The last two passages are from the end of the Dialectic, but the same idea can be found at the beginning of the Aesthetic:

That in appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter. (A20=B34)

In the latter three passages the matter is not identified with sensation but rather with something corresponding to sensation. There is no inconsistency in Kant here; these six passages can be reconciled. In the first three passages either the relevant matter is the matter of experience, or the kind of matter is not explicitly indicated, in which case it might be plausible to assume that he is talking about the matter of experience. In the last three the matter of appearance or that of the field of appearance is being discussed and sensation is said to correspond to this matter. It seems, therefore, that Kant has two uses for the term 'matter' in connection

with sensation. On the one hand, sensation is the matter of experience (probably considered phenomenologically) and on the other hand sensation corresponds to the matter of appearance.

Thus, in order to reconcile passages (C) and (D) with Kant's statements to the effect that sensations aren't cognitions, it might be that in (C) and (D) Kant is not claiming that sensation gives some kind of direct knowledge of what is in appearance, but that by means of sensation we can have knowledge of that in appearance which corresponds to sensation. Kant provides some indications as to what he thinks it is that corresponds to sensation in the Anticipations of Perception. In this section Kant discusses the fact that sensations have intensive, but no extensive magnitude. A thing has extensive magnitude in virtue of having spatial parts; all of the primary qualities are extensive magnitudes. Sensory qualities have no spatial parts; they can be measured only in degrees; this is what it is to have intensive magnitude (See A167-8=B209-10).⁹ In the Anticipations Kant speaks as if the degree of intensive magnitude possessed by a sensation corresponds to a degree of intensive magnitude in reality:

...what corresponds in empirical intuition to sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); what corresponds to its absence is negation = 0. Every sensation, however, is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually vanish. Between reality in the [field of] appearance and negation there is, therefore, a continuous correspondence (continuirlicher zusammenhang) of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference between any two of which is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero or complete negation. In other words, the real in the field of appearance always has a magnitude. (A168=B210)

Kant seems to me to be saying here that there is a reality, albeit a phenomenal reality with a certain intensive magnitude, which corresponds to a sensation of some level of intensity. Sensations are not realities in the phenomena, but are indications of such realities. Kant suggests that these realities are causes of sensations:

Every reality in the [field of] appearance has therefore intensive magnitude or degree if this reality is viewed as cause, either of sensation or of some other reality in the [field of] appearance, such as change, the degree of reality as cause is then entitled a moment, the moment of gravity. (A168=B210)

He is nevertheless careful about making such an assertion outright. Kant doesn't say much else in the Critique about the intensive magnitude of reality in the field of appearance. One might gather from the Metaphysical Foundations of Nature that what he has in mind is force, in particular repulsive force. There he says:

Matter fills its space by the repulsive forces of all of its parts, i.e., by its own force of extension, which has a determinate degree, beyond which can be thought smaller or greater degrees to infinity. (Ak IV 499)

One might wonder how strongly Kant is attached to the idea that there are really, that is irreducibly, intensive magnitudes in the real in appearance. For this would mean that there would be qualities of the real that would not be reducible to primary, i.e., relational qualities. Kant seems to deny the existence of irreducibly intensive magnitudes in matter in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, where he writes:

Matter is substantia phenomenon. That which inwardly belongs to it I seek in all parts of the space which it occupies, and in all effects which it exercises, though admittedly these can only be appearances of

outer sense. I have therefore nothing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively inward, and is itself again composed of outer relations. (A277=B333, see also A284-5=B340-1)

Intensive magnitudes are not outer relations; thus if substantia phenomenon can be identified with the real in appearance then Kant is effectively denying here that the real in appearance has irreducibly intensive magnitudes. What is inward or intensive is only comparatively so, and it is reducible to outer relations, extensive magnitudes.

The idea that there is something like primitive repulsive force in matter would solve a problem in the Cartesian theory of matter which is pointed out by Leibniz and hinted at by Berkeley (Principles 10), namely that primary qualities are all purely relational and a system of relations without relata is inconceivable. Repulsive force, if primitive, is not a relational property; Kant could say that repulsive force is the stuff which has the primary qualities, the relatum for the relational properties. But in the Amphiboly Kant seems to present a different solution to the problem:

But this necessity, which is founded solely on abstraction, does not arise in the case of things as given in intuition with determinations that express mere relations, without having anything inward as their basis; for such are not things in themselves but merely appearances. All that we know in matter is merely relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward only in a comparative sense), but among these relations some are self-subsistent and permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object." (A285=B341)

Here Kant reiterates his exclusion of any intensive magnitude (the inner) from matter and rather than saying that there is something that

serves as primitive relata in matter he advocates the view that some of the extensive magnitudes, some of the all relational properties, are "self-subsistent and permanent." What Kant is thinking that phenomena don't have to measure up to the standards of genuinely real things, that in phenomena there can be relations without relata. We will return to this issue and discuss it in greater detail in Chapter 7.

III. Concepts

1. Images and rules.

In the Critique there are two ways in which Kant tries to capture the nature of concepts. One of these presents concepts as representations of representations. This might be taken to indicate a traditional view according to which concepts somehow picture that which falls under them, although, as we will see, Kant does not have this in mind. The other identifies them with rules, a characterization which appears to break with the tradition. These two descriptions may not be inconsistent, but the fact that there are these two at least prima facie indicates that Kant has two notions of the way concepts work.

The passage which introduces concepts as representations of representations is found at the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction:

Since no representation, save when it is an intuition is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representa-

tion an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. (A68=B93)

The picture one gets from this passage is that intuitions are representations of particulars, whether they be pre-synthetic or already synthesized, and that concepts can represent many of these which are of the same kind at once. A crude first approximation of what Kant means is that intuitions are images of particulars and that concepts are general images. I want to argue that this interpretation isn't justified.

There are useful clues as to what Kant means by the "representation of representation" metaphor in the Schematism. At the beginning of this section he writes

In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the concept; in other words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. This, in fact, is what is meant by the expression, 'an object is contained under a concept'. Thus the empirical concept of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical concept of a circle. The roundness which is thought in the latter can be intuited in the former. (A137=B176)

From this passage one may easily be led to think that Kant is indeed still wedded to at least something like the view that concepts image or picture particulars. Kant's use of the term homogeneous is vague, but it does seem as if he means to say that there must be a similarity between concept and object and the notion of similarity between concept and object seems unintelligible apart from a theory

according to which concepts represent objects in the strong sense that they picture objects. Furthermore, the fact that the problem of the Schematism is put in terms of homogeneity and heterogeneity is another indication that Kant has the traditional representational idea in mind. The problem of the Schematism is that purely non-empirical concepts cannot be encountered in any intuition. Kant states it in this way:

But pure concepts of the understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met within any intuition. For no one will say that a category, such as that of causality, can be intuited through sense and is itself contained in appearance. How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible? (A137-8=B176-7)

The problem arises because certain concepts could not be met within intuition because these concepts are neither "intuited through sense" nor "contained in appearance." Kant's solution to the problem is to provide a schema, some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, which makes the application of the former to the latter possible (A138=B178). It is at least prima facie difficult to see that this solution would be put this way if concepts were not thought to represent in the way that images do.

This conjecture, however, runs into problems. First of all, Kant does not think that concepts themselves or the schemata (which seem to be components of concepts) are images. Consider, for instance, the following passage. It explicitly concerns only "pure sensible

concepts," presumably those of mathematics and geometry, but the point made would seem to hold for empirical concepts as well.

Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure sensible concepts. No image could ever be adequate to the concept of triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, whether right-angled, obtuse angled, or acute angled; it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere. (A140-1=B180)

Kant's argument here is like one of Berkeley's arguments for the non-existence of abstract ideas (viz. Principles, Introduction, 15). For an image to be able to literally represent all kinds of triangles would be for it to have all the properties of all the triangles, which is logically impossible.

This argument leads Kant to reject the idea that concepts and schemata can be identified with images. But maybe Kant has moved too fast. While accepting the same argument, Berkeley advances an alternative theory of thought according to which images play the leading part. Berkeley thinks that although there are no abstract general ideas, particular ideas can become general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort (Principles, Introduction, 12). General terms refer by being associated with a particular idea which in turn stands for similar ideas. Yet this theory lacks an account of the mental activity required to make the particular idea stand for the ones similar to it. Such an account would seem to be necessary given that some particular ideas are just representations of particulars and not of many things similar to them. Kant's solution to the problem of how general terms

refer does provide an account of the kind of mental activity which explains how general terms refer, and in this account it would seem that images could only play an inessential role.

For Kant concepts are not identical with and are not associated with images; rather they are or are associated with rules. It seems to me that this is one of the most important contributions Kant has made to the debate on these issues. He says:

(E) The schema of a triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect of pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience or its image ever adequate to the empirical concept, for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept. The concept 'dog' indicates (bedeutet) a rule according to which my imagination can signify (verzeichnen) the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto actually presents. (A141=B180) 11

For Kant a concept is or is associated with a rule for mental activity. What kind of mental activity? Bennett takes the above passage (E) and the sentence

(F) This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept I entitle the schema of a concept. (A140=B179-180)

to indicate that schemata are rules for constructing images. On Bennett's account of Kant's theory we apply concepts through producing an appropriate image and comparing it with the object:

Kant wants his schematism theory, I think, to explain how we are able to recognize, classify, describe. For example: I have no doubt that this thing here in front of me is a dog; but what, for me now, links this with other things I have called 'dogs', in such a way that I

am entitled to call this a dog too? Kant's answer is that I can link this dog with other dogs by conjuring up a mental picture of a dog, and checking it against the object which I now see. 12

Bennett proceeds to forward telling objections against this theory.

It seems to me, however, that Bennett's interpretation of Kant is mistaken. This interpretation consists of two theses:

(1) A schema is a rule for constructing an image.

(2) To apply a concept is to check the image against an object.

But this could not be Kant's theory for all concepts because he says that there are no images which can be constructed by means of rules associated with the pure concepts of the understanding:

...the schema of a pure concept of the understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever. It is simply a pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression. (A142=B181)

In general, therefore, a schema is not a rule for constructing an image. One might yet take the position, as R. C. S. Walker does, that Kant thought that images are required for the application of empirical concepts but not for non-empirical ones.¹³ But this attributes a view to Kant that is somewhat strange. On the one hand, his theory of concept application would no longer be unitary; empirical and non-empirical concepts would apply to objects in very different ways. But this isn't a very serious problem. On the other hand Kant's reasons for saying that concepts cannot be identified with images seem to obviate the usefulness of images for the concept application process altogether. If concepts aren't images because of the impossibility of general images, what would be the role of a rule for

producing an image or even different images that fall into a general class, especially if Kant already has an account of how some concepts apply without the mediation of images?

Further evidence against Walker's view is suggested by the passage in which Kant discusses the rule which is identified with the concept 'dog':

The concept dog indicates a rule according to which my imagination can signify the figure of a four footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concrete actually presents. (A141=B180, emphasis mine)

Here Kant says that the concept in question signifies something which falls under it while mentioning images as something by which that which the concept signifies is not constrained. Furthermore, Kant explicitly mentions that he does not know how schemata to apply to appearances:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. (A141=B180-1)

If Kant thinks that we can't know how schemata apply to objects, it would seem to be wrong to attribute to him a view according to which schemata or concepts apply via images.

One piece of evidence that stands in the way of my interpretation of Kant's position on the relationship between concepts and images is the passage (F) above, in which schemata indeed seem to be identified with rules for producing images. But given the other assertions that Kant makes, and given the context (a paragraph in which he has been

arguing that schemata shouldn't be identified with images), it seems plausible to think that (F) is not intended as a definition of 'schemata'. What Kant means to say here, I think, is that at most schemata can function as rules for constructing images; that the only interesting fact about the relationship between schemata and images is that schemata can be used to produce images. I think that he doesn't mean to say that images play an intrinsic role in concept application.

Schemata are therefore rules. Since concepts cannot stand for objects without them (A147=B186-7), it seems plausible to think of them as parts of concepts; they might also be called conceptual rules. Can we say that concepts just are rules for Kant? The closest Kant comes to explicitly adopting this characterization in the Schematism is when he says

The concept dog indicates a rule according to which my imagination can signify the figure of a four-footed animal in general...(A141=B180)

Elsewhere he calls the understanding a faculty which gives us rules:

We have already defined the understanding in various different ways: as spontaneity of knowledge (in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments. All these definitions when they are adequately understood, are identical. We may now characterize it as the faculty of rules. This distinguishing mark is more fruitful, and approximates more closely to its essential nature. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but understanding gives us rules. (A126)

The fact that Kant says that there is a parallelism between forms of intuition and rules strongly suggests that he is identifying concepts and rules, for in other places in the Critique one finds the same parallelism drawn between forms of intuition and concepts. Further

evidence that Kant thinks of concepts as rules is that he switches between saying that synthesis takes place by means of concepts and saying that it takes place by means of rules. For instance he says that it takes place by means of concepts at A111-112, A119, B143, and B143, while he says that it takes place by means of rules at A108, in many places in the Second Analogy, and at A302=B359 where he says "Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules." It should be noted, however, that the characterization of concepts as rules does not appear in the material that Kant added in the second edition. Possibly this means that he lost interest in the metaphor, but maybe it's just that his most pressing concerns in revising the Critique didn't include a specification of the nature of concepts. Kant's most explicit identification of concepts with rules is found at A106 where he writes:

But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances.

But why the restriction "as regards its form"? It might be that Kant thinks that besides the form of a concept there is a content, possibly something occurrent, that we can introspect when we have employed a concept. The first metaphor, which identifies concepts with representations of representations, may also point in this direction. Kant does say that concepts have to be homogeneous with their objects, and this might lead one to think that concepts must be representations in some pictorial sense. However, they are not images, but rules.

They also do not appear to be just rules for constructing images, nor do images seem to be necessarily involved in concept application. It is possible that all Kant means to indicate by means of this metaphor is that concepts are rules which are general and mediate, that they can in some sense signify or organize or unify several other representations at once. But I think that it indicates something more: for any matter that is potentially conceptually organized, it is possible to organize it in more than one rule-like way. Different conceptual rules would lead one to think of or experience the world in different ways. Consequently, conceptual rules must be more than purely formal, they must be something more than pure organizing mechanisms. They are ways of organizing material, organizing mechanisms with a particular content. Each concept must have a material aspect which accounts for our organizing or unifying our experience in a certain way.

So far we haven't considered the question as to what kind of a rule constitutes or partially constitutes a concept. To answer it, it is necessary to examine another metaphor for what a concept is, the metaphor according to which concepts are associated with functions of unity.

2. Rules and functions of unity.

Kant's picture of concepts as associated with functions of unity is, I think, original. It seems to differ quite radically from the other accounts of the modern period in which concepts are somehow associated with images. The fundamental notion is roughly that

concepts are rule-like ways for providing organization for other representations. Kant thinks that there are two levels on which concepts are employed. On an ordinary, or what Kant might call the analytic use of concepts (A77-8=B103, B133n), we apply concepts consciously in thought and experience. The organization that is hereby achieved is possibly an ordering of objects and their features into general classes, an ordering which is explicitly displayed before the mind. Kant's next move is to argue that the fact that this order or organization is discoverable or implicit in experience requires an explanation. Production of this order requires an extraordinary, or what Kant calls a synthetic use of concepts. Through this synthesis by means of concepts organized experience is created.

2.1. Ordinary concept application.

At the beginning of the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant introduces concepts in their ordinary role.

(G) Whereas all intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 'function' I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation. (A68=B93)

As we have seen, according to Kant concepts are representations which have three essential characteristics: (1) they are associated with activity and not passively received, (2) they are mediate as opposed to immediate, and (3) they are general rather than singular. These three characterizations are implicit in the above passage. As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, the idea that concepts are associated with activity belongs to traditional Aristotelianism.

Aquinas, for instance, parallels Kant in that for him sensation is passive and thought is active. Although Aquinas's reason that thought must be active is somewhat different from Kant's, it is related to it. For Aquinas the intelligible species is only potentially understandable when it inheres in matter, and all potency requires activity in order to be actualized. The intellect must therefore perform the act of abstracting the intelligible species from matter in order to understand. Kant is not an abstractionist of this sort. For Kant, the paradigmatic activity of the mind is not abstraction, but unification--putting together, gathering into one, which is what it does in judgment:

...all judgments are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object. (A69=B93-4)

Given that concepts are rules, and that judgments are acts of applying concepts to other representations, judgments are the acts which provide unity or organization for such representations. In cases of ordinary concept application, judgments can be acts of applying rules to groups of ordinary representations of particulars, making a certain unity or organization explicit which was formerly only implicit. For instance in naive, ordinary, experience one might have intuitions of elm trees on several occasions and not realize that they are all of a single kind. An acquisition of the concept 'elm' and its subsequent application can serve to make explicit this particular unity or organization in intuition which was only implicit beforehand. As a result, one might have an intuition of an elm and think of it as an

elm, rather than just as, say, a tree. Kant also thinks that concepts can serve to unify or organize other concepts; biological classification systems might provide an example of this.

An unclarity in the above characterization is brought to the surface when we ask exactly how concepts in their ordinary application are mediate, rather than immediate. Kant says that concepts are mediate in that they are representations of representations, but this seems strange. For it is odd to think that, for instance, the concept 'elm' is a representation of intuitions of elms, or that the concept 'phylum' is a representation of various species concepts. One wants to say that that concept 'elm' represents elms, and not intuitions of elms. If one wanted a concept that would represent intuitions of elms, it would seem that one should look to a concept like 'intuition of elm'.

This suggests that concepts in their ordinary use are not mediate in that it is literally other representations that they stand for or represent. This is borne out by the text, although Kant is not completely lucid on the issue. In the following passage Kant is explaining the mediacy of concepts.

In every judgment there is a concept that holds (gilt) for many representations, and among them comprehends (begreift) a given representation which is immediately related to the object. Thus in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies (bezieht sich) to various other concepts, but is here applied (bezogen) in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us (vorkommende Erscheinungen). These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility. (A68-9=B93)

The last sentence in this quote is an important one to notice. Kant also wants to say that particular objects, not only other representations, are represented mediately by way of concepts, so if there is a sense in which concepts represent representations, it must be consistent with concepts also representing particular objects. But if this is true, the concept 'body' cannot represent intuitions of bodies in the way that the concept 'intuition of body' does. For there is no sense at all in which the concept 'intuition of body' represents particular bodies.

The words Kant uses in the above passage to indicate how concepts are related to other representations permit some leeway in this regard. Concepts hold (gelten), comprehend (begreifen), or apply to or are related to (sich beziehen) other representations. This could mean something as weak as that they merely require these other representations to represent particular objects, and certainly need not mean anything as strong as that they represent these other representations in as strong a sense as the concept 'intuition of a body' represents intuitions of bodies. Such weak talk is also present in Kant's characterization of representations at the beginning of the Aesthetic:

Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters (Merkmale), relate (beziehen) ultimately to intuitions and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. (A19=B33)

What Kant means to say, I think, is just that in order for a concept to be involved in a cognition or Erkenntnis for some person, that person (or possibly even someone else) must have (or have had) an intuition which represents an object or feature of which the concept is a concept, or of which a concept contained by the concept is a concept, etc. Concepts represent mediately just in that all by themselves they could never be cognitions but require appropriate intuitions in order to complete the cognition. They are rules which require that someone have or have had representations of particulars if they are to constitute genuine cognitions.

It is interesting to note that in the above passage Kant seems to identify concepts with Merkmale, which Kemp-Smith translates as 'characters'. In the *Logic*, Kant makes this identification in a more explicit way:

All our concepts are therefore Merkmale, and all thinking is nothing other than a representing by means of Merkmale. Every Merkmal may be considered from two sides: First, as a representation in itself; second, as belonging as a partial concept (Teilbegriff) to the complete representation of a thing, and thereby as a ground of knowledge of this thing itself. (*Logic*, Intro., VIII)

Aquila interprets Kant's Merkmale as "characteristics or features that objects might possess".¹⁴ In a way Kemp-Smith and Aquila's translations are correct, but there is a possibility of being misled here. Merkmale are not properties of objects; Kant uses the term 'Eigenschaft' to refer to properties. Merkmale are mental entities, as the above passage from the *Logic* indicates. The word comes from merken, which means 'to perceive' or 'to notice' and 'Mal' which means

'sign' or 'mark'. A Merkmal is thus literally a sign or mark for perceiving or noticing. We might say that it is a way we have of recognizing something, a rule for recognition. This may help to show how Kantian concepts are general. They are not representations of particulars, but rules or marks for recognition of particulars or their features or for recognition of other concepts. Concepts are rules or marks for the recognition of any number of particulars or representations; they are never, by their nature, rules or marks for the recognition of only one particular or representation. Among the consequences of this is that for Kant there are no singular or individual concepts, a fact which he acknowledges in the Logic (§15).

It is not going to turn out that all concepts in their ordinary use are completely statable rules. Possibly a concept like 'triangle' will be a completely statable rule, but concepts like 'yellow' and 'soft' will certainly not be. The rule for 'triangle' might be 'think of something as a triangle and/or call it a triangle when it is a three-sided closed plane figure', whereas the rule for 'yellow' might be something like 'think of something as yellow and/or call it yellow when it is relevantly similar to this color', when a sample of yellow is demonstrated. Since a demonstration is essential to the rule, the rule cannot be fully stated. The same, in fact, would be true for the rule for 'triangle' if the rule as stated above were explicated in greater detail. Nevertheless, the fact that not all conceptual rules are fully statable does not call into question Kant's characterization of them as rules. A rule can be a standard or guide for some practice, a standard or guide that need not be fully statable.

A noteworthy methodological issue is raised by Kant's characterization of judgments and concepts. From Kant's descriptions one gets the picture that for all of our concepts we actually have the representations of the particular objects which fall under them. He says, for instance, that judgment is the mediate knowledge of an object and that in "every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object" (A68=B93). This picture seems odd, given that we often don't actually have representations of the particulars which fall under our judgments. What is going on here is evident from an example of concept application that Kant gives:

Thus, in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible', the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility. (A68=B93)

It is obvious that Kant has chosen to work with cases of perception, probably because he considers such cases to be central to an analysis of cognition. In perception we typically have representations of particulars that fall under the relevant concepts. Possibly Kant's idea was that once an account of the central cases of cognition is complete, it could fairly easily be extended to other kinds of thought and knowledge.

One might get the feeling from these characterizations of concepts that something important yet remains to be explained. Kant states that understanding consists in acts of unification by means of concepts, and the characteristics of concepts which are supposed to

explain how this works is that they are rules which are general and mediate. One might expect a further account than what has been given so far of what it is for concepts to represent mediately and generally, but Kant doesn't provide one, and I think that there are interesting reasons for this. In the philosophical tradition, there are indeed accounts of how it is that concepts represent mediately and generally. For instance, Locke thought that an idea is general by lacking the characteristics not universally shared by the particular ideas which fall under it, and that the general idea is mediate in virtue of resembling those particular ideas (Essay, III, iii, 6ff). Kant gives no such explanation; for Kant it is not the case that there are two such stages in conceptual representation; rather judgment consists in a single act in which the mind apprehends an object by means of a concept. All of the intentionality is contained within this act of mind; there is no description of what it is for a concept, as an entity, to have the capabilities of representing things mediately all by itself. For Kant these are capabilities of the understanding, capabilities exercised in acts of judgment. Kantian concepts are best viewed not as entities which represent on their own, but as abstractions from these cognitive capabilities exercised in judgment; they are the rule-like modes by which acts of judgment can be made.

2.2. The extraordinary use of concepts.

In the analytic or ordinary use of concepts we discover and make explicit the unity or organization which is implicit in experience by

saying, thinking, or experiencing objects or features as having something in common or belonging to a single kind. Kant argues that the fact that this unity or organization can be discovered through concepts needs to be explained. The explanation Kant gives in the Metaphysical Deduction is that experience has first been synthesized or put together through concepts. Consequently a synthetic use of concepts parallels the analytic use. Kant's idea is that if a unity or organization can be picked out by means of a certain concept, it must have been antecedently organized or unified by means of that concept:

Before we can analyze our representations, the representations must themselves be given, and therefore as regards content no concepts can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge, and unites them to [form] a certain content. (A77-78=B103)

This idea of synthesis may seem quite strange; its source is likely the idea that an atomistic chaos is the appropriate starting point for explanation and order is that which has to be explained. Kant's thought is that the order we discover in our experience couldn't just be there; the fact that there is order in experience rather than a manifold of atomistic and chaotic representations demands an account, and this account is provided by the notion of synthesis:

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that

unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension.... (A99)

The manifold of representations can be given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity; and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation, without being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected. But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination--be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts--is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned, as indicating that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined....(B129-30)

There has been a long tradition in Western cosmology of attempting to explain the order of the world, taking formless matter as the starting point in the account. In Plato's Timaeus, the Demiurge stamps the Forms on the formless receptacle. Aristotle and the medieval philosophers follow suit in explaining order by the doctrine that ordering form inheres in chaotic matter. Kant is skeptical about cosmology, but he nevertheless seems to want to explain the order in experience in a way analogous to the way in which the Greek and Medieval metaphysicians explained the cosmic order. In Kant's system, atomistic representations, pre-synthetic intuitions, play the role of matter, and our concepts correspond to the ordering forms. For Kant we are like the Demiurge, creating our "world" by conceptualizing chaotic representations.

Kant never actually argues at length that the same concepts must be used in synthesis as in analysis; he just appeals to intuitions of symmetry. He writes:

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in general. (A70=B104-05)

This notion of symmetry is to play an important role in the Transcendental Deduction. But one would think that concepts in the two uses must at least differ in form to a certain extent, even though they are significantly similar to one another. Interpreted as rules, ordinarily used concepts have a form like 'when you perceive something with such and such characteristics, think of it as a plant and/or call it a plant', whereas extraordinarily used concepts would have a form like 'when you've received such and such sensory matter, organize into a representation of a plant'. Kant's belief that they are qualitatively identical does have historical precedent in Aristotelianism, and possibly this was influencing him. On Aristotelian theory the same forms that are the metaphysical constituents of objects also serve as concepts, that by which we know the objects. So on Kant's theory, the forms used to produce representations of objects of experience are identical to the concepts by which we think about these objects in ordinary thought. The idea

that concepts as used in these two ways are identical plays an important role in the Transcendental Deduction. Kant's ultimate aim there is to show that concepts like cause and substance can be applied in experience in an ordinary analytical way. But his proof essentially involves only the idea that experience must have been synthesized by concepts such as these; the notion that such concepts can be analytically applied is thought to follow automatically from this.

Concepts in their extraordinary, synthetic, use are also associated with activity, and are also mediate and general. Kant clearly thinks of synthesis as an activity of the understanding. In the Transcendental Deduction in B he may be thinking of synthesis as a kind of judgment as well (B141-2), which, if this suggestion could be given some content, make for an important similarity between the actual ordinary and extraordinary uses of concepts. Concepts as employed in synthesis are mediate in that they are rules for organizing other intuitions. In contrast with the ordinary use, there is no problem as to whether concepts apply to intuitions or their objects in synthesis; now there is no distinction between intuitions and their objects. Concepts as employed in synthesis are presumably general in that they are rules which can be used for organization in more than one instance; this accounts for the fact that the same concepts can in principle consciously be used to pick out more than one instance to which they apply.

It is important to notice that there are two distinct kinds of organization or unity that synthesis by means of concepts produces for

ordinary experience. On the one hand, since a concept, like cause, is general, it can be applied in synthesis in many different instances. Consequently, on the conscious level, we can think of many different events as instances of causation. Because the concept of cause has figured in the unconscious synthesis of experience in many different instances, we can consciously organize many different events under the concept of cause. On the other hand, there is a kind of organization which synthesis produces in every single intuition. We are, on any given occasion, aware of objects, not merely disorganized flashes and twinges, and synthesis is responsible for this experience of unified objects. So whereas the first kind of organization is a result of the same concept having been applied in synthesis in many different instances, the second kind of organization is a result only of the fact that concepts have been applied to a particular manifold in a single instance.

2.3. Intuitions as products of synthesis.

In Kant's Leibnizian period his notion of an object of representations or experience was that of a thing-in-itself. After his Copernican revolution, his Critical turn, this notion of an object of experience is no longer available to him. Consequently Kant struggled to find a new notion of object of experience, a struggle of which we find evidence in A104-111:

...we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations'. We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects

capable of existing outside our power of representation. What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge?
(A104)

In A104-111 Kant makes use of the notion of transcendental object=x, which I don't want to consider partly because he eliminates all such talk in the second edition. The notion of object of experience which Kant finally comes to is that of an intentional object of an intuition:

Now, also, we are in a position to determine more adequately our concept of an object in general. All representations have, as representations, their object, and can themselves in turn become objects of other representations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations...
(A108-9)

Objects are appearances, which can be taken to mean that objects are that which appears in immediate representations, intuitions. In the Second Analogy Kant develops his idea by proposing that objects of experience are Inbegriffe of representations, by which I think Kant means to say that they are the content of representations. Kemp-Smith translates the word as 'sum', and indeed 'Inbegriff' often means 'sum' for Kant, but in this case I think that 'content' provides the more natural reading:

Now immediately I unfold the transcendental meaning of my concepts of an object, I realise that the house is not a thing in itself, but only an appearance, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which is unknown. What, then, am I to understand by the question: how the manifold may be connected in the appearance itself, which yet is nothing in itself? That which lies in the successive apprehension is here

viewed as representation, while the appearance which is given to me, notwithstanding that it is nothing but the content (Inbegriff) of these representations, is viewed as their object; and my concept, which I derive from the representations of apprehension, has to agree with it. (A190-1=B235-6)

That this eventually becomes Kant's favored notion of object of experience is evident from a passage in the letter to J.S. Beck of January 20, 1792:

You've really hit the nail on the head (Sie haben es ganz wohl getroffen) when you say "The content (Inbegriff) of a representation is itself the object; and the activity of mind whereby the content of a representation is presented is what is meant by 'relating it to the object'. (Z 183, JZ 191)

This notion of an object of experience calls for a clarification in what Kant means when he says that an intuition as a representation of a particular is a representation which is in immediate relation to the object. One might, upon reading this characterization, call up a mental picture of a representation immediately adjacent to an object. But since the object is the content of the intuition, this isn't quite right. It would be better to call up a picture of a representation which encircles the object. An intuition isn't in immediate relation to an object external to it, but to an object which is part of it, an object which is its content. This notion of an object of experience, as we will see in chapter 4, is central to Kant's Transcendental Idealism.

This is indicative of a reason why synthesis is not a dispensable element of Kant's account of intuitions of ordinary particulars. If objects were external to the representations one has of them one might think that one would not need to provide an account of the unity of

these objects, nor for the unity of the representations of them. The unity of the objects might then have some physical or non-psychological metaphysical explanation, and that of the representations could be construed as derivative or dependent on that of the objects. But on Kant's view objects are contents of intuitions, so this kind of explanation of unity isn't possible. It is therefore essential that the explanation of the unity of objects and the representations of them have a different account, and Kant proposes one in which the notion of synthesis is central. Commentators have tried to avoid this in various ways. Aquila, for instance, thinks that in interpreting Kant there is no need to think that Kant believes that there is any sense in which a whole is generated out of parts by means of synthesis:

It is sometimes supposed that Kant maintains that the apprehension of anything manifold must always arise out of an act whereby the mind puts a manifold of discrete items (sensations?) together into a whole. Since we are not conscious of any such act, and in ordinary experience are already presented with spatial wholes to be conceptualized in various ways, it is also tempting to suppose that the acts in question must occur on some deeper, pre-empirical (noumenal?) level....There is no need to adopt this line. What we need to remember is that Kant is undertaking an explanation of the application of concepts to intuitions. He is concerned, that is, with whatever conditions are involved in recognition of the spatial (and temporal) forms with which we are presented. In that context, when Kant claims that a certain kind of "synthesis" is involved in the representation of anything manifold, he can only be talking about conditions involved in the conceptualization or recognition of something as a manifold. There is no need to suppose an activity whereby a whole is generated out of parts; at most we are dealing with an activity whereby a whole is recognized as having parts. 15

For Aquila synthesis is just the recognition of something manifold, not the generation of an entire unified cognition out of a manifold. But this is inconsistent with something that Aquila himself acknowledges to be central to Kant, namely that conceptual structure is not experienced to be external to intuitive cognitions and their objects, but is part of them. In other words, ordinary representations of particulars and their objects always have at least an implicit conceptual content. About an interpretation of the passage in which Kant says that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind (A51=B75) Aquila says:

If a concept is at best something externally combined with an intuition, then the intrinsic identity of the latter would be independent of the former. Furthermore, the approach seems to involve a doctrine of "bare particulars." Intuitions provide our references to particulars; concepts provide the means by which they are classified as certain sorts of particulars, in terms of the various characteristics or Merkmale that they exhibit. It seems to follow that by themselves intuitions refer to something characterless. Not only does this appear nonsensical, but it contradicts Kant's claim that it is the form of intuition itself by which concrete spatial and temporal characteristics are presented for possible conceptualization in the first place. 16

Since for Kant objects are the contents of intuitions, precisely the way in which he avoids this type of view is through his doctrine of synthesis. Pre-conscious synthesis assures that the particulars of which we are aware in intuition are not "bare particulars" or "something characterless". Synthesis is what provides for the conceptual structure of our intuitions and their objects, it is what for Kant explains the fact that all of our intuitions and their

objects have a conceptual content. The conceptual content, in turn, is that in which the unity of an intuition consists.

Aquila has an answer to this objection against him, an answer that is implicit in the last sentence of the above quotation. He thinks that the explanation why Kant's intuitions are not "bare particulars" is that they are characterized by the forms of intuition. Indeed, the forms of intuition do characterize intuitions, but it is evident from the text that Kant thinks that intuitions are also the products of synthesis, and synthesis is always conceptual. For instance he says:

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding.
(A79=B104-5, see also the first two quotations on p. 9 and the last two on p. 54)

In general, on Aquila's interpretation of Kant the forms of intuition are supposed to do a great deal of work; for example they are supposed to account for the intentionality of mental states, the fact that they are of or about something. While the forms of intuition do play a role here, I think that for Kant a more important role in the explanation of intentionality is played by synthesis by means of concepts. This is an important and interesting issue; I will discuss it in greater detail in Chapter 6, which deals with Kant's theory of intentionality in general.

3. Appendix: Is the notion of synthesis philosophically acceptable?

Several recent commentators, Richard Aquila for example¹⁷, have attempted to interpret synthesis as a weaker notion than I have thought it to be and than it is traditionally thought to be. Others, like Bennett, have tried to reinterpret Kant's views deleting at least some aspect of the notion of synthesis.¹⁸ The apparent motivation for these trends is in part that the notion of synthesis appears, prima facie, to be philosophically unacceptable. I want to argue that this is mistaken on the grounds that direct descendants of the notion of synthesis have an important role in several important modern theories in psychology and philosophy of mind. I suspect that the feeling that there is something very wrong with the notion of synthesis often has positivist and behaviorist roots; the idea seems to be that a notion as mentalistic as synthesis cannot be meaningfully or interestingly explanatory. Another source of difficulty is that Kantian synthesis is noumenal and atemporal, but one might accept many aspects of the notion nonetheless. Moreover, the notion of the noumenon as a thing in itself doesn't deserve the negative reactions it often gets; a thing in itself is nothing more than a mind independent object.

The notion of synthesis seems less bizarre when it is compared to the functionalist theory of mind and to some current theories in the study of cognitive development. Drawing these analogies isn't relevant in every respect, but both in functionalism and in the theories of cognitive development there are parallels to what seem to me to be, at least for the purposes intrinsic to Kant's psychology, the two central notions in the doctrine of synthesis, that synthesis

in some sense begins with sensory matter of experience, and that synthesis is an act of the mind on the sensory matter which takes place in accordance with rules. One of the theories of cognitive development is analogous in other ways as well.

First, according to functionalist theories of mind, the mind receives an input and performs various computational processes on this input, which results in the production of an output. Analogous to Kant's theory, the input is usually construed as sensory, the computational processes process the sensory data, and the processes are rule-like in nature. There are many functionalist theories, all of which differ from Kant's theory of synthesis to some degree or other, but the basic structure of any functionalist theory is the same as that of Kant's theory of synthesis.

Secondly, some experimental results concerning the acquisition of the ability to perceive size constancy seem to indicate that the experience of a newborn infant is chaotic in the way in which the sensory material for synthesis is chaotic for Kant. To perceive size constancy is to perceive an object as remaining the same size through changes of the size of the image in the visual field. When we move away from an object, the size of its image in the visual field diminishes, even though we perceive the object itself as remaining constant in size. Although no one has done experiments with infants so young that they don't yet perceive size constancy, psychologists have found that when rats who have been deprived of visual experience since birth first acquire visual experience they learn size constancy rather quickly, at times in less than a week.¹⁹ It seems intuitively

plausible to suppose that human infants learn to perceive size constancy in the same way rats do.

Before learning size constancy, an infant's experience must be relatively unstructured with respect to depth. Possibly what the cognitively mature would experience as objects with size constancy appear as blotches in the visual field which increase and decrease in size as the infant moves towards and away from them. Since there are many aspects of experience which are learned in this way, it seems plausible to think that an infant's experience at birth is disorganized in many other ways as well. The limiting case is an experience which consists only of a chaos of representations which is not unified or organized in any way. Even a very young infant may never have such an experience, but it is nonetheless somewhat compelling to think of this as the starting point for an account of the development of a cognitively mature experience.

Infants apparently learn size constancy through putting together various kinds of information, information from seeing and feeling, from motion parallax, and from felt change in the curvature of the lens of the eye. This may parallel the second central notion in the doctrine of synthesis, that synthesis is an act of mind which takes place when rules are applied by the mind, yet the example needs to be spelled out. But rather than concentrate on size constancy, it is more fruitful to turn to the account of the genesis of the object concept developed by Piaget and T.G.R. Bower, who was inspired by Piaget, since this account is so detailed.

Piaget thought that the best approach to a study of the development of the object concept is to observe infants' reactions to objects that have vanished or have been obscured from view. In Bower's catalogue of relevant infant behavior in the series of stages from 0-18 months, let us consider the progress from Stage II (2-4 months) to Stage III (4-6 months). During Stage II the behavior of an infant can be accounted for by its in some sense accepting one of two conflicting rules, standards or guides for the organization of experience, one of them some of the time and the other the rest of the time:

- (1) Something is a permanent spatial object if and only if it occupies a bounded volume of space and is in continuous motion along a path.
- (2) Something is a permanent spatial object if and only if it occupies a bounded volume of space and stays in the same place.²⁰

(The distinguishing of bounded volumes of space takes place at a very early age. The kind of bounds selected are described by the Gestalt rule of good continuation; they must possess a certain simplicity.)

The evidence used to support this description of Stage II behavior is, for example, the fact that when the infant is presented with an object that moves along a continuous path and then stops, continued tracking behavior and concentration on the stationary object are exactly equiprobable.²¹

There are different possible ways of explaining the fact that a Stage II infant behaves according to laws (1) and (2). One way (A),

is that the infant is not in any sense sorting out the world with these laws in mind; he is just a stimulus-response mechanism and the rules only figure into a description of its behavior. According to this account the infant in no sense applies the rules. Such a view does not lend any aid or support to Kant's notion of synthesis. The opposite, however, is true of Bower's account. According to Bower, as for Kant, some notion of the application of a rule is central to an account of how mature experience is produced. On Bower's theory, cognitive development occurs only when a child becomes aware of a conflict between two rules or concepts or modes of coping with the same situation which, it seems, couldn't happen unless the infant was in some sense applying the rules in the first place.²² For instance, rules (1) and (2) come into conflict whenever an object starts or stops moving. These rules provide the infant with conflicting behavioral options in such situations. On Bower's view, this kind of a conflict leads to an equilibration process, in which the two conflicting rules are reformulated into a new one which, when applied, eliminates the conflict. In this case the new rule might be

- (3) Something is a permanent spatial object if and only if it occupies a bounded volume of space and it can move from one place to another along a path.

There are good reasons to think that (A) is false and that Bower's theory comes much closer to the truth. On theory (A), the behavior of the infant should be subject to reinforcement. But when an experience is introduced to correct a behavior at an arbitrary point in the infant's development, the reinforcement does not lead to

improved behavior, and may in fact hinder development. Bower's theory explains this by postulating that at such an arbitrary time equilibration cannot occur. Only when a reformulation of rules and subsequent application of a new rule occurs does an infant undergo cognitive development. Bower's theory is also supported by the fact that development occurs in very distinct stages. During the entire length of Stage II it is true that when an infant is presented with an object that moves along a continuous path and then stops, continued tracking behavior and concentration on the stationary object are exactly equiprobable. Then, all of a sudden, tracking error drops to zero. On theory (A), one would expect the development to be gradual. But it is not; rather, it is abrupt and dramatic, which, again, can be explained by the idea that development occurs when rules are reformulated.

The phenomena which provide support for Bower's theory seem to be present at the other stages of the development of the object concept. In each case development is sudden and can be explained as the resolution of a conflict.²³ For instance, the conflict/equilibration hypothesis can also explain an infant's behavior in connection with the development of the concept of size. At one stage, an infant can only perceive the sizes of objects relative to his own hands; the evidence for this is that he can reach for and pick up objects with success, but he cannot order objects according to size relative to each other. A change occurs when the infant gains the ability to perform actions like putting one smaller object on top of a larger one. But at this stage he cannot order more than two objects

according to size. It seems that he is operating with the concept of size which includes only two categories, big and little, without any concept of a continuum of sizes. At some point he suddenly becomes able to order many objects in order of size. This development can be explained as a result of a conflict in the concept of size of the last stage. According to a rule which is plausibly possessed by the infant at the last stage, the same object can be both big and little depending on, for example, whether it functions as a supporting or supported object. This conflict seems to result in a concept of size which allows objects to be ordered on a continuum.²⁴

Thus parallels of central elements in Kant's doctrine of synthesis can be found in functionalism and in some important contemporary theories in developmental psychology. There are, however, some asymmetries between Kant's and these modern theories. For instance, Kant thinks of the synthesizing self as an atemporal intelligence, which besides organizing experience, also legislates the moral law for itself. The self of the functionalist or Bower's pictures is hardly an atemporal intelligence. Also, Kant's self applies a priori concepts; it is not clear that there is room for a priori concepts on this psychological reconstruction, but this depends on what Kant really means by 'a priori', an issue which I will try to discuss in detail in chapter 4.

Bower's theory of cognitive development suggests another way of getting hold of Kant's notion of synthesis. When infants apply a new rule there may well be a sense in which they experience their environment in a new way, a sense in which the immediate intentional

objects of their experience change. One might say that applying a new rule amounts to actualizing an ability to perceive the matter of experience in a new way. Possibly, then, Kant's process of synthesis can be thought of as the actualizing of abilities to perceive or experience some matter of experience as some ordinary object or objects, taken in a broad sense to include processes and events. Concepts in their extraordinary use would then be rules for perceiving or experiencing some matter of experience as some object or objects. For example, the concept of cause in its extraordinary use would be the rule for perceiving or experiencing some matter of experience as causally related events.

Footnotes to Chapter 1.

¹Several commentators have forwarded views on what intuition is for Kant. In "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)", in T. Penelhum, and J. J. MacIntosh eds., The First Critique. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1969) Jaakko Hintikka claims that the immediacy condition collapses into the singularity condition and that "anything which stands for an individual object as distinguished from general concepts" is an intuition. Charles Parsons, in "Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic" (Morgenbesser, Suppes, and White, eds., Philosophy, Science and Method. London: MacMillan, 1971) and Manley Thompson in "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology" (Review of Metaphysics 26 (1972-73)) argue that Hintikka doesn't take the notion of immediacy seriously enough and argue that Kant's notion of intuition is more like that of pre-synthetic representations. Wilfred Sellars, in the first chapter of Science and Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1968), argues for roughly the same interpretation as I do. He thinks that on the one hand there are those intuitions which have been synthesized by the productive imagination, which have a form of this cube. On the other hand, there are intuitions which are nonconceptual, which involve nothing over and above sheer receptivity.

²Wilfred Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, ch.1, p. 7.

³Jaakko Hintikka, "On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)".

⁴Rolf George, "Kant's Sensationalism", Synthese 47 (1981), pp. 241-2.

⁵See Marilyn Adams's forthcoming book on Ockham, ch. 13

⁶M. Adams, ch 12.

⁷Margaret D. Wilson, "Confused Ideas" in Rice University Studies v.63, n.4 (Fall 1977), p. 134.

⁸Kemp-Smith translates 'Materie' as 'material' here, but this seems unwarranted, given that he translates it as 'matter' in every other place that I've come across.

⁹See Jonathan Bennett's discussion on this topic in Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 167-176.

¹⁰Changed from Kemp-Smith.

¹¹Kemp-Smith translates Kant's "nach welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfussigen Thieres allgemein verzeichnen kann..." as "according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general." To translate 'verzeichnen' as 'delineate' is to overinterpret in favor of

a theory according to which Kant says that an image mediates concept application. (See the discussion below.) I have translated 'verzeichnen' as the more neutral and accurate 'signify' instead.

¹²Bennett, Kant's Analytic, p. 143.

¹³R. C. S. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 88-89.

¹⁴Richard E. Aquila, Representational Mind (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 36.

¹⁵Aquila, pp. 122-3; Aquila goes on to cite Kant's illustrations for synthesis of drawing a line in thought.

¹⁶Aquila, p.119.

¹⁷See pp. 68-9, Aquila, pp. 122-3.

¹⁸J. Bennett, Kant's Analytic, pp. 111ff.

¹⁹I. Rock, An Introduction to Perception, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975), p. 65.

²⁰T. G. R. Bower, Development in Infancy (San Francisco: Will Freeman and Company, 1974), pp. 180-241.

²¹Bower, p. 223.

²²Bower, p. 217.

²³See Bower, p. 235ff.

²⁴Bower, p. 234.

Chapter 2: Kant and Hume on the Distinction between Sensation and Understanding and on Intentionality.

In order to understand Kant's theory of mental representation, it is important to grasp how it differs from Hume's. Both in the Prolegomena (Preface, Ak IV 258ff) and in the Critique of Practical Reason (Ak V 52ff), Kant describes his theory of concepts, in particular, as a theory which contrasts with its Humean counterpart. In the Preface to the Prolegomena Kant presents the gist of what he is attacking in Hume in this way:

Hume started mainly from a single but important concept in metaphysics, namely, that of the connection of cause and effect.....He challenged reason, which pretends to have given birth to this concept of herself, to answer him by what right she thinks anything could be so constituted that if that thing be posited, something else must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrates irrefutably that it was entirely impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination as involves necessity.....Hence he inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of the imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under the law of association, and mistook a subjective necessity (custom) for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such connections... (Proleg. Ak IV 257-8)

What Kant presents in this passage are the aspects of Hume's theory he wants to show to be mistaken (despite the "He demonstrated irrefutably that..."). Hume thinks that, experience contains nothing contributed by the mind, in particular no a priori conceptual content contributed by the mind, that experience consists of nothing more than passively

received perceptions linked together by association. Kant views his theory of concepts as arising in reaction to this aspect of Hume's theory:

So I tried first whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form, and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only concept by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such concepts. I sought to ascertain their number; and when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts, which I was now certain were not derived from experience, as Hume had tried, but sprang from the pure understanding." (Proleg. Ak IV 260)

I will try to examine this discussion between Kant and Hume in detail in my discussion of the Transcendental Deduction. For now I want to come to terms with what theories underlie this disagreement and what theories might shed further light on it. I think that for this purpose it would be best to examine Kant and Hume on the topics of mental activity and the intentionality of sense perception, and to do so from a fairly broad historical perspective. Such an investigation will reveal patterns and trends which will enable us to acquire a deeper insight into the controversy between Kant and Hume.

A case can be made that, at least as regards what I have called his ordinary psychology, Kant was trying to recapture a schema of the Aristotelian view of the matter that had been lost or rejected by the other philosophers of the modern period. The schema of the Aristotelian view is that in cognition or experience a person or mind undergoes and performs processes of the following form: First, there is a mind-independent object which is passively sensed, and

subsequently this same mind-independent object is actively thought. This thinking is a mental act distinct from the sensation, but it is also in some sense dependent on the sensation. The mind-independent object is not only sensed and thought in that it is the cause of the sensation and of the thought, but also, and necessarily, in that it is the immediate object of awareness of the sensation and of the thought. The medieval scholastic theories were paradigmatically Aristotelian in these respects. For example, on Aquinas's theory (ST 1a 77-79, 84-86.), the process begins when instances of the various sensory forms of the object leave the matter of the object and migrate to the sense organs. When I see and bite into an apple, visual forms of redness and apple-shape leave the matter of the apple and are taken up by my eyes, a form of tartness leaves the apple and is received by my taste buds, and so on. All of these sensory forms then come together somewhere in the body to form a phantasm. The phantasm is a particular material object, so in the phantasm the various sensory forms inhere in some matter, matter which is distinct from the matter of the original apple. Even though the the phantasm is that with which the sensory faculty is in immediate contact, the phantasm is not properly that which is sensed, but that by which the mind-independent object is sensed and ultimately perceived (ST 1a 85, 2. There is, as we will see, an interesting problem regarding this claim.). At this point sensation ends and intellectual processes begin. This is also the point where mental activity commences; the data received in sensation are received passively. The agent or active intellect abstracts the intelligible species or forms which are universals, and

which are included in the phantasms, from the matter of the phantasms, and imprints them on the passive intellect, whereupon a concept is formed. And even though the intelligible species is that with which the intellect is in immediate contact, it is not properly that which is understood, but that by which the extramental thing is understood (ST 1a 85, 2).

Criticisms and revisions of such scholastic theories by late medieval and modern philosophers up to Hume resulted not only in their abandonment but in a drastic weakening of the hold of the Aristotelian schema as well. Kant's attempt to recapture the Aristotelian schema can best be understood against the background of this development. The criticisms and revisions of the scholastic theory were of a variety of sorts, and two of them are these: First, up until Hume empiricist philosophers gradually diminished the distinction between sensation and intellection by positing only a single sensation-like type of intentional object for representations in general, and by eliminating the notion of active powers of the intellect or understanding from their theories. Second, among modern philosophers in general the idea that sense perceptions do not have mind-independent things as immediate objects of awareness became entrenched. We will examine both of these in detail.

1. Sensualizing the understanding.

An important aspect of the upheaval of scholastic psychology was caused by empiricist philosophers who, between the time of Aquinas and Kant, came closer and closer to identifying sensation and intellection

or thought, both the faculties and the functions. The functions tended to be identified through the gradual elimination of tasks (e.g. activities) peculiar to the intellect in the scholastic picture, and the faculties probably tended to be identified because the functions were. William of Ockham was one of the leaders of the Franciscan movement to revise scholastic psychology in the direction of making the theory itself more empirically plausible.¹ His psychological theory quite clearly fits into this historical trend among empiricists to gradually remove the distinction between sensation and intellect. As we have seen in Chapter 1, he adopts the notion of intuitive cognition by the intellect partly in order to avoid a pervasive problem in previous epistemological theories, the problem that particulars cannot be known if only universal form can be apprehended by the intellect. But he also thinks that the faculty of sensation has intuitive cognitions, and moreover, that the content of a sensitive intuitive cognition is exactly the same as that of its intellectual counterpart. This indicates that Ockham has a tendency to think of immediate intellectual contents as being more similar to immediate sensory content than did Aquinas, who thinks that particular phantasms constituted immediate sensory content and universal species immediate intellectual content. Furthermore, Ockham has a tendency to believe that no activity of a faculty is involved in either sensitive or intellectual intuitive cognition. (He says that if it weren't for the authority of the saints and philosophers, he would say that the intellect is purely passive [Reportatio II q. 25, A, R, AA.]). This is significant in that it is a step in the direction of

eliminating features of the functioning of the Aristotelian intellect not shared by sensation. In making these various moves Ockham has in fact eliminated three Thomist differences between the senses and the intellect: First, the intellect as well as the senses can apprehend particulars; second, the senses and the intellect can immediately apprehend the very same kind of content, and third, the intellect passively receives data from outside of itself just as the senses do. For Ockham the intellect differs from sensation only in that the intellect can perform abstractions that the senses can't. But he doesn't say what he thinks abstraction is; it is somewhat hard to see what it would be, given the remark that as far as he is concerned, the intellect is completely passive.

Another reason Ockham probably had for not actually identifying sensation and intellection was the force of the tradition. One thing that contributed to its downfall was that the modern philosophers beginning with Descartes, in contrast with this tradition, thought of humans as having only a single center of consciousness, the mind or the understanding, and not two, one corresponding the faculty of sensation and the other to the faculty of thought. For Locke, for instance, ideas of sensation are kinds of ideas in the mind, and he usually writes as if the senses themselves are bodily organs which lack consciousness and which serve to feed ideas of sensation into this mind (Essay II, i, 23; II, iii, 1). But even though Locke doesn't believe that there are different centers of consciousness corresponding to sensation and intellection, there is still a distinction between sense and intellect in his theory. The Lockean

mind possesses both the capability to passively receive sensations and active powers of the sort that the Aristotelian intellect possessed. These active powers are the powers of remembering, reflection, contemplating, and comparing of ideas, composition and enlarging of ideas, and abstraction. Yet at the same time Locke often seems to think of the ideas themselves, even abstract ideas, as sensation-like. His thinking of abstract ideas in this way is manifest in that he indicates that there is a difficulty in coming to possess an idea like the general idea of a triangle because different triangles have incompatible sensory characteristics:

For when we nicely reflect upon [abstract ideas], we shall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not require some pain and skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult,) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenum; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together.... one has reason to suspect that such Ideas are marks of our Imperfection... (Essay IV, vii, 9)

Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas and, by implication, abstraction as a mental activity, takes off from such difficulties. Even though Berkeley doesn't reject all mental activity, his denunciation of abstract general ideas is a significant step in the development of the idea of a passive mind. As cautionary note, as we've already seen in chapter 1, Berkeley does not attack the notion of general idea, but only the notion of abstract general idea. Berkeley thinks that perfectly legitimate particular ideas can be made

general by an act of the mind (Principles, Intro. 12). There are two categories of abstraction which Berkeley rejects: First, being able to form abstract general ideas of such qualities, and second, being able to form abstract general ideas of "the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities," like the abstract idea of man (Principles, Intro. 7-9). The reason that Berkeley rejects these kinds of abstraction and the abstract ideas that result is that we cannot bring such ideas before the mind, we cannot introspect them:

...whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. (Principles, Intro., 10)

And in reference to Locke's abstract general idea of a triangle Berkeley says:

If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I got about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is 'neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?'" (Principles, Intro., 13)

That Berkeley is employing introspectability as the criterion for acceptability of a type of idea is also manifested by the fact that there is a kind of "abstract idea" that he allows, like the smell of a

rose or a body without limbs (Principles, Intro., 10; Princ. 5). Such ideas would seem to pass the introspectibility test.

Hume endorses Berkeley's condemnation of Lockean abstract ideas (Treatise, Bk 1, Part 1, Sect. 7). But whereas Berkeley posits an act of mind that can make a particular idea stand for a general class (Principles, Intro., 12), for Hume it seems that the process of mind that relates a particular idea to a general class is passive.

Consider, for instance, Hume's example of this process:

Thus shou'd we mention the word, triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it, and shou'd we afterwards assert, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the other individuals of a scalenum and isocetes, which we overlook at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make us perceive the falsehood of this proposition tho' it be true with relation to that idea, which we had formed. If the mind suggests not always these ideas upon occasion, it proceeds from some imperfection in its faculties; and such a one as is often the source of false reasoning and sophistry. (Treatise, p. 21)

It is not an act of mind which makes that particular idea stand for several triangles, but rather the ideas of several triangles themselves "crowd in upon us." This process is to be explained by means of the principle of the association of ideas, a principle which is supposed to explain the workings of the mind in the way that natural forces of attraction explain physical processes (Treatise, pp. 12-13; c.f. Enquiry, S58). On Hume's view neither physical attraction nor mental association require the activity of a subject; both simply occur.

Hume's psychology is radical in that it tends to a picture of a mind which is wholly passive, a picture not explicitly endorsed in the

empiricist psychology of our millennium by anyone other than by Ockham, (and then with reservation). Hume divides mental representations, which he calls perceptions, into impressions and ideas. Impressions are of two kinds, both of which are clearly passively received, those of sensation which arise from "unknown causes" (Treatise, p. 7) and those of reflection, which are produced by ideas (Treatise, p. 8). Ideas are often copies of impressions; and in such cases impressions cause the corresponding ideas (Treatise, p. 5). Ideas can also be produced in other ways, for instance in the ways that the ideas of cause and of identity are produced.

Phenomenologically, the two kinds of perceptions differ only in feeling; impressions have more force, vivacity, solidity, firmness, or steadiness than ideas (Treatise, pp. 1-8; also pp. 629 and 636). Thus for Hume all mental representations are more consistently than ever before assimilated to what was considered to be sensation by the Aristotelians. It must be remarked that Hume maintains, in a formal way, the diverse Aristotelian roles for mental representations. In the class of impressions there are "sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul...", whereas ideas are the "faint images of these in thinking and reasoning..." (Treatise, p. 1). Consequently, impressions correspond to Aristotelian sensations in function while ideas are supposed to play the role of Aristotelian concepts.

Although he clearly holds that impressions cause ideas, Hume also thinks that there is a mental faculty which produces ideas from impressions; he calls this the imagination. (Memory is another Humean

faculty; it produces representations which are midway in vividness between ideas and impressions) (Treatise, pp. 8, 9). The imagination also possesses other mental powers: "...all simple ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in which form it pleases" (Treatise, p. 10, see also p. 629). It may seem at this point that Hume's imagination is an active mental power, but investigation indicates otherwise. First of all, Hume thinks that there must be some quality among perceptions themselves which leads from the presence in the mind of one to the presence of another in different ways and under various conditions:

...nothing would be more unaccountable than the operations of [the imagination] were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places. Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one idea naturally introduces another. (Treatise, p. 10)

Hume says that ideas are linked together by means of the principles of association which are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect (although clearly he thinks that impressions and ideas can be united in this way as well) (Treatise, 11, Enquiry, S14-15). And further, he seems to be saying that when ideas are associated, no active faculty is needed to produce the association. This consistently appears to be his position. The question at hand now is whether, when ideas are linked in the mind, an active faculty of mind can ever produce the new idea, or whether all ideas that are linked are linked by association. Hume's ideas about this seem to have changed between the time of the

writing of the Treatise and the writing of the Enquiry. In the Treatise he says:

This uniting principle [association] among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails... (Treatise, p. 10).

Hume seems to be saying here that principles of association need not constitute the whole account of every connection of ideas. Sometimes the mind itself provides part of the causal story. But in the Enquiry Hume writes:

...even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person, who broke the thread of the discourse, might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation... (Enquiry, S14)

In the Enquiry, there is no mention of exceptions to the idea that principles of association of ideas are sufficient for explaining the links among ideas. Thus Hume here seems to lean towards the position that all ideas that are connected in any mind are connected by means of principles of association. On the Enquiry position there seems to be no provision for any active powers of mind; Hume there tends towards the view that association does all the work. This position is more consistent with the doctrine of the Treatise that the mind "is

nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations..." (Treatise, p. 207), "that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect..." (Treatise, p. 216). On this picture of what the mind is, it is difficult to see how there could be any active mental powers.

It must be remarked that the kinds of mental processes that Hume describes in the chapter in the Treatise entitled "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses" (Treatise, p. 180ff) go beyond association as Hume describes it. In this chapter Hume wants to account for ideas like identity and persistence, and his account sometimes seems to involve elaborate hypothesis formation. But given what has already been said, I think, that it is safe to say that Hume would want to think of such hypothesis formation as ultimately passive as well.

This is a point at which it is possible to determine more precisely what it is that is at stake in this activity/passivity of mind issue. Voluntary activity, or activity of the will, isn't, at least in general, what is meant by activity of mind. Although Kant speaks of mental activity as spontaneous, there is no emphasis in Aristotelianism on the voluntary nature of the kind of mental activity at stake. Mental activity also could not mean the causal efficacy of representations, or Hume's theory would turn out to be one in which the mind is active. Robert Adams (in conversation) suggests that in this debate the notion of mental activity is equivalent to the notion of agent causation, the causal efficacy of a person or mind. This is a

fruitful and, I think, correct suggestion. The suggestion of the Aristotelian and Lockean theories would be that the understanding or intellect is causally efficacious in the abstraction process. And indeed, in Kant's theory, although the term 'cause' is not strictly speaking applicable to the organizing activity of the understanding, when one dissociates this term from the peculiarities of Kant's theoretical framework, it is not implausible to think of the understanding as a causal agent in this organizing activity. In his tendency to reject all mental activity, then, Hume would be rejecting this sort of agent causation. This is consistent with his general theory of causation; for Hume, causal links are always between events; things like agents can't cause anything.

To understand Kant it is important to see how it is that the Humean inactive mind can reason. Hume divides reasoning into two categories; reasoning about relations between ideas and reasoning concerning matters of fact. The former roughly comprises mathematics and logic, and the latter everything else (Enquiry, S15, cf. Treatise, p. 69ff). Hume is not very clear about exactly what occurs in thinking about relations between ideas, but by putting together some scattered evidence one can conclude that Hume believed that the mind is completely passive in this process. On the one hand, to the extent that reasoning about relations between ideas depends on thinking up steps in proofs, the acquisition of the ideas which constitute the steps can presumably be accounted for by the association theory. The remainder of the reasoning consists in comparison of the ideas

themselves. If the relevant ideas were sensory then the mind would be passive in the comparison:

(A) When both the objects are present to the senses alone with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation. (Treatise, p. 73)

There is something quite unintuitive about this, but I want to avoid evaluation at this point. Further, mathematical ideas are presumably also derived from impressions. If this is indeed true, then it seems that principle (A) would hold for reasoning concerning them. Even if mathematical ideas were in no respect sensory, one would expect Hume to maintain that the principle in (A) would hold for them anyway.

Hume also seems to think that all reasoning concerning matters of fact, e.g., inductive reasoning, involves no activity of mind. He thinks that all reasoning of this type is founded on the relation of cause and effect: "by means of that relation alone can we go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (Enquiry, S16, cf. Treatise, p. 74). As for the kind of "reasoning" concerning matters of fact which does not bring us beyond the evidence of our memory and senses, Hume thinks it better to call this perception and not reasoning (and in perception the mind is passive--see (A) above). But the mind is also completely passive in causal reasoning. Causal reasoning consists only in this: Given a suitable series of past constant conjunctions the idea of the second conjunct is automatically produced in the mind when the first reappears:

...having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe, that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent. (Enquiry, S30)

Thus the development of empiricist theories of mental representation from Aquinas to Hume has two characteristics which set it off from Aristotelian theory: a tendency to think of all mental representations as being of a single kind, this single kind being more similar to Aristotelian sensations than to Aristotelian concepts, and a tendency to think of the mind as passive rather than active.

It is instructive and interesting to speculate about what underlies these tendencies in empiricist psychology. The tendency towards positing only sensation-like entities as mental representations may again be inspired by atomism in natural science. Just as the natural world ultimately consists of physical atoms, the psychological world consists of sensory atoms. Traditional concepts were perhaps thought to be insufficiently atom-like to be attractive theoretical entities. Maybe the tendency to think of the mind as completely passive is at least partially due to the introspectionist bent of empiricist psychology. Just as in empiricist natural science it is stipulated that its assertions somehow be linked to sensation, the classical empiricist condition on psychological statements is that

they be linked to reflection or introspection. This, however, doesn't tell the whole story; although Aristotelian abstraction may not be introspectible, Lockean compounding would be an introspectible operation. Possibly the tendency towards thinking of the mind as passive is partially explained by the typical focus of introspection. The tendency to posit a single sensation-like type of representation might suggest that introspection in these theories is limited to things, qualities, events, and possibly acts, and possibly this is because entities like these rather than powers or abilities are what we naturally introspect.

But a yet deeper reason for positing a passive mind may stem from broader philosophical and psychological considerations. In order to see what this is, it is helpful to recall that according to another group of theories, the Platonic ones, part of the mind, the intellect, is passive. According to these theories there is typically some sense in which the will is free and active; human beings are causal agents via their will. But humans are not causal agents via their intellect. On these Platonic theories the representations (in the sense of Vorstellungen) of the intellect are received from without; the intellect plays only a passive role in their reception, although the will can perform the function of turning the intellect towards the representations. One thing that is significant about such theories is that they posit a sufficient cause of intellectual representations that transcends the human mind. On a broadly Platonic conception, humans are radically dependent for intellectual representations on a transcendent thing or order, whether it be Plato's own realm of the

forms, or God and the ideas in his mind for the Christian Platonist Augustine, as well as for the fairly close followers of his, Anselm and Malebranche. On Malebranche's theory, for instance, we see all of the ideas we have in God, and we have no causal efficacy in this process at all. Humans are radically dependent on God for their intellectual representations.

Analogously, it seems that Hume, as well as many modern empiricists, are drawn by the idea that humans are creatures radically dependent on nature, not only for their intellectual representations, but in general. According to modern naturalism a human being is a physical organism whose mental processes are explained in the same way as, and are continuous with, processes of the natural environment. Modern naturalists hold that mental processes are of a kind and linked up with the processes posited by contemporary physics and biology. Although Hume might not believe in a material natural world--for him the natural world may consist of bundles of perceptions--he also thinks that the kinds of processes that go on in the human mind are the same as and indeed one of a piece, part of, those of nature. Perhaps the most significant point to make is that Hume thinks that mental processes are exactly as causally determined as processes in nature are, and that the mental and the physical form a single determinate order (Enquiry, Sect. viii). Consequently, just as in the natural world, there is no room for spontaneous activity in the realm of the mental. On Hume's and on other naturalistic theories there is no human agent causation at all; humans are, ultimately, completely dependent on nature.²

Kant opposes himself to the trend in empiricist psychology to think of all mental representations as analogous to sensations. He reasserts the position of the Aristotelian schema that there are two sorts of mental representations, representations of particulars on the one hand and general, organizing, concepts on the other. This is one of the central doctrines of the Critique; much of Kant's philosophy is linked up with it. The two kinds are different, as in the Aristotelian schema, but, as is clear by now, they don't exactly match up to their Aristotelian counterparts. For instance, even though Kantian concepts and Aristotelian intellectual representations are both characterized as forms, Kantian concepts are not typically apprehended without their corresponding matter whereas Aristotelian intellectual representations are. In the Aristotelian picture there is nothing like Kant's manifold of intuition, and there is also nothing exactly like intuitions as representations of particulars either.

I think that Kant can be seen as arguing, in the Transcendental Deduction and the Second Analogy, for the idea that there are these two kinds of mental representations, and I devote Chapters 5 through 7 to setting out and discussing these arguments. To be sure, the Transcendental Deduction was considered by Kant to be an argument or a series of arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, and undoubtedly Kant thought this particular conclusion to be one of the most important goals of his own philosophizing. It is not clear to me, however, that his arguments succeed at showing this ambitious thesis to be true. But I think that they are successful at

demonstrating the somewhat less spectacular, but nonetheless deep and interesting conclusion, that our mental repertoire must contain both organizing concepts and representations of particulars.

Kant also returns to the Aristotelian schema insofar as he thinks that the human mind must be capable of intellectual activity as well as the passive reception of atomistic representations. Kant's arguments for this position are consciously directed against Hume's idea that an account of the structure of experience requires only atomistic representations and association among them, that the account can do without any kind of mental activity. Kant contends that neither an account of self-consciousness, of intentionality, nor of certain kinds of regularity in experience is possible without the positing an active, organizing understanding. Although the idea of an active intellect, or understanding, is Aristotelian, the kind of activity performed by Kant's understanding is different from that of Aristotle's. In the Aristotelian system, forms inhere in matter in the phantasm, and it takes intellectual activity to abstract them from this matter. The typical activity of the intellect consists in abstraction. In his Logic (Ak XI 94-5) Kant does mention abstraction in connection with empirical concepts, but in general, for him, the typical activity of the understanding is organization and unification. From the point of view of extraordinary, transcendental psychology, by means of concepts it synthesizes representations which are disunified in themselves; from the point of view of ordinary empirical psychology it uses those same concepts to form judgments, a process which consists in the unification of representations.

In Kant's theory, as in Aristotle's, the intellect or understanding, not only the will, is a source of activity or agent causation. Such a view is expressive of the idea that human beings are less dependent on outside forces than on either the Platonic or the naturalistic theories. There is a sense in which humans have a more significant place in the world for Aristotle and Kant than for the proponents of these other theories. For Aristotle and for Kant human beings are intellectual agents. It's not, of course, that Aristotle and Kant think that human beings are not passive with respect to God and nature at all, but that humans are more active than they are in these other theories.

What I am suggesting is that in this context theories of cognition are often expressive of a broader philosophical view. From a purely theoretical point of view, one might question how much more of an original causal force in the world the human being is on the Aristotelian and Kantian theories that she is on, say, Augustinian theories. On the Aristotelian and Kantian theories the intellect is active in that it abstracts from or organizes previously received content, whereas on an Augustinian theory the only activity associated with the intellect is that of the will turning the attention of the mind towards God to await enlightenment. The net difference in causal agency doesn't seem all that great. But what may seem to be minor differences are significant since they are expressive of a broader philosophical view of the place of humans in nature and in the world in general.

2. The intentionality of perception.

I think that Aquinas really wants to hold the position that in normal sensory perception we are immediately aware of entities that are extramental (ST 1a 85, 2). By this I mean to say that Aquinas would like to hold the position that from the internal, first-person, phenomenological point of view, the immediate object of awareness of any normal sensory perception is something external to and independent of the mind, not a phantasm or form, nor a sense-datum or an idea. But there is a tension in Aquinas's position. The means by which the extramental objects are apprehended in perception are the phantasm and the form, and if the phantasm and the form are the only things that actually make contact with the perceptual faculties, one might ask whether the phantasm and the form rather than the extramental object are the immediate objects of awareness. This problem for this theory is generalizable; it is not specifically Aristotelian. On any theory according to which a typical perceptual state is caused by an extramental object, there is natural pull to thinking of the perception as a modification of the mind in which one is not immediately aware of an extramental object, the extramental object functioning merely as a cause. This is Locke's position. For him Ideas are the immediate objects of awareness in sense perception (Essay, Intro., sec. 8; II. 8.8).

Locke and other moderns were motivated to this position by other concerns as well, one of which may be the modern scientific theory of body. According to the theory developed by Galileo and Descartes, the material world possesses only the qualities which comport well with

geometric/mechanistic explanation, qualities which became known as the primary qualities. A typical list of primary qualities consists of extension, shape, position, motion, duration, and number (Meditations, HR I 164). By contrast, non-geometrical qualities like colour, smell, sensation of heat and cold, taste, and sound are thought to be modifications of the mind, caused in part by the influence of mechanistic matter on the mind. These qualities eventually came to be called secondary qualities. Both Galileo and Descartes represent their mechanistic motivations for this theory as a purely rational motivation; the theory is supposed to be a deliverance of reason untrammelled or "unguided" by the senses. Galileo writes in The

Assayer:

Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.

Descartes's theory is summarized in the following passage from the

Third Meditation:

For if I look more clearly and examine them one by one, as I yesterday examined the idea of the wax, I observe that it is only of a very few properties that they give me clear and distinct perception: viz.

magnitude or extension in length, breadth, and depth; shape, which arises from this extension's having boundaries; position, a relation between objects possessing shape; and motion, or change of position; to these may be added substance, duration, and number. Other properties--light and colours, sounds, odours, flavours, heat and cold, and other tactile qualities--are experienced (cogitantur) by me only in a very obscure and confused way, so that I do not know whether they are real or illusory, that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of positive reality or not. (AG 83)

Descartes goes on to say that ideas of secondary qualities are materially false, which is a quality that ideas have "when they represent what is not a positive thing as if it were one"⁴ (AG 84).

Margaret Wilson points out that Descartes gives us little reason for accepting this theory about secondary quality representations based on their phenomenological character.⁵ The deep reasons for the denigration of secondary quality representations are twofold. First, secondary qualities have no obvious place in mechanistic science, one ideal for Descartes and Galileo, whereas the primary qualities do. The primary qualities are the qualities that are essential to mechanistic explanation. Second, secondary qualities cannot clearly be represented mathematically, and mathematics is the ideal and paradigm for knowledge on Descartes' view. Shape, size, extension, and motion can all be geometrically and algebraically described; this is not the case or at least not obviously the case for colour, taste, and smell.

Locke thinks of a secondary quality as the "Power that is in any Body, by Reason of its insensible primary Qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different Ideas of several Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, etc."

(Essay, II, viii, 23), so given his definition secondary qualities do have some kind of extramental existence. But secondary quality ideas do not resemble secondary qualities (Essay, II, viii, 15ff), and the secondary qualities are really primary quality textures that have the power to affect the mind with secondary quality ideas (Essay, II, viii, 17, 18, 23). Thus for Locke, as for Galileo and Descartes, there are many sensations which don't resemble anything in the external, extramental world. Consequently, these sensations could not be immediate awarenesses of anything extramental. And, perhaps, if a significant group of sensations are not regarded as having this kind of intentionality, it becomes more natural to think of all sensory perception as similar.

Moreover, the idea that secondary qualities are not real extramental qualities did not die with mechanistic science. Newtonian physics maintained the position, as did the phenomenisms of Berkeley and Hume. Berkeley's and Hume's arguments for the thesis that if secondary qualities are modifications of the mind, primary qualities must be so as well provide even stronger support for this thesis about perception (Principles 9-15, Treatise, pp. 225-231). Locke could have held (although he did not) that insofar as sense perceptions are of primary qualities they have extramental things as their intentional objects, but if Berkeley and Hume are right, then this position is ruled out. By the time of Kant, therefore, the idea that secondary qualities ideas are modifications of mind had plenty of powerful endorsement and defense.

Another reason for holding this view about sense perception is provided by skeptical arguments. According to one argument, since sense perceptions that we have in dreams and hallucinations are qualitatively indistinguishable from those of normal experience, why should the latter be thought to have extramental immediate objects of awareness and the former not? It might be more plausible to hold that neither have extramental immediate objects of awareness, and at most that normal experiences are caused by extramental objects which resemble immediate (mental) objects of awareness. Furthermore, there is something intuitively appealing about this picture, which is sometimes called the "idea" idea. In typical non-idealistic theories, the ultimate causes of perception are extramental objects. Given that they are extramental, it is plausible to think that perceptual states are states of the mind caused by these objects, not states in which the immediate objects of awareness are the extramental ones. There is thus a pull to thinking that one's perceptual states, content and all, are completely in the mind. This is a pull which Kant to which Kant yields (Fourth Paralogism in A, Refutation of Idealism in B, cf. ch. 4) On a view of this kind, the picture according to which immediate objects of awareness are extramental perhaps suggests that the sense organs are something like windows, and that once they are opened, the pure consciousness is in immediate contact with the external world, a picture which can seem strange.

It is clear that the apprehension of the matter of Kant's transcendental psychology, the atomistic representations which are synthesized by the understanding, is not the immediate apprehension of

something extramental. Although Kant thinks that there are things in themselves which correspond to appearances (e.g. B308-9), he does not think that we ever actually have any awareness of things in themselves (e.g., B66ff, A253=B309ff). Rather, the things in themselves are somehow responsible for appearances:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
(Bxxvi-xxvii)

and appearances are completely in us:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance, that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. (A42=B59)

Kant, therefore, accepts something like the "idea" idea in his transcendental psychology. But it is very important to see that Kant wants to restrict the "idea" idea to transcendental psychology in order secure immediate awareness of external objects at the empirical level. Kant's view is that we cannot have immediate awareness of objects that are ultimately external to minds because we can only be aware of the effects of them on our minds (Fourth Paralogism in A). He consequently shifts our relation to ultimately external objects, things in themselves, to the transcendental level. Kant then constructs a notion of object at the empirical level which allows

immediate awareness of them. The central notion of an empirical object is that of the content of an intuition (e.g. A108-9, A191=B236), and the empirical object is constructed by the mind out of the effect the ultimately external objects have on the mind. Since the content of intuitions are in the mind, it is possible for us to be immediately aware of empirical objects.

I think that the motivation to preserve the belief that we are immediately aware of the ordinary objects of experience is one of the dominant ones in Kant's theory of cognition. As we will discuss in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6, this motivates much of what is unique in Kantian theory of cognition. I think that this belief is part of the Aristotelian schema, and I suspect that, as in Aristotle, it expresses the broader philosophical view that humans are creatures at home in the empirical world.

Yet the situation with regard to sense perception at the empirical level is somewhat clouded since Kant presents two potentially conflicting theories about it. On the one hand Kant says that sensations are just ways in which the subject is affected by objects: "The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is sensation" (A19-20=B34). He also says that sensations don't yield knowledge of objects at all:

...sensations of colours, sounds, and heat, which, since they are mere sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves yield knowledge of any object, least of all any a priori knowledge. (A29=B44)

Although this is not, presumably, supposed to exclude the idea that sensations may correspond to something like repulsive force,⁶ it

excludes the possibility of sensations having empirical objects as immediate objects of awareness. On the other hand, in the Refutation of Idealism Kant takes himself to have proven that we have immediate awareness of outer objects, in the sense that there is no inner "veil of ideas" between us and these outer objects. We don't apprehend outer objects by having ideas which represent outer objects by being similar to them; we represent them without the mediation of such ideas:

Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we can only infer outer things--and this, moreover, only in an untrustworthy manner, as in all cases where we are inferring from given effects to determinate causes. In this particular case, the cause of the representations, which we ascribe, perhaps falsely, to outer things, may lie in ourselves. But in the above proof it has been shown that outer experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is inner experience possible. (B276-77)

The representations that Kant is talking about here must be intuitions since they are defined as immediate representations of objects. Regardless of whether this immediate apprehension is demonstrated by the proof in the Refutation of Idealism, it presents a problem for the anti-realist view of secondary quality sensation that Kant also holds. Phenomenologically, our representations of outer objects include both primary and secondary quality representations. If Kant wants to maintain his anti-realism about secondary quality sensation, his view that we are immediately aware of things (relatively) external to our minds must hold only for primary quality representations. This seems at least somewhat strange; on this view my perception of the shape of the plant in front of me is an immediate awareness of something

external to my mind, whereas my perception of its colour is a mere modification of my mind, something in me. Maybe this is perfectly consistent, but yet it seems troubling. Perhaps my perplexity is mainly a result of not seeing what kind of room there is in Kant's ordinary psychology for the notion of a sensation as the mere modification of the mind (see ch. 1). If the notion of an object of experience is just the notion of the content of an intuition, it's hard to see how one might justify the idea that objects of experience aren't really coloured.

It seems most accurate to describe Kant's empirical psychology as tending towards a rejection of the tendency in modern philosophy to think of perception as having no extramental immediate objects of awareness, and trying to turn back to the Aristotelian schema. What gets in the way, at least at the time of the writing of the Critique, is his desire to accommodate the anti-realist notions about secondary quality sensation of the scientific revolution.

In order to preserve the belief that we are immediately aware of ordinary empirical objects Kant must resist or subvert the motivations that drew his predecessors to the opposing view. As we've just seen, part of this is accomplished by means of his transcendental idealism. There is another motivation that works against the Kantian view, a motivation that we have not yet discussed, to which I devote Chapter 6. This is the motivation to extensionalize all mental intentional relations, to recast them so that the resulting description of them is extensional. Locke and Hume, for instance, accomplish this by making every mental intentional relation a relation to a perception or an

idea. I will argue that the tendency to extensionalize mental intentional relations is naturalistic in certain instances, a tendency to embrace a naturalistic model for the explanation of mental intentional relations, and that Kant's resistance of this tendency reflects his resistance of naturalism in general.

Footnotes to Chapter 2.

¹The information on Ockham has been gleaned from ch. 13 of Marilyn Adams' forthcoming book on Ockham and from conversations with her.

²David Hume, Enquiry, Sect. VIII.

³For example, R.C.S. Walker says in his book Kant (op. cit. ch. 1, n.13) "but redness is Kant's paradigm of an empirical concept, acquired by abstraction from the observation of things." (p. 29) I can't find any justification for this interpretation in 'abstraction' is taken in the Aristotelian or Lockean sense, but if all Walker means by this term is "derived from" then what he says is unproblematic.

⁴The notion of material falsity is notorious. For a discussion of the issue see Margaret D. Wilson's Descartes, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 100-109.

⁵M. Wilson, Descartes, p. 119.

⁶Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Nature, Ak IV, 496ff.

Chapter 3: Kant and Leibniz on Innateness and on the Appearance/Reality Distinction.

In the last chapter I argued that on two important issues, on the distinction of sensation and understanding, and on the intentionality of sensory experiences, Kant rejects the radical empiricism and naturalism of Hume and moves towards the more moderate position of the Aristotelians. Kant also adopts a great deal from the modern rationalist tradition and this is only to be expected, given that he was educated in the Leibnizian philosophy. But what he took from rationalism he also modified, and these modifications are at least partially inspired by empiricist considerations. Thus there is at least some truth in the Hegelian view that Kant's philosophy is a synthesis between rationalism and empiricism.

Among the aspects of Kant's theory of mental representation that are strongly influenced by rationalism two stand out: the theory of a priori concepts and a priori intuitions, and the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Kant's theory of a priori representations is closely related to one of the hallmarks of the rationalist tradition, the doctrine of innate ideas. It is informative to explore Kant's relation to Leibniz on this issue, to see what Leibniz's theory is and how Kant perceives his own theory in relation to Leibniz's. The rationalist doctrine of the split between appearance and reality is as old as Parmenides and Plato, but there is a distinct development of it in the modern period. Galileo and Descartes's secondary quality anti-realism already entails a distinction between the way things seem

to the perceiver and the way things really are, sometimes described as the distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. In Leibniz's theory there are still more appearance/reality distinctions, of which the most famous is the distinction between the world of monads and how this world appears to us. A motivation common to Descartes and Leibniz is a desire to hold that what reason discerns through metaphysics and science is more real than that which is immediately presented by the senses. But Leibniz goes a step further and evokes a reality/appearance distinction which expresses his view that that which is presented by metaphysical reasoning is more real than the world picture presented by scientific reasoning.

Kant takes over the notion of the appearance/reality distinction but the precise nature of his distinctions and his motivations for making them are somewhat different from Leibniz's. For instance, whereas Leibniz thinks that the world of monads, the real metaphysical structure of the world, is apprehended by reason, Kant thinks that no cognition can be had of such ultimate reality. This is the result of his critique of metaphysics, a central anti-rationalist aspect of Kant's philosophy. According to Kant's critical theory, the task of metaphysics is not to discover what the ultimate nature of reality is, but to show what we can and must merely believe about the ultimate nature of things for the purposes of morality and religion (see Bxxviff). For Kant, then, Leibniz's distinction between monads -- the things in themselves -- and the world of appearance leaves the service of traditional rationalist metaphysics, and instead contributes to the interests of moral and religious faith (Bxxx).

In this chapter I don't want to expand on this moral and religious motivation. Rather, I want to focus on Kant's view that there is something wrong with Leibniz's way of making the ultimate appearance/reality distinction, the distinction between monads and how they appear. Kant's famous charge against Leibniz is that for him representations of sensibility are merely confused representations of things in themselves. It will prove to be interesting to examine this charge, not only to see whether Kant is right, but to discover the significance of the charge itself for the understanding of Kant's theory of mental representation.

1. Innate ideas.

According to traditional Aristotelianism, humans naturally (as opposed to the disembodied state) have no innate ideas. Aquinas, for instance, held that human beings acquire all of their concepts through sensation, at least in the natural state (ST 1a 84, 7).¹ By contrast, the rationalist tradition developed the Platonic notion that there are concepts or ideas that are in some sense in the mind from the beginning. Descartes's psychology, for instance, differs from Thomistic psychology in that it posits ideas which are not acquired through sense perception, but somehow are in the mind as it is created by God. One of Descartes's more dramatic presentations of this view is in a letter to Mersenne on the innate eternal truths:

Do not hesitate, I pray you, to assert and proclaim it everywhere that it is God who set up these laws in nature, as a king sets up his laws in his kingdom. Now there is no single one of these laws that we cannot comprehend, if our mind turns to consider it;

and all of these laws are naturally implanted in our minds, just as a king would impress his laws on his subjects' hearts, if he had power enough. (AG 259, cf K11).

This rejection of Thomistic Aristotelian empiricism is continued by Spinoza and Leibniz. Leibniz develops accounts of the origins of innate ideas which are especially relevant to understanding Kant. One group of Leibnizian innate ideas consist of what Robert McRae calls metaphysical concepts.² Various lists of these are given in Leibniz's works; they include concepts like being, unity, substance, identity, action, change, force, and power. On McRae's view, Leibniz's account of the origin of these concepts is significantly similar to Descartes's view on the same issue. McRae cites a passage in Descartes's Third Meditation:

As for the clear and distinct elements in my ideas of corporeal objects, it should seem I may have borrowed some of them from my idea of myself; viz. substance, duration, number, and so on. (AG 84)

Descartes is suggesting here that (some of) our metaphysical concepts are derived from the idea we have of the self, although it should be noted that the context of this passage is not one in which he is clearly presenting his own metaphysical position. Compare what Descartes says in the above passage to the view Leibniz presents in the New Essays:

Those who support innate truths must indeed maintain and be convinced that those ideas are also innate--I acknowledge that this is my own opinion. The ideas of being, possible, and same are so thoroughly innate that they enter into all our thoughts and reasoning, and I regard them as essential to our minds. But I have already said that we do not always pay particular attention to them, and that it takes time to sort them out. I have said too that we are so to speak innate

to ourselves; and since we are beings, being is innate to us--the knowledge of being is comprised in the knowledge that we have of ourselves. Something like this holds of other general notions. (New Essays 101-2)

This is like the account which Descartes suggests; yet there is a difference. Descartes speaks of borrowing metaphysical concepts from the self whereas Leibniz says that they are comprised in the knowledge we have of ourselves and that it is through focussing on them that they become conscious for us. Leibniz's account on is Platonic or Augustinian in that no activity of mind is required to produce metaphysical concepts. They are part of the mind's structure, and all that is needed to make them conscious is a focusing of the mind.

Leibniz also has an account of the origin of another type of innate idea, the mathematical concepts like extension, figure, space, and motion. McRae thinks that Leibniz's account here is also similar to Descartes view on the same issue.³ According to McRae, the account goes like this: by means of the senses we acquire ideas like those of extension and shape. So far, mathematical concepts are empirical. What the understanding contributes is a conception of possibles; the understanding turns in on the ideas presented by the senses and discerns possibilities in these ideas. Mathematical concepts are the concepts of possibilities in sensory ideas like extension and shape. These concepts are innate in that they partially originate in the powers of mind to discern such possibilities.

Another aspect of the rationalist notion of innate idea which is particularly relevant to Kant's psychology is the notion of an innate idea as a power or disposition. One of the reasons that Locke rejects

the notion of an innate idea is that he thinks it to be obvious that young children do not possess the ideas which Descartes, say, thought to be innate (e.g., Essay, I, ii, 12). What this shows is not that the notion of an innate idea is absurd, but that for the believer in innate ideas there has to be more to such an idea than an object of an occurrent, conscious, mental state. In the Third Meditation, it may seem that in general Descartes is thinking of all ideas as such objects of occurrent, conscious mental states:

Some of these experiences are as it were pictures of objects (tanquam rerum imagines), and these alone are properly called ideas; e.g., when I think of (cogito) a man, a chimera, the sky, an angel, or God. (AG 78, HR I 164).

But this is not his considered view. In Notes on a Certain Programme, Descartes suggests that innate ideas are at least in part dispositions or powers:

...in order to distinguish that all the content (formae) of these thoughts from other ideas which adventitious or manufactured, I called them innate. It is in the same sense of the word that we say generosity is innate in certain families; or again that in others certain diseases, e.g., gout and the stone, are innate, not that infants of these families suffer from these diseases in their mother's womb, but because they are born with a certain disposition or liability to contract them. (AG 302-3)

Just as a generous family is not always actualizing its generosity, so an innate idea is not always actualized in an occurrent, conscious, mental state. Presumably an infant can become conscious of this innate idea as it matures, and presumably the idea is not acquired through empirical means,⁴ although experience may be the occasion or the trigger for the conscious acquisition of it. Furthermore, for

someone who has become conscious of an innate idea, the idea isn't always actualized as a conscious state. One who knows what unity is does not consciously think of unity all the time. For Descartes, then, we might conjecture that although an innate idea, on the one hand, may be an object of an occurrent conscious mental state, it is, on the other hand, an inborn disposition to eventually have that conscious mental state on appropriate occasions.

Leibniz seems to embrace something like this theory of the nature of an innate idea, and expands it into a theory of all ideas (after all, he thinks that all ideas are innate):

In order properly to conceive correctly what an idea is, we must forestall an ambiguity, for several thinkers take the idea for the form or the differential of our thoughts, and thus we have an idea in our mind only insofar as we are thinking of it, and every time we think of it anew we have another idea of the same thing, though it is similar to the preceding ones. But others, it seems, take the idea to be an immediate object of thought or for some permanent form which remains even when we no longer contemplate it. As a matter of fact, our soul always does have within it the quality (qualite) to represent to itself any nature or form whatever, when an occasion arises for thinking of it. I believe that this quality (qualite) of our soul, insofar as it expresses some nature, form, or essence, is properly the idea of the thing, which is in us and is always in us whether we think of it or not. (Discourse on Metaphysics 26)

First of all, by the term idea we understand something which is in our mind ... There are many things in our mind, however, which we know are not ideas though they would not occur without ideas--for example thoughts, perceptions, and affections. In my opinion, an idea consists not in some act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea, even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can think of it. (What is an Idea?, G VII 263, L317)

5

In both of these passages Leibniz identifies an idea with a faculty or disposition. In the second passage this is quite clear; in the first passage the quality with which the idea is identified is dispositional in that it is in us whether or not we are thinking of the form or nature that the quality expresses. Leibniz sometimes thinks of ideas as objects of occurrent, conscious mental states. This notion of an idea is quite prevalent in the New Essays.⁶ As is the case for Descartes, it seems to be a mistake to find a completely uniform pattern in the use of the word 'idea' in Leibniz. What is important is that Leibniz's theory of what an idea is contains both the notion of a disposition to represent something to oneself which persists over time, and the notion of an object of an occurrent mental state. I think that it is quite clear that the former notion is dominant.

Margaret Wilson thinks that Leibniz generally makes the distinction between conceptual abilities on the one hand and particular presentings on the other, thus anticipating Kant's concept/intuition distinction.⁷ This is right if not too much is meant to be claimed here. For Leibniz a conceptual ability is primarily an ability to present a certain content to oneself. It is not a representation with a content of its own, or even an ability to order or to organize. Leibniz's account of clarity and distinctness does associate conceptual ability with an idea, but it is not clear to what extent Leibniz was aware of the distinction between conceptual ability and an ability to present a certain content to oneself. One should be somewhat circumspect as to what one attributes to Leibniz

here; in particular, one should be careful not to assimilate his theory to Kant's.

As regards Kant's notion of innate idea, the situation is rather complicated. In some sense Kant accepts the notion of an innate idea, but he rejects the use of the term 'innate'. In the Critique Kant never uses the term 'innate' ('angeboren') in connection with a priori concepts or a priori intuitions. Kant explains this fact in On a Discovery (1790), a work in which he defends himself against Eberhard's charge that the Critique is only an example of inferior Leibnizianism. Kant compares his theory of mental representation to Leibniz's in the following way:

(A) The Critique admits absolutely no divinely implanted (anerschaffene) or innate (angeborene) representations. It regards them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, as acquired (erworben). There is, however, an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural right formulate it), consequently also of that which previously did not exist, and therefore did not pertain to anything before the act. Such is, as the Critique shows, first of all, the form of things in space and time, secondly, the synthetic unity of the manifold in concepts; for neither of these is derived by our faculty of knowledge from the objects given to it as they are in themselves, but rather it brings them out of itself a priori. There must, however, be a ground in the subject which makes it possible for these representations to originate in this and no other manner, and which enables them to be related to objects which are not yet given. This ground at least is innate. (Ak VIII 221-2)

Kant doesn't want to say that the categories and the forms of intuition are strictly speaking innate, but yet he does want to say that an innate ground in the subject makes their acquisition possible. In affirming that there is an innate ground in the subject for a

priori concepts and intuitions from these representations are derived, Kant is more or less aligning himself with Leibniz. With respect to concepts, the metaphysical positions of Leibniz and Kant are similar in that Leibniz holds that metaphysical concepts derive from an idea of the self, and Kant says, mysteriously, that they have a ground in the subject. Kant differs from Leibniz in his non-Platonic talk of acquisition of innate ideas. For Kant, more than a mere effort of attention is required to become conscious of the a priori concepts. Instead, Kant says, these ideas must be acquired, and this indicates that he is in some sense aligning himself with Aristotelianism and empiricism. But he is not deeply Aristotelian on this point, since Aristotelians did not hold that certain ideas had a ground in the self or are to be acquired from the self. I suspect that Kant is rejecting the term 'innate' to differentiate himself from Leibniz and not to put himself in another already defined philosophical camp.

Kant's position on this issue differs from Leibniz's in another important respect. Both Leibniz believes that the a priori metaphysical concepts can be derived from an idea of the self which precedes all experience, while Kant argues in the Paralogisms that the idea of the self that can be acquired a priori is not nearly as rich as it has to be to yield metaphysical concepts all by itself. For instance, Kant argues that the notion of a self which is a substance in the full-fledged sense of a thing which persists through time cannot have an origin which is completely a priori (A348ff, B406ff). Moreover, if the pure concepts cannot genuinely apply beyond experience, it seems unlikely that they could be grounded completely

in the transcendental self. But now the sense in which the self is the innate ground of the pure concepts for Kant is even more of a mystery. Although he doesn't say much which is directly relevant to this issue, there is a story about it which seems to me to be appealing as an interpretation of Kant. Two Kantian doctrines are relevant to it; the first is Kant's notion that despite the failure of the Leibnizian account, there is always a "logical" or "formal" predicate of the self that can be derived from each of the Paralogisms. For instance, about the proof that the soul is a substance, Kant says:

...the first syllogism of transcendental psychology, when it puts forward the constant logical subject of thought as being knowledge of the real subject in which thought inheres, is palming off upon us what is a mere pretense of a new insight. We do not have, and cannot have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject. Consciousness is, indeed, that which alone makes all representations to be thoughts, and in it, therefore, as the transcendental subject, all our perceptions must be found, but beyond this logical meaning of the 'I', we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which as substratum underlies this 'I' as it does all thoughts. The proposition 'The soul is a substance', may, however, quite well be allowed to stand, if only it be recognized that this concept [of the soul as a substance] does not carry us a single step further, and so cannot yield us any of the usual deductions of the pseudo-rational doctrine of the soul...
(A350)

Thus, although the Cartesians and Leibnizians, the rational psychologists, cannot prove a priori that for instance the self is a substance in that it is a thing which persists through time, they can show that the soul is substance in the sense that it is the subject of all perceptions, which might be thought of as the formal sense of the

term 'substance'. The second relevant Kantian doctrine is that the categories do not apply in experience until they have been schematized:

But pure concepts of understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with any intuition... How, then, is the subsumption of intuitions under pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible? (A137-8=B176-7)

"By means of the schemata" is Kant's answer to the question in this passage. Schemata, as we've seen in chapter 1, are "temporalizations" of the pure concepts.

These two elements of Kantian doctrine suggest the following account. For every pure concept there is a core concept, which does not by itself apply to experience, and a schema which enables it to apply. The innate ground of this core concept is the transcendental self. Kant's comment in passage (A) above, that "The Critique admits no ... innate representations... It regards them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, as acquired" thus has the following implications, at least with regard to representations which are concepts. Pure concepts are originally acquired as opposed to being strictly speaking innate in that the formal aspects of these concepts are grounded in the transcendental self. On this interpretation the net difference between Kant and the rational psychologists is that while the rational psychologists think that the whole of any empirically applicable pure concept can be derived from the a priori notion of the self, Kant thinks that only an aspect of it can. What cannot be derived from the a priori idea of

the self are the schemata, which complete the concepts. Again, I am not suggesting that this is Kant's thoroughly considered position, only that it is a view that he might have had in the back of his mind. Moreover, I can see how this account might work for pure concepts like unity, substance, and existence, but it is not obvious at all how concepts like necessity and community could arise in this way.

Kant's anti-Cartesian assertion in passage (A), that the Critique admits no divinely implanted representations, also requires some attention. Kant is against the idea of divinely implanted pure concepts because then, as he states in the Transcendental Deduction in B, the necessity of the categories would have to be sacrificed:

The concept of cause for instance, which expresses the necessity of an event under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I would not then be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object, that is to say, necessarily, but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. This is exactly what the sceptic most desires. (B168)

To discern exactly what Kant means by the necessity that would have to be sacrificed on the divine implantation theory is a complicated and difficult undertaking. I will try to deal with it in Chapter 8.

Kant explains the respect in which the ground of pure intuition is innate in this way:

(B) The ground of the possibility of sensible intuition ... is the particular receptivity of the mind, whereby it receives representations in accordance with its subjective constitution, when affected by something (in sensation). Only this first formal ground, e.g., the possibility of a representation of space, is innate, not spatial

representation itself. For impressions are always required in order to first enable the faculty of knowledge to represent an object (which is always its own act). Thus, the formal intuition, which is called space, emerges as an originally acquired representation (the form of outer objects in general), the ground of which (as mere receptivity) is nevertheless innate and the acquisition of which long precedes determinate concepts of things that are in accordance with this form. (Ak VIII 222)

Exactly what Kant means by all this would require a great deal of reconstruction. Suffice it to say that Kant's account of the innateness of mathematical concepts is very different from that of Leibniz and Descartes. According to Kant the innate aspect of mathematical concepts is not the ability to discern possibilities, but the type of receptivity the mind, presumably the transcendental self, has, which is an aspect of the mind's nature or constitution. And just as in the case of concepts no representation is, strictly speaking, innate here; the receptivity is the innate ground of acquired a priori spatial and temporal intuitions.

Of all the ways in which Kant sees himself to be differing from Leibniz, the most significant is likely on the issue of whether a priori intellectual representations, concepts, are sufficient for knowledge. Kant thinks of himself as differing from Leibniz in that whereas Leibniz holds that representations which are innate or have their ground in the intellect by themselves yield knowledge of objects, he thinks that passively received material is required as well. Kant argues for this view in the Critique in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection and also in On a Discovery, a later work

directed against J.H. Eberhard, a critic of his views. I will examine this issue in Chapter 8.

2. Appearance and reality.

A central theme in Leibniz's philosophy is that there is not only one, but that there is a series of distinctions between appearance and the "reality" of which it is the appearance. The Leibnizian world of experience is an appearance which is not an immediate appearance of an ultimate reality, but an appearance of an appearance. There are several such appearances which finally end in a reality which is not itself an appearance.⁸

For Leibniz there are three distinct kinds of appearance/reality distinction. First, our secondary quality ideas are not only underlain and caused by primary quality structures, but are also appearances of them. Leibniz writes:

(C) We say that the light is in the fire, because there are motions in the fire which the senses cannot detect individually, but which form a confusion--a running together--which is brought within reach of the senses and is represented to us by the idea of light.
(New Essays II, viii, 15, emphasis mine)

It should be noted that in a sense Leibniz is more hesitant than Descartes is about denigrating representations of secondary qualities. It is true that, like Descartes, Leibniz holds that secondary quality ideas are less representative of things outside us than primary quality ideas are. For instance Leibniz says that "we may doubt whether [the ideas of color, heat, and other similar qualities] are actually to be found in the nature of things outside us" (DM 12).

Like Descartes, he also thinks that primary qualities are causally more fundamental, that primary quality structures cause secondary quality sensations in us:

...'sensory ideas [colours, tastes and so on] depend on detail in the shapes and motions, which they precisely express, though the mechanical processes which act on our senses are too small and too great in number for us to sort out this detail within the confusion (New Essays IV, vi, 7)

But Leibniz's general tendency is to reduce the size of the Cartesian gulf between ideas of primary and those of secondary qualities. First of all, although he agrees with Descartes that our secondary quality ideas are confused, he maintains that our primary quality ideas are confused as well, although not to as great a degree:

It can even be demonstrated that the concepts of size, figure and motion are not so distinct as has been imagined and that they include something imaginary and relative to our perceptions, as do also (though to a greater extent) colour, heat and other similar qualities... (DM 12)

Although any sensory idea may be clear (Leibniz, siding with Locke, holds that primary quality ideas 'are sensory, just as secondary quality ideas are (New Essays passim)), that is, sufficient for recognizing an instance of it, no sensory idea that we have is ever perfectly distinct, that is, such that we can state all of the characteristics which differentiate an instance of what is represented by the idea from anything else.⁹ Our sensory ideas of colours, for instance, are indistinct, i.e., confused, because we cannot say what differentiates one colour from another (Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas, W284). But Leibniz also has a more general reason for believing that all sensory ideas are confused:

We see also that our sense perceptions, even when they are clear, must necessarily contain a certain confused feeling, for, since all the bodies of the universe are in sympathy with each other, ours receives impressions from all the rest, and though our senses are in response to all of them, it is impossible for our soul to pay attention to every particular impression. This is why our confused sensations result from a really infinite variety of perceptions. This is somewhat like the confused murmur heard by those who approach the seashore, which comes from the accumulation of innumerable breaking waves. For if out of several perceptions which do not harmonize so as to make one, there is no single one which surpasses the others, and if these perceptions make impressions that are about equally strong and equally capable of holding the attention of the soul, it can perceive them only confusedly. (DM 33) 10

Leibniz's suggestion is that the content of every sensation we apprehend really has infinite variety in it. The reason is that our "senses respond to everything", which presumably means that sensations are caused by the entire complex of states of the universe. For Leibniz effects are expressions of their causes. Expression is a mathematical relationship; one thing expresses another if there is a one to one correspondence between the elements of the one thing and the elements of the other, and if the correspondence is precise and natural (New Essays II, viii, 13). Thus since the universe is infinitely complex sensations must also be infinitely complex in nature (New Essays II viii, II i 17).¹¹ Just as the murmuring of the sea is really the result of innumerable sounds of individual waves, so the consciously apprehended sensations of colour result from an infinite variety of smaller perceptions. This theory also applies to primary quality sensations; Leibniz thinks that the sensation of a square shape is constituted by perceptions of infinite complexity such

that if we could analyze some sensation of a square shape the result would be a figure of infinite complexity.¹² This yields a second Leibnizian appearance/reality distinction: the primary quality ideas we immediately experience are appearances of more complex structures of qualities of the same sort as the ones we experience.

One should note, however, that for Leibniz there is an important sense in which primary quality sensations must have a higher status as appearances, a higher position on the scale of the representation of reality, than secondary quality sensations do, in that the causes of both kinds of sensations are "shapes and motions", that is primary quality structures (New Essays VI, vi, 7; II viii 15, 21). Because primary quality sensations are more similar in kind to their causes than secondary quality sensations are, the first kind of appearance is farther removed from experience than the second is. Yet the difference between these kinds of representations is less dramatic than it is for Descartes. There is at least one way in which primary quality sensations are confused in the same way in which secondary quality sensations are, while secondary qualities resemble their causes in the same way as primary qualities do, by expressing them (New Essays II viii 15).

A significant aspect of these appearance/reality distinctions concerns the notion of resolution. It is evident that Leibniz holds that if we had more discerning faculties we would perceive basic primary quality structures rather than the shapes and motions we in fact perceive. So for the second kind of appearance/reality distinction, if our faculties became more discerning, so that the

perceptions we are now having would be infinitely better focused, what appears would resolve into that of which it is the appearance. It is not clear whether Leibniz thinks this is true for the first kind of appearance/reality distinction. On the one hand he suggests that red may actually be the "revolving of certain small globules", and heat may be "the expansion of air". (L285) On the other hand, Leibniz also writes:

Confused attributes are those which are indeed composite in themselves or by intellectual principles but are simple to the senses and whose definition therefore cannot be explained. These attributes can be imported not by description but only by pointing them out to the senses. (L285)

What Leibniz says in this passage seems to have the consequence that only having a sensation of red can give one knowledge of what it is to be red. On this view, even if one knew what the primary quality basis of red is, one would still not know what it is to be red. It thus isn't clear whether for the second kind of appearance the appearance would resolve into that of which it is the appearance if our faculties became more discerning.

It will turn out that for an understanding and assessment of Kant it is important to see whether this holds true for the third and most dramatic kind of appearance/reality distinction, Leibniz's notion that matter or bodies are phenomenal in that they are appearances of monads, i.e., simple substances. On the one hand, from reading the Monadology one might easily be led to think that Leibniz believed that bodies are aggregates of monads in a straightforward sense:

1. The monad of which we shall here speak is merely a simple substance, which enters into composites; simple, that is to say, without parts.
2. And there must be simple substances, since there are composites, for the composite is only a collection or aggregatum of simple substances.
3. Now where there are no parts, neither extension, nor figure, nor divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of things.

From this passage it may seem that if only our faculties became more discerning, so that perceptions of bodies would become better focused, these perceptions of bodies would resolve into experiences as of aggregates of things in themselves (monads). (For convenience I will call this the resolution thesis from now on.) On the other hand, there are reasons to think that what The Monadology seems to be saying is not the best expression of Leibniz's considered view. Leibniz wrote to De Volder that "accurately speaking, matter is not composed of "monads" but results from them."¹³ This view, as opposed to the account of the Monadology, gives us an indication of what Leibniz means when he says that matter and bodies are phenomenal. Although one might take this view to indicate that the resolution thesis does not hold for perceptions of bodies, there is an interpretation of this which is consistent with the resolution thesis. The reason that Leibniz often gives for bodies being phenomenal is that they are not one per se, and anything that is one per accidens must be a unity by relation to a mind which perceives appropriate relations among the things that are aggregated.¹⁴ If bodies are appearances of monads

only in this way, then it would seem that perceptions of bodies would become perceptions as of monads if only the resolution were improved.

But there is still another reason that Leibniz gives for bodies being phenomenal. This reason derives from Leibniz's comparison of phenomena to the rainbow.¹⁵ One kind of parallel that Leibniz draws is that just as the rainbow is an aggregate of drops, a body is an aggregate of monads. Another parallel, the one I want to consider, is associated with the idea that "the qualities by which [the rainbow] is known are apparent or at least of that kind of real ones which are relative to our senses." (Gr 322)¹⁶ According to Robert Adams, Leibniz's contention here is that certain intrinsic properties of bodies are relative to perception and this contributes to their phenomenality.¹⁷ Monads, in themselves, have no spatial properties, not even spatial location. A monad, however, can be assigned a spatial position by reference to its organic body, which, together with the monad (the dominant monad), forms a corporeal substance. Bodies are aggregates of corporeal substances, but some essential properties of bodies, like size, shape, and position are dependent on how the organic bodies are grouped in perception. Bodies are thus phenomenal. From this account it can be concluded that a kind of resolution thesis holds for the third kind of appearance/reality distinction since perceptions of bodies would become perceptions as of organic bodies if the distinctness were increased. What we really want to know, however, is whether they would become perceptions as of monads. Leibniz thinks that an organic body is itself best thought of

as a phenomenon, an appearance of monads, which possesses spatial properties.¹⁸

Does a resolution thesis hold for the relation between organic bodies and monads? If it does, then one would expect the resolution thesis to hold for the relation between bodies and monads. We now need to know Leibniz's account of the relation between organic bodies and monads, how it is that organic bodies are appearances of monads. In particular it would be important to know how phenomenal spatial bodies arise from monads, i.e., how entities with phenomenal spatial properties arise from entities without spatial properties. Leibniz doesn't, at least as far as I know, provide an account of the relevant sort. Consequently we can't say for sure whether Leibniz believed the resolution thesis to hold for the relation between bodies and monads. But on the other hand, he has no account according to which something has been added into the monad-appearances to make them spatial. This gives rise to a deep difficulty: How is it possible that in Leibniz's theory representations of spatial things arise from non-spatial things? But in the meantime, given that on his view nothing nonconceptual, like Kant's forms of intuition, has been added to the monad-appearances, Leibniz cannot easily escape the charge that the resolution thesis does hold for the third kind of appearance/reality distinction. These matters are quite significant for Kant; as we will see the absence of a Leibnizian theory here provides Kant with an argument for his own position on this issue.

Kant does not suggest that there is such a thing as the second kind of Leibnizian appearance/reality distinction, that is, he does

not say that our primary quality representations are appearances of more complex realities of the same type. But Kant does acknowledge the first type of Leibnizian appearance/reality distinction; as we have seen in chapter 1, Kant thinks that colours and tastes are appearances of the primary quality structures possibly together with mass. But in contrast with Leibniz, the size of the gulf between primary and secondary qualities does not seem to be an issue for him. For Kant and for Kant's time the intense philosophical concern about the primary/secondary quality distinction in general has ended; there is not much discussion of this issue in Kant's works nor in the works of his contemporaries. It is nevertheless true that Kant endorses a version of the distinction. A resolution thesis does not seem to hold for the second kind of appearance/reality distinction for Kant; he does not indicate, as far as I know, that he thinks that if only our sense organs were more powerful, and thus if the resolution of our sensations were better, primary quality structures would appear to us. In fact, it would seem that this is precluded by the talk of sensations as 'mere changes in the subject'.

On the other hand the third Leibnizian appearance/reality distinction, the one between things in themselves and their appearances (presumably, although possibly not always the world of scientific theory), is the one that interests and concerns Kant a great deal. Kant's third distinction differs from Leibniz's in three respects.

1) For Leibniz we can know what things in themselves are like; for Kant we can at most speculate about their nature and be forced by our

nature to believe certain things about them. Leibniz thinks that we can have intellectual representations of things in themselves which constitute knowledge of them; for Kant intellectual representations, concepts, serve to organize appearances and only yield knowledge when applied to these appearances. Concepts can be used to think things in themselves but cannot be used to acquire knowledge of them.

(Bxxvi-xxvii, B166n)

2) Kant presents an account of how the spatiality (and temporality) of appearances arises whereas Leibniz does not. For Kant, appearances are spatial and temporal because they have been organized spatially and temporally by us. The spatial and temporal forms of intuition account for this organization (Transcendental Aesthetic).

3) For Leibniz, it was hard to say whether the resolution thesis (if only our faculties became more discerning, so that perceptions of bodies would become better focused, these perceptions of bodies would resolve into perceptions as of things in themselves) held for the third kind of appearance/reality distinction. On the one hand, Leibniz doesn't say that it holds, in so many words. On the other hand, he has no account of how spatial appearances arise from non-spatial monads according to which something has been added into the monad-appearances to make them spatial, which might make it seem that the monads could be perceived if the relevant representations were better focused. Kant, by contrast, is adamant that the resolution thesis doesn't hold here. Given that we impose spatiality and temporality on appearances no amount of resolution in our perceptions would present us with an aspatial, atemporal world. As an

interpretation of Kant this is relatively certain, as we will see, although given that Kant thinks that the in-itself is unknowable, he may have no right to the claim that it is aspatial and temporal. It appears that Kant's actual belief about what things in themselves are like is similar to and thus probably inspired by Leibniz's, given his remark in the Amphiboly that

Once we have abstracted from all conditions of intuition, there is, I admit, nothing left in the mere concept but the inner in general and its interrelations, through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity, which is founded solely on abstraction, does not arise in the case of things as given in intuition with determinations that express mere relations, without having anything inward as their basis; for such are not things in themselves but merely appearances. (A284-285=B340-341)

Like Kant, Leibniz also says that things in themselves have nothing external or extrinsic in them, that is, they have no relational properties, thus no primary qualities. Rather, things in themselves have only inner or intrinsic properties, which are at least thought on analogy with intentional states, if they are not explicitly identified with intentional states. But what I want to emphasize at this point is that Kant thinks that the world of appearance has an integrity of its own; no amount of resolution will reveal it as another realm--it is not the content of a confused representation of things in themselves.

There are several places in the Critique where Kant challenges a position he represents as Leibniz's on these issues. These are the passages in which Kant attacks Leibniz and his followers for thinking that the representations of sensibility are confused intellectual

representations. The more significant of these are from the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection. In a passage from the Aesthetic, which I will quote in a moment, Kant in effect merely juxtaposes his theory to what he takes to be Leibniz's, but neglects to justify his own position. From this passage we get some sense of what the issues between them are, but little argumentative content. The central theme of the passage is that the difference between intellectual representations and sensible intuition really could not be logical, could not really be a difference between clear and confused representations, and even if our intuitions achieved maximum resolution, things in themselves would not become immediately perceived. I think that the crucial point to get straight in interpreting this and the other two passages is what exactly it is that Kant thinks is illegitimately confused for Leibniz. Seeing what Kant means to say on this issue will begin to reveal the nature of his argument against Leibniz:

(C) The concept of sensibility and of appearance would be falsified, and our whole teaching in regard to them would be rendered empty and useless, if we were to accept the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things, containing only what belongs to them in themselves, but doing so under an aggregation of characters and partial representations that we do not consciously distinguish. For the difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content.... The representation of a body in intuition ... contains nothing that can belong to an object in itself, but merely an appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that something; and this receptivity of our faculty is termed sensibility. Even if that appearance could become completely transparent to us, such knowledge would remain toto coelo different from knowledge of the object in itself.

The philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff, in thus treating the difference between the sensible and the intelligible as merely logical, has given a completely wrong direction to all investigations into the nature and origin of our knowledge. This difference is quite evidently transcendental. It does not merely concern their [logical] form, as being clear or confused. It concerns their origin and content. It is not that by our sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any save a confused fashion; we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever. If our subjective constitution be removed, the represented object, with the qualities which sensible intuition bestows upon it, is nowhere to be found, and cannot possibly be found. For it is this subjective constitution which determines its form as appearance. (A43=B60-A44=B62)

In the last part of this passage, Kant stresses that sensibility cannot yield confused modes of representation, but that it is the source of a different, i.e. non-intellectual, kind of representation. In the first passage from the Amphiboly this same theme is reiterated; subsequently, other themes of the first passage are reviewed, and the passage ends with a historical generalization:

(D) [Leibniz] compared all things with each other by means of concepts alone, and naturally found no other differences save those only through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another. The conditions of sensible intuition, which carry with them their own differences, he did not regard as original, sensibility being for him only a confused mode of representation, and not a separate source of representations.

Appearance was, on his view, the representation of the thing in itself. Such representation is indeed, as he recognised, different in logical form from knowledge through the understanding, since, owing to its usual lack of analysis, it introduces a certain mixture of sub-representations (Vermischung von Nebenvorstellungen) into the concept of a thing which the understanding knows how to take away from it. In a word, Leibniz intellectualised appearances, just as Locke, according to his system of noogony (if I may be allowed the use of such expressions), sensualised all

concepts of the understanding, i.e. interpreted them as nothing more than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection. Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations which, while quite different, can supply objectivity valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men holds to one only of the two, viewing it as in immediate relation to things in themselves. The other faculty is then regarded as serving only to confuse or to order the representations which this selected faculty yields. (A270=B326-A271=B327)

In the second passage from the Amphiboly, we see the beginnings of an argument from the nature of representations of space and time against Leibniz's view, but the piece ends in what seems to be mere rhetoric:

(E) Leibniz's famous doctrine of time and space, in which he intellectualised these forms of sensibility, owed its origin entirely to this same fallacy of transcendental reflection. If I attempt, by the mere understanding, to represent to myself outer relations of things, this can only be done by means of a concept of their reciprocal action; and if I seek to connect two states of one and the same thing, this can only be in the order of grounds and consequences. Accordingly, Leibniz conceived space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time seem to possess as proper to themselves, in independence of things, he ascribed to the confusion in their concepts, which has led us to regard what is a mere form of dynamical relations as being a special intuition, self-subsistent and antecedent to the things in themselves. Thus space and time were for him the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) in themselves; and the things were intelligible substances (substantiae noumena). And since he allowed sensibility no mode of intuition peculiar to itself but sought for all representations of objects, even the empirical, in the understanding, and left to the senses nothing but the despicable task of confusing and distorting the representations of the former, he had no option save to treat the [intellectualised] concepts as being likewise valid of appearances. (A275=B331-A276=B332)

The first issue to get clear about concerns the following: Kant charges Leibniz with holding that the representations of sensibility are confused intellectual representations or confused concepts. There are different possible interpretations of this accusation; Parkinson¹⁹ thinks that Kant is accusing Leibniz of holding that sensations are confused conceptual abilities, i.e. confused concepts in the sense of 'concept' of Kant's critical philosophy. Parkinson's interpretation seems to be fueled by his belief that Leibniz's notion of concept is that of a conceptual ability, like an ability to recognize or to use a word. For instance, Parkinson attributes the following to Leibniz:

A sensation is confused in that when one has a sensation, what is not really simple appears to the percipient as simple. To have a confused concept, on the other hand, is to think that a word stands for something simple (or, it is to take the word as meaning something simple) when in fact it stands for something complex. 20

I think that Parkinson's interpretation is mistaken, but this mistake, if there is one, has an explanation. In the Critique Kant usually uses the term 'concept' in the sense peculiar to the critical philosophy. But this term actually has a much broader signification for Kant; he uses it to stand for intellectual representations in general. Particularly when Kant is discussing Leibniz and Wolff, 'concept' and 'intellectual representation' are supposed to signify representations of things in themselves. This is what 'concept' and 'intellectual representation' mean for Kant in his Leibnizian pre-critical period. For instance, in the Inaugural Dissertation he says:

The object of sensuality is the sensible; that which contains nothing but what is to be cognised through the intelligence is intelligible. In the schools of the ancients the first was called a phenomenon and the second a noumenon. Cognition in so far as it is subject to the laws of sensuality is sensitive, in so far as it is subject to the laws of intelligence is intellectual or rational. (Inaugural Dissertation §3, Ak II 392. In §5, Ak II 393, Kant identifies intellectual cognitions with concepts.)

So when Kant accuses Leibniz of holding that the representations of sensibility are confused concepts or confused intellectual representations, I think that he is accusing Leibniz of holding that the representations of sensibility are confused representations of things in themselves. The following excerpts from the above passages provide evidence that this is the correct interpretation:

From (C) (A43=B60-A44-B62):

...if we were to accept the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things, containing only what belongs to them in themselves...

It is not that by our sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any save a confused fashion, we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever.

From (D) (A270=B326-A271=B327):

...sensibility being for him only a confused mode of representation, and not a separate source of representations. Appearance was, on his view, the representation of the thing in itself.

Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations....each of these great men holds to one only of the two, viewing it as in immediate relation to things in themselves. The other faculty is then regarded as serving only to confuse or

to order the representations which this selected faculty yields.

Kant's claiming that Leibniz believes sensible representations to be confused intellectual representations amounts to his charging Leibniz with holding the belief that the resolution thesis about the third kind of appearance/reality distinction is true. Kant is charging Leibniz with thinking that representations of the world of appearance would resolve into representations of things in themselves if only they would become more distinct. Since it seems to me that one cannot decide whether Leibniz believed the resolution thesis to be true, one also cannot decide whether Kant is justified in his accusation. Kant might be excused from not being more circumspect, however, because the de Volder correspondence, where much of Leibniz's phenomenalist theory first becomes clear, was probably not available to him. Moreover, in On a Discovery Kant shows some signs of retracting his condemnation of Leibniz, and transferring it to his followers (Ak VII 221). There is a point to this. On these issues, Christian Wolff, Leibniz's most famous disciple, adheres to what one might justifiably take to be Leibniz's theory in the Monadology. Wolff appears to hold that all composite entities are straightforwardly composites of simple entities (which are things in themselves); composite entities are "generated from several simple entities taken together as number is generated from unities taken together" (Ontologia 793, cf. 792 and 794-5; for Wolff's account of simple entities see Ontologia 673ff). Kant would seem to be justified

in thinking that the resolution thesis would hold for all composites in such an account.

One might wonder why Kant is so vehement about accusing Leibniz of an error here. Parkinson suggests that Kant is expressing opposition to the supposed implication of Leibniz's theory that sense experience is superfluous to understanding nature, and that such understanding can be acquired through a priori thought alone.²¹ This might be gleaned from the above passages, but one must admit that Kant isn't very lucid about his reasons for rejecting what he takes to be the Leibnizian position there. In On a Discovery, however, Kant expresses his reasons much more clearly. After an exposition of Eberhard's interpretation of the Leibniz-Wolff position (Ak VIII, 216-219), he launches into what I take to be three reasons for preferring his own theory. Kant first claims that there is a contradiction in his opponents' position:

The Critique itself asserts that besides these subjective grounds of the logical form of intuition, the appearances also have objective grounds, and in this it does not contradict Leibniz. It is, however, an obvious contradiction to assert that--if these objective grounds (the simple elements) lie as parts in the appearances themselves, and merely because of their confusedness cannot be perceived as such, but can only be known to be there by demonstration--they should thus be called sensible, and yet not merely sensible, but also, because of this latter reason, intellectual intuitions.... One of the two: either the intuition of the object is entirely intellectual, i.e., we intuit the things as they are in themselves, and then sensibility consists merely in the confusedness which is inseparable from such an all-inclusive intuition, or it is not intellectual, and we understand by it only the mode in which we are affected by an object which is in itself entirely unknown to us. Then, however, sensibility so little consists in the confusedness, that sensible intuition

may contain even the highest degree of clarity....
Both together cannot be thought in one and the same
concept of sensibility. (Ak VIII, 219)

But the alleged contradiction seems to be merely a linguistic matter. Kant is averse to using the term 'sensible' to refer to confused intellectual representations, so for him it turns out to be a contradiction to call one and the same representation a sensible and confused intellectual representation. For Kant, in order for a representation to be truly sensible, it must have an integrity of its own; that is, its intentional object cannot be revealed as something completely different when the representation acquires greater distinctness. This move of Kant's isn't very enlightening; Leibniz's or Eberhard's use of the term 'sensible' in reference to a confused intellectual representation is perfectly respectable from the linguistic point of view. Kant's claims will have to rest on considerations of greater depth.

The second argument in On a Discovery is prefigured in passage (E) (A275-6=B331-2) above, where Kant says of Leibniz: "That which space and time seem to possess as proper to themselves, in independence of things, he ascribed to the confusion in their concepts..." According to Kant, his opponents' position has the consequence, for example, that the science of space and of the things in space is a body of knowledge to which confusion of representations is essential. Without confusion there would be no representation of space nor of spatial things. And this, Kant seems to think, detracts too much from the integrity of natural science. He writes:

From the incapacity, the weakness, and the limits of the faculty of representation (the exact expressions which Mr. Eberhard uses) one can derive no extension of knowledge, no positive determination of the object. The given principle must of itself be something positive, which constitutes the substrate for such propositions, although only subjectively, and which only has objective validity in respect to appearances.... [H]ow will he derive such a positive knowledge, which contains the conditions of the most extensive a priori sciences (geometry and universal physics) from these limits, from unclarity, and therefore from mere deficiencies? (Ak VIII, 220)

Kant's thought here is that beliefs that essentially involve confused representations can never amount to knowledge. But for him geometry and universal physics are paradigmatic bodies of knowledge. So he concludes that it is absurd to think that these sciences rest on confused representations. As Kant presents it, this is much less a powerful argument against his opponents than it is an expression of Kant's high regard for geometry and physics. After all, it isn't absurd to hold that the objects of geometry and physics are intentional objects of representations characterized by a particular level of confusion. Kant's vehement rejection of such a view manifests a sentiment that these sciences are pure and ultimate in some way. One should note, however, that to a certain extent the difference between Kant and his opponents is one of degree. For Kant as for Leibniz and his followers, geometry and physics are sciences of appearances, not of things as they really are. Consequently, for both Leibniz and Kant these sciences lack the realism that they have in the philosophy of someone like Descartes.

Kant's view on this issue can possibly be described as an attempt to chisel out a status for these sciences that is as high as possible

given that their objects are only appearances. This he engineers, somewhat paradoxically, by suggesting that intentional objects of sensibility only in part result from ultimately real things in the noumenal world and that their status as objects is accounted for to a large extent by the forms of intuition and the synthetic activity of the mind. Not imperfections of mind, but mental faculties with excellences of their own, i.e., "something positive," form the central core of his account of the objects of science. This means that for Kant the representations of the objects of science are not just imperfect representations of ultimately real things, but rather that representations of objects of science are representations whose intentional objects wouldn't change in kind in case the representations were perfected. Although these considerations don't amount to a good argument, I think that this desire to maintain the integrity of science is Kant's deepest motivation for opposing Leibniz on this issue and instead holding his theory of a priori forms of intuition.

The third argument of On a Discovery is more telling than the other two as an argument against Leibniz and his followers. We have already seen that Leibniz lacks an account of how spatial organic bodies result from aspatial monads, or possibly more accurately, how representations of spatial organic bodies result from representations of aspatial monads. The problem is as acute for Wolff, since he thinks that all composite bodies, which include spatial objects, are composites of aspatial simple substances. Kant doesn't think that one can even conceive an explanation of the kind that is demanded without

adding something to the account, and he capitalizes on this difficulty in order to support his idea that there is indeed something else, i.e., the spatial form of intuition, which must figure into the account of the production of representations of objects in space. In the relevant passage from On a Discovery Kant also extends these considerations to time. He writes:

If we grant to Mr. Eberhard his simple parts of the objects of sensible intuition, and allow him to explain, in the best manner he can, their combination in accordance with his principle of sufficient reason, how and through what conclusions will he draw from his concept of monads and their connection through forces, the representation of space? How, for instance, will he be able to explain that space has three dimensions, and that of its three kinds of limit, two are themselves space, while the third, namely, the point, is the limit of all limits? Or, in respect to the objects of inner sense, how will he determine their underlying condition, time, as a magnitude, albeit only of one dimension, and (like space) as a continuous magnitude, from his simple parts, which in his opinion are perceived by the senses, although not separately, but which are conceived to be there by the understanding? He must regard all of these properties as false and merely invented (for they contradict the simple parts he accepts)... (Ak VIII, 220-1)

Specifically, Kant's charge is that it is impossible to account for representations of phenomena with dimensions as consisting in or resulting from nothing but objects without any dimensions at all and their forces. His argument is quite powerful given that it appears to be correct to say that one cannot conceive of an explanation of the requisite sort, and that, at least as far as I know, neither Leibniz nor any of his followers ever attempted to produce one.

3. Conclusion: Kant's cautious retreat from rationalism.

On both of these issues, that of innateness and that of the appearance reality distinction, we see that Kant is moving away from a Leibnizian rationalist position, towards a view that is more Aristotelian and empiricist. Kant rejects Leibniz's Platonic notion that merely focusing the direction of the mind on the self will enable one to employ innate ideas. Rather, he thinks that one gains the analogous a priori concepts and intuitions by means of an act of mind, an original acquisition. This isn't very strongly empiricistic but the emphasis on acquisition does tend in that direction, and the positing of a mental act of acquisition is an Aristotelian move. Furthermore, he thinks that only certain representations are arrived at in this way. Kant believes that many representations are acquired from experience. In the case of the appearance/reality distinction, Kant opposes the Leibnizian conception of purely rational metaphysics, holding that it can give us no knowledge of what really exists. Rather, he changes the nature of the appearance/reality distinction, in order to give a higher status to natural science as a way of coming to know reality, an interest which Kant shares with both Aristotelian and modern empiricists, and for reasons connected with his ethics.

As was the case for the debate concerning activity and passivity, I think that the issue of innate ideas has expressive significance in that it is expressive of a broader philosophical view. What are the real theoretical differences, one might wonder, among Locke's view that certain ideas are acquired by reflection on and abstraction from the operations of the understanding, Leibniz's view that we become

able to employ certain ideas by turning our attention to the mind, and Kant's theory that pure concepts are acquired through an original acquisition which has an innate ground in the self? The expressive significance of what these philosophers actually say may be as important for understanding them as the theoretical content of the views expressed. Kant and Locke say that there are no innate ideas, whereas Leibniz says that there are, even though one might wonder whether their actual theories differ very deeply. We know that Leibniz had profound respect for Platonism and that his philosophy as a whole is similar in important ways to Plato's; perhaps this is why he wanted to clothe his theory in Plato's language and stress the similarities between his theory and Plato's (e.g. DM 26-28). Locke and Kant, on the other hand, lean towards Aristotelianism in their language, even though both are not really as empiricistic as Aristotle and the high medievals were on this issue. Both of them make acquisition of the relevant ideas conform roughly to the Aristotelian theory as to how we come to have any concepts whatsoever, that is, by an act of acquisition from things in nature. It is as if for Locke the operations of the self and for Kant the self are thought of as additional things in nature and then fitted into an Aristotelian theory of concept acquisition, although in the case of Kant such language is misleading because he does hold the Leibniz-inspired notion that the relevant self is not an object in the natural, empirical world. But it should be emphasized that Kant's idea is only a cautious retreat from Leibnizianism and rationalism towards

something more Aristotelian. The very notion that the self is a source of representations is a hallmark of rationalism.

Kant's way of construing the phenomena-noumena distinction can also be viewed as a cautious retreat from Leibnizianism and rationalism towards Aristotelianism and empiricism, although it should not be forgotten that Kant's skepticism about the in-itself in the interests of morality and religion have precedents only in very different traditions. Kant wants to guarantee natural scientific knowledge a certain kind of integrity; this is why he rejects the Leibnizian position which is at best wishy-washy on whether the representations of sensibility are confused representations of things in themselves. And again, this aligns Kant with Aristotle and many other empiricists in his high view of natural scientific knowledge, which reflects the broader view that at least in part, human beings are objects in an external, natural world, and that interaction with and possession of knowledge of this world is the natural state for human beings to be in. The other side of this is Kant's demeaning of the status of pure metaphysical knowledge. Kant does believe that we can have a priori knowledge of the conditions of any possible experience, but he rejects the Leibnizian idea that the deepest knowledge about reality is possible through direct, purely intellectual, non-sensible thought.

Again, it must be emphasized that Kant's rejection of Leibnizianism is mitigated. Kant does not reject the notion of a purely intelligible world. He says:

Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation whatsoever... (B308-9, cf. Bxxvi-Bxxvii)

And even though he does not think that such a world is knowable, he does think that we can think and speculate about it, and that this is of great significance for ethics and religion (Bxxviiff, B166n).

Thus, rather than saying that Kant rejects Leibnizian metaphysics, it might be better to say that he radically transforms it. Also, as we have seen, Kant shares the rationalist propensity to denigrate sensation in that he doesn't think that secondary qualities directly reveal what is real, although he tries to give primary quality intuitions more integrity than they have in Leibniz's theory.

From all this one might conclude that Kant's theory is as complex as it is partly because his motivations are so varied. I think that it can be safely said that Kant is very sensitive to several different deep philosophical interests, and that he tries to make room for them in his overall theory. He wants to think of humans partly as things in the external, natural world, and of the natural world as familiar. At the same time he wants to make room for a conception of human beings as raised above the realm of sensation and passion, of human beings as active, and to a certain degree, in control of nature. And he also aims for a philosophical system that expresses his particular conception of ethics and religion. The result is a kind of Hegelian synthesis between rationalism and Platonism on the one hand, and naturalistic empiricism and Aristotelianism on the other, together with a rather unique skeptical theory of ethics and religion.

Footnotes to Chapter 3.

¹Aquinas suggests that when the soul is disembodied, God bestows intelligible species on it so that it can think. According to Aquinas, this is also the way in which angels acquire ideas. (ST Ia 89)

²Robert McRae, Leibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 93-97.

³McRae, pp. 97-103.

⁴Locke might have charged at this point that such ideas are acquired through inner experience, and this is of course where the issue becomes quite complex. Kant discusses this in the Paralogisms.

⁵Found in McRae, p. 74.

⁶Leibniz, New Essays, passim. On this topic see Margaret Wilson's "Confused Ideas", op. cit. ch.1, n.7, esp. pp. 128-9.

⁷M. Wilson, "Confused Ideas", p. 123.

⁸Information on Leibniz's phenomenalism was gleaned from Robert M. Adams' paper Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1983 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) pp. 217-257, and from conversations with him.

⁹For definitions of clear and obscure, distinct and confused, see Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas and DM 24.

¹⁰In the New Essays, Leibniz gives another example to make the same point. When a cog-wheel turns quickly its teeth disappear to the perceiver and an imaginary continuous transparent [ring] appears in their place. The ring is made up of the teeth, but we cannot discern them. So Leibniz concludes, "The teeth are encountered in the distinct notion of this transparency, but not in the confused sensory perception of it" (New Essays IV, vi, 7).

¹¹See M. Wilson, "Confused Ideas", p. 127.

¹²G VII, 563-4. See R. McRae, p. 133.

¹³G II, 268, L536.

¹⁴See Robert M. Adams' Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz, pp. 236ff.

¹⁵G II, 58, G II, 306.

¹⁶Quoted from Robert M. Adams, Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz. p. 240.

¹⁷Robert M. Adams, Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz, pp. 240ff.

¹⁸G III, 657.

¹⁹In G. H. R. Parkinson, "The "Intellectualization of Appearances": Aspects of Leibniz's Theory of Sensation and Thought" in Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays, Michael Hooker, ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 3-20.

²⁰Parkinson, "The Intellectualization of Appearances", p. 17.

²¹Parkinson, "The Intellectualization of Appearances", p. 17.

Chapter 4: The Transcendental Deduction: The A Priori and the Transcendental.

Kant's Transcendental Deduction is very plausibly interpreted as an anti-skeptical argument or part of such an argument. The anti-skepticism that the Deduction espouses is uncontroversially directed against a Humean skepticism about knowledge involving concepts like cause and substance, and is not quite as clearly aimed at a skepticism about the external world. But I don't want to focus on skepticism in my interpretation of the Deduction; rather, I want to concentrate on the Deduction as an argument for a particular theory about mental representation. Even given that one of Kant's primary aims in the Deduction is to refute a skeptical, empiricist rejection of synthetic a priori knowledge and to vindicate the applicability of certain a priori concepts, it remains quite a significant fact about this project that Kant executes his refutation by way of arguments concerning mental representation. Roughly, Kant's claim is that a theory like Hume's, according to which certain of what Kant thinks to be a priori concepts cannot legitimately be applied in experience, is a theory that cannot explain the very nature of experience. Experience cannot be accounted for by means of a theory which countenances nothing other than the passively atomistic representations (the manifold) and various relations among them. In addition to such atomistic representations, an adequate account of experience requires a priori concepts, modes of unifying other

representations, modes which have their source in the mind and are independent of passively received representations in their genesis.

What is going on here is this: In general, Kant's strategy in the Transcendental Deduction is to show that a priori concepts have objective validity, that we have a right to apply them in conscious and explicit thinking, because the very experience to which they can be applied must have been constructed by the mind by means of these very concepts. Kant just assumes that a priori concepts can be applied in ordinary thinking about the objects of experience if that experience has been synthesized by means of these concepts in the first place. Consequently, the immediate focus of the Transcendental Deduction is to try to prove that the correct account of the nature of experience requires that experience be synthesized by means of a priori concepts.

Furthermore, I think that it is correct to construe the Transcendental Deduction not only as an attempt to show that a priori concepts are applicable in experience, but also as an argument to show that we use Kantian concepts at all. If it is successful, the Transcendental Deduction does not only show that we legitimately use a priori concepts, but also that we use Kantian concepts, either a priori or empirical. One might easily and correctly be led to think that Kant's Transcendental Deduction is not intended to show that the use of empirical concepts is legitimate; Kant himself writes at the beginning of the Deduction:

Many empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. Since experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality, we believe

ourselves, even without a deduction, to be justified in appropriating to them a meaning, an ascribed significance. (A84=B116-7)

The legitimacy of empirical concepts, in some broad sense of 'empirical concept', is not an issue. Many of Hume's ideas, for instance, since they are derived from impressions, would not need a proof of objective validity. But Kantian concepts of any sort have a special nature, and whether we use them, whether they are part of our mental repertoire at all, is a significant issue. Kantian concepts, empirical as well as a priori, are associated with mental activity in that they are modes of judgment and functions of unity. All a priori and empirical concepts are ways the mind has of organizing other representations, and the sheer ability to organize is an element in the theory of mental representation over and above atomistic representations and relations among them. The Transcendental Deduction of the categories can be thought of as having two aspects, first, an argument that concepts whose content is derived from the mind are required to construct experience, and second, that the mind possesses abilities to organize other representations, abilities which are elements in a theory of mental representation over and above atomistic representations and relations among them. To the extent that the Transcendental Deduction is an argument for the second aspect, it is also an argument for the thesis that we use any Kantian concepts, either a priori or empirical.

Still Kant's most desired goal in the Transcendental Deduction is to show that there are concepts which we legitimately apply in experience that are a priori. But this is a phase in the more general

project to show how it is possible for us to have synthetic a priori knowledge. An account of the alleged synthetic a priori knowledge we have in mathematics and geometry was partially given in the Transcendental Aesthetic; although the Transcendental Deduction is relevant to mathematics and geometry, Kant's focus here seems to be on what he later calls the a priori science of nature (e.g. Proleg. §14ff, Ak 294ff) which includes, for instance, the most basic scientific laws regarding substances and causes, which are supposed to be synthetic and a priori. But in this regard, an important issue arises: Exactly what is it to have a priori knowledge, and exactly what is it to be able to synthesize by means of and apply a priori concepts?

1. A priori concepts and a priori knowledge

Kant discusses the nature of a priori knowledge at the beginning of the Introduction to the Critique. In the first sentence of the Introduction of the second edition, Kant sets up a constraint for his account of a priori knowledge. It reads

(1) There can be no doubt that all of our knowledge begins with experience. (B1)

This is supposed to be consistent with the claim that we actually possess a priori knowledge, the definition of which is

(2) In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. (B2-3)

These claims are consistent, according to Kant, because of the fact that "...though all of our knowledge begins with experience, it does

not follow that it all arises out of experience." (B1). What is meant by "all of our knowledge begins with experience" is explained in what succeeds (1) in the text:

For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins. (B1)

This is a difficult passage to interpret. There are three possibilities as to what it might mean. The first is that all knowledge begins with experience in the sense that it either must be or must be justified at least partially on the basis of a product of a mental process which begins with passively received representations. It is unlikely that this interpretation is correct because on Kant's view, mathematical knowledge, for example, doesn't meet such a criterion. A second possibility is that all knowledge begins with experience in the sense that in time, the first knowledge we actually have is knowledge produced by the described process. This is a plausible interpretation. Another one that merits consideration is that all of our knowledge begins with experience in that all knowledge is dependent on passively received representations for triggering the faculty of knowledge, which presumably includes the understanding and the faculty which produces a priori intuitions, into action. This would imply that a priori concepts and a priori intuitions don't come into play before the self is affected by passively received

representations. This makes some sense, but it does create an ambiguity in the sections of B1 quoted above; the term 'experience' in one case stands for passively received representations and in the other it names the result of the mental process which begins with passively received representations.

Why is it that "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises out of experience"? Kant answers that this is because

...it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. (B1, emphasis mine)

On an interpretation in keeping with a traditional definition of a priori knowledge what Kant means to suggest is that since the self is source of some aspects even of empirical knowledge, there is knowledge to be had which, although passively received representations are the occasion for our having it, does not require passively received material, or, more accurately, propositions in any sense about passively received material, for its justification. Rather, its justification is intimately tied up with the fact that we actively contribute a content to experience. Most recent interpreters of Kant think that this justificatory notion is the dominant notion of a priori knowledge for Kant. Consider, for example, these passages from two of the latest books on Kant. The first passage is from Richard Aquila's Representational Mind, the second from Robert Pippin's Kant's Theory of Form:

Kant's concern with the a priori is not, as already noted, limited to a preoccupation with the genesis of representations nor even with the genesis of knowledge claims based upon representations. The Kantian concern extends itself to, and is indeed primarily a concern with, the problem of justifying representations, i.e., of justifying knowledge claims involving one's representations. 1

A priori does not mean "not derived from experience" but "known without appeal to experience." The question the deduction will pose is thus not: Can we discover in the understanding (as birthplace) concepts which lie there (like seeds) prior to any actual experience? but: Can we identify and justify a use of concepts which establishes a relation to all possible objects of experience which does not justify that use by appeal to what we have experienced? 2

I do not want to argue that a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge has no a place in Kant's thought, but my position is that the central notion of a priori knowledge for Kant, and the most important notion of it, particularly for the Transcendental Deduction and the Principles, is genetic. In particular, I want to argue that Kant generally writes as if a judgment is knowable a priori when its content is derived only from the transcendental self and is not in any sense passively received. This point has interesting and important consequences for the way in which Kant's philosophy as a whole is to be viewed. As for a justificatory notion, I think that Kant's genetic notion of a priori knowledge may yield a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge, or rather quasi a priori knowledge, to borrow a notion from Philip Kitcher.⁷ Kitcher's characterization of quasi a priori knowledge, a notion which he attributes to Kant, is knowledge obtainable given any sufficiently rich experience. Why this notion is yielded by the genetic notion of a priori knowledge we will discuss

later. I want to maintain that any justificatory notion is not central and dominant in the Critique. There are considerations, as we shall soon see, that lead one to deny that in the Critique there is an important connection between the genetic and a justificatory notion of genuine rather than quasi a priori knowledge, that is, a notion of knowledge which does not appeal to experience at all in its justification.

The best support for the idea that a notion of a priori knowledge linked to justification is dominant in Kant's theory is to be found in the Aesthetic, in his account of mathematical knowledge. There he says:

Take, for instance, the proposition, "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with them alone no figure is possible", and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and of the number two. Or take the proposition, "Given three straight lines, a figure is possible", and try, in like manner, to derive it from the concepts involved. All your labour is vain; and you find that you are constrained to have recourse to intuition, as is always done in geometry. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is this intuition? Is it a pure a priori intuition or an empirical intuition? Were it the latter, no universally valid proposition could ever arise out of it--still less an apodeictic proposition--for experience can never yield such.
(A47-8=B65)

A point that Kant apparently makes here is that if knowledge of mathematical propositions were based on an empirical intuition, which quite clearly means that it would be justified on the basis of experience, these propositions could never be universal or necessary, and possibly worse, they could never be apodeictic or certain. So knowledge of mathematical propositions must be justified independently

of experience. But surely Kant wants all of the a priori principles of the understanding, and all of transcendental philosophy, to be universal, necessary, and apodeictic or certain. This is, for instance, what Kant says in the Preface to A; in regard to the Critique of Pure Reason in general:

As to certainty, I have prescribed to myself the maxim, that in this kind of investigation it is in no wise permissible to hold opinions. Everything, therefore, which bears any manner of resemblance to an hypothesis is to be treated as contraband; it is not to be put up for sale even at the lowest price, but forthwith confiscated, immediately upon detection.
(Axx)

It would appear to follow that the a priori principles and transcendental philosophy would all have to be knowable a priori in the sense that their justification is independent of experience. This would seem to show that this justificatory notion of a priori knowledge would have to be a very important one for Kant.

Let us now focus on the types of synthetic a priori knowledge which are more directly connected with the notion of synthesis by means of the categories. It will assist our understanding of the issue to note that there are several central notions of the a priori connected with this type of knowledge. First, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Kant thinks that a priori concepts are a priori in that they have ground in the self and in the way they arise they are independent of passively received representations. Second, knowledge is a priori on the justificatory interpretation when it is independent of passively received representations in its justification, and on the genetic interpretation when it is independent of passively received

representations in its genesis. There is also a third central use of the term 'a priori', and this use may very well be the most frequent use in the Transcendental Deduction. Consider the following sentence from the Transcendental Deduction in B:

Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thought. (B134)

and the sentence from A

We entitle the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if without distinction of intuitions it is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold. (A118)

In both of these sentences 'a priori' designates a way in which synthesis can take place, a way in which concepts can organize experience. Here the term 'a priori' modifies an act of mind, not a type of knowledge or concept. From the sentence in B we can glean that for an act of synthesis to be a priori it has to precede determinate thought, which I take to mean thought of which we can actually be conscious and which is of objects. The temporal term 'precede' is a metaphor; on Kant's view a priori acts of synthesis are the acts of organization of representations that take place atemporally, independently of the phenomenal and temporal realm altogether. This notion of a priori is also a genetic notion; it concerns a way in which experience is produced, not a way in which knowledge is justified. Thus so far, of our three central notions of the a priori, a priori concepts, a priori knowledge, and a priori synthesis, two are clearly genetic notions, and only one, a priori knowledge, might be a notion which isn't genetic.

In the Transcendental Deduction of the categories Kant's immediate aim is to show that a priori concepts apply a priori, that the categories constitute the form of our conscious experience because they are applied in an act of synthesis which somehow precedes all of this conscious experience. So far, the aim concerns only the genesis of conscious experience, but once this is realized, has Kant also shown that we have a priori knowledge in the sense of knowledge which in no sense is dependent on the passively received for its justification? For all we know so far, our only access to a priori concepts and synthesis by means of them comes by way of apprehension of the finished product, experience. If this were indeed the case, all of our knowledge about a priori concepts and a priori synthesis would not be a priori in the sense that the justification of this knowledge is independent of what is passively received. If this is the notion of a priori that Kant is working with then this would be a bad result for him if one takes it that a primary aim of the Critique is to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, where 'a priori' is taken in the justificatory sense. How indirectly Kant deals with this problem may seem surprising. One solution is suggested in the Preface in B by Kant's talk of the Copernican revolution in metaphysics. Kant here writes:

If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. Since I cannot rest in these intuitions if they are to become known, but must relate them as representations to something as their object, and determine this latter through them, either

I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts. In the former case, I am again in the same perplexity as to how I can know anything a priori in regard to the objects. In the latter case the outlook is more hopeful. For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They find expression in a priori concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform....we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them. (Bxvi-xviii)

If objects conform to concepts, then Kant thinks that it is understandable that we can have a priori knowledge about them, for we can know a priori of things what we have put into them. If Kant's notion of a priori knowledge is justificatory we might take this to mean that we have immediate access to the results of a priori synthesis. One prima facie objection to this account is that Kant also says that the "putting into," the synthesis, is "a blind....function of the soul,...of which we are scarcely ever conscious." (A78=B103) Synthesis most often happens unconsciously and atemporally. How would this then help in giving us knowledge? Why should this synthesis by means of concepts be more epistemologically accessible to us than the thoughts of, say, some other being? Yet Kant could very well be appealing to some type of epistemological nearness of the mind to its own activities and contents here, although it isn't all that clear what the details of the account are. On the other hand, if Kant's notion of a priori knowledge is genetic, then this problem does not arise. What is contributed by the mind becomes

a priori knowledge, independently of the existence of any special access to such contributions. The genetic interpretation yields what may be a surprising result; Kant's dictum that we can know a priori of things only what we put into them now becomes Kant's account of what a priori knowledge is, not an explanation of how it is that certain propositions can be known independently of a posteriori justifications. Whereas on the justificatory interpretation of a priori knowledge this point from the Preface in B is supposed to explain how we can have access to content which is independent of the passively received, on the genetic interpretation its role is to give content to the very notion of a priori knowledge.

There are several stronger reasons for thinking that the genetic as opposed to the justificatory notion of a priori is the one that is central to Kant's own philosophy. First, a genetic interpretation of a priori knowledge allows for a unified interpretation of Kant's notion of the a priori. We have seen that the other central notions of the a priori, a priori concepts and a priori synthesis, are unimpeachably genetic. It is desirable to interpret Kant as having a unified notion of the a priori partly because it seems somewhat odd to think that Kant would be radically switching notions whenever he moved from the consideration of a priori concepts or a priori synthesis to a priori knowledge and vice versa.

There are several passages which indicate that Kant has a genetic interpretation of a priori knowledge in mind. One of the most significant passages is the one in which Kant explains his statement that a priori knowledge does not arise from experience. He says

But though all of our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. (B1)

In the explanation Kant makes a point about the genesis of knowledge while he says nothing about justification. If his notion of a priori knowledge were linked to justification, one would expect him to say so precisely at this point. Rather, Kant indicates that the knowledge which does not arise out of experience is knowledge that "our own faculty...supplies from itself." 'Supplying' is a genetic notion; Kant is saying here that a priori knowledge is knowledge produced by a faculty of the self. Furthermore, the passage immediately following the last one quoted reads:

If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it.
(B1-2)

Here Kant asserts that the addition that the faculty of knowledge makes, which he identifies with a priori knowledge, can, although it is difficult, with long practise of attention be separated from it. The passage reads as if what we must pay the attention to is experience, which at least suggests that acquisition of a priori knowledge is possible through scrutinizing experience. This does not suggest that Kant has a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge in mind.

I contend that most of the other passages in the Critique in which Kant is referring to a kind of a priori knowledge that he thinks

to be possible for us can easily be interpreted genetically. There are also several more which come close to demanding a genetic interpretation. For instance, in The Transcendental Deduction in B Kant says:

The synthesis or combination of the manifold in [a determinate object] relates only to the unity of apperception, and is thereby the ground of possibility of a priori knowledge, so far as such knowledge rests on the understanding. (B150)

The idea that a priori knowledge rests on the understanding does not have a clear, non-genetic interpretation in this context, whereas it seems natural to take it to mean that a priori knowledge is produced by through synthesis by means of the understanding. Also, at the beginning of the Principles Kant writes that "...it is through the relation of the categories to possible experience that all pure a priori knowledge of the understanding has to be constituted..." This talk of constituting knowledge is quite clearly genetic. At another place in the Principles, Kant actually identifies a priori knowledge with synthesis:

...since experience, as empirical synthesis, is, in so far as such experience is possible, the one species of knowledge which is capable of imparting reality to any non-empirical synthesis, the latter [type of synthesis] as knowledge a priori, can possess truth, that is, agreement with the object, only in so far as it contains nothing save what is necessary to synthetic unity of experience in general. (A157-8=B196-7)

'Synthesis' is undoubtedly a genetic notion; synthesis is a process. So to identify a priori knowledge with synthesis would seem to lend support to the idea that it too is a genetic notion, even though this identification isn't exactly perspicuous.

The way in which Kant presents necessity and universality as criteria for a priori knowledge is also evidence that Kant has a genetic notion of a priori knowledge in mind. Kant states these criteria as follows:

What we here require is a criterion by which to distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical knowledge. Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we have a proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment; and if, besides, it is not derived from any proposition except one which also has the validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a priori judgment. Secondly, experience never confers on its judgments true or strict, but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction. We can properly only say, therefore, that, so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, then, a judgment is thought with strict universality, that is, in such manner that no exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori.
(B3-4)

One thing that Kant says here is that if a judgment is thought as necessary and it is not derived from any proposition except one which also has this characteristic, it is an absolutely a priori judgment. This leaves room for there being a priori judgments which are not derived from any proposition which is thought as necessary. I think that Kant is saying here that if a proposition is thought as necessary and is not derived from any other proposition at all it is also absolutely a priori; if he is not saying this in the above passage it would still be implausible to interpret him as thinking that such underived propositions which are thought as necessary are not absolutely a priori. Consequently, the above passage leaves room for there being propositions known merely a priori which are derived from

propositions which are not thought as necessary. Since propositions which are not thought as necessary, if they are thought at all, are thought as contingent, and since for Kant propositions that are thought as contingent have passively received or empirical content, it follows that there is room for propositions merely known a priori to be based on or derived from propositions with such a passively received or empirical content. This does not fit with the idea that for Kant propositions that are known a priori are a priori in the justificatory sense.

Furthermore, Kant's notions of necessity and universality themselves fit a genetic notion of a priori knowledge rather well. Kant has these two ideas, which are ideas prominent in his ethics as well: First, that human rational nature is uniform so that every human rational self would contribute the same kinds of things to experience under all of the relevantly similar conditions, hence universality (B140, Proleg. Ak IV 298-9), and second, that our human rational nature is a source of law and the normative, so that human rational selves could contribute necessity to experience. Furthermore, Kant says that the universality of a judgment is an indication that the judgment has come from a special source, which is a genetic characterization:

When...strict universality is essential to a judgment, this indicates a special source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of a priori knowledge. (B4)

This is not something Kant would be likely to say if his notion of a priori knowledge was that of knowledge which does not employ empirical material in its justification.

Earlier we noted that the best evidence for a Kantian emphasis on the justificatory notion of a priori knowledge concerns its connection with certainty. But it appears to be Kant's view that some judgments which are certain are not so because they are justified a priori . Although he does say that mathematical propositions have certainty because they are justified without recourse to empirical intuitions (A47-8=B65), as we have seen above he also thinks that the synthetic a priori principles of the understanding are apodeictically certain when experience is presupposed (A737=B765). Furthermore, in the section in which he gives a genetic account of necessity and universality he also says:

For whence could experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and therefore contingent?
(B5)

Since it seems that Kant is speaking genetically in this section, the term 'empirical' as it is used in this passage is likely to have genetic import. What Kant is ruling out, then, is that certain knowledge, if it is to be certain, can have a passively received aspect. It would seem that what Kant is implicitly ruling in is that certainty in knowledge might have an explanation in the fact that the knowledge has a source in the mind. In addition, necessity and universality seem to be closely linked to certainty for Kant, so if necessity and universality have genetic accounts, certainty may very well also have.

Two passages which actually seem to preclude that a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge is most important for Kant are found near

the end of the Critique, in what is officially its second main division, entitled "Transcendental Doctrine of Method." The first is in the Chapter entitled "The Discipline of Pure Reason". In this passage Kant is concerned with the principles of the pure understanding, which he holds to be examples of synthetic a priori knowledge:

Through concepts of understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely, possible experience. When such experience (that is, something as object of possible experiences) is presupposed, these principles are indeed apodeictically certain; but in themselves, directly, they can never be known a priori. Thus no one can acquire insight into the proposition that everything which happens has its cause, merely from the concepts involved. It is not, therefore, a dogma, although from another point of view, namely, from that of the sole field of its possible employment, that is, experience, it can be proved with complete apodeictic certainty. But though it needs proof, it should be entitled a principle, not a theorem, because it has the peculiar character that it makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof, and that in this experience it must always itself be presupposed. (A736-7=B764-5)

Kant is saying here that the second analogy, the synthetic a priori principle that everything which happens has its cause, can only be proved from experience, experience must always be presupposed in its proof. This again suggests that a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge is not on Kant's mind here. The second passage from the Doctrine of Method appears in the chapter entitled "The Architectonic of Pure Reason". Here Kant is dealing with the extent to which metaphysics can yield knowledge:

(A) First of all, how can I expect to have knowledge a priori (and therefore a metaphysics) of objects in so far as they are given to our senses, that is, given in an a posteriori manner? And how is it possible to know the nature of things and to arrive at a rational physiology according to principles a priori? The answer is this: we take nothing more from experience than is required to give us an object of outer or of inner sense. The object of outer sense we obtain through the mere concept of matter (impenetrable, lifeless extension), the object of inner sense through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical inner representation, 'I think'). As to the rest, in the whole metaphysical treatment of these objects, we must entirely dispense with all empirical principles which profess to add to these concepts any other more special experience, with a view to our passing further judgments upon the objects. (A847-8=B875-6)

Kant is not saying that we have to take much from experience in order to have a priori knowledge of nature, but we have to take something. What we have to take is the concept of an object, either the concept of matter or the concept of the empirical self. These may be fairly abstract empirical concepts, yet Kant is saying that they are empirical concepts just the same.

This passage also may be taken to indicate that something not completely unrelated to a justificatory notion of a priori knowledge is yielded by the genetic notion that we have isolated. I have already suggested that Philip Kitcher's notion of quasi a priori knowledge captures what this justificatory notion is. Quasi a priori knowledge is knowledge obtainable given any sufficiently rich experience.⁴ The above passage indicates that for Kant 'sufficiently rich experience' would denote an experience which contains matter and a thinking being. As we will see in later chapters, Kant might want to spell this out by specifying that the experience contain

regularities, intentionality, and self-consciousness of varying sorts. I think that for Kant all a priori knowledge (genetically specified) will turn out to be quasi a priori knowledge. This is because what the self contributes to experience are very general features of it; it does not contribute particular material content. Thus, it stands to reason that in justifying any knowledge about what the self contributes to experience we need not appeal to specific material content, only to general facts about experience, such as its intentionality, its regularity, and the fact that it is self-conscious. It is nevertheless important to note that Kant's genetic notion of a priori knowledge does not yield a justificatory notion of genuine rather than quasi a priori knowledge.

There are reasons to believe that there is an important sense in which considerations deeply rooted in Kant's thought preclude him from accepting the notion of strict a priori knowledge which concerns justification for many of the principles he wants to call a priori. These reasons have to do with Kant's conviction that all knowledge requires intuitions together with his belief that intellectual intuitions are impossible for us. This is, to be sure, not to say that no knowledge is justified a priori for Kant; mathematics, for instance, is justified a priori because the kinds of intuitions to which justifications in mathematics appeal are a priori. The point I want to make concerns the fact that the kinds of intuitions involved in the justification of a priori principles like the Analogies of Experience are not plausibly a priori intuitions. I will consider this in the last section of this chapter.

2. The nature of the transcendental.

These considerations may help in determining what the transcendental is for Kant and what the significance of this notion is for his project as a whole. Kant applies the adjective 'transcendental' in various contexts, for instance he speaks of transcendental deductions, aesthetic, logic, ideas, idealism, unity, synthesis, reflection, knowledge, and philosophy. Let's begin the investigation with a consideration of the notions of transcendental knowledge and philosophy. In a passage in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant writes:

(B) I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy. (A11-12=B25)

Neither knowledge of objects nor a priori knowledge of objects is transcendental knowledge; transcendental knowledge is knowledge of the mode or way in which we can know objects a priori. Given the typical genetic force of the notion of the a priori for Kant, this means that transcendental knowledge is knowledge of the way in which the self contributes to empirical knowledge or experience. Thus transcendental philosophy is the system of knowledge of the way in which the self contributes to empirical knowledge. This interpretation of the notions of transcendental knowledge and philosophy is supported by the general definition of the word 'transcendental' which Kant provides in two places in the Prolegomena:

...the word "transcendental"...for me, never means a reference of our knowledge (Erkenntnis) to things, but only to our faculty of knowledge..(Proleg., Ak IV 293)

(C) ...the word "transcendental,"....does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible.
(Proleg. Ak IV 373n)

Transcendental knowledge is knowledge of the preconditions of experience, knowledge of what precedes experience a priori, knowledge of what the self's faculty of knowledge contributes to experience. It is quite clear that the self referred to here is the self as it is in itself; the empirical self, an object synthesized by means of concepts out of passively received representations could not be active, could not produce anything (B132). Moreover Kant says "I exist as intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination..." (B158-9), which, since for Kant selves as they are in themselves are intelligences, indicates that the self as it is in itself is the agent of the type of activity that produces a priori knowledge. One should object that Kant believes that we cannot have knowledge of the self as it is in itself, that we are merely conscious of the self which is the agent of combination (B158). This is a puzzle which will concern us again in this chapter. What I would like to emphasize at this point is that there is a great deal which Kant says about faculties of the self as it is in itself like the understanding and the imagination which he clearly thinks of as transcendental knowledge. Many commentators have thought it best to reinterpret Kant on this issue, excising the transcendental knowledge (at least the transcendental psychology), but I think that this approach leaves no room for too

much of what Kant says in the analytic, and isn't sympathetic enough with Kant's own theory. Although his classification of faculties may be unhelpful and unilluminating at times, Kant's transcendental philosophy is philosophically important in its own right and has had significant influence on the development of psychology and the philosophy of mind. We will discuss this in greater detail as well.

The two passages from the Prolegomena above put us in a position to begin to get a grasp on the general notion of the transcendental. First of all, the term 'transcendental' applies to any aspect of the preconditions of experience, preconditions which are to be found in the activity of the self. This fits with what Kant says about transcendental synthesis, the transcendental unity of apperception, and transcendental reflection:

We entitle the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if without distinction of intuitions it is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold... (A118)

A synthesis is transcendental when it is a synthesis that unifies the passively received elements of the manifold and is a priori, i.e. performed by the self as a precondition of experience. Then in §16 of the Transcendental Deduction in B Kant writes

The unity of apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it. (B132)

Again, this fits the pattern. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness is so named because of its relation to a priori knowledge, that to which the self gives rise in empirical knowledge or

experience. Lastly, Kant discusses the topic of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection:

The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty (Erkenntniskraft) to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call transcendental reflection (Ueberlegung). (A261-B317)

This, too, conforms to the line I have been taking; transcendental reflection will provide information about what is produced by the self in giving rise to knowledge and experience. But there is more here as well, and I suspect that this is what is most fundamental about the notion of the transcendental. It is the idea of a point of view which one has on some aspect of reality when one is theorizing. When one has the transcendental point of view, one can consider more than just the empirical world as subject matter for investigation. One is in the position to reflect on the activity of the understanding, which is beyond the empirical world. When one has acquired the transcendental point of view, one is in a position to investigate what the genesis of empirical representations is, and to what extent it is produced by one's own cognitive faculties.

It is significant that Kant contrasts the transcendental with the empirical (e.g. A369ff). There is also an empirical, or perhaps better, an internal point of view; it is the one which one ordinarily possesses. It is also a point of view which Kant often seems to assimilate to the point of view science has on reality. It contrasts with the transcendental in that from the internal point of view we are not capable of investigating what the real genesis of the ordinary

perspective is. Internally, we think that we experience outer objects which are independent of us, which interact causally with us and with each other in certain ways. Kant even wants to say that this is all true (e.g. A235=B294ff). But when we've acquired the transcendental point of view, we see things differently. We see that "all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance;.... As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us."(A42=B59) This touches on the topic of Kant's transcendental idealism, which we will discuss in a moment.

But first, there is the issue of exactly what we are capable of investigating from the transcendental point of view. At times he applies the term 'transcendental' to what lies beyond the bounds of experience in general, for example:

(D) The principles of pure understanding, which we have set out above, allow only of empirical and not of transcendental employment, that is, employment extending beyond the limits of experience.
(A296=B351-3)

This application may make sense in that if what lies beyond the bounds of experience in general were to be apprehended by us it would be from the transcendental rather than from the internal point of view. But as is evident from the above passage, Kant's applying the term 'transcendental' here does not mean that things in themselves in general can actually be investigated from the transcendental point of view. There is, furthermore, evidence that the use of the term 'transcendental' in passage (D) is a slip on Kant's part and that he really only wants to apply it in instances where we can apprehend and investigate. He says in passage (C) in the Prolegomena:

(C) ...the word "transcendental,"....does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible.

Yet what Kant is saying in passage (C) may be too strong, given the character of his transcendental philosophy. For isn't the self as it is in itself the object of transcendental reflection? Kant says that as a spontaneous (i.e. synthesizing) being I entitle myself intelligence (B158n; cf. B155-6, B158-9), and this sounds to me like talk about the self in itself. Kant is quite attracted to the idea that synthesis is a spontaneous activity (e.g. A50=B74, A68=B93), and spontaneity can lie only in what lies beyond possible experience (e.g. Bxxviff). So Kant has a problem on his hands. Although it looks as if transcendental knowledge is of the self as it is in itself, the significance of this passage (D) seems to be that Kant believes that he can't afford to admit cognition or knowledge of anything, especially the self, as it is itself. The following kind of reasoning may typify Kant's worry: the categories apply to what we can know about, causation is a category, and on Kant's view if the category of causation applies to the self as it is in itself, it cannot be free. (This is because for Kant if the category of cause applies in some realm, causal determinism is true in that realm.) And it is of utmost importance that we be able to think of ourselves as free. In the Paralogisms Kant describes what is at issue in this way:

(E) Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) personality is

inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession. (B409-410)

Kant has a hard time with this. On the one hand he wants to do transcendental philosophy, and on the other hand he wants to say that we can have no knowledge of the self as it is in itself. One solution is that we have no intuition of transcendental synthesis, say, and that our apprehension of this synthesis consequently does not constitute knowledge. Rather we are merely conscious of synthesis and of ourselves as agents of synthesis. Kant says, along these lines;

On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition. Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given. (B157, cf. A78=B103)

This may be a plausible assessment of what our epistemological position is in ordinary life. Possibly we are only barely conscious of ourselves as spontaneous. But the deliverances of transcendental philosophy amount to much more than mere consciousness. In fact as we have seen, he defines transcendental philosophy as the system of transcendental knowledge. (A11-12=B25)

Another solution to the problem could be taken to be suggested by passage (C) from the Prolegomena. There he says that the transcendental does not concern what passes beyond experience, but what precedes it, and by implication, that transcendental knowledge is not knowledge of anything which passes beyond the bounds of experience, but knowledge of what precedes it. If this is to be taken seriously, then transcendental philosophy may be much like highly theoretical empirical cognitive psychology, at least in the respect that its object of study is not the self as it is in itself. Are we to conclude that its object of study is the empirical self, and that transcendental philosophy is to the self what highly theoretical physics is to the physical world, and no more? I think that this consequence might not hinder Kant's project a great deal; I don't think it threatens his transcendental idealism or the anti-skepticism that is supposed to result from it. But Kant himself is wary of it; in the Architectonic, after characterizing transcendental philosophy as a branch of metaphysics, he writes:

...how are we to regard empirical psychology, which has always claimed its place in metaphysics, and from which in our times such great things have been expected for the advancement of metaphysics, the hope of succeeding by a priori methods having been abandoned. I answer that it belongs where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature belongs, namely, by the side of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy; it is therefore so far connected with applied philosophy, though not to be confounded with it. Empirical psychology is thus completely banished from the domain of metaphysics; it is indeed already completely excluded by the very idea of the latter science.
(A849=B877)

I suspect that the things Kant says on this issue, the material we just canvassed, reflects the fact that he finds it very difficult to deal with, that he is not sure of himself at this point. There is another solution to this problem, however, which fits better with Kant's general line of thought, for instance with his account of a priori knowledge as having its source in the self. We will encounter and discuss this solution in the next two sections.

It has sometimes been suggested that the central idea of transcendental philosophy is that it is constituted by a theory of the necessary conditions of experience which is an a priori theory in that it is justified independently of experience. But just as it appears that the dominant notion of a priori in Kant is not that which is justified independently of experience or of that which is passively received, so it is not central to transcendental philosophy that it is a priori in this sense. Kant never says that transcendental philosophy has this nature. Rather, given that a priori knowledge is that which is contributed to experience by the mind, the central notion of transcendental philosophy is the study of how this a priori knowledge is produced. Consider passage (B) again:

(B)I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects, in so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori. A system of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philosophy.
(A11-12=B25)

Kant does not say here that transcendental knowledge and philosophy are themselves a priori, rather they concern how a priori knowledge is possible. So far, this is not to say that transcendental knowledge

won't sometimes turn out to be a priori in the sense that it is justified independently of what is passively received, but rather that this is not central or essential to the notion of transcendental knowledge. The relevant passages indicate that what is central is that it is knowledge that one can gain by reflection on the self from a point of view which gives one a more inclusive perspective than the ordinary, empirical one does, a point of view from which one can ascertain various facts concerning the self's contributions to experience. Much remains to be clarified in all of this; to this end an examination of Kant's transcendental idealism will prove to be significant.

3. Transcendental idealism.

What is transcendental and what is idealistic about Kant's transcendental idealism? Since we have already come to some conclusion about what 'transcendental' means, let's tackle the notion of idealism first. Perhaps the most important passage to look at is found in the Fourth Paralogism in A, where Kant first defines 'idealism' and then 'transcendental idealism'. Kant defines idealism in this way:

The term 'idealist' is not, therefore, to be understood as applying to those who deny the existence of external objects of the senses, but only to those who do not admit that their existence is known through immediate perception, and who therefore conclude that we can never, by way of any possible experience, be completely certain as to their reality. (A368-9)

In this passage from A Kant does not give the term 'idealist' metaphysical but only epistemological import. 'Idealist' does not

apply to theorists who think that external objects don't exist, but only to those who don't believe in what Kant calls realism about external objects, that is, those who don't believe that in perception, say, we have immediate awareness or cognition of external objects as opposed to awareness of mental states. An idealist is thus someone who doesn't believe that we have intuitions, in the sense of immediate representations of ordinary objects, of external objects (in some sense of 'eternal objects'. All we do have immediate awareness of are our own mental representations or their contents.

There is a sense of idealism which Kant himself wants to accept and a sense which he wants to reject. What he wants to accept is transcendental idealism, which he characterizes in the passage in the Fourth Paralogism in A which closely follows the definition of 'idealist' quoted above:

Before exhibiting our paralogism in all its deceptive illusoriness, I have first to remark that we must necessarily distinguish two types of idealism, the transcendental and the empirical. By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves, and that time and space are therefore only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves. (A369; cf. A490-1=B518-9))

The definition of 'idealist' had a negative and a positive aspect; negatively, the idealist thinks that we lack intuition, immediate awareness or cognition of external things, and positively he thinks that our immediate awareness is of mediating mental representations. So for the transcendental idealist, negatively, we lack intuitions of things as they exist in themselves, and positively, our immediate

awareness is of mental entities. Yet Kant thinks, and this is a central aspect of his system, that the transcendental idealist need not and does not deny that we have intuitions of objects in space, objects of outer intuition; he can maintain this position because he holds that space and time are mind-dependent, they are forms of intuition and not determinations of things as they are in themselves. Consequently the intentional objects of our outer intuitions, which Kant calls appearances, can both be mental entities and external in the sense that they are in space.

What enables Kant to maintain his position is that he divorces the notion of a thing in space, a thing belonging to outer appearance, from the notion of a thing in itself. Consequently there are two senses of 'external object', one is 'thing in itself' and the second is 'the content of (spatial) outer intuition.' As Kant puts it, the expression 'outside us' is ambiguous:

The expression 'outside us' is thus unavoidably ambiguous in meaning, sometimes signifying what as thing in itself exists apart from us, and sometimes what belongs solely to outer appearance. In order, therefore, to make this concept, in the latter sense--the sense in which the psychological question as to the reality of our outer intuition has to be understood--quite unambiguous, we shall distinguish empirically external objects from those which may be said to be external in the transcendental sense, by explicitly entitling the former 'things which are to be found in space'. (A373)

Thus there are transcendentially external and empirically external objects. In accordance with this there are four positions to be identified as regards cognition of these kinds external objects, transcendental and empirical realism and idealism. Kant calls his

position on the relation between our cognition and things in space and time empirical realism. Kant thinks that one way in which it is possible to preserve the notion that we have intuitions of things in space and time is to hold that they are not things in themselves, but contents of mental representations. In this way it is possible to secure immediate awareness or cognition of them. Consequently, one way in which to be an empirical realist is to be a transcendental idealist:

The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist or, as he is called, a dualist; that is, he may admit the existence of matter without going outside his mere self-consciousness, or assuming anything more than the certainty of his representations, that is, the cogito, ergo sum. For he considers this matter and even its inner possibility to be appearance merely; and appearance, if separated from our sensibility, is nothing. Matter is with him, therefore, only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external, not as standing in relation to objects in themselves external, but because they relate perceptions to the space in which all things are external to one another, while yet the space itself is in us. (A370)

Furthermore, Kant thinks that the only way to be an empirical realist is to be a transcendental idealist. The negation of transcendental idealism is transcendental realism. On this view things in themselves are identified with things in space and time. What the transcendental realist holds is that what we have intuitions of are things existing in space and time and completely independent of us, that is, existing in themselves:

To this [transcendental] idealism there is opposed a transcendental realism which regards time and space as something given in themselves, independently of our sensibility. The transcendental realist thus

interprets outer appearances (their reality being taken as granted) as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of us and of our sensibility, and which are therefore outside us--the phrase 'outside us' being interpreted in conformity with pure concepts of understanding. (A369)

The transcendental realist position includes or entails empirical realism, since empirical realism is part of transcendental realism. The transcendental realist holds that we have intuitions of things in space and time, which is just empirical realism, and in addition that these things in space and time are transcendently external, that is that they are things in themselves, ultimately independent of us and our cognitive faculties.

Kant thinks that transcendental realism contains an internal tension which destroys it; he thinks it has to dissolve into empirical idealism, the position that we don't have immediate awareness or cognition of things in space, which in turns dissolves into skepticism about things in space.

It is, in fact, this transcendental realist who afterwards plays the part of empirical idealist. After wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses, he finds that, judged from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their reality. (A369)

One reason for the dissolution of transcendental realism into empirical idealism is that it is impossible to maintain the view that we have intuitions of things in themselves. If things are ultimately independent of us, then we can only apprehend them via some representation, and not immediately:

If we treat outer objects as things in themselves, it is quite impossible to understand how we could arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, since we have to rely merely on the representation which is in us. For we cannot be sentient [of what is] outside ourselves, but only [of what is] in us, and the whole of our self-consciousness therefore yields nothing save merely our own determinations. (A378)

So if spatiality is held to be a determination of things in themselves, then spatiality goes as the things in themselves go. If there is no intuition of things in themselves, there can be no intuition of things in space either.

Although Kant doesn't actually say so, he surely would say that as it dissolves into empirical idealism, transcendental realism dissolves into the negative aspect of transcendental idealism as well. On the transcendental realist picture if it turns out that we cannot have intuition of things in space, intuition of things in themselves will also turn out to be impossible. Kant also seems to espouse the view that idealism about some realm of objects entails skepticism about that realm. In the passage from A369 quoted above he actually appears to identify empirical idealism with a kind of skepticism about things in space and it is quite clear that Kant believes his transcendental idealism to entail a kind of skepticism about things in themselves. Kant writes:

That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only conditions of things existing as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of understanding, and consequently no elements for the knowledge of things, save insofar as intuition be given corresponding to these concepts; and that we therefore have no knowledge of any object as a thing in itself, but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance--all this

is proved in the analytical part of the Critique.
(Bxxv-xxvi, cf. A235=B294ff)

This kind of skepticism consists in the fact that we typically can't know their properties in any detail. This skepticism is peculiar since it concerns entities of which we don't have any initial, common sense conception. But in this connection we might wonder what Kant's theory of inferential knowledge is; if we have no immediate awareness or cognition of something is it still possible to acquire knowledge of it? Kant says that we can. In the Postulates of Empirical Thought he says:

We can also, however, know the existence of the thing prior to its perception and, consequently, comparatively speaking, in an a priori manner, if only it be bound up with certain perceptions, in accordance with their principles of empirical connection (the analogies). For the existence of the thing being thus bound up with our perceptions in a possible experience, we are able in the series of possible perceptions and under the guidance of the analogies to make the transition from our actual perception to the thing in question. Thus from the perception of the attracted iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from all immediate perception of this medium. (A225-6=B273)

We actually know of the existence of this magnetic matter even though we have no immediate awareness or cognition of it. So even though we have no intuition of magnetic matter, we can have knowledge of it. One might think that this violates a Kantian condition on knowledge, namely that both concepts and intuitions are necessary for knowledge, but two points can be made here. First, Kant thinks that we could have an intuition of magnetic matter if only our faculties were more refined:

For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions, we should, were our senses more refined, come also into an experience upon the immediate empirical intuition of it. (A226=B273)

Secondly, an intuition is intrinsically involved in the justification of knowledge about magnetic matter; in this case the knowledge of magnetic matter is dependent upon the intuition of attracted iron filings. So possibly Kant would, if pressed, generally allow such an indirect use of intuition in the justification of knowledge. But if Kant would allow such an indirect use of intuition, then it may follow that idealism about things in themselves does not entail complete skepticism about that realm. For he could then allow inferences from intuitions we actually have to things in themselves. There are some indications that he intentionally allows for such inferences, although he is wary of calling the result knowledge. In the Critique, he allows an inference of existence of things in themselves from their appearances:

But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. (Bxxvi-xxvii)

In his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant allows that we can at least conjecture facts about the self as it is in itself from experience. In the following passage he is concerned with one's inner disposition, which is a feature of oneself as intelligence. Kant says:

It is true, indeed, that the man who, through a sufficiently long course of life, has observed the

efficacy of these principles of goodness, from the time of their adoption, in his conduct, that is, in the steady improvement of his way of life, can still only conjecture from this that there has been a fundamental improvement in his inner disposition (GH62, Ak VI 68)

and again

And so that good and pure disposition of which we are conscious (and of which we may speak as a good spirit presiding over us) creates in us, though only indirectly, a confidence in its own permanence and stability, and is our Comforter (Paraclete) whenever our lapses make us apprehensive of its constancy. Certainty with regard to it is neither possible to man, nor, so far as we can see, [would it be] morally beneficial. For, be it well noted, we cannot base such confidence upon an immediate consciousness of the unchangeableness of our disposition, for this we cannot scrutinize: we must always draw our conclusions regarding it solely from its consequences in our way of life. Since such a conclusion, however, is drawn merely from objects of perception, as the appearances of the good or evil disposition, it can least of all reveal the strength of the disposition with any certainty. (GH65, Ak VI 70-1)

So even though Kant sometimes says that complete skepticism about things in themselves is entailed by transcendental idealism, on a deeper level his view may be different given that he allows inferences like these. As we shall see, a case can be made that Kant believes that facts about the self as it is in itself can be inferred from intuitions we do have without our having intuitions of this self.

This suggests another solution to the problem as to how to reconcile the possibility of transcendental knowledge with Kant's maintaining that we can have no knowledge of the self as it is in itself. Possibly, when Kant says that we can have no knowledge, that is, Erkenntnis, of the self as it is in itself he means to say that we cannot have a cognition of this self, and in particular a cognition of

the sort that involves an intuition of the object in question. Transcendental knowledge may then be knowledge of this self, its faculties and their processes, which does not involve an intuition of it, but rather an intuition of something else. Even though Kant does not offer this explanation, I suspect that this solution to this problem comes closest to his own way of thinking about it. We will explore this in greater detail in the next section.

On the other side, realism about external objects doesn't obviously preclude skepticism about them. This is something which Kant fails to notice. Kant admits that not "every intuitive representation of outer things involves the existence of these things, for their representation can very well be the product of the imagination,(as in dreams and delusions)" (B278). But this makes room for skepticism about objects in space and time because if we sometimes have non-veridical intuitions, the skeptic can argue that in any given case we cannot know the intuition we are having is veridical or not. Kant would want to claim that such a skeptical suggestion could be defeated because we have a causal coherence criterion of what is real (A376, B278-9), but to this the skeptic could reply that in any given instance we couldn't be sure whether the criterion applies.

Since Kant does not want to deny the existence of things in themselves (Bxxviff, B308) he would not want to deny what might be called humanistic metaphysical realism with respect to some of the things there are. Let's define humanistic metaphysical realism with respect to some realm as the doctrine that things in that realm exist, or more inclusively and accurately, sentences about that realm are

true, independently of what we humans may think, believe or know. (In contrast to Hilary Putnam's notion of metaphysical realism, which has both a metaphysical and an epistemological aspect, the one I define here is strictly metaphysical.⁵) Verificationists thus typically deny humanistic metaphysical realism in general, whereas all of the early modern philosophers accept it with respect to some realm or other. Kant believes that there are things in themselves which are humanistically metaphysically real; he speaks as if such entities exist independently of all of our minds, and says that his idealism is not meant to deny their existence:

My idealism concerns not the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), since it never came into my head to doubt it, but it concerns only the sensuous representation of things, to which space and time especially belong. (Proleg. Ak IV 293, cf Bxxvi, B308)

As we saw in chapter 3, Kant's conception of things in themselves seems to be very close to Leibniz's conception of monads. Kant would, it seems, deny humanistic metaphysical realism with respect to the empirical world, the world apprehended from the internal point of view. Objects in space as well as empirical selves and their states are dependent for what they are on our mental processes. In making this same point, Putnam illustrates it with Kant's statement in the Prolegomena that all properties of bodies are like Lockean secondary qualities (Proleg. Ak IV); for Kant all properties of bodies and of empirical selves are aspects of appearance, of how we are appeared to.⁶

Another perspective on Kant's realism can be acquired with the use of a notion of metaphysical realism defined with respect to all minds (including God's). Let's call this general metaphysical realism. At first one might think that Kant is a general metaphysical realist with respect to things in themselves, whereas Berkeley, for instance, is not. But as Margaret Wilson points out, for Kant things in themselves may be nothing more than the objects of God's non-sensible intuition⁷, which is really not all that different from Berkeley's idea that the archetypes of physical objects are in God's mind.⁸ Kant's idea is that in contrast to our intuition, which is characterized by passivity, God has an active intuition, which actively produces the objects that it apprehends,

[a]n understanding which through its self-consciousness could apply to itself the manifold of intuition--an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist...(B138-9)

Kant speculates that only God could have mental activity of this kind:

...such intellectual intuition seems to belong only to the primordial being and can never be ascribed to a dependent being, dependent in its existence as well as in its intuition..." (B72; cf. B68, B135, B145, B307-8, A286=B342)

But there are yet two ways of construing this description of God's mental activity; either the objects produced by his intuitions are in his mind, which gives us a picture like Berkeley's, or the created things have some kind of independence of God's mind, which is a view akin to Leibniz's, and is strongly suggested by the term 'thing in itself' (as opposed to 'thing for some mind'). Possibly God's

intuitions are supposed to be like Leibniz's "continuous fulgurations of the divinity" by which monads are generated (Monadology 47, L647). If Kant's view is more like Berkeley's then he doesn't hold general metaphysical realism about things in themselves, if it is more like Leibniz's then he might hold it. But whatever is true of Kant's view on this issue, it is clear that his transcendental idealism is not supposed to deny the truth of humanistic metaphysical realism with respect to things in themselves. Consequently, contrary to what some have supposed, nothing like verificationism is part of the Kantian picture.⁹

By now we're in a good position to consider in greater depth what is transcendental about transcendental idealism. I've said earlier that what is central to the notion of the transcendental is the idea of a point of view from which one can reflect on the self and its representations in a way in which one cannot from the ordinary internal point of view. This characterization of the transcendental fits with Kant's notion of transcendental idealism quite well. From the ordinary, internal point of view we have intuitions, immediate cognitions of external objects. But when we acquire a point of view which enables us to discern the way things really are with regard to certain aspects of our cognitive faculties, we can see not only that we do not have intuitions of things in themselves, which is in fact impossible for us, but also that space and time are forms of our intuition and that the contents of our representations are dependent on conceptual organization for their character. Furthermore, transcendental idealism is transcendental because it, in both its

negative and positive aspects, is only to be seen as idealism from the transcendental point of view. From the transcendental point of view one can see that there is a distinction between external objects as things in themselves and external objects as things in space, that things in space are only relatively external. By contrast, such a distinction is not apprehended from the everyday, internal point of view; from the internal point of view it just appears as if we have intuitions of things in space, of things which are independent of us and external to us simpliciter. Kant's view might consequently be taken to capture Hume's famous sentiment of §XII of the Enquiry:

It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: Our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves the existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it. (Enquiry, S 24)

The instinct of nature is what determines our conception of the world on the internal point of view, whereas when we engage in the

"slightest philosophy" we have acquired the transcendental perspective.

The consideration of transcendental idealism reveals a very significant fact about Kant's notion of the transcendental. It is this: What occasions the split between the internal and the transcendental points of view for Kant is the idealist theory of cognition and perception, the "veil of ideas" view that that of which we have intuition is something in the mind, not an ultimately mind-independent entity, a thing in itself. On this theory it can make sense to think that we can have a point of view from which what we naively think to be an immediate relation of our cognitive faculties to external objects looks different from the way it looks from the ordinary, internal point of view. This is not to say that some difference between the transcendental and internal points of view could not arise on a theory according to which the spatial objects of which we have intuitions are also things in themselves. It could nonetheless arise because there is still room for skepticism on such a realist theory, and consequently a distinction could be drawn between our ordinary point of view on experience and the real relation between our cognitive faculties and experience. But on such a theory the internal view might reveal nothing different from what the transcendental view reveals; a difference is present only if one's intuitions are dreams, hallucinations or something like them. Only if one holds a view like Kant's, according to which the objects of which we have intuitions are mental entities can we suspect that the contents of our mental representations are never like the way things

are in themselves. Only then could it be that the mind generally determines the nature of what we naively take to be external objects, and only then could it be that in general objects which ordinarily seem to be external to our minds are not external to our minds in a very strong sense.

4. Psychology and point of view

The notion of a transcendental point of view from which we can acquire knowledge has been rejected by many philosophers. For example, Kierkegaard, the early Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists all condemn this notion to some degree or other. An idea that they all have is that the transcendental point of view from which one can acquire knowledge can't really be had or achieved, and the positivists go so far as to say that it is not a possible point of view at all.

To find out what the issue is here, we must first examine the very notion of point of view with regard to the self. How does this notion arise? In his Tanner Lectures, Thomas Nagel links the notion of point of view to the quest for objectivity. His idea is that in order to gain objectivity, we must step back from our current point of view and subsequently see that point of view and its world as object:

To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of the world, we step back from our view of it and form a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its object. In other words, we place ourselves in the world that is to be understood. The old view then comes to be regarded as an appearance, more subjective than the new view, and correctable or confirmable by reference to it. 10

Objectivity is to be acquired by stepping back from one's own point of view to a new point of view from which one can see the old point of view as something in and related to the world around it. This "stepping back" metaphor is quite fruitful. To see this, consider the attempt to acquire objectivity on some practise or belief, say it's the idea that women shouldn't have any positions of authority in society. One can live a belief or practise like this without, in an important sense, acquiring any objectivity with respect to it. To acquire objectivity one has to step back from the belief or practise, which, I think, includes two factors: First, in some sense removing oneself from unreflective involvement with it, and second, seeing the belief or practise as it relates to other similar or competing beliefs or practises, as it relates to its origins, etc. Thus the metaphor of stepping back from some aspect of one's self would contain, first the idea of removing oneself from unreflective involvement and secondly, the seeing of the relevant aspect of the self in relation to other relevant aspects of the world.

The notion of stepping back from some aspect of one's self is closely related to the idea of a third person point of view. When we step back from some aspect of ourselves, in the above sense, we acquire, as it were, a third person point of view on this aspect. In a sense we view this aspect as another person would see it. What has been called the third person point of view in psychology, however, represents a more specific and in a way a more powerful concept of objectivity than this. According to the methodology related to this concept, which behaviorists and functionalists typically endorse, one

not only removes oneself from one's unreflective involvement with one's own psychological states and views them in relation to other relevant things in the world, but one also sees oneself as a physical thing among other physical things. Nagel points out that the physical conception of objectivity is a very important one for us, one that has proven to be powerful and fruitful.¹¹

Kant didn't endorse this physicalistic third person point of view in psychology; it wasn't at issue in his time, although from the transcendental point of view there is a sense in which we see our internal point of view as a third person would see it. We are removed from involvement with ourselves at the internal point of view and see them as something in the phenomenal world, causally related to other phenomenal objects. Now let's say that a scientific (and internal) point of view in psychology is acquired by stepping back from one's ordinary, everyday experiences--suspending one's living of them and seeing them as an elements of the phenomenal world. The psychology of the phenomenal self, after all, also demands objectivity. But there is a further question about how the transcendental point of view is acquired; the transcendental point of view differs significantly from the scientific. Possibly it is acquired by stepping back again; Nagel thinks that the stepping back process can be repeated. In stepping back

...we place ourselves in the world that is to be understood. The old view then comes to be regarded as an appearance, more subjective than the new view, and correctable or confirmable by reference to it. The process can be repeated, yielding a still more objective conception. 12

On this suggestion it is by abandoning the internal psychological point of view by stepping back from it that we reach the standpoint from which we can do transcendental philosophy and psychology.

But the truth of the matter is complicated, however. There is a sense in which it is true for Kant that the transcendental point of view is a step back from the internal, but there is also a sense in which it is not. And the sense in which it is not is, I think, very revealing of the anti-rationalist direction of Kant's philosophy as a whole. But first, there is a clear sense in which the transcendental point of view is a step back from the internal psychological standpoint. When one has the transcendental point of view one not only removes oneself from unreflective involvement with one's ordinary experiences and proceeds to see them as elements in the phenomenal world, but one also comes to see the whole phenomenal world, including one's ordinary experiences as resulting from the self's synthesis of the passively received manifold of intuition. One has thus acquired a broader, further removed view of one's ordinary experience than an internal psychological standpoint yields. One has stepped back to acquire a view of the relation of the self as intelligence to one's ordinary experiences, a view that is not limited to the aspects of the self which one apprehends in ordinary, everyday life.

But what is the nature of this step back? First let's look at the notion of the internal standpoint more carefully. The internal standpoint according to Kant is the characteristically human standpoint in which things in themselves are hidden from us by a veil of ideas. We occupy the internal standpoint when we do mathematics,

physics, and any of the sciences. It is clear that for Kant there is a limiting condition on knowledge and cognition for the internal standpoint. This limiting condition, as was already indicated by the discussion of transcendental idealism, is that in the internal standpoint no direct awareness or cognition, no intuition of things in themselves is possible. But Kant holds the view that all of our knowledge is subject to this condition. Consequently, there is a sense in which we cannot get beyond the internal standpoint. This broad picture is suggested in reference to the notion of the transcendental in the following passage from the Prolegomena:

In order to take a position to easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light, without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation, he begins and ends by saying: "This work is a system of transcendental (or, as he translates it, of higher) idealism."*

[footnote]* By no means "higher." High towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos of experience; and the word "transcendental," the meaning of which is so often indicated by me but not once grasped by my reviewer (so carelessly has he regarded everything), does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible. If these concepts overstep experience, their use is termed "transcendent", which must be distinguished from the immanent use, i.e., use restricted to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been sufficiently guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found his advantage in misunderstanding me. (Proleg. Ak IV 374)

The fact that Kant does not believe that the transcendental point of view is to be gained by stepping out of the internal standpoint can be seen most clearly in his attack on the rationalist

psychology of Descartes and especially Leibniz. Leibniz holds that through reason alone, by means of clear and distinct perception, one can know both the self as it is in itself and things outside of oneself as they are in themselves. On Leibniz's view, by means of reason alone we can know the ultimate metaphysical structure of our own minds and of the universe. We, as rational beings, have the capacity, without being tied to any conditions on knowledge, to step back from the ordinary internal standpoint. In this way, we can proceed beyond sensation and its deliverances, beyond the relative confusion of sensory ideas, to a standpoint from which we can view ourselves and other things as they are in themselves.¹³ There are no limits to the possibility of stepping back; it is one of the most central features of classical rationalist doctrine that we can step back so as to attain maximal objectivity, to see the world as God would see it. It is one of the fundamental features of Kant's philosophy that he rejects this rationalist picture. This is indicated by the fact that he rejects the rationalist idea of direct awareness or cognition of things in themselves, which would be the case if the rationalist idea that we can somehow put ourselves beyond the internal standpoint were correct. For instance, in the Paralogisms Kant sets himself to the task of showing that direct awareness or cognition of the self as it is in itself is impossible. In passage (E) from the beginning of the Paralogisms in B he says:

(E) Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows

from this same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession. (B409-10)

Kant is intimating here that if the proofs of the rational psychologists were good ones, we would be conscious of, have intuition of, the self as it is in itself. The intuition would already be indicated in the premise(s) of the arguments, in particular in the 'I think', "the sole text of rational psychology" (A343=B402). Since Kant thinks this to be a threat to his whole system, he works hard to refute these arguments.

How then, can we acquire the transcendental point of view, a perspective which gives us some knowledge of our selves as they are in themselves, given that we can have no intuitions of our selves as they are in themselves? Since Kant holds that some intuition or other has to be involved in the justification of any knowledge we have, it must be that we acquire the transcendental point of view and the consequent transcendental knowledge indirectly by means of the kinds of intuitions we have in the internal standpoint, without ever having intuitions of the self as it is in itself. As I've already suggested, although I don't think that this is unambiguously Kant's position, I do think that it is the view that can most consistently be attributed to him and the one that best represents the direction of his thought. I also suspect that it is the position that is best substantiated by

the various things Kant says on the topic, even though he may say things that conflict with it. There is an alternative position on the nature of justification in Kant's transcendental philosophy, namely that Kant neither does nor does not think the conditions on knowledge of the internal standpoint to apply to it, but I will argue later on that this position is implausible.

There are two kinds of intuition we can have in that internal standpoint to which we're limited, a priori and empirical intuitions. In general, any knowledge we have must be justified on the basis of some instances of either or both of these two kinds. Let's call this the criterion for knowledge of the internal standpoint. (A problem, which we will discuss soon, arises here concerning analytic knowledge.) One might try to make the criterion more stringent by arguing that Kant holds that even knowledge in mathematics and geometry requires empirical intuition for its justification. For instance Kant writes:

Through the determination of pure intuition we can acquire a priori knowledge of objects, as in mathematics, but only in regard to their form, as appearances; whether there can be things which must be intuited in this form, is still left undecided. Mathematical concepts are not, therefore, by themselves knowledge, except on the supposition that there are things which allow of being presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition. Now things in space and time are given only in so far as they are perceptions (that is, representations accompanied by sensation)--therefore only through empirical representation. Consequently, the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to a priori intuitions, as in mathematics, yield knowledge only in so far as these intuitions--and therefore indirectly by their means the pure concepts also--can be applied to empirical intuitions. Even, therefore, with the aid of [pure]

intuition, the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle experience. Our conclusion is therefore this: the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience.
(B147-148 c.f. A156=B195ff)

But Kant is not saying here that the justification of knowledge in mathematics requires empirical intuitions, rather, his view is that judgments in mathematics must be applicable to empirical intuitions if they are to count as knowledge. The justification procedure need only involve a priori intuitions. This creates no problem because a priori knowledge in mathematics does not give us knowledge of things in themselves, but only of the forms of intuition which we ourselves impose on experience.

On the view I am attributing to Kant, justification of knowledge in transcendental philosophy must involve some particular empirical or a priori intuitions or both. This is because such knowledge could never be a priori in the sense that it lacks intuitive content, and could never be a priori in the sense that it contains an intuition of things in themselves. Now some transcendental philosophy may be a priori in the justificatory sense in that the only kind of intuition appealed to in justification is a priori. Kant says that the mathematical principles, the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception, are known with "immediate evidence" (A160-1=B200). A guess as to why this is is that its justification involves only a priori and no empirical intuitions. Yet Kant says that the dynamical

principles, the analogies of experience and the postulates of empirical thought, do "not contain that immediate evidence" (A160=B200). In general, it is doubtful that Kant's transcendental deductions and the Second Analogy, for example, appeal only to a priori intuitions. Consequently I want to suggest that in transcendental philosophy we infer some aspects of the nature of the synthesizing self and what it contributes to experience from general characteristics of both of the kinds of the intuitions of the internal standpoint. To acquire the transcendental point of view, therefore, we must lift ourselves up by the bootstraps of the internal standpoint; we acquire transcendental knowledge while abiding by the criterion of knowledge of the internal standpoint, dependence on the intuitions of the internal standpoint for justification. With regard to our ability to know, we are not creatures at home in the in-itself; rather we are at home only in the bathos of experience, of the internal realm.

This is not to say that transcendental philosophy is indistinguishable from natural science in its justificatory procedures. Philip Kitcher's justificatory notion of quasi a priori knowledge, knowledge obtainable given any sufficiently rich experience, applies to it. Transcendental philosophy doesn't rely directly on particular bits of experimental or observational data, for instance. It relies directly on very general characteristics of any experience of mine (or ours) like the fact that my experience manifests some organization rather than a sheer chaos of representations, or that my experience is intentional, or that in my

experiences I can typically draw a distinction between representations and the objects, events, or processes the representations are of or about, or that my experience consists of representations all of which I can ascribe to myself. One just has to have had some stretch of experience to notice these things; no special observation and experimentation is required.

Let's examine this interpretation indirectly by considering the most significant objections to it. One apparent obstacle to my interpretation of transcendental philosophy is that Kant emphasizes that a transcendental deduction, which is part of Kant's transcendental philosophy, concerns a question of right and not a question of fact:

The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction; and from it I distinguish empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de facto mode of origination. (A85=B117)

A transcendental deduction is not equivalent to the Lockean project of showing how concepts are "acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience", and it might seem as if on my interpretation Kant's Transcendental Deduction is just that. On the one hand, if this phrase is read genetically, it is clear that there is a sharp contrast between Kant and Locke. Kant's pure concepts do not have their genetic origin in experience. But even if the phrase is read as concerning justification, there is still a deep difference. Then the contrast Kant draws between his Deduction and Locke's project

is that whereas Locke just wants to show how concepts arise, Kant wants to prove that we have the right to use them, in particular he wants to show that we have the right to use concepts that originate in the self. He does this by trying to prove that synthesis by means of concepts that originate in the self is required for an account of possible experience, and from this it follows that we may apply such concepts in thought about our experience. Such a project establishes more than just the "de facto mode of organization" of concepts. That general facts about our intuitions are employed in Kant's proof that experience is synthesized by means of pure concepts presents no problem for the project characterized in this way. Whether the proof amounts to an a priori justification is of no particular relevance.

It might also be argued that in transcendental philosophy Kant wants to proceed from premises independent of the intuitions of the internal standpoint, thus independent of the criterion of knowledge of the internal standpoint. These are premises like "All my representations must be combined in a single self-consciousness" and "It is possible for the 'I think' to accompany all of my representations." Three points can be made here. First, we have already seen from the Paralogisms that he is explicitly opposed to the idea that we can have any intuition of the self as it is in itself. The rational psychologist wants to base his entire project on the 'I think' alone (which, by the way, is distinct from "It is possible for the 'I think' to accompany all of my representations"), which allegedly indicates an intuition of the self as it is in itself, and Kant thinks that this is fruitless (A341=B399-A348=B406). But if

transcendental philosophy were based on intuitions which do not belong to the internal standpoint, and if knowledge of the self as it is in itself would result, then it appears that Kant would be committed to admitting that we have intuitions of the self as it is in itself. For no knowledge can be had without intuitions -- concepts without intuitions cannot constitute knowledge (e.g. A50=B74; cf. ch.7) -- and intuitions of the self as it is in itself would be the only plausible candidates in the case of transcendental knowledge. Second, Kant does not limit the kinds of premises transcendental philosophy employs to premises of the above sort. As we will see more clearly in the next chapter, there are several arguments which form part of the transcendental deduction which appeal to the general nature of appearance or of the empirical. For instance, Kant begins one of the arguments of the transcendental deduction in this way:

We will now, starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearance. What is first given to us is appearance... (A119-120)

Kant has no general policy of restricting the premises of transcendental philosophy to those which do not appeal to or contain empirical intuition.

Thirdly, one might argue that transcendental philosophy is analytic a priori. If this were right, then my interpretation would be in trouble since it is not clear how or that the condition for knowledge of the internal standpoint, that its justification must involve intuitions, applies to analytic knowledge. But even though Kant sometimes indicates that first premises like "It is possible for

the 'I think' to accompany all of my representations" and "All my representations must be combined in a single self-consciousness" are analytic and therefore justifiable a priori, Kant does not think that transcendental knowledge is ever merely analytic a priori. It is fairly common to think of Kant's transcendental knowledge as analytic of our concept of experience or of our concept of possible experience. But this view is implausible since it is intrinsic to all of Kant's transcendental proofs that our experience involves passively received, atomistic representations. Only on this assumption can Kant arrive at the conclusion that synthesis by means of an active understanding is required for the unity of consciousness. One might contend that it is Kant's view that involving a passively received element is analytic of our notion of experience. But this is unlikely; for Kant experience is possible which does not involve any passively received element:

An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition--an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist--would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. (B138-9)

God's experience contains only what is actively produced.

Consequently, we would have to look to our own experience to see if it involves a passively received element, and at least to this extent transcendental philosophy requires information from experience, albeit very general information from experience.

One might reply that transcendental philosophy is nevertheless analytic of our notion of experience or of our notion of possible experience because it is Kant's view that God doesn't really have an

experience; one might suppose that it is part of our concept of experience that it involves a passively received element. Three points can be made here: First, if this were the case, then we would still have to check out whatever it is we have to see whether it is experience in order to find out whether the results of transcendental philosophy apply to us. This is an empirical undertaking. Second, even if it is true that it is analytic of our notion of experience that it involves a passively received element, it is highly unlikely that Kant thinks that the next step in the argument, that the passively received element, since it is unified, must be organized by means of synthesis, is arrived at by means of an analysis of concepts. For this step invokes an explanation for the unity of experience and Kant thinks that even a very general and formal explanatory principle, his non-trivial version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, is not analytic but synthetic. Kant takes J.A. Eberhard to task in On a Discovery for making the claim that this principle is logical and formal and can be demonstrated by means of conceptual considerations alone (Ak VIII 193-198 cf. A783-4=B811-2). Certainly, if Kant thinks that such a general and formal explanatory principle is synthetic, then he would think that the explanatory principle that he employs in the second step above is synthetic. But if a synthetic principle has been invoked in the derivation of a proposition from a concept, then the proposition can no longer be said to be analytic of the concept. Third, a somewhat more general point might also be made. Suppose one contends that it is a fact about our concept of experience that it involves a passively received element or that it involves apprehension

of objects, and therefore propositions like 'experience is of objects' are analytic. But it is not yet clear that such propositions can be known a priori in the justificatory sense. Consider two cases. On the one hand, it is plausible to hold that 'All red things are red' can be known a priori in the justificatory sense through analysis. But on the other hand, even if one wanted to say that being H₂O is analytic of our concept of water one would have to admit that we didn't discover this fact through analysis of the concept of water. To which of these two is a proposition like 'experience is of objects' more similar, even if 'is of objects' is part of our concept of experience? We certainly don't have to engage in high level scientific research to discover that experience is of objects, but don't we have to look at experience just the same? Certainly we do not come to know this truth in the way that we come to know that all red things are red.

One might worry about the fact that Kant often uses terms like 'the possibility of experience' or 'possible experience' in reference to transcendental philosophy rather than terms like 'experience' or 'our experience'. The presence of the notion of possibility may suggest to some that there is something purely conceptual going on. Kant says, for instance:

The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry

must be directed, namely, that they must be recognised as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought. (A93-4=B126)

But it is clear that what Kant means to indicate when he is using phrases like 'possible experience' is not that transcendental knowledge is analytic of such a very general concept, but rather that transcendental knowledge is dependent on facts about what constitutes a possible experience for us, in particular an experience which contains a passively received element. For instance, consider the juxtaposition of the following three sentences in the Principles:

The possibility of experience is, then, what gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge. Experience, however, rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, that is, on a synthesis according to concepts of an object of appearances in general. Apart from such synthesis it would not be knowledge, but a rhapsody of perceptions that would not fit into any context according to rules of a completely interconnected (possible) consciousness, and so would not conform to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. (A156=B195-6)

It is quite clear that when Kant says that the possibility of experience gives objective reality to all our a priori modes of knowledge he means to say that our concepts acquire objective validity from our particular type of experience, for which they are required in order to unify a previously disunified manifold. And as I've argued, if the notion of experience to which transcendental philosophy appeals is our particular type, the claim that it is analytic is implausible.

That this view about Kant's project is correct is substantiated by Kant himself; he himself argues that transcendental knowledge cannot be analytic:

In transcendental knowledge, so long as we are concerned only with concepts of the understanding, our guide is the possibility of experience. Such proof does not show that the given concept (for instance, of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transition would be a saltus which could not be justified. The proof proceeds by showing that experience itself, and therefore the object of experience, would be impossible without a connection of this kind. Accordingly, the proof must also at the same time show the possibility of arriving synthetically a priori at some knowledge of things which was not contained in the concepts of them. (A783=B811)

Transcendental knowledge is not analytic, but its justification must make reference to characteristics our experience and its objects have. It proceeds from general facts about experience and its objects to preconditions of that experience. Kant does not think that a mere analysis of concepts would yield interesting results for transcendental philosophy; it is not a sufficiently fruitful procedure. This theme occurs in other places in Kant as well. In the Transcendental Logic he says that analytic truths, the truths of general logic, cannot extend our knowledge, and that consequently instruction based on this method "is unbecoming of the dignity of philosophy":

Now it may be noted as a sure and useful warning, that general logic, if viewed as an organon, is always a logic of illusion, that is, dialectical. For logic teaches us nothing whatsoever regarding the content of knowledge, but lays down only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding; and since these conditions can tell us nothing at all as to the objects concerned, any attempt to use this logic as an instrument (organon) that professes to extend and enlarge our knowledge can end in nothing but mere talk--in which, with a certain plausibility, we maintain, or, if such be our choice, attack, any and every possible assertion.

Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. The title 'dialectic' has therefore come to be otherwise employed, and has been assigned to logic, as a critique of dialectical illusion. This is the sense in which it is to be understood in this work. (A61-2=B86)

Kant's view of truths of general logic, which are analytic truths, is that they are not informative. Bennett has thought it fruitful to reinterpret Kant's philosophical project as an analytic one partially on the grounds that besides trivial analytic truths there are truths acquired through subtle and complex conceptual considerations.¹⁴ But this is an extremely controversial thesis, and as Quine and others have shown, a hard one to defend. Given that there are good indications that Kant himself rejects it, it would be better to leave Kant with the beliefs about analytic and synthetic truths that he actually held.

One might be led to think that Kant's transcendental philosophy is analytic given that he calls it 'transcendental logic'. But Kant distinguishes transcendental from general logic by stipulating that the former does not abstract from all content, whereas the latter does:

General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general. But since, as the Transcendental Aesthetic has shown, there are pure as well as empirical intuitions, a distinction might likewise be drawn between pure and empirical thought of objects. In that case we should have a logic in which we do not abstract from the entire content of knowledge. This other logic, which should contain solely the rules of the pure thought of an object, would exclude only those modes of knowledge which have empirical content.

It would also treat of the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects. General logic, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the origin of knowledge, but only considers representations, be they originally a priori in ourselves or only empirically given, according to the laws which the understanding employs when, in thinking, it relates them to one another. It deals therefore only with that form which the understanding is able to impart to the representations, from whatever source they may have arisen. (A55-6=B79-80).

Transcendental logic deals with "the origin of the modes in which we know objects, in so far as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects, and this project involves more than dealing with the form of thought, which is what Kant would deny if he thought it to be analytic.

What Kant says in these passages solves a problem which may have been worrying some, namely that the condition for knowledge of the internal standpoint, that its justification must involve intuitions that we can have, doesn't seem to hold for analytic knowledge. In so far as analytic knowledge is knowledge, indeed it may not. (Although I suppose one might argue that the acquisition of the concept 'red' from experience is involved in the justification of 'All red things are red'.) But Kant is somewhat wary of thinking of any apprehension of analytic truths as knowledge in any significant sense at all; such truths are missing a content. About general logic he says:

There is, however, something so tempting in the possession of an art so specious, through which we give to all our knowledge, however uninstructed we may be in regard to its content, the form of understanding, that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgment, has been employed as if it were an organon for assertions, and has thus been misapplied.

General logic, when thus treated as an organon, is called dialectic.

However various were the significations in which the ancients used 'dialectic' as the title for a science or art, we can safely conclude from their actual employment of it that with them it was never anything else than the logic of illusion. It was a sophisticated art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its 'topic' to conceal the emptiness of its pretensions. (A61=B85)

In addition, in his 1799 "Open Letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre" Kant objects to Fichte's system precisely because it is supposed to be analytic; indeed, the whole system is supposed to be derived from nothing but the premise 'A=A'. Kant writes:

. . . I hereby declare that I regard Fichte's Theory of Science [Wissenschaftslehre] as a totally indefensible system. For the pure theory of science is nothing more or less than mere logic, and the principles of logic cannot lead to any material knowledge. Since logic, that is to say, pure logic, abstracts from the content of knowledge, the attempt to cull a real object out of logic is a vain effort and therefore a thing that no one has ever done. If the transcendental philosophy is correct, such a task would involve metaphysics rather than logic. (Z 253)

If Kant objects to Fichte's system on the grounds that it is supposed to be analytic, certainly he wouldn't be thinking of his own system of transcendental philosophy as analytic.

I suspect that the tendency to interpret transcendental philosophy as analytic is an anachronistic reading of a logical positivist ideal into Kant. The idea of the role of philosophy as an analytic discipline opposed to science as synthetic is simply not Kantian. Given that it is synthetic, I have argued that the more general idea of philosophy as a priori in the sense that it its

justification in general does not appeal to the deliverances of experience can also not be Kantian. For knowledge can only be had at the internal standpoint, and Kant's condition on synthetic knowledge of the internal standpoint is that its justification involves intuitions, either empirical, or instances of the kinds of a priori intuitions that we can have, or both. I have also said that the way in which the justification of transcendental knowledge in the Deduction involves intuition is that it proceeds from general facts about experience, which involves both a priori and empirical intuitions. I think that Kant expresses just this view in a passage from the Architectonic of Pure Reason, a passage in which he wants to encapsulate the method of the aspect of metaphysics that produces knowledge. (I've already quoted this passage earlier in the chapter.) Kant is here concerned to state how it is possible to know synthetic a priori principles about experience, a task of transcendental philosophy:

(A) First of all, how can I expect to have knowledge a priori (and therefore a metaphysics) of objects in so far as they are given to our senses, that is, given in an a posteriori manner? And how is it possible to know the nature of things and to arrive at a rational physiology according to principles a priori? The answer is this: we take nothing more from experience than is required to give us an object of outer or of inner sense. The object of outer sense we obtain through the mere concept of matter (impenetrable, lifeless extension), the object of inner sense through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical inner representation, 'I think'). As to the rest, in the whole metaphysical treatment of these objects, we must entirely dispense with all empirical principles which profess to add to these concepts any other more special experience, with a view to our passing further judgments upon the objects. (A847-8=B875-6)

What we have to take from experience in transcendental philosophy are general facts about the nature of experience, general facts about the objects of inner and outer sense, facts for the knowledge of which we need to have a priori and empirical intuitions. Kant says that no more is obtained from experience; he may be mistaken about this given that his explanatory principles may have some empirical content as well. But I think that what Kant says here should at least make one strongly suspicious of interpretations which make transcendental philosophy out to be a priori in the justificatory sense. For Kant the role of transcendental philosophy is not quite so clearly demarcated from that of say empirical physics and empirical psychology. The difference between these sciences and transcendental philosophy is not so much their status as needing to appeal to the deliverances of experience for justification as their level of theorizing. Transcendental philosophy appeals to highly general facts about experience and how it is produced; empirical physics and empirical psychology have a greater concern for the specific. The justificatory notion of quasi a priori knowledge, knowledge obtainable given any sufficiently rich experience, experience that contains at least intentionality, regularities and self-consciousness, applies to transcendental philosophy. Moreover, it is not clear why Kant should be interested in a philosophy which is genuinely justified a priori. Indeed, a priori justification is the classical provider of certainty, and at least in the A edition of the Critique Kant makes it clear that he wants his transcendental philosophy to possess certainty (Axv). But as we have already seen, there are indications that Kant believes

that certainty in knowledge can also be accounted for just by the fact that the relevant sentences or propositions have their source in the mind.

Let us now return to a different story about the way Kant sees justification in transcendental philosophy. I think that the evidence that I've presented so far indicates that justification in transcendental philosophy needs to appeal to the kinds of intuitions we have in the empirical standpoint, and sometimes has to appeal to the empirical sort. One might try to argue, however, that although Kant is not clearly advocating that transcendental philosophy is a priori in the justificatory sense, the truth is that he takes no position on the mode of justification of transcendental philosophy at all. On this view although he may indicate that he thinks that all knowledge needs to be justified with appeal to either empirical or a priori intuition or both, he never actually supposed this condition to apply to transcendental philosophy. The situation, on this view, is similar to the case of the logical positivists, whose advocated the universal applicability of the principle of verification while it does not clearly apply to their philosophical theorizing. This view of Kant's transcendental philosophy, however, underestimates the centrality of his conception of his philosophy as a critique and improvement upon rationalist metaphysics. Kant's philosophy is a very self-conscious reaction against the Leibnizian tradition, and in particular against the idea that we can do old-style metaphysics, that is, rational psychology, cosmology, and theology--theory of the soul, the world, and of God that is a priori in the justificatory sense, and

is not a priori because it appeals to pure intuitions of space and time. Kant explicitly denies that such metaphysics is possible throughout the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. Thus it would seem to be a mistake to attribute to Kant a position according to which he either has not decided or has not thought out the issue about justification in transcendental philosophy.

With this understanding we might again address Kant's worry that if it can be shown that something can be known about the self as it is in itself, then he is in trouble because

...by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession.
(B409-410)

The problem as we saw it was that in his own transcendental philosophy Kant seems to be making claims to knowledge about the self as it is in itself. Yet, at the same time, he denies the possibility of such knowledge which, by the way, along with the denial of knowledge of things in themselves in general, is underlain by a sentiment so fundamental to Kant's philosophical outlook that it is impossible to disregard these claims to ignorance and come to an understanding of what this outlook is all about. This is the decisively anti-rationalistic sentiment that an important part of what it is to be human is to lack the capability to know the ultimately real nature of ourselves, each other, and the world in general, and that in spite of this, we must commit ourselves to believing certain things about these ultimately real natures for the sake of a vision of the good.

Many commentators have indeed disregarded these claims to ignorance and the theory of the nature of things which accompanies it, and as a result have made Kant out to be a kind of rationalist which he manifestly could never be.

Nevertheless, the inconsistency is present in the text. But now there seems to be a way in which Kant might remove himself from this difficulty while remaining true to his basic philosophical outlook. He could admit that transcendental knowledge is of the self as it is in itself but eschew the domino theory of the above passage. On his theory, the categories apply in experience because they are employed in the synthesis of the intuitions which partially constitute experience. There is no good argument to show that Kant is committed to the claim that the categories are applicable to states of affairs of which we can't even have intuitions, even if knowledge of these states of affairs is dependent for its justification on intuitions we do in fact have. So the domino theory doesn't seem to apply in this case; it hasn't been shown from the fact that we can know something about how the self in itself synthesizes the manifold of intuition by means of the categories that the categories (like 'cause') apply to it, even given that we can have this knowledge by inference from general truths about intuitions that are possible for us. Thus Kant could yet make room for moral and religious faith even though some knowledge of the self as it is in itself is admitted. Furthermore, it might be that the domino theory fails to apply only because the knowledge which is admitted of the self as it is in itself is acquired from the internal standpoint--its acquisition is not independent of

the kinds of intuitions we have in the internal standpoint. If it were otherwise, if, as on Leibniz's theory, Kant allowed the acquisition of some knowledge independent of intuitions of the internal standpoint altogether, then he might have no principled reason for not admitting the possibility of more knowledge of this sort. But one would have to examine the nature of the relevant knowledge acquisition before any of this can be assessed in a genuinely satisfactory way.

So, in summary, Kant rejects the rationalist idea that we can acquire knowledge of things in themselves in a way which is independent of the condition on knowledge for the internal standpoint. He rejects the notion that pure reason provides us with cognitions of the way things are in themselves. Yet knowledge, even though it is not immediate cognition, knowledge of the in-itself, in particular of the self as it is in itself, is possible by inference from intuitions we have at the internal standpoint. This is a theory which had a deep and significant effect on the development of empirical psychology. It has been quite commonplace since Kant wrote the Critique to doubt the value of his transcendental philosophy of the self, but this is what inspired Gestalt psychology, which in turn played an essential role in the evolution of cognitive and developmental psychology as we know it today. On my interpretation the central idea of Kant's transcendental philosophy is that from general facts about the nature of our experience we can infer facts about the self and the structure it gives to experience. Although some aspects of the content of his particular theory may not inspire many today, what should be

emphasized is that with regard to its form this is still a philosophically interesting and important theory, and moreover, one that has proven to be historically significant.

Footnotes to Chapter 4.

¹Robert Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 102.

²Richard E. Aquila, Representational Mind, op. cit. ch. 1, n. 14, p.69.

³Philip Kitcher, "Kant's Philosophy of Science" in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, Wood, Allen W. ed., (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 185-215.

⁴ibid.

⁵Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. chs.1-3.

⁶Putnam, pp. 60-64

⁷Wilson, Margaret D., The "Phenomenalisms of Berkeley and Kant" in Wood, Allen W. ed., Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy Kant, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 157-173.

⁸Wilson cites Berkeley, Works II pp. 241, 254, 271-97.

⁹See for instance Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 26-9.

¹⁰Thomas Nagel, Tanner Lectures, McMurrin ed., (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), p. 77.

¹¹Nagel, Tanner Lectures. I think that the power of this third person, physicalist, conception of objectivity lies partly in the fact that what is physical is public--statements about physical objects can be checked by other people, whereas not all of that which is countenanced by first person psychology is checkable in this way. According to psychologies which say that there is something irreducibly mental and subjective about ourselves and other minds as well, we are not able to check the nature of all of these subjective elements, not in other species, such as bats (see Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to be a Bat?", Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450), and not in other human beings. On this view, which Nagel, and probably most of the pre-twentieth century tradition holds, we are stuck with first person psychology because third person psychology doesn't capture all that needs to be captured. The power of third person psychology also lies partly in the fact that physical objects are paradigmatic for our notion of objectivity. We naturally have an objective attitude towards physical objects in that we don't have to dissociate ourselves from physical objects in order to study them in

the sense that we have to dissociate ourselves from the various aspects of ourselves in order to study them.

¹²Nagel, Tanner Lectures, p. 77.

¹³Nagel, Tanner Lectures.

¹⁴Bennett, Kant's Analytic, op. cit. ch 1, n. 9, p. 27.

Chapter 5: The Transcendental Deduction: Arguments From Below I.

Commentators have found many different arguments in the Transcendental Deductions in the two editions of the Critique and have classified them in different ways. I think that it is most fruitful to work with a twofold division; the two basic arguments for the applicability of the categories to experience are the argument from above and the argument(s) from below. This division and this terminology is suggested in A, the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says

We will now, starting from below, namely with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which the understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearances. (A119-20)

As far as I know Kant never uses anything like the phrase 'starting from above' but it is the obvious correlate of 'starting from below' and it naturally applies to the passage immediately preceding the one above. There are really several arguments from below, or alternatively one might say that the argument from below has several different aspects. In these arguments from below, Kant begins with premises to the effect that we have experience of objects and that these experiences have certain features. By 'experience of objects' Kant does not mean experiences whose immediate objects of awareness are genuinely external objects; this would be much too strong a premise for the Deduction. Rather, by 'experience of objects' Kant means experiences with certain phenomenological features, for instance experiences for which it seems that that of which one is immediately

aware has a kind of unity or organization, or is phenomenologically independent of one's perceptions. The stronger argument, stronger since it begins with a weaker premise, is the argument from above; it begins with the premise of self-unity, that all of my representations are unified in a single consciousness, and that I am conscious of this unity.

In this chapter I want to discuss several arguments from below; I will discuss the argument from above in the next chapter. In A, an argument from below is found in A119-A128. A discussion of the arguments from below must also encompass part of the Transcendental Deduction in B. An important difference between A115-128 (the passage which has become known as the Objective Deduction in A) and the B Deduction is the comparative lack of emphasis on an argument from above in the B Deduction. When Kant summarizes the Deduction argument in §20 of B (B143), he summarizes it as an argument from below, beginning with the premise that the manifold given in a sensible intuition (an ordinary singular representation of an object, event or process) must be subject to the synthesis of the understanding. The parts of the B Deduction, §15-§16 (B129-136), which correspond to the argument from above in A, are not summarized in §20. Moreover, whereas in A the argument from above ends with the conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction (A119), such a conclusion is not drawn at the end of §15-§16. Rather it seems that §15-§16 functions as a preamble to the argument from below in B, a preamble whose role there may be to explicate notions like synthesis and apperception. There are also other passages in the Critique that contain arguments from below or

elements of arguments from below. These include several passages which precede A115 in the first edition it appears to me that the most significant of these passages is the Second Analogy.

1. Association and its grounds.

That one of the explicit purposes of the argument from below in A119-A128 is a refutation of the Humean account of our experience of phenomena, which eschews a priori concepts, is evident from the mere fact alone that Kant here devotes his attention to refuting what he thinks of as an associationist account of experience.¹ We might call this a negative aspect of the argument from below. A positive aspect is Kant's attempt to argue that the notion of synthesis by means of a priori concepts is essential to an account of the genesis of experience, and that Hume's account fails just because it doesn't posit an understanding which synthesizes atomistic representations by means of a priori concepts. These negative and the positive aspects are not neatly separated in the text; it is while attempting to point out the inadequacies of associationism that Kant tries to show that a priori concepts are just what is lacking.

The first part of the argument from below in A119-A128 is more or less the same as the beginning of the B Deduction argument from below, so until the arguments diverge, let's consider them in parallel. At the opening of the argument in A Kant assumes that our experience possesses a particular sort of objectivity. He writes:

We will now, starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding, by means of the

categories, stands to appearances. What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception. (Save through its relation to a consciousness that is at least possible, appearance could never be for us an object of knowledge, and so would be nothing to us; and since it has in itself no objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all.) (A119-120)

Kant is assuming here that experience is or contains appearances which are objective at least in the sense that they can be objects of knowledge or cognition (Erkenntnis). This argument from below is thus not an argument against a skeptic who does not admit even such a notion of objectivity. The following is a cognate passage in §17 of the B Deduction:

Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge (Erkenntnis.) This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object. (B137)

Again Kant assumes that experience contains objects of Erkenntnis. These objects probably include not only persisting objects of experience like tables and chairs, but also objective phenomena like processes and events which exhibit necessary connections, given that in the Analogies Kant also refers to them as 'objects'. (e.g. B218ff, B234ff) Kantian objects, then, are objective phenomena in general. But in what sense of 'objective'? One might be tempted to think that Kant has already assumed what Hume is trying to disprove here, since Hume thinks that persisting objects and events related by necessary connections are fictions in some sense. There is, however, a notion of objectivity which Hume must countenance, that which pertains to the immediate objects of awareness in experience and the beliefs we all

have about these objects. Kant and Hume may very well differ as to how the phenomenology of experience and the beliefs about experience divide up. For example, Kant seems to think that we have experiences as of persisting objects, whereas Hume's official theory is that we have beliefs about necessary connection which accompany certain experience. But this is unimportant for the sake of the argument we're discussing now. What is important is that Hume assumes the kind of objectivity in experience to which Kant is appealing in this particular argument from below when he says that our ideas of necessary connection and persistence need explanations, and these are the explanations upon which Kant wants to remark.

In the B Deduction Kant continues by introducing his own account of this kind objectivity:

Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge, and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding.

The first pure knowledge of the understanding, then, upon which all the rest of its employment is based, and which also at the same time is completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, is the principle of original synthetic unity of apperception....The synthetic unity of consciousness is....a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me. (B137-8)

If this argument from below is indeed an argument against a Humean account of experience, then it would seem as if the above passage is case of blatant question begging. Here Kant says not only that the relevant kind of objectivity in experience demands a unification of

representations which is to be accounted for by a synthesis which is undergirded by a unity of consciousness, but also that this involves some pure, i.e. a priori knowledge. Hume would resist such an explanation of objectivity and probably would not countenance such a priori knowledge, even though Kant thinks, at least at the time of the writing of the second edition, that the particular piece of knowledge in question is analytic (B138, cf. A117n). The parallel passage in A is the following (which is a continuation of the above passage from A.)

Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. (A120)

This passage, although it doesn't mention the pure knowledge of the B passage, is even clearer in its positing of an active faculty of synthesis.

I still think, however, that the arguments from below are argument against a Humean account of the relevant kind of objectivity in experience and that Kant doesn't beg the question against Hume. In the above two introductions of his own account of objectivity Kant does not intend to make a dogmatic assertion, but rather a suggestion which is eventually backed up by actual arguments against a Humean account. I think that this is clear from the fact that such anti-Humean arguments follow closely on the heels of the above passages, in A at A121ff, in B in §18 (B139-140).

At this point (A121, the end of §17 in B) the arguments in A and B diverge. What follows in A is an argument for the thesis that association requires a ground in the objects of experience, whereas what follows in B is an argument with a somewhat different focus. I will discuss the argument in A first and the argument in B in the next section. A more immediate difference between the arguments at this point is that in A, contrary to B, Kant makes reference to the imagination, more precisely to two sorts of imagination. The imagination, as the faculty of a priori synthesis, Kant entitles the productive imagination (A123, cf. B152). Besides this transcendental faculty, Kant also argues for the existence of a correlative empirical faculty, the reproductive imagination:

There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension....

But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions, were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form a whole series of perceptions. This is the reproductive faculty of imagination, which is merely empirical. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is called the association of representations. (A120-121)

The reproductive imagination is the faculty which is intimately linked up with association, and from its description one could conclude that Kant's notion of association is very close to, and probably what he thinks to be, Hume's notion. Association is the ground for rule-governed reproduction of representations (A121); it is the

"attraction" which we feel representations have for one another, and it is part of the explanation for their orderly reproduction. As an argument for the existence of this faculty, however, the above passage is quite obscure, partly because it's hard to know why it is needed over and above the productive imagination, which is because it's not clear exactly what the phenomenological results of its activity are. Kant is better off, I think, just stating, as Hume does, that there is a faculty linked up with association, rather than arguing for it.

This is the line which Kant takes in the Subjective Deduction in A:

It is merely an empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of the representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about the transition of the mind to the other. (A100)

In this passage the claim that there is such a thing as empirical association is more or less an observational claim, as it is for Hume. This isn't implausible; for instance it is an introspectible fact about our mental life that if two kinds of perceptions have constantly been conjoined in the past, the presence of one in the mind somehow brings about the other or at least the expectation of the other.

Kant's positing of the productive imagination alongside an empirical faculty of association is another instance of his general program of positing a transcendental self and its faculties alongside of an empirical self and its faculties. The empirical self and its faculties are passive; their role is to apprehend. For instance, by means of the analytic, ordinary use of concepts we discern or notice structure in appearance. By contrast, the transcendental self and its

faculties actively provide or produce this structure by means of the extraordinary use of concepts (cf. ch. 1). Furthermore, Kant does not typically just posit the transcendental alongside the empirical; this would be a weak move since transcendental faculties are by no means readily empirically accessible. In general, he argues that the transcendental self and its faculties must exist to provide the structure which is empirically apprehended. In accordance with this general policy it is central to Kant's argument against the Humean account of experience that empirical association requires a transcendental ground, that the possibility of empirical association can't be explained without the positing of some activity of the transcendental self.²

Kant, then, wants to prove that the relevant kind of objectivity in experience can't be accounted for by means of Humean associationism alone:

This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of representations.

Now if this unity of association had not also an objective ground which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge.... There must, therefore, be an objective ground...which constrains us to regard all appearances as data of the senses that must be associable in themselves and subject to universal rules... This objective ground of all association of appearances I entitle their affinity. It is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception... (A121-2)

Association, Kant thinks, must possess regularity if it is to supply the apprehension or cognition we have of objective phenomena. For

instance, if the impression of flame were associated with heat at one time and cold at another, we wouldn't have the kind of causal cognitions or experiences that we in fact have; it would be full of jolts and surprises. But in order for association to exhibit such regularity, there must be an explanation or ground for it. This means that the representations must be subject to a rule which ensures regular patterns of association, in other words there has to be an affinity of representations. There are two issues here. First, if we, for example, associate heat with flame, the heat and flame we experience have to manifest the relevant regularity in order that our total experience be as it is. If there were no ground or explanation for association "even though we should have the power of associating perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they would themselves be associable..."(A121-2) But furthermore, if there were no ground or explanation for association, if there were no rule to explain regular patterns of association, then the tendency or capacity to associate ideas wouldn't arise at all. This emphasis comes out more clearly in a passage from the Subjective Deduction:

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated.... But this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a coexistence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules. Otherwise our empirical imagination would never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its powers.... If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy, if a man changed sometimes into this and sometimes into that animal form, if the country on the longest day were

sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar. (A100-101)

If there were no assured regularities among representations then the mind would not have a tendency to associate one feature with another. But the mind does have this tendency. So, again, association must have its ground in rules which guarantee regular patterns of association among representations.

In this part of the Objective Deduction Kant also gives an argument why perceptions must be associable (A122), an argument from the premise that I am conscious of all my perceptions. If my perceptions weren't associable, then "much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself." This contradicts the premise "that I can say all of my perceptions that I am conscious of them." This is an interesting argument, whose core is the notion that I wouldn't be conscious that all of my perceptions belonged to a single self if they weren't organized or unified in a certain way. Since this is an aspect of the argument from above, however, I will not discuss this argument again at this point. It is significant that Kant injects this aspect of the argument from above into the argument from below in A. In general, the arguments from below assume that we have experience of objective phenomena in a certain sense, and as we have seen, Kant argues that it follows from this that perceptions are associable. This aspect of the argument from above is kind of a meta-argument designed to prove that perceptions are associable, one

that begins with a much leaner premise than those of the arguments from below, like "we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge". (A116) Possibly this indicates that Kant was interested in refuting a skepticism more radical than Hume's skepticism about cause and substance, and possibly it also shows that he was concerned to set his theory on foundations that are more solid than those of the arguments from below.

Kant's next step is to claim that the fact that there are rules which ensure regular patterns of association among representations also requires an explanation. He is assuming, I think, that these rules and the organization by means of rules couldn't just be there, but that an account for them and this organization is required. The considerations that are at work here seem to be like those of the teleological argument for the existence of God. Order and organization according to rules requires an explanation, and the explanation must include the positing of an organizing act and of an organizing agent. Thus the rule governed regularities in appearance must be produced by means of an act of synthesis of the transcendental self, through the faculty of the productive imagination:

The objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one consciousness, that of original apperception, is thus the necessary condition of all possible perception; and [this being recognized we can prove that] the affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is grounded a priori rules. Since the imagination is itself a faculty of a priori synthesis, we assign to it the title, productive imagination....The abiding and unchanging "I" (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our

representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. (A123)

Kant continues by claiming that the synthesis which explains the the rule governed order and regularity among appearances is carried out by means of the categories:

Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains in recognition, the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge. These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern solely the form of an experience in general, are the categories. (A124-125)

Kant is assuming that organization of experience must take place by means of certain modes of organization. This seems to make sense; given some atomistic representations, it would seem that there would be many ways of organizing them, and that given that a mind does in fact organize them, one of these ways must be picked out--the categories. Kant summarizes the argument in a dramatic way by claiming that we produce the order and regularity in nature. He also states that he thinks that this order has to be established a priori because order in nature is in some sense necessary:

Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had we not ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances... (A125, cf. A112-114, B163-165)

The question as to exactly what synthesis by means of concepts can explain raises one of the deepest problems with this argument.

Kant's argument involves the claim that this synthesis can account for the fact that there is rule governed regularity and order, an affinity, among appearances. But there are limitations to the types of regularity that conceptual synthesis can account for. It is significant to keep in mind that concepts are the form for the matter of experience or knowledge (e.g. A125). To the extent that the regularities involve the fact that the matter of experience has certain characteristics, conceptual synthesis is irrelevant. Consider for instance, Kant's cinnabar example. Kant wants to say, in the end, that synthesis by means of concepts can explain why it isn't the case that cinnabar is "sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy." But these regularities must involve material elements of experience, that is, material which is organized by means of concepts. It doesn't seem as if any amount of conceptual organization could guarantee that cinnabar sensations would only occur in red and never in black. The same considerations seem to hold for Kant's other examples. Whether "a man changed sometimes into this and sometimes into that animal form," and whether "the country on the longest day were sometimes with ice and snow," could hardly be purely a matter of conceptual organization. The basic intuitions or sensations, the matter of experience, would have to manifest substantial regularities themselves in order for such experience ever to arise.

Thus, in providing an account using conceptual synthesis for the regularities among appearances, Kant seems to be violating his own idea that concepts provide only the form for experience and knowledge.

Not only those regularities discussed above, but most empirical regularities would appear to manifest aspects which are material as well as aspects which are formal. Yet it may be that something in the argument can be redeemed. In order to find out whether this is true we should ask what the formal and material aspects of experience really are, and exactly what aspects of empirical regularity can and which can't be accounted for by means of conceptual synthesis. For this purpose it might be instructive to find cases in which a formal/material distinction can be made out. Consider the infant of chapter 1 before it has acquired the capacity of depth perception. It might have a two-dimensional experience as of red illuminated dots of various sizes up against a wire cage background. When it acquires depth perception it has an experience as of red spheres of uniform size in various positions in a three-dimensional wire cage. On the one hand, it isn't implausible to think that the color of the red patches in the visual field abstracted from the infant seeing them as red is a purely material aspect of experience. It would seem that no amount of conceptual organization could produce it or change its intrinsic nature. The arrangement in experience of the spheres as to depth and distance, on the other hand, are formal aspects. Material aspects shouldn't be of the sort that one can add to one's experience in virtue of organization. This is just what form is. The material aspects of experience must be the ones that precede (in whatever sense) and persist through all changes in organization. In chapter 1 I suggested that the notion of 'seeing as,' or, more broadly, 'experiencing as' might give one a better handle on the notion of

form. Maybe some feature F is a formal aspect of experience if it is in some sense possible, for some experiential field or part thereof, for someone both to experience it as F and not to experience it as F. The infant can both see the patches as spheres in a three-dimensional space and not see them as such. The infants in Bower's experiments which we discussed in Chapter 1 could either see or not see various "objects" as persisting objects when they disappeared behind a screen and subsequently re-emerged.

Although this criterion might give us some degree of understanding as to what formal aspects of experience might be for Kant, in the end it may falter. In his argument from above Kant tries to show that one can't have any self-conscious experience unless synthesis by means of the categories has taken place. Possibly this means that we cannot even conceive of what a formless experience would be like. If this is true, it would also be the case that for some rudimentary form of experience G, it's not possible that we could have or even conceive of having an experience of something both as G and not as G. Kant, in fact, wants to say that the categories are such rudimentary forms. Maybe we would want to make a more purely theoretical distinction between form and matter here, but I wonder very much whether there is any such distinction which would genuinely help us decide exactly which aspects of our experience are formal and which ones are material on the Kantian scheme.

Kant and Hume, it appears, are in the same predicament with regard to the rule governed material regularities in experience. Hume's view may very well be that there is no explanation for these

regularities. Given that it is unlikely that they be accounted for by means of conceptual synthesis, Kant might have to say that they are explained by unknown features of things in themselves. But what of formal regularities such as the following: Under normal conditions, after an object passes behind a screen, if an object that looks the same subsequently emerges from behind the screen, we experience it as the same object. The regularity here lies in the fact that under these normal conditions we regularly experience what comes out from behind the screen as the same object as the one which disappeared behind the screen. Also, we often have experiences as of effects following causes with some kind of necessity, or feeling of inevitability or whatever one might call it. Here the regularity lies in the fact that similar events are regularly experienced with the same kind of necessity or feeling of inevitability. Possibly Kant can argue that regularities of this sort among objective phenomena of experience are best explained as products of conceptual synthesis.

To this Hume might answer that it is misleading to say that these formal regularities are actually aspects of the objects of which we are aware in experience, that they are aspects of the world of appearance. He might say that beliefs are produced in us about causal regularities and persisting objects by the original impressions, but that the original impressions never amount to experiences as of causal regularities or persisting objects. The beliefs that are produced in us in addition to the original impressions, but they do not form or infuse these impressions. If Hume is right about this then it seems to follow that no genuine organization impressions into objects is

experienced by us, and thus there would be nothing for conceptual synthesis to explain.

At this point the issue between Kant and Hume appears to be a matter of phenomenology. Hume would have to maintain that nothing formal ever gets infused into experience, and Kant disagrees. I can imagine someone fairly reasonably maintaining the Humean view of the example of causation, but hardly of the example of persisting objects. When the moon goes behind a cloud we experience what comes out at the other side as the same object. To convince a Humean we might drive more deeply into the structure of experience. Consider the Gestalt rules of good continuation and common fate. According to the principle of good continuation there is a preference in perception to perceive segments of lines that in some sense are good or smooth continuations of one another as one line or form and line segments that are not good continuations as different lines or forms.³ The principle of common fate states that where perceptual units move in the same direction at the same speed the units are experienced as a group, and without such movement a different perceptual organization may occur.⁴ These Gestalt principles of organization are without a doubt deeply infused into our experience, so that the objects of our experience are informed by them. Furthermore, there are conscious experiences which are not uncommon which lend support to the Kantian idea that what we experience can become organized or ordered new ways. When looking at clouds, you might ask what a certain cloud looks like. If it hits you that it looks like a ship, say, you might experience the cloud shape as the shape of a ship. Inkblots and the duck/rabbit

example are also relevant here. The following is possibly a case in which it is more clear that judgment or belief is instrumental in organizing or ordering an experience. Suppose someone greets you on the street; you have an experience as of a person. When she tells you who he is you recognize her as Clara, the person who sat next to you in your first psychology class. As a result you have an experience as of Clara, and your experience has changed because of a belief you've acquired and a judgment you have made and are making.

So it seems that Hume would be wrong if he thought that beliefs and judgments could not be the ordering principles of the objects of our experience. This does not, however, immediately show that the strand of argument in the Transcendental Deduction which we are now discussing is successful. Although this is not Hume's view, there seems to be no reason why an associationist couldn't in principle say that the beliefs which result from association infuse experience, so that we perceive the objects of experience as persisting and the events as causally related. Kant might claim, in opposition to this, that such an associationist account would be insufficient because the modes of organization involved must be a priori. First, as for the criteria of the a priori, necessity and universality, I don't think that Kant could justify a claim that the relevant formal features of experience are either necessary or universal features. Certainly, for all Kant knows, there might be the odd apparent causal irregularity or an object that does not seem to persist in someone's experience. Association would still be possible even if this were the case; it is implausible to hold that the tendencies we have to expect objects to

persist and to assume that similar events cause similar events would cease if once, without explanation, a person seemed to disappear before our eyes and a bush burned before us and yet was not destroyed. Secondly, has Kant shown that there are modes or principles for the organization of experience which in some sense precede all reception of data? Kant wants to say, as we saw in Chapter 3, that concepts like those of substance and cause are somehow acquired from the self, and not from passively received data. But why couldn't Hume's account of the acquisition of, for example, the ideas of cause and persisting object be correct? It might be that these ideas are acquired as Hume says they are and that they subsequently infuse experience, in much the same way as one's recognition of a person, which involves empirical knowledge, may infuse an experience of her. Kant's reply would again be that experience won't provide the requisite necessity and universality, but as we have seen, this is problematic. In the end, what may decide this issue is a deeper critical evaluation of the relevant associationist accounts. Since this is something Kant doesn't attempt to do, I won't attempt such an examination either.

Another perspective on this point may be gained by asking whether the modes of organization in our experience are genuinely conceptual in the Kantian sense. In Chapter 1 we delineated three defining characteristics of concepts: generality, mediacy, and their link with the spontaneous activity of a self. Undoubtedly these modes of organization are mediate; they are modes of organizing other representations. They are also general, any given mode of organization can be applied more than once. But does the argument

yield the conclusion that these modes of organization are linked to the spontaneous activity of a self? The other two criteria might very well be sufficient for many versions of the notion of concept, but not Kant's. For Kant it is essential to the notion of concept that its concomitant act of organization be an act whose agent is the self. Again, the problem with this argument from below is that it doesn't show that the relevant modes of organization can't be explained by an associationistic theory, which involves only a passive self (cf. ch. 2). This problem is closely related to the fact that Kant hasn't shown the concepts involved in organization to be a priori. Since Kant's notion of the a priori is mainly genetic, since it is generally true for Kant that that which he calls a priori has its source in the self, Kant's not being able to show that the organization has its source in the self undermines his claim that the modes of organization are a priori.

Thus it would seem so far that the argument from below doesn't preclude an associationistic account of the relevant formal features of experience, as long as it is accepted that association can eventually infuse phenomenological experience, which on the face of it doesn't seem any less plausible than the idea that Kantian concepts or judgments can infuse phenomenological experience. It should be remembered, however, that the idea that concepts or judgments can infuse experience is one of Kant's contributions to the discussion, and is one of the hallmarks of his theory of mental representation. In order to get an idea of what Kant needs to do to show the inadequacy of an associationistic account we might try to probe more

deeply into the distinctions between Humean association and Kantian conceptualization. One might think that a significant difference lies in the fact that Kantian concepts can be a priori and that possibly all Kantian concepts have an a priori aspect, whereas Humean principles of association don't participate in the a priori at all. But why couldn't at least some principles of association be thought of just as Kantian a priori concepts, as abilities to organize which aren't derived from experience? Maybe we really have no less reason to think that the Humean principle of association which yields the idea of cause is a priori, that is, has its source in the self, than Kant does to think that his concept of cause is a priori. But this misses a central, naturalistic, point about Humean associationism; that in any instance of association, no mind or a self which is distinct from atomistic, passively received representations or perceptions is a causal factor and such a self does not contribute any content to experience. Association is a relation among atomistic, passively received perceptions themselves; for Hume a self is just a collection of these perceptions, so there could be no source of content in a self which lies beyond them. No cause beyond the perceptions is involved in associating perceptions. The perceptions associate with one another all by themselves. This is indicated by Hume's way of speaking about association; the first sentence of Hume's chapter "Of the Association of Ideas" in the Enquiry reads:

It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. (S14, emphasis mine)

And he says in the Treatise:

...the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it and like a galley put into motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. (Treatise, p. 198)

This points out, I think, one of the deepest difference between Kant and Hume on these issues. Kant thinks that, for instance, our experiences of necessary connections are to be explained by a causal factor outside of the atomistic, passively received perceptions and that this factor contributes to the content of such experiences. Hume's official account, on the other hand, is that the genesis of our idea of necessary connection can be explained just in terms of atomistic, passively received perceptions and relations among them.

For Kant to prove Hume wrong, then, he might show that experience has content, formal content, that couldn't have originated in atomistic, passively received perceptions and that this content is contributed by an organizing factor outside of such perceptions. Kant hasn't shown these theses to be true in the argument we've just discussed, but I think that he eventually provides fairly good arguments for them. Yet it should be noted that these theses are perfectly consistent with certain kinds of naturalism, which are in an important way in the spirit of Hume's own naturalism, for example a materialist functionalism according to which a brain, which is something over and above perceptions, automatically provides the organization in experience. Kant wants, in addition, to prove something that sets him apart from all naturalisms, namely the transcendental aspect of his theory of mental representation--that

there is a spontaneously acting self, not just a self as cause, which organizes representations by means of concepts. But as will eventually become clear, it is this aspect of his theory that he has the most difficulty establishing.

In summary, in this first argument from below Kant attempts to demonstrate the application and applicability of a priori concepts from a kind of objectivity which is an aspect of the phenomenology of experience, a kind of objectivity which embraces, for instance, the fact that we experience physical objects as persisting and events as causally related. Association is the attraction we feel representations to have to one another, which partially explains the reproduction of representations in accordance with regularities experienced in the past. Suppose that association is, as Hume thinks it to be, indeed part of the account of our experience of causal regularities. Then in order for association to be possible there must be regularities in past experience which give rise to it. But these regularities couldn't just be there; they must owe their character as regularities to rules, which Kant says, in a move analogous to that made in the teleological argument for the existence of God, must be applied by an agent. Although the application of rules by an agent cannot explain the material regularities in experience, they can possibly explain the formal regularities. It is not clear, however, that Kant has shown that a version of associationism cannot provide the requisite explanation. Nevertheless, Kant's account provides important insights into the nature of experience that Hume's theory lacks.

2. Actively contributed content.

In §18 of the Transcendental Deduction in B Kant continues the argument from below begun in §17. The argument from below in the B deduction is summarized in §20. This summary, however, is a simplified sketch of the argument which Kant presents in the preceding sections; I will attempt to extract the complex argument from these preceding sections rather than following the structure of what is presented in §20.

The argument of §18 is somewhat different from that of the Objective Deduction in A. Here Kant writes:

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness...the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent.... Only the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception...which is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity. (B139-40)

§18 is notoriously obscure; what Kant means here is far from clear. We might start by noting that several times Kant makes a contrast between empirical unity of consciousness as merely subjective and the transcendental unity of apperception, or the original unity, as objective. I take this to mean that the organization of representations grounded in the transcendental unity is objective whereas that grounded in the empirical unity is subjective. First, what exactly does Kant think to be subjective about the empirical? Some clues from §18 we have are these:

1) An example Kant adduces in §18 to indicate the lack of objectivity of the empirical is given in the following sentence: "Whether I can become empirically conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive depends on circumstances or empirical conditions." This leads Kant to say that "the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent." (B139-40)

2) Kant also gives the following illustration of the subjectivity of the empirical unity of apperception. "To one man, for instance, a certain word suggests one thing, to another some other thing..." upon which the conclusion follows that "the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessarily and universally valid." (B140)

For Kant a unity of consciousness grounds or effects a way in which representations are organized (it does not ground a mode of organization, like a concept, but an actual organization of a certain kind) (B132). The transcendental unity of apperception grounds the kind of organization that is effected through the pure concepts of the understanding. The empirical unity grounds the kind of organization which is produced by an empirical mechanism--what Kant calls association. In §18 it is evident that Kant is considering the nature of empirical unity in some sense independently of the transcendental unity. There are two possible interpretations as to the sense in which Kant is considering the empirical unity independently of the transcendental unity here: either (a) he is considering the empirical unity to be a kind of organization which we can experience without at

the same time experiencing the kind of organization produced by the categories, or (b) he is considering the empirical unity as a kind of organization which, in cases of experiences of objective phenomena, has only a theoretical status independent of the transcendental and cannot be experienced in isolation from the kind of organization produced by the categories. From several points we have already considered, it seems that (a) must be the mistaken interpretation. Kant thinks that the categories are the form of the intentional objects of our experience and that atomistic, passively received representations without conceptual organization are not an object of possible experience. The second interpretation, (b), therefore must be the correct one. In §18 Kant's consideration of the notion of the empirical unity of consciousness in isolation from the transcendental unity is a consideration of the theoretical status of atomistic, passively received representations apart from organization by means of the categories. And since Hume thinks that what we experience consists of passively received, atomistic perceptions with no transcendental but only empirical organization, Kant's critical consideration of representations organized only empirically simply amounts to his critical consideration of the Humean account of experience.

Kant's general strategy in the argument from below is to try to show that an account of experience requires the application of the categories by the self in synthesis. This seems no less true for the argument of §18, and I think that Kant's specific suggestion as to what a Humean account would be missing is given in clue (1) above.

Kant says that "whether I can become empirically conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive depends on circumstances or empirical conditions." Here Kant is invoking considerations which he spells out in greater detail in the Second Analogy. He is assuming that we have experiences some of whose intentional objects are objective successions and some whose intentional objects are just objective simultaneities. Kant's examples in the Second Analogy are of perceptions of a boat going downstream and of perceptions of the parts of a house. All apprehension (representation considered subjectively, as mere modification of the mind) is successive according to Kant. But there are differences in the ways in which the contents of these successive apprehensions are represented; some contents are represented as really successive, as in the case of the boat, while some are represented as merely simultaneous, as in the case of the house. Kant thinks that the atomistic perceptions all by themselves cannot account for the differences in the ways in which the contents of these successive apprehensions are represented. Hume would say that what accounts for the differences are facts about the way perceptions are associated. But Kant thinks this is too contingent; if all we have to go on is association, one might represent what we in fact take to be the same objective phenomenon in different ways depending on empirical conditions. Possibly he is thinking something like this: It might be, for a single person, that her experience is such that the parts of a house were observed in the same succession over and over again. That person might then begin to experience the parts of a house, at least on Hume's account, as some

kind of objective succession. But this should be ruled out, because experience presents us with (see clue 2) universal and necessary objective successions, that is to say, objective successions which must be the same for everyone, and such that there couldn't be relevantly dissimilar successions in anyone's experience. On the associationist's account it might also be that some person would never begin to experience the boat going downstream as an objective succession. If he turned his head and had a perception of a windmill every time he was having perceptions of a boat at a certain point, he might begin to experience windmill-perception as part of the objective succession. Kant might want to rule out this possibility as well on the grounds that experience presents us with universal and necessary objective successions.

Kant's solution is to suggest that the understanding organizes experience by means of concepts so that the requisite universality and necessity are in fact instituted. In this case the relevant concept is that of cause and effect; objective successions are successions which instantiate causal rules or laws, part of whose explanation is the activity of the understanding, objective simultaneities are successions which don't instantiate such rules or laws. This application of causal laws, in turn, sets up representations so as to make regular, rule governed association possible: the empirical unity is derived from the original or transcendental unity. But these considerations aren't very convincing. The associationist might very well accept the fact that a person could come to experience the parts of a house as an objective succession or not experience a boat going

downstream as an objective succession. He might very plausibly claim, against Kant, that there is no universality or necessity that pertains to our experience that would rule out such cases. He could also point out that what might seem to be universality and necessity in experience can be explained by the fact that the accidental circumstances in the above counterexamples come about very infrequently if at all, and that moreover, one can learn certain facts about head turning and eye-closing and have them infused into one's experience. Besides, the associationist might ask, how could the application of concepts by means of the understanding prevent the above examples from becoming actual? What constraints upon the understanding would prevent it from thinking the house-successions as objective? At this point Kant has to present a more detailed account of synthesis, which he in fact fails to do.

If I am right in interpreting Kant here, the issues he raises are like those of the "accidental constant conjunction" objection to Hume's definition of cause. (Hume defines cause in several places in terms of the constant conjunction of perceptions (Enquiry, §VII, S51; Treatise, p. 170)) It might turn out on Hume's definition of cause that the parts of the house in the above case constitute a causal succession, and this is undoubtedly bad. But Hume need not admit that his account as to how we get our idea or our experience of cause is wrong. He might very well revise his definition of cause while retaining his associationistic account as to how the idea of cause arises in the mind. And it seems at this point that Kant has no good objection to such an account. The associationist might well agree

that whether we become "conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or successive depends on circumstances of empirical conditions," but that the circumstances and empirical conditions are usually such that the associationist account produces the right results, and that no facts about our experience preclude the odd deviant result.

Kant, however, may have a deeper, more abstract, consideration in mind. The strategy in the above argument was to find cases in which atomistic, passively received perceptions were grouped so that the association would produce a deviant organization. But at this point Kant might ask: Given the many possible ways in which atomistic representations can be organized, why should such representations be organized in one way rather than another? Why should one particular mode of organization be determined? Kant's answer to these questions is that any mode of organization has to come from a source outside the representations themselves, in particular from the understanding. What Kant wants to say is that some conceptual content must be infused by the understanding in order for a determinate type of organization to take hold. Kant suggests this line of argument in several places in the Second Analogy. One of them is the following:

....imagination can connect...two states [perceptions] in two ways, so that either the one or the other precedes in time...the objective relation of appearances that follow upon one another is not to be determined through mere perception. In order that this relation be known as determined, the relation between the two states must be so thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which of them must be placed before, and which of them after, and that they cannot be placed in the reverse relation. (B233-4, last emphasis mine, cf. A201=B246ff)

One might disagree with Kant that the understanding has both the ability to think one state to objectively precede another and vice versa, and one might disagree with Kant's assertions regarding necessity, but still the passage makes a what I think to be a valid general point. Given any manifold of atomistic representations, different ways of organizing them are possible. This shows that the atomistic representations don't contain within them a particular mode of organization. So given that they are organized, the organization has to, at least in part, come from a source other than the atomistic, passively received representations themselves, and for Kant this source is the self, or more precisely, the thought of the understanding.

Why couldn't association, one might ask, account for the mode of organization which in fact takes hold? It is essential to Humean associationism that there be no content in experience except that provided by the atomic representations. In accordance with this, the associationist account of organization requires that the particular modes of association are natural in the sense that they are dictated by the atomic representations themselves. In order to put pressure on this requirement, one might wonder why it is more natural in this sense to experience constant conjunctions together with a feeling of being carried from the first to the second of the perceptions rather than without such a feeling. It would seem that the perceptions themselves would be no less likely to dictate one rather than any other mode of organization. Hume's account of our belief in the distinct and independent existence of objects provides an other

relevant example. Although this account probably strays beyond the bounds of associationism proper,⁸ Hume's naturalistic stricture that no content be infused from outside the series of atomic representations still must apply. But then why would it be more natural for these perceptions to be experienced together with a belief in persistence rather than without such a belief? Given only the perceptions themselves again no one possible mode of organization would seem more likely to take hold than any other. The same would hold for the case of the infants and depth perception; if the organization of their perceptual field had to come from their perceptions alone, it would seem at least as likely that they wouldn't acquire depth perception as that they would. It's not clear at all that Hume could come up with a satisfactory rebuttal to these considerations.

From all of this it follows that if his accounts are to be successful, Hume would have to posit some causal factor outside of the perceptions which explains why we have a tendency to associate representations in one way rather than another, which provides perspectival content in experience. This would ensure that besides the passively received, there is another kind of mental representation, the organizing kind, without which experience would not have an account. These representations, concepts, are the vehicles whereby organization is brought about by the mind. To the extent that these concepts have content contributed by the mind they are a priori in Kant's sense; to the extent that they include content derived from passively received representations they are empirical.

Thus, if this argument is indeed successful, Kant has shown, at least to a certain degree, that we have and use Kantian concepts. I say "to a certain degree" because, again, there is nothing in the argument so far which precludes a purely naturalistic account, in the spirit of Hume's theory, of our tendencies to organize representations in one way rather than another, whereas the Kantian theory of conceptualization is not naturalistic. The functionalist account that identifies functional states with physical states might very well be adequate; tendencies to organize could be identified with aspects of the design of the functional system. Kant's present argument provides an important part of what he is trying to prove, yet it doesn't carry with it the anti-naturalism that he would like it to. Since none of the other arguments from below add anything to Kant's case in this particular respect the next time we will encounter this issue again is in connection with the argument from above.

In summary, of the two arguments against Hume of §18 embellished by the Second Analogy one appears to be unsuccessful while the other fares better. First, Kant argues that Humean associationism cannot account for universal and necessary features in experience because association could produce deviant results, for instance a belief that or an experience whose content is that a causal succession is present when it is not, or that a causal succession is present when it is. Consequently, synthesis by means of a priori concepts must explain these universal and necessary features in experience. Hume can plausibly argue, however, that there is no such universality and necessity in experience, and that the apparent universality and

necessity can be explained by the infrequent occurrence of phenomena like accidental constant conjunction. Kant's other argument is that Hume's associationism cannot explain why one mode of organization should arise in experience rather than any other. Given only the atomistic representations, it would seem that no one mode of organization would be determined. This fact about experience can be explained by Kant's notion of the contribution by the mind of the organization in experience, although this explanation does not carry with it the anti-naturalistic force that Kant would like it to.

Footnotes to Chapter 5.

¹It has often been contended that Kant was not that well acquainted with Hume's philosophy. This view is very likely mistaken; for example, Richard Popkin has found a copy of Hume's Treatise in Wolfenbuttel whose marginal notes indicate that its owner had access to comments on it made by Kant. Popkin contends that even if Kant hadn't read much of Hume's philosophy, he would yet have been quite thoroughly acquainted with his philosophical views, given that there is excellent historical evidence that these views were in the air in Kant's intellectual milieu in much the same way as Frege's views are in the air in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical circles. See Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem", Journal of the History of Philosophy 21:4, Oct. 1983, pp. 175-193.

²One might think that Kant's project is not clearly anti-Humean because Hume's account of various aspects of objectivity in experience is in never purely associationistic. For instance, Hume's account of our beliefs that objects have a continuous existence and are distinct from the mind and perception involves hypotheses that go far beyond explanation in terms of atomic representations and relations of association among them (see Barry Stroud, Hume, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), ch. V.) Thus if Kant's attack against Hume is just an attack against associationism then Hume possesses material for rebuttal. Yet for the purposes of this exposition, even though the term is not completely accurate, I will refer to the Humean account as an associationist one. But as we will see, what Kant thinks is lacking in Hume's account are ultimately features which Hume would never countenance. Moreover Kant may use the term "association" in a looser and broader way than Hume does. Consequently it's really not very important to Kant's argument against Hume that Hume strays beyond the bounds of associationism to a certain extent; on Kant's view there are good objections to Hume's project as Hume himself conceives of it.

I also don't think that it is essential to Kant's argument against Hume for Kant to hold that in his own theory, on the empirical level, association has exactly the same role as Hume says it does. In fact, I don't think that it's necessary for Kant to assign any special place to association in his own system at all. Possibly Kant eventually came to this conclusion himself, given that in the B Deduction the notion of association as a part of Kant's system hardly turns up at all. What is essential to Kant's argument is that the empirical apprehension of the objective phenomena, regardless of exactly how association is part of the story of this empirical apprehension, cannot be accounted for in the way suggested by Hume. This is not to say that for some of the strands of the argument to work for Kant, he doesn't have to countenance some associationism in his own theory. I do think, however, that for the success of the best strands of argument, the truth of some associationism plays no part.

³I. Rock, An Introduction to Perception, op. cit. ch. 1, n. 19, p. 254.

⁴Rock, An Introduction to Perception, p. 257-8.

⁵Changed from Kemp-Smith due to inconsistent translation of 'wirklich'.

⁶Changed from Kemp-Smith due to inconsistent translation of 'wirklich'.

⁷I am indebted to Robert Adams for this interpretation of Kant's phenomenalism and for the idea of the contrast between the British and the German varieties of phenomenalism. See Adams's paper Leibniz's Phenomenalism, op. cit. ch. 3, n. 8.

⁸See footnote 2.

Chapter 6: The Transcendental Deduction: Arguments from Below II
(Kant on Intentionality).

Further strands of argument from below can be found in §19 of the B Deduction and in the Second Analogy. They do not proceed from certain facts about regularities in experience, but rather from the intentionality of our experience, the fact that our experience contains intentional relations. There are different ways of approaching this material; I will not focus on these strands of argument as arguments, rather, I will consider them as accounts or explanations of the intentionality of experience. This is because I suspect that they are somewhat more interesting as an account of intentionality than they are as arguments for the objective validity of the categories.

1. A summary of Kant's views on intentionality.

Intentional relations are the relations of which some authors take directedness of a mind towards an object, in a broad sense of 'object', to be the hallmark.¹ Thinking, sensing, seeing, hearing, desiring, experiencing, loving, hating, grasping, and hitting are all, or at least all can be, intentional relations, although the ones on which I want to focus here are the paradigmatic relations of awareness of a mind to an object, like thinking and perceiving. Typically the object of an intentional relation is a real or apparent mental or physical object, process, or event. I don't want to commit myself on the issue as to whether all consciousness is intentional; experiencing

a tickle, a twinge, or dizziness may or may not involve an intentional relation in that these states may or may not involve awareness of an object. The term 'relation' might not capture what I am describing very well, since, as we shall see, the "object" of an intentional "relation" may not exist, but for want of better terminology I will, in keeping with a tradition, continue to use 'relation'. One of Kant's projects is to provide an account of the fact that we have intentional relations to objects that appear to be independent of their representations as opposed to mere subjective states, mental episodes that lack intentionality. In the next section we will examine the nature of this account.

Most intentional relations (not all, on my conception of intentional relations), if they capture the first-person psychological perspective, can be distinguished in that they have two characteristics which nonintentional relations lack. In specifying that the relation capture the first-person psychological perspective I mean to rule out the intentional relation Akhenaten thinking about the evening star being the same relation as Akhenaten thinking about the morning star when Akhenaten's thought employs the concept 'the evening star' and he doesn't know that the evening star and the morning star are identical. If one is interested in relations that capture the first-person psychological perspective then one is interested in capturing what the subject thinks, believes, and knows. If this is what one is interested in, then in the above case Akhenaten thinking about the morning star isn't the relation in question, whereas Akhenaten thinking about the evening star is. The two distinguishing

characteristics of typical intentional relations are these: First, they are prima facie existence-independent; that to which a mind is intentionally related need not exist. One can experience an oasis in a hallucination where the oasis does not exist, and one can think of the non-existent present king of France. Second, intentional relations are prima facie concept-dependent; one can be intentionally related to an object under one concept or description which applies to it and not under another such concept or description. One may think of Venus as the evening star and not as the morning star; one may experience an apple as red on the outside and not as white on the inside. What accounts for the concept-dependent character of intentional relations is the possibility that there are characteristics of a thing of which one has no cognition or knowledge, that is, the possibility of an epistemological gap between the subject or the mind and the object. If they are intended to capture other perspectives besides that of first-person psychology, intentional relations might not appear to have these characteristics. From a different perspective, the intentional relation Max thinking about the chair may not differ from Max thinking about the Eames chair, supposing the subject doesn't know that the chair in question is an Eames chair. This, I think, is, or at least may be, a legitimate way of thinking about intentional relations. But there is more to intentional relations; in particular there is more to their psychology. If they capture the first-person psychological perspective intentional relations are typically concept-dependent and existence-independent.

What follows from this is that prima facie, sentences which report intentional relations capturing the first-person psychological perspective are typically not extensional, which is to say that they are intensional.² There are some difficulties involved in moving from discourse about intentional relations to the semantic level, the level of discourse about sentences reporting intentional relations. Yet I think that this is worthwhile because it links Kant's views about the concept-dependence and existence-independence of intentional relations to a broader and more familiar tradition in philosophy. Two conditions that characterize extensional sentences are that in them co-referential expressions can be substituted for one another salva veritate and that they are subject to existential generalization. Intensional sentences lack one or both of these conditions; sentences which report intentional relations capturing the first-person psychological perspective usually don't satisfy either of them. One can't, for instance, if these sentences are read as reporting intentional relations capturing the first-person psychological perspective, make a logical inference from 'Akhenaten is thinking about the evening star' to 'Akhenaten is thinking about the morning star', nor to 'The evening star exists'. Indeed, the sentence 'Akhenaten is thinking about the evening star' has an extensional reading, but on this reading there remains an obvious sense in which sentences logically derivable from this one do not express what the subject believes and knows, and then what is the case from the point of view of the subject is not what these sentences are designed to capture. Let us, following the tradition, call the parts of sentences

for which substitution of co-referential expressions salva veritate and existential generalization fails intensional contexts.

What is it to explain, or give a theory of intentional relations? Part of the answer for most of the great philosophers is that such an explanation consists in redescribing intentional relations capturing the first-person psychological perspective in an extensional way, taking these relations whose description contains intensional contexts, and redescribing them so that the intensional contexts are eliminated so that the resulting sentence is extensional. The pre-Kantian history of philosophy presents three general strategies for doing this. The first is the Aristotelian strategy, propounded by Aquinas and others, according to which an intentional relation to a thing is redescribed as two relations, the subject's apprehension or grasp of a form, and the form's standing for the thing intended. On Aquinas's theory, a sensory form is received by a sense organ and is apprehended in sensation; the intelligible form is abstracted from the sensible form by the intellect and is apprehended in cognition. The form is in effect the intermediary between the subject and the object; the subject is related to it and it is related to the object. Sentences accurately describing both of these relations capturing the first-person psychological perspective them will be extensional. There is no such thing as a non-existent form to which the subject can be related, so the subject is never related to a non-existent object. The form also functions as a concept through which the subject is related to the object, and sentences describing the relation I've specified of the subject to the form itself are also extensional. The

grasping relation may be intentional in that it is a relation of apprehension of a subject to an object, but a proposition or sentence which reports it contains no intensional context. Sentences describing the relation between a form and an ordinary object are also extensional; whether it be resemblance, sameness, or exemplification, none of these relations have the two distinguishing features that typical intentional relations prima facie do.³

Another theory of intentionality of this type emerged from Aristotelian theory in the views of Ockham and Locke. In this kind of view the intermediary entity is not a form but a sensible idea in the mind.⁴ Let us discuss Locke's version of this theory. Sentences accurately describing the mind's relation, the relation capturing the first-person psychological perspective, to a Lockean idea are extensional; on the one hand, the issue about the non-existence of the ideas doesn't arise and on the other hand the ideas themselves are the objects of immediate awareness; they function as the concepts and the awareness of them is not concept-dependent in any further way. Furthermore, sentences describing the relation between an idea and its object are extensional; the paradigm relation is that of resemblance.⁵

A third, somewhat different theory was developed by Berkeley and held by Hume. In these theories, again, it is true that sentences describing the mind's relation to what it is related to, ideas or perceptions, are extensional.⁶ Let us discuss the Humean version of the theory. On the one hand, part of Hume's theory of intentionality is like Locke's in that it is a resemblance theory. Hume's theory is like Locke's in an important way for intentional relations that are

not immediate awareneses. Ideas for Hume are faded copies of original impressions and they represent those original impressions by resembling them (Treatise pp. 1ff). And one cannot make mistakes about, or have cognitive perspective on ideas or on any perceptions, while if one has these perceptions it's not possible that they don't exist. Also, sentences describing the resemblance relations between ideas and impressions are extensional. On the other hand, Hume's theory differs from Locke's for intentional relations that are immediate awareneses, for cases in which one is having original impressions. Impressions don't stand for or resemble ordinary objects outside or beyond them, rather they constitute ordinary objects. So what is prima facie a relation between the mind and ordinary objects that is only intensionally describable is resolved into many relations between the mind and perceptions, relations which don't have the distinguishing features of typical intentional relations. So when someone is immediately aware of an object, having original impressions, sentences accurately describing the intentional relation, the relation which captures the first -person psychological perspective, are extensional.

There are several problems that can be raised about these sorts of theories, some of them particularly relevant to an understanding of Kant's view. One of them is this: Why would such theories count as a good explanations of intentional relations, or alternatively, what accounts for the rather pervasive feeling that such theories are good explanations, given that it is not immediately obvious why positing the relevant relation of a mind to an idea or form makes the

intentional relations more perspicuous or understandable? I'm not calling into question the positing of an entity to be or to explain the cognitive perspective, say. Rather, my worry concerns the fact that the posited entity becomes that of which we are immediately aware. An important role of the theory of intentionality is to explain what it is to be immediately aware of that which we seem to be immediately aware, ordinary objects, for instance. It would seem that to substitute unusual entities for the ordinary objects as the objects of immediate awareness constitutes giving up ground.

Furthermore, there is something unsatisfactory about the fact that in some of these theories the relation to the ordinary object turns out to be something like resemblance or exemplification. Again, it is not the positing of an entity to explain some aspect of intentional relations that worries me here. It is just that prima facie the subject or mind is aware of the ordinary object in an intentional relation. But on these theories the relation to the ordinary object is no longer anything like awareness. It would seem that something that we wanted to explain, the awareness of the ordinary object, has been lost.

To these charges Locke, for instance, might give the partial reply that immediate awareness aside, to be aware of an object is just to be aware of an idea which resembles it. But there is an implausibility to thinking that all there is to awareness of an object is awareness of an idea of it. At least it should be required that there be knowledge of the fact that the idea is an idea of the relevant particular object. But this seems to reintroduce the notion

of awareness of an object independent of awareness of an idea of it, so it would seem as if the account is in trouble as it stands. This same problem can be constructed for an Aristotelian theory.

It is a significant fact about Kant's theory of intentionality that it is in a sense not extensionalist. On the one hand, he preserves the existence-independence aspect of intentional relations. For Kant what we are immediately aware of in typical intentional relations are the contents of intuitions, some of which are real or, we might say, exist, and others of which are not real or do not exist. Given this phenomenalism, one might plausibly expect that Kant does indeed eliminate existence-independence, roughly in the way that Hume does. But Kant makes a distinction between real and unreal contents of intuitions, using the notion of causal coherence. This also provides an argument for the thesis that we have and use Kantian concepts; all of this we will explore later on.

On the other hand, Kant also does not attempt to eliminate the concept-dependence feature of intentional relations. He uses none of the three main strategies for extensionalizing concept-dependence. The fact that he makes no use of Aristotelian forms in his account of intentional relations indicates that he fails to endorse the first kind of theory. Although concepts are a kind of form for Kant, he never speaks of them as entities which subjects are aware of or apprehend. Two things about Kant's theory indicate that Kant rejects any theory like Aquinas's, Locke's, or Hume's. First, for him the immediate object of awareness is always the ordinary object and not some special object. This view appears, for instance, in the

Refutation of Idealism. Second, there is an important way in which for Aquinas, Locke, and Hume, varying cognitive or conceptual perspectives are merely apparent; all that we are immediately aware of are forms, ideas, or atomistic perceptions which if we apprehend, we necessarily apprehend completely. For Kant the characteristics of the object immediately apprehended are independent of the subject, they transcend what the subject may apprehend. That this is Kant's view is evident, for instance, in §19 of the Transcendental Deduction in B. We will examine this story in detail in the third section of this chapter.

One must be precise at this point, because there is a clear sense in which Kant's theory of intentional relations viewed from the first person psychological perspective is indeed extensionalist. On Kant's theory, Akhenaten's perceiving the evening star can be described by the sentence:

- (1) Akhenaten perceives the evening star under the concept 'evening star'.

or something akin to it. This sentence is extensional, substitution of co-referential expressions and existential generalization are both possible. But what I want to focus on are, for the simple cases like the one above, two-term relations between a mind and an object of its awareness and the sentences describing these relations. One can trivially transform these relations into three-term relation by making the concept or mode of awareness the third term, and thereby render the sentences describing them extensional, ceteris paribus. The divergences between the theories we are considering are manifested in

the sentences describing what are, for the simple cases, two-term relations. This is, I think, because these sentences describe the awareness relations to objects as it appears from the original perspective of the subject and not, say, as it appears from the perspective of a theory of the structure of intentional relations, and the former is what we are focussing on here. Sentence (1) above does not meet this condition since it makes reference to a concept and to the evening star independently of the way in which the subject originally, pre-theoretically apprehends them. The following sentence, read as reporting a relation capturing the first person psychological perspective, does fulfill these conditions:

(2) Akhenaten perceives the evening star.

This sentence is not extensional because one cannot substitute coreferential expressions for 'the evening star' salva veritate, and one cannot existentially generalize on it.

This condition allows us to show what the contrast regarding intensionality and extensionality among the various theorists is. Aquinas's version of (2) is something like:

(3) Akhenaten apprehends the form 'evening star'.

Locke's version is something like:

(4) Akhenaten apprehends the idea 'the evening star'.

Hume's is, at least for a case of immediate awareness:

(5) Akhenaten has this perception and this perception and this perception etc. (where the perceptions together constitute Akhenaten's image (or something like it) of the evening star).

Whereas sentence (2) is intensional, sentences (3), (4), and (5) are extensional. In all of them co-referential expressions are substitutable salva veritate, and for all of them existential generalization holds.

One can, to be sure, argue that sentence (2) is extensional because 'perceives the evening star' should be regarded as a semantically simple expression. But such a move is not in the spirit of Kant's theory, for him apprehension relations have a complex structure; they are apprehension relations of the mind to objects. Regarding 'perceives the evening star' as a semantically simple expression obscures this fact. The reason for sentences like (2) being intensional relevant to this discussion is that the expression for the object of the intentional relation is not such that coreferential expressions can be substituted for it salva veritate and not such that existential generalization applies to it.

If Kant thinks that we have immediate awareness of ordinary objects, the question arises as to what role Kantian concepts play in cognition, especially since these concepts are characterized as mediate representations.⁷ For Locke ideas might be said to be mediate because they are that of which we are immediately aware, and these ideas themselves represent in virtue of similarity. But for Kant it is not the case that there are two such stages in conceptual representation; rather judgment consists in a single act in which the mind apprehends an object by means of a concept. All of the intentionality is contained within this act of mind; there is no description of what it is for a concept, as an entity, to have the

capabilities of representing things mediately all by itself. For Kant these are capabilities of the understanding, capabilities exercised in acts of judgment. Kantian concepts are best viewed not as entities which represent on their own, but as abstractions from these cognitive capabilities exercised in judgment; they are the rule-like modes by which acts of judgment can be made.

2. An account of a basic feature of intentionality.

In the Second Analogy Kant presents an account of the fact that a distinction can be drawn between a series of perceptions as subjective states on the one hand and those perceptions as perceptions of objects on the other. This account is presented in the form of an argument from a basic feature of intentionality to its explanation, which involves the application and the applicability of the concept of cause. Kant states the issue in this way:

We have representations in us, and can become conscious of them. But however far this consciousness may extend, and however careful and accurate it may be, they still remain mere representations, that is, inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time. How, then, does it come about that we posit an object for these representations, or, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, ascribe to them an objective reality of which I don't yet know the nature. (A197=B242)

When Kant draws the distinction between representations as inner determinations of our mind and the objects posited for these representations, I don't think that he means to imply that this distinction can be apprehended in a single experience. On the one hand, there is no sign that he is drawing Sartre's controversial

distinction between the consciousness of an object and the awareness of that consciousness within a single experience.⁸ On the other hand it also doesn't seem that this distinction is based on our being able to view our experiences as experiences of objects and our being able to view them as states of ourselves. It isn't that Kant thinks that we don't have such an ability, in fact he probably thinks that our notion of the empirical self is dependent on being able to view our experiences as states of ourselves (e.g. B167). Rather, even viewed as states of ourselves our experiences still have objects, while from the above passage it seems that the distinction that Kant wants to draw is one between representations that have and representations that don't have objects. Given that for Kant representations that don't have objects are typically the theoretical, atomistic and passively received representations, the distinction Kant wants to draw is a theoretical distinction between an experience consisting of nothing but atomistic representations and the experience of objects that we actually have. The problem that Kant is addressing in the Second Analogy is how it might be that the latter arises from the former.

Kant is here asking for an explanation for a basic feature of the intentionality of experience, that our experiences are of objects. Atomistic representations considered in isolation have no objects; they are mere "inner determinations of the mind." Perhaps the closest things to such atomistic representations in our conscious experiences are tickles and momentary twinges; if they have any intentionality at all they just barely do. According to Kant there must be some fact

about perceptions, or about the mind, or both, which explains the rise of intentionality from these atomistic representations.

In the Second Analogy Kant uses this basic feature of the intentionality of experience to argue for the applicability of the concept of cause and effect to events, and the kinds of objects that are his primary concern are events. However, when he describes the intentionality of experience, as is clear in the above passage, he doesn't restrict his comments to events. It is likely that Kant's account of the basic feature of the intentionality of experience is meant to apply to other objective phenomena and to other concepts, most notably to persisting objects and the concept of substance. But for the purposes of this exposition it would seem best to stick to Kant's own examples.

Kant repeats the argument from the basic feature of the intentionality of experience five times over the course of the Second Analogy. In this exposition I won't restrict myself to any one statement, since some are more complete in some respects and others in others. The argument proceeds with Kant's identification of the objects of experience with the content (Inbegriff) of representations, given that the things in themselves, obvious candidates for intentional objects, are not accessible to cognition:

Now as soon as I unfold the transcendental meaning of my concepts of an object, I realise that the house is not a thing in itself, but only an appearance, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which is unknown. What, then, am I to understand by the question: how the manifold may be connected in the appearance itself, which yet is nothing in itself? That which lies in the successive apprehension is here viewed as representation, while the appearance which

. is given to me, notwithstanding that it is nothing but the content of these representations, is viewed as their object... (A190-1=B236) 9

At this point the question arises as to how the content of these representations gets experienced as something distinguishable from the representations themselves. Kant's answer is as follows:

If we enquire what new character relation to an object confers upon our representations, what dignity they thereby acquire, we find that it results only in subjecting the representations to a rule, and so in necessitating us to connect them in some one specific manner; and conversely, that only in so far as our representations are necessitated in a certain order, as regards their time-relations do they acquire objective meaning. (A197=B242-3)

So Kant's explanation for the fact that our experience is of objects, for the rise of this basic feature of the intentionality of experience, is that atomistic representations get synthesized by means of rules, in particular the concept of cause.¹⁰ I suspect that what Kant has in mind is that organization among representations leads us to experience the content of these representations as objects phenomenologically over against us. There is a particular point, I think, to Kant's taking up this issue in connection with the concept of cause. What is supposed to make us able to experience the content of representations as objects over against us is that the content takes on an apparent life of its own. The way in which such content can acquire a life of its own is through preceding and succeeding parts of the content being related in a lawlike way, that is, causally. (There are in reality, to be sure, other factors relevant to the account, like the Gestalt rules of good continuation and common fate.¹¹) Kant's thought is that it is when contents of intuitions are

experienced as having their own dynamic, their own causal pattern, that our experience can be of objects. Possibly it is Kant's position that synthesis by means of the concept of cause is the most important part of the explanation of this basic feature of intentionality, that other concepts don't play as significant a role in this explanation. But our best evidence for this is only that he considers this issue in the Second Analogy and not elsewhere; he never explicitly makes this point.

Kant illustrates this account with the use of his example contrasting perceptions of a house and a boat moving downstream. Even though the perceptions of the house do not constitute an example of subjective states with no object, this example is nevertheless appropriate because it supplies a case of a feature of a series of representations, namely their order, which is not of an object independent of their representation. The perceptions of the boat moving downstream, by contrast, is a case in which the order of the perceptions is a feature of the object represented. Kant wants to show what accounts for the difference between a successive apprehension in which succession is not in the object of the apprehension, is not in the appearance itself, and one where it is. Kant introduces the example of the house in this way:

...in spite also of the fact that their representation in apprehension is always successive, I have to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in the appearances themselves. For instance, the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive. The question then arises, whether the manifold of the house is also in itself successive. This, however, is what no one will grant. (A190=B236)

The house, in the example, is apprehended successively. First, say, the ground floor is apprehended, then the second story, then the third, and finally the gable adorning the roof. Is this succession in the house itself? No, it is not an aspect of the house, the object of my apprehension. It is otherwise in the case of a happening or event, for instance a boat moving downstream:

But, as I also note, in an appearance which contains a happening (the preceding state of the perception we may entitle A, and the succeeding B) B can be apprehended only as following upon A; the perception A cannot follow upon B but only precede it. For instance, I see a ship move down stream. My perception of its lower position follows upon the perception of its position higher up in the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up. (A192=B237)

In the case of the perception of an event, the succession is indeed an aspect of the object of the apprehension. What explains this, according to Kant, is that one could not have chosen to see the boat downstream first and upstream later; the order forces itself upon us, it is in a sense necessary. This causal necessity accounts for the fact that the succession is apprehended as objective, as an aspect of the object or objective phenomenon apprehended. What in turn explains this is that a rule, namely a rule associated with the concept of cause, has been applied in this case and not in the case of the apprehension of the house:

...in the perception of an event there is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another a necessary order....The objective succession will therefore consist in that order of the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows

upon the apprehension of that which precedes. Thus only can I be justified in asserting, not merely of my apprehension, but of appearance itself, that a succession is to be met with in it. (A193=B238)

This is an interesting account, at least given that there is something to be explained here. To make things clearer at this point it may be important to review what Kant means by his notion of organizing by means of a rule. Especially in the Second Analogy Kant is given to using metaphors like 'setting' representations alongside one another and 'putting' representations in certain places. My suggestion was that maybe the best way of cashing out these metaphors is in terms of the notion of thinking or experiencing something as F. In the case of the experience of causal successions, the explanation begins with atomistic representations occurring and recurring in similar patterns. I suspect that the organization of the experience of the boat by means of a rule must consist in the exercise of an ability the mind has to think and experience such patterns as rule-governed patterns, and hence to have thoughts and experiences of causal successions. To organize atomistic representations by means of a rule associated with the concept of cause is to think and experience them as causally ordered.

Is the argument from the basic feature of intentionality to the application and applicability of the concept of cause a good one? The basic feature of the intentionality of experience, the fact that we have experiences of objects rather than having mere subjective states, is something that most philosophers before Kant did not attempt to explain. Naive or direct realists might think that it is a fact which

doesn't need explanation; rather, according to them there are people and there are objects and it is to be expected that thought and experience relations of people to these objects are going to be of objects. Possibly they think that the distinguishing features of intentional relations (which I will get to soon) need explanation, but hardly the fact that these are typically apprehension relations to objects. To the extent that this naive realism is plausible, therefore, Kant's account of this basic feature of intentionality has no force. But this is not to say anything surprising. The plausibility of the whole of Kant's arguments from below is dependent on accepting the atomistic thesis about mental representations, which some may want to deny.

Possibly, it is a point in Kant's honor that whereas he does, many philosophers who aren't naive realists don't attempt an explanation of this basic feature of the intentionality of experience. Locke and Berkeley, for instance, although they believe that all that is present to the mind is ideas, never try to explain the fact that our experience is typically of objects. In the case of Locke, this may be closely related to the problem of his confusion between or identification of ideas as mental states and ideas as objects of mental states. Since Locke doesn't clearly see or believe that there is a difference, it's not so surprising that he didn't attempt an explanation of one as opposed to, or arising from, the other. One could also take Locke as holding that there is really no experience of objects, that ideas are just a veil and refer to objects beyond the veil. But then Locke is subject to the charge of not doing his

phenomenology correctly. Berkeley, as far as I can tell, has no explanation for the fact that experience is of objects either. He says objects are collections of perceptions, but I don't think that he ever tries to show how these objects come to be experienced as over against us.

Hume attempts something close to an explanation of this feature of the intentionality of experience. What he attempts to explain is the fact that we believe that objects of experience are distinct from the mind and perception, which is like our basic feature of intentionality, and the prior principle, on which Hume thinks distinctness is dependent, that objects have a continuous existence (Treatise, pp. 188, 199). The explanation is undertaken in the chapter of the Treatise entitled 'Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses', where he forwards two accounts, one involving the causal notion of coherence, which he rejects as too weak, and the other involving the notion of constancy, which he thinks to be more powerful. The coherence account, it turns out, is not dissimilar to Kant's account of the basic feature of intentionality. We believe that perceptions have a continuous existence because there is a coherence in their changes; the changes possess an organic, causally ordered character. When I return to a fire after an hour's absence I notice that the new state of the fire is like the one which results when I actually watch a similar fire for an hour (Treatise, p. 195). Invoking consideration of simplicity, Hume says that the supposition of the continuous existence of the fire when I am not perceiving it "gives us a notion of a much greater regularity among objects than

what they have when we look no farther than our senses" (Treatise, p. 198). The belief in the distinctness of the fire from the mind and perception arises naturally from the belief in its continuous existence. From this we can see that it is possible that Kant's account was inspired by Hume, and that Hume is actually the innovator.¹² We must credit Kant, however, with his insistence that in our experience we are presented with objects which are apprehended as being distinct from subjective states. Hume seems to be saying that all we experience are atomistic perceptions; for him beliefs accounted for by association and the like do not constitute the form and organization of the objects of experience. Furthermore, we must credit Kant with his explanation of the basic feature of intentionality in terms of mental abilities, which contrasts with Hume's official line according to which the entire explanation cannot have recourse to anything beyond the perceptions themselves.¹³

3. Kant's accounts of the distinguishing features of typical intentional relations.

Let us now examine in greater detail the fact that in Kant's theory there is no complete reduction of intentional relations in general to extensionally describable relations. First, as we have seen, in the Second Analogy Kant develops his idea by proposing that objects of experience are the content of intuitions. The fact that Kant identifies objects of experiences with the contents of intuitions could readily make one suspect that Kant renders extensional after all intentional relations which are not trivially extensional through the

addition of a term for the concept or the cognitive perspective, and which capture the first person psychological perspective. But Kant provides accounts which preserve both the existence-independence and the concept dependence of intentional relations. We have already caught a glimpse of these accounts; now we will examine them in detail.

First, let us consider existence-independence. When one hallucinates a non-existent oasis in a desert one is intentionally related to the contents of this representation, which exist as contents of a representation, and at least initially this relation does not seem relevantly different in kind from my intentional relation to the contents of my present non-hallucinatory representation, which also exist as contents of representations. But at this point Kant provides a notion of that which is real (wirklich), or of the existent, we might say, which accounts for our belief that contents of hallucinations aren't real or don't represent something real whereas the contents of ordinary experiences are or do. He provides an explanation which preserves the prima facie existence-independence of intentional relations. The passages in the Critique relevant to this account can be found in the Postulates of Empirical Thought, The Refutation of Idealism in B, and its cognate in A in the Fourth Paralogism. The Second Postulate reads as follows:

2. That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is real (wirklich). (A218=B266) 14

This Postulate as stated here is somewhat vague, but it becomes evident in the discussion that he means to say that the real is that

which conforms to the system of empirical causal laws (A225=B272ff).

How this is related to dreams and hallucinations is spelled out in the third note to the Refutation of Idealism:

Note 3. From the fact that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of the self, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things involves the existence of those things, for their representation can very well be the product merely of the imagination (as in dreams and delusions). Such representation is merely the product of previous outer perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of outer objects.... Whether this or that supposed experience be not purely imaginary, must be ascertained from its special determinations, and through its congruence with the criteria of all real experience (wirklichen Erfahrung). (B278-9)

Dreams and hallucinations don't meet the criteria of all real experience of the Second Postulate, namely that the real is what fits into the causal system in the right way. In the Fourth Paralogism Kant says much the same thing:

From perceptions knowledge of objects can be generated either by mere play of imagination or by way of experience; and in the process there may, no doubt, arise illusory representations which don't correspond to the objects, the deception being attributable sometimes to a delusion of the imagination (in dreams) and sometimes to an error of judgment (in so-called sense-deception). To avoid such deceptive illusion, we have to proceed according to the rule: Whatever is connected with a perception according to empirical laws, is real (wirklich). (A376, cf. A492=B520-1)

Three things might be noted about this account of what is real in phenomena. First, by saying that objects of dreams and hallucinations are not connected with real objects according to causal laws he is not saying that the dreams and hallucinations themselves, as mental states, are outside of the causal system. Dreams and hallucinations

are real events, thus by the Second Analogy they follow from previous real events by causal laws. It is just that their objects, the contents of dreams and hallucinations, are not real because they don't fit into a general causal system of intentional objects of experience. Second, this account again involves the notion of conceptual synthesis. The real is that which has been synthesized in a certain way. Dreams and hallucinations have also been synthesized since they are conscious, but they have not been synthesized in a way that allows them to count as real. Exactly what the details of this account are Kant does not say, but it is undoubtedly complex. Third, this account is not such a bad one. Although Kant does not himself provide a defense of it against anti-phenomenalist objections, Berkeley does, and I think he says what needs to be repeated. About dreams and hallucinations Philonous, Berkeley's spokesman, says to Hylas, the materialist

And though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet by their not being connected, and of a piece, with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish things from chimeras on your own scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference, and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive. (Dialogues, Ad 68-9)

Certainly Lockean representationalists and even naive realists must employ some criteria as to what is real and what is not; material objects don't come with labels that read "This is real". Berkeley's point is that any criterion that anyone actually uses to distinguish the real from the illusory is available to the phenomenalist. And

this seems right to me. The difference between the realist and the phenomenalist here is just that whereas for the realist the criterion is indicative of the real, for the phenomenalist it is constitutive of, it defines the real.

Thus Kant explains the prima facie existence-independence of intentional relations without eliminating it. What are intuitively intentional relations to non-existent objects are on Kant's account intentional relations to objects, contents of intuitions, that don't causally cohere with the rest of experience. Kant also does not attempt to eliminate concept-dependence from intentional relations, for which he might have the following type of reason. On the Lockean picture of intentionality different objects are posited for experiences under different conceptions, even when the object experienced is prima facie the same object. So when I experience Venus as the Evening Star I am related to a different idea from the one you are related to when you experience it merely as a bright heavenly body. And when I experience a calculator as a shiny object I am related to a different idea from the one I am related to when I come to experience it as a machine that can compute. On Locke's theory these various ideas, at least the primary quality ideas, resemble ordinary objects, but mediately; the ordinary object is behind the scenes. The immediate intentional object of my experience is not the same as yours when we are both experiencing Venus. This is unintuitive. When I experience an object as the Evening Star I believe that the object of which I am immediately aware is the same one that you might experience merely as a bright object. And when I

experience a calculator as a rectangular object, I think that the object of which I am immediately aware is the same one that I might later experience as a machine that can compute. We commonly believe that ourselves and others could have varying cognitive perspectives on the very same objects of immediate awareness. It is traditional and intuitive to think that what explains the possibility of this varying cognitive perspective on the objects of experience is the recognition-transcendent character of these objects, that these objects are the way they are independently of what we might think or know of them. Kant makes the claim that the objects of immediate awareness are recognition-transcendent, and this he wants to try to explain, a project which might easily seem to be at odds with his phenomenalist assumptions.

Part of the explanation of recognition-transcendence, or at least certain conditions for it, are given in the Second Analogy, as we saw in the last section. If we are to have immediate awareness of objects that are recognition-transcendent it certainly (and tautologically) must be the case that this awareness is of objects in the first place, and Kant's account of this, as we have seen in the previous section, is given in terms of the application and applicability of the concept of cause. For further explanation we must look to §19 of the Transcendental Deduction in B. On the one hand, §19 is the continuation of the argument of §18, in that here Kant interprets the notion of synthesis in terms of judgment (§20, B143). But there is also something else going on. In §19 Kant makes the intuitive observation that the objects of experience have their characteristic

nature independently of what the states of the experiencing subject might be. He has a unique way of making this point; he thinks that we implicitly assert this fact about the objects of experience whenever we make judgments of a certain sort about them:

Thus to say 'The body is heavy' is not merely to state that the two representations have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception be repeated; what we are asserting is that the are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be. (B142, cf. Proleg, §19; Ak IV 298ff)

Kant thinks that embedded in judgments we make about objects is a presupposition that these objects are recognition-transcendent. He makes his point by having us contrast such judgments with judgments about our subjective states like 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight' (B142) and 'The room is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood nasty' (Proleg. §19, AK 299). We're supposed to sense the difference between such subjective judgments and judgments like 'The body is heavy'. Kant wants to say that these subjective judgments don't point to the existence of anything beyond the states of the subject, whereas implicit in our making the judgment 'The body is heavy' is the presupposition that the body is the way it is independently of what the subject might be experiencing. The fact that we make judgments like 'The body is heavy' of experience, and not just judgments like 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight' shows that the relevant objects of our experience are ones on which cognitive perspective can be had and are recognition transcendent. In the former type of judgment it is presupposed that

the objects are a certain way whereas in the latter type this is not so.

So far it is still possible that these objects which are presupposed to be recognition-transcendent are not objects of which we are immediately aware that they are behind the scenes, as they are for Locke. But the fact that Kant doesn't think that judgments like 'The body is heavy' are about objects which are not immediately apprehended is strongly suggested by the fact that he calls such judgments 'judgments of experience' in the Prolegomena (Ak IV 297ff.). I think that this is evident from the Second Postulate and the Refutation of Idealism. Kant writes in the Refutation of Idealism:

...the consciousness of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me...Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we can only infer outer things--and this, moreover, only in an untrustworthy manner, as in all cases where we are inferring from given effects to determinate causes...But in the above proof it has been shown that outer experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is inner experience--not indeed the consciousness of my own existence, but the determination of it in time--possible. (B276-7, cf. Bx1-xli n.)

In these passages he also makes it clear that he believes that we have immediate cognitions of objects that are permanent, which persist and undergo causal change even when we don't perceive them and which possess characteristics we may not perceive (B275ff, A225=B272ff). It is also significant that Kant characterizes an intuition as a representation which "...relates immediately to the object..." (A320=B377, cf. Bx1-xli n., A19=B33). Intuitions, (in one sense) are the representations of ordinary particular objects, and it is central

to Kant's notion of intuition that they are immediate awarenesses of these ordinary objects.

The recognition-transcendence that is presupposed in judgment requires an account. Again conceptual synthesis is invoked to explain a characteristic that experience intuitively seems to have; the notion of conceptual synthesis allows Kant to create an epistemological gap between the states of the subject and the real nature of the objects of which we are immediately aware. This idea is also developed in §19 of the B Deduction. When reading §19 it should be understood that Kant there uses the term 'judgment' to refer only to judgments like 'The body is heavy', judgments about recognition-transcendent objects and not about objects which are not distinct from the representations of them. In §19 Kant writes as follows:

...I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. It indicates their relation to original apperception, and its necessary unity. It holds good even if the judgment itself is empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for example, in the judgment 'Bodies are heavy'. I do not here assert that the representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, in so far as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations--principles which are derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, that is, a relation which is objectively valid, and so can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have only subjective validity--as when they are connected according to laws

of association. In the latter case, all that I could say would be , 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight'; I could not say, 'It, the body, is heavy'. (B141-2)

Kant is clearly concerned to set himself off from a position on which judgments about objects don't differ in kind from judgments about subjective states. An associationist like Hume, he thinks, is doomed to hold such a view because for him experience consists of perceptual atoms, which are just modifications of the mind, possessing no intentionality. It is important to note that Hume could come up with a notion of a recognition-transcendent object. This notion of object could be constructed out of the varying experiences of people at certain places and times, and/or counterfactuals about an individual's experience at certain places and times. But it is not clear that on Hume's view this would be a notion of a recognition-transcendent object of immediate awareness, and the problem with this is that this is not the commonly held notion of object of experience. Hume thinks that we are only immediately aware of atomistic perceptions; we can form beliefs based on association or some other process among these perceptions but yet only these original perceptions are contained in the experience (Treatise, pp. 1-7).

This contrast between Kant and Hume is indicative of a broader contrast, that between German phenomenalism, that of Kant and Leibniz, on the one hand and British phenomenalism, that of Hume and Berkeley, on the other. On the British view, the passively received matter of experience, atomistic sensation and its analogues, are paradigmatically all one is really aware of in experience. (In the

case of Berkeley one must make room for notions, representations of minds). Intentionality is given an account based on the nature of sensation, but strictly speaking it is not considered to be a feature of experience. Sensations, mental states with no intentionality, are the only building blocks for experience, and the entire content of experience, at least on the official accounts, can be resolved into them. On the German view, on the other hand, it is not true that the entire content of experience can be resolved into sensations, mental states with no intentionality. Rather, the intentionality of experience is taken as a datum, a feature of experience that is taken to require a non-reductionist explanation.¹⁵

But why should it be that a priori conceptual synthesis accounts for recognition-transcendence? What Kant says is that in a recognition-transcendent object the relevant representations "belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to the principles of the objective determination of representations..." but this doesn't seem to give much of an explanation as to why a priori conceptual synthesis can "objectively determine representations". §19 is somewhat disappointing in this respect; Kant just says that synthesis and the transcendental unity of apperception account for the relevant kind of objectivity without really saying why this is so. But we can extrapolate from other sources. Maybe a feature of a priori synthesis which is especially significant for an account of recognition-transcendence is that it takes place preconsciously. Kant's a priori synthesis is a preconscious extraordinary application

of concepts besides which, if actual knowledge is to be had, there must be another, an ordinary use of concepts.¹⁶ By means of the first application we preconsciously put a certain content into objects of experience, in ordinary use of concepts we make conscious what we put in by means of synthesis. This at least partially accounts for the epistemological gap that must exist between thinker and object if the object is to be recognition-transcendent; it does explain the fact that there are features of objects which we might not notice or recognize at a particular time. For instance one might not know the causal relations of an event in one's experience to others because one hasn't fully developed one's notion of causation. But there are other elements of the epistemological gap which synthesis by means of concepts does not obviously explain. For instance when you experience a calculator as nothing more than a shiny object what makes it true that this object of your experience is a calculator? It seems unlikely that an empirical concept like 'calculator' figured into your pre-conscious synthesis. I think that it is quite clear that the fact that we may not have formed empirical concepts dependent on certain material aspects of experience explains how this element of the epistemological gap comes to be. Consequently, synthesis by means of concepts at most only partially accounts for recognition-transcendence.

Yet another aspect of recognition-transcendence of objects is the presumed fact that they continue to exist when we don't experience them. Kant's criterion for the reality of unexperienced objects and the reality of their characteristics concerns the notion of causality;

objects continue to exist when we are not experiencing them, and we can know that they do and what they are like by means of causal reasoning. On the view of the Second Postulate we know that they exist and have the characteristics they do in virtue of the extension of causal nexus we experience. Kant would also say that we can know that objects which no one has ever experienced, like certain planets, do in fact exist as long as they are part of this causal nexus. Yet, one might ask, where do objects exist when they are not being experienced? In our spatio-temporal framework, would be Kant's answer. But here a tension manifests itself. Kant gives sense to the idea of a phenomenal object through the notion of the content of an intuition; we want to know what sense it makes to say that an object exists if and when it is not the content of an intuition. If Kant elects to say that such objects exist just the same it would seem that he has compromised his notion as to what an object of experience is.

There is, however, a way out. Kant thinks that although the central notion of an object of experience is that of the content of an intuition, this notion acquires broader scope by means of the causal criterion of the Second Postulate so as to include objects which play a role in an ideal story about experience. Kant writes:

That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever perceived them, must certainly be admitted. This, however, only means that in the possible advance of experience we may encounter them. For everything is real which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with the laws of empirical advance. (A493=B521)

On Kant's view this broader notion would be accounted for partially by means of conceptual synthesis, especially because causality figures so

prominently in it. This notion allows Kant to add to his account of our ordinary beliefs about the recognition-transcendence of the immediate objects of awareness; for example, he can use it to account for the fact that we suppose we can make discoveries of unintuited facts about objects, discoveries in which we employ new empirical concepts, concepts which are not used in a priori synthesis. Kant can also use it to explain the intuition that there are empirical facts about objects which no one has ever or may ever discover. These empirical facts are discovered, if they are, by means of causal reasoning and, in virtue of the causal criterion of the real, they become, on Kant's view, genuine facts about the objects. Kant writes, for instance:

For the existence of the thing being thus bound up with our perceptions in a possible experience, we are able in the series of possible perceptions and under the guidance of the analogies to make the transition from our actual perception to the thing in question. Thus from the existence of attracted iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from immediate perception of this medium. (A225-6=B273)

Because the central notion of an object is that of the content of an intuition, we can regard such facts as characterizing the objects we immediately perceive. It is a fact about the iron filings I immediately perceive that magnetic matter pervades them. This embellishes Kant's account of how it is that even within a phenomenalist framework, intentional relations can be irreducibly concept-dependent.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of our beliefs about recognition-

transcendence that this broader notion may well fail to capture. Consider, for instance, the belief that the objects of my experience are quantitatively identical to those of the experience of others. A notion of quantitative identity might be constructed on the basis of the qualitative similarity of the experiences of different people, but if quantitative identity is primitive then Kant cannot provide the relevant account. Another common belief that the broader notion fails to capture is that most physical objects, the planets, say, are in no sense mind-dependent entities. Kant thinks that he can account for our belief that most physical objects of experience are outside of our minds in the sense that they are spatially external to our heads and independent of empirically intuitable mental states, but he allows the belief that such objects are ultimately mind-independent to be overridden by his phenomenalist convictions.

So, in summary, in order to preserve ordinary beliefs concerning the recognition-transcendence of the objects of immediate awareness, Kant propounds a theory according to which the concept-dependence of intentional relations is not eliminated. It may seem that it would be difficult to impart recognition-transcendence to immediate objects of awareness on Kant's phenomenalist theory, especially since for him the central notion of an object is that of the content of an intuition. Yet Kant attempts to do so by means of his notion of conceptual synthesis. This attempt has two sides; one is his idea that synthesis is preconscious, the other is his expansion of his notion of object by means of the notion of causal coherence. What results on Kant's view is a notion of object of which we are immediately aware and on which

we can have genuine cognitive perspective. This attempt is, furthermore, an essential component of Kant's transcendental idealism, to the extent that transcendental idealism is the doctrine that the nature of the ordinary objects of experience is dependent on our cognitive processes.

4. Motivations.

I have suggested that the reason Kant's theory turns out this way is that he thinks that we have immediate awareness of objects that are recognition-transcendent and that this motivation is bound up with his project of trying to preserve our ordinary beliefs about our apprehension of the external world. Let us examine this motivation in greater detail. In the fourth Paralogism in A it becomes evident that Kant believes a kind of phenomenalism to be a prerequisite for preserving the belief that we have immediate awareness of external objects, and consequently a prerequisite for avoiding a significant amount of skepticism about them. On a view according to which external objects are completely mind-independent, we could be immediately aware only of representations caused by these objects, and our access to them would have to be via these representations. Consequently, from the internal point of view, from the ordinary point of view of human subjects, we couldn't know much about the nature of the cause of these representations, nor even what kind of cause it is. Kant writes:

After wrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if they are to be external, must have an existence by themselves, and independently of the senses, [the

transcendental realist] finds that, judged from this point of view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to establish their reality. (A369)

In Kant's transcendental idealism, external objects, that is, objects in space and time, are only relatively external. They are in space but they "are nothing" outside of the mind (A370, cf. A491-2=B520). Kant preserves the intuition that we have immediate awareness of them by specifying that they are the contents of intuitions; from the transcendental point of view our relation to them is not the relation of a mind to objects external to it, but the relation of a mind to the contents of its representations.

The belief about immediate awareness leads Kant to phenomenalism; the other ordinary belief that results in his view about intentional relations, the belief that what we are immediately aware of are recognition-transcendent objects, might readily be thought to conflict with the phenomenalism. What motivates Kant to persist is just what more generally motivates his phenomenalism, his desire to preserve our ordinary beliefs concerning our intentional relations to the external world. We ordinarily think that the very objects of which we're immediately aware have properties, like those which physicists discover, which we don't apprehend; we think that the world as a whole has or may have features, for instance stars, planets, or even "inhabitants on the moon", which we don't apprehend. We have seen how Kant attempts to reconcile these beliefs with his phenomenalism.

But certainly the other philosophers we have been discussing are aware of these ordinary beliefs about the world as well. What has led them to propound theories which do not preserve them? What

motivations is Kant resisting in leaving sentences describing intentional relations from the original perspective of the subject unextensionalized? One possibility involves the common belief that objects in space and time are completely mind-independent. If Kant is right, then this doctrine leads to the idea that that of which we can be immediately aware is a representation caused by such an object. The relation between the mind and the representation, in turn, is perhaps readily construed as extensionally describable. There is also the lure of foundationalism, which runs through the entire history of theories of intentionality. The relation of a mind to an idea in the Lockean theory, for example, described from the original perspective of the subject, is held to be extensional, and one thing that accounts for this, in particular the lack of concept-dependence, is that there is not supposed to be a possibility of an epistemological gap between the mind and a form, while there is such a gap between the mind and an ordinary object. On the Lockean theory one cannot have varying cognitive perspectives on an idea if one apprehends it at all. There is also no question about the idea not existing if it is indeed apprehended. Thus this apprehension of ideas meets the criteria for being included in the foundations for some foundationalist theories of knowledge.

But there are, I think, other reasons why such an extensionalizing theory is or seems to be explanatory, reasons more closely bound up with precisely the fact that the theory redescribes extensionally what seemed to be only intensionally describable. A good starting point may be this: One might think of typical

intentional relations as being strange because we think of some background or contrast as being normal. That background is the external, natural world and the relations among the things in it. Sentences describing typical relations in the external world are extensional.¹⁷ Possibly philosophers have thought that extensional redescription of intensional relations has explanatory value all by itself because of a more general predilection to take such natural, extensionally describable relations as paradigmatically understandable. Maybe this is because there is a general tendency to think that for anything to be explained it must be part of or at least continuous in kind with the external, natural world. This is explicitly the aim of naturalist philosophers of mind such as physicalists and many functionalists, not to mention Hume. (By naturalism here I mean the view that all explanation is natural scientific explanation or closely analogous to it, and that all entities are or are very similar to entities which are encountered in natural scientific theory.) Hume makes a point of modelling his theory of mind on the Newtonian physical world and of trying to show that the mind is causally determined in the same way as Newton's physical world is (Enquiry, S8). Possibly a desire to see the intentional as continuous with the external and natural is the explanation for philosophers like Aquinas's and Locke's extensionalizing of the intentional as well, albeit that for them the desire isn't as explicit as it is for philosophers who are more resolutely naturalistic. Part of the general underlying feeling here may be that we have an understanding, a cognitive hold on the external, natural world of a

sort that we don't so obviously have on the mind, and that if we could construe the mind as conforming to nature we'd have at least a good start in understanding it.

Another motivation for describing intentional relations so that the resulting descriptions are extensional comes from logic. On one fairly prominent conception logic depends on the principle that the truth value of a sentence or a proposition is determined by the references and/or truth values of the parts of the sentence or proposition. Frege put the requirement this way: he defined the notion of Bedeutung as that which contributes to the truth value of a sentence, which is also a Bedeutung, such that the Bedeutung of a sentence is a function of the Bedeutungen of its parts.¹⁸ Matters become controversial when a principle like this is applied to intensional contexts, at least where the intensional contexts concern intentional relations. (Modal logic seems to be on a better footing.) This is a problem because intensional contexts don't have the same logical properties that extensional ones do. Restricting the discussion to intensional contexts that have to do with intentional relations, such intensional contexts have two features that extensional ones lack, features that correspond to concept-dependence and existence-independence. Because intentional relations are concept-dependent, one cannot necessarily substitute expressions with the same reference in the that-clauses of sentences that report such relations while preserving the truth value of the sentence. So the truth value of these sentences does not seem to be a function of the references and/or truth values of their parts. If one can't

substitute co-referential expressions for one another while maintaining the truth value of a sentence it will be complicated and difficult to establish interesting inference patterns for such sentences, and it may be impossible to come up with any interesting inference patterns on the basis of the sentences alone without looking into the context, what the speaker knows and believes, and so on. Also, because intentional relations are existence-independent, one cannot existentially generalize from what is inside a that-clause. The invalidity of existential generalization is a problem for the logic of intensional contexts because existential generalization is such a fundamental logical rule.

In the face of such problems, some philosophers are willing to say that intensional contexts have no logical structure at all, but this is to give up the project of developing an intensional logic. One possible and prima facie appealing route to take is Frege's. He had the Bedeutungen of elements in intensional contexts be the usual Sinne (senses or meanings) of these elements. So on Frege's theory the Bedeutung of a sentence is a function of the usual Bedeutungen of the extensional elements and the usual Sinne of the elements in intensional contexts. But in order for this to work, the strange features of typical intentional relations cannot be present among these Sinne, otherwise the problems will arise all over again. Thus the new Bedeutungen of intensional sentences must work in a purely extensional way. On Frege's theory, the Bedeutungen of the parts of

(1) Akhenaten/believes/that that morning star [in front of him] is not identical to the evening star. are

(2) Akhenaten himself/believing (or some relation like the grasping relation associated with believing/the sense of '(that) that morning star is not identical to the evening star' (which is a function of the senses of all of the expressions in the 'that' clause taken individually)).

The sentence, as reconstrued, can have no intensional context in it, and for some this might be a motivation to take this extensional sentence as describing the intentional relation from the perspective of the subject, as describing a relation which is neither genuinely concept-dependent nor existence-independent. I am not saying that Frege makes this extra move, but someone might be motivated by these considerations to hold that on the level of psychology only something like Fregean senses are apprehended, while at the same time admitting the obvious fact that the recognition-transcendent Venus itself is not a sense.

Thus we have two possible motivations for eliminating the distinguishing features of intentional relations, a naturalistic and a logical one. Is Kant resisting either of these two in leaving intentional relations unextensionalized? Kant's concerns certainly weren't explicitly with logic; it would be very hard to show from Kant's writings that his position against the extensionalizing of intentional relations was motivated by logical or perhaps anti-logical considerations. Anti-naturalism, on the other hand, is an important theme in Kantian philosophy. Kant opposes, for instance, Hume's theory that the mind is wholly passive and his general causal determinism. (Although Kant may be deterministic about the phenomenal

realm, he believes that we, as noumenal selves, are free). He also opposes Hume's anti-religious stance and his naturalistic (not in the sense of the naturalistic fallacy) ethical theory. From a wider perspective Kant can be seen as resisting a trend towards naturalism, and as inspiring the anti-naturalistic religious and ethical thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I suspect that the fact that he leaves intentional relations unextensionalized is another aspect of this anti-naturalism. Kant is satisfied with a theory according to which minds, at least as they are in themselves, as subjects of intentional relations, have characteristics peculiar to them in that they are characteristics which the natural world doesn't share, which make minds very different from the things of the natural world. Minds are related to the things of the natural world, to their own states, and to each other in ways which differ in kind from the way in which things of the natural world are related to each other.

Possibly the logical motivation can be seen as connected to the naturalistic motivation in a wholistic way. Maybe part of the reason theorists are drawn towards an extensionalist logic is naturalistic, and part of the naturalistic motivation is a pull towards extensionality for the sake of logic. If this is true, Kant can yet be seen as resisting the logical motivation to a certain extent, as resisting the logical pull towards extensionality.

There are, to be sure, many philosophers, like Locke and Aquinas, who hold similar notions about the mind who yet extensionalize intentional relations. They may nonetheless be maintaining what are naturalistic ideas about explanation of intentional relations. On my

proposal, Kant is so anti-naturalistic, or at least, so removed from naturalistic motivations, that he avoids the attempt to explain the mind as subject of intentional relations naturalistically. This is not to say that Kant is not at all naturalistic in his explanation of intentional relations. It may even be supposed that it is Kant's view that explanation of anything, including the mind, is only possible to the extent that what is to be explained are things in the physical world or are sufficiently similar to these things. If Kant believes this and he believes that the mental and the natural, or at least the mind as subject of intentional relations and phenomena, are very different kinds of things, then we might expect him to say that the extent to which we can explain the mind and intentional relations is limited. He does, indeed, say this:

Through observation and analysis of appearances we penetrate into nature's inner recesses, and no one can say how far this knowledge may in time extend. But with all this knowledge, and even if the whole of nature were revealed to us, we should still never be able to answer those transcendental questions which go beyond nature. The reason is that it is not given to us to observe our own mind with any other intuition than that of inner sense; and that it is precisely in the mind that the secret source of our sensibility is located. The relation of sensibility to an object and what the transcendental ground of this [objective] unity may be, are matters undoubtedly so deeply concealed that we, who after all know even ourselves only through inner sense and therefore as appearance, can never be justified in treating sensibility as being a suitable instrument of investigation for discovering anything save still other appearances--eager as we yet are to explore their non-sensible cause. (A278=B334)

We are able to answer questions about nature, we are able to give explanations for natural phenomena. But our knowledge of the mind is

limited, in particular we cannot explain the relation of sensibility to an object. The reason we can understand nature (which includes the empirical self) is that we have intuition of its objects, but the relation of sensibility to an object is deeply concealed, it is not even possible for us to investigate it. Kant is saying that all we can discover through investigation are other appearances, but the mind as subject of intentional relations is a very different kind of thing. Kant is not, to be sure, saying that we can do nothing to explain intentional relations; Kant himself says a great deal about their structure. What he is saying is that we have no access to any explanatory model for what it is for the mind to be the subject of them.

Footnotes to Chapter 6.

¹I am indebted for this characterization of intentionality to David W. Smith and Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982) pp. 1-85 and John Searle's Intentionality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), chapter 1. The fact that intentional relations are existence independent is the fact about them that was of particular concern to Brentano, Meinong, and Russell (viz. On Denoting in Bertrand Russell Logic and Knowledge, R.C. Marsh, ed. (London, Allen and Unwin, 1956) pp. 39-56), whereas Frege (viz. On Sense and Reference, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Peter Geach and Max Black eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1970) pp. 56-78) was more interested in concept-dependence. See also Frege's The Thought in Philosophical Logic, P.F. Strawson ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967) pp. 17-38.

²The terms extensional and intensional are used in this way by Rudolf Carnap in Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947) pp. 23ff.

³See Aristotle, De Anima Bks. 2 and 3; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1a, 84-86.

⁴Marilyn Adams, forthcoming book on Ockham, and also Marilyn Adams, "Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities," Philosophical Review 86, 1977, pp. 144-176. Locke, Essay II, esp. 1 and 8.

⁵It should be noted that Locke probably doesn't succeed in redescribing all intentional relations so that the resulting description is extensional. This is due to his empiricism; if all concepts were indeed Lockean ideas then the extensionalism would succeed, but there are concepts like 'the third idea of red I've had today' which cannot clearly be cast as Lockean ideas. As a result, relations between the mind and Lockean ideas seem to be concept-dependent; it is possible for me to have a Lockean idea of red and not realize that it is the third idea of red I've had today. Yet this is not Locke's intention; he thinks that all concepts are Lockean ideas. This point about the failure of the Lockean theory to extensionalize intentional relations was suggested to me by Richard Foley. With regard to the next point, for Locke ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities but ideas of secondary qualities don't resemble secondary qualities. The manner in which secondary quality ideas relate to secondary qualities is more difficult to determine. Alexius Meinong's theory of intentionality resembles that of Locke and Ockham in certain respects. See Smith and MacIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality, esp. pp. 54-57. Also David Smith, "Meinongian Objects" in Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1975), 43-71.

⁶Berkeley, Principles, esp. 1, 8-23. Dialogues, passim. Hume, Treatise, pp. 15-16, 187ff. I read Hume as saying that the distinctness and continuous existence of objects, say, are external to the atomistic perceptions into which all of our perceptions of objects can be resolved. One might be tempted by the view that for Hume the beliefs in the distinctness of objects from our perceptions and their continuous existence are features of the objects we experience, but this isn't right. In the first chapter of the Treatise Hume says that all of our perceptions can be resolved into simple ones, and in the chapter entitled 'Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses' it is a mystery for Hume where the beliefs in distinctness and continuous existence come from. It wouldn't be a mystery if he thinks that they are a feature of the objects we experience.

⁷It might be thought that certain passages in the schematism indicate that Kant's theory of representation is closer in kind to Locke's than I am presenting it, that for him images are in some way or other essential to concept application. He says, for instance:

(A) The schema of a triangle can exist nowhere but in thought. It is a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect of pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience or its image ever adequate to the empirical concept, for this latter always stands in immediate relation to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in accordance with some specific universal concept. The concept 'dog' indicates (bedeutet) a rule according to which my imagination can signify (verzeichnen) the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto actually presents. (A141=B180)

Bennett takes the above passage (A) and the sentence

(B) This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept I entitle the schema of a concept. (A140=B179-180)

to indicate that schemata are rules for constructing images. Thus even though concepts are not identical with images, they are closely associated with them. On Bennett's account of Kant's theory we apply concepts through producing an appropriate image and comparing it with the object:

Kant wants his schematism theory, I think, to explain how we are able to recognize, classify, describe. For example: I have no doubt that this thing here in front of me is a dog; but what, for me now, links this with other things I have called 'dogs', in such a way that I am entitled to call this a dog too? Kant's answer is that I can link this dog with other dogs by conjuring up a mental picture of a dog, and checking it against the object which I now see. (Jonathan

Bennett, Kant's Analytic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) p. 143.)

Bennett proceeds to forward telling objections against this theory. It seems to me, however, that Bennett's interpretation of Kant is mistaken. This interpretation consists of two theses:

(1) A schema is a rule for constructing an image.

(2) To apply a concept is to check the image against an object.

But this could not be Kant's theory for all concepts because he says that there are no images which can be constructed by means of rules associated with the pure concepts of the understanding:

...the schema of a pure concept of the understanding can never be brought into any image whatsoever. It is simply a pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression. (A142=B181)

In general, therefore, a schema is not a rule for constructing an image. One might yet take the position, as R. C. S. Walker does, that Kant thought that images are required for the application of empirical concepts but not for non-empirical ones (R. C. S. Walker, Kant (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) pp. 88-89). But this attributes a view to Kant that is somewhat strange. On the one hand, his theory of concept application would no longer be unitary; empirical and non-empirical concepts would apply to objects in very different ways. On the other hand Kant's reasons for saying that concepts cannot be identified with images seem to obviate the usefulness of images for the concept application process altogether. If concepts aren't images because of the impossibility of general images, what would be the role of a rule for producing an image or even different images that fall into a general class, especially if Kant already has an account of how some concepts apply without the mediation of images?

Further evidence against Walker's view is suggested by the passage in which Kant discusses the rule which is identified with the concept 'dog':

The concept dog indicates a rule according to which my imagination can signify the figure of a four footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concrete actually presents. (A141=B180, emphasis mine)

Here Kant says that concepts signify things which fall under them while mentioning images as something by which that which a concept signifies is not constrained. Furthermore, Kant explicitly mentions that he does not know how schemata apply to appearances:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze. (A141=B180-1)

If Kant thinks that we can't know how schemata apply to objects, it would seem to be wrong to attribute to him a view according to which schemata or concepts apply via images.

One piece of evidence that stands in the way of this interpretation is the passage (B) above, in which schemata indeed seem to be identified with rules for producing images. But given the other assertions that Kant makes, and given the context (a paragraph in which he has been arguing that schemata shouldn't be identified with images), it seems plausible to think that (B) is not intended as a definition of 'schemata'. What Kant means to say here, I think, is that at most schemata can function as rules for constructing images; that the only interesting fact about the relationship between schemata and images is that schemata can be used to produce images. I think that he doesn't mean to say that images play an intrinsic role in concept application.

⁸Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, ch.1.

⁹That this is Kant's favored notion of object of experience is evident from a passage in the letter to J.S. Beck of 20 January 1792: You've really hit the nail on the head (Sie haben es ganz wohl getroffen) when you say "The content (Inbegriff) of a representation is itself the object; and the activity of mind whereby the content of a representation is presented is what is meant by 'relating it to the object'. (Z 183, JZ 191)

¹⁰There is good reason to think that Kant identifies concepts with rules. In the Schematism he says:

The concept dog indicates a rule according to which my imagination can signify the figure of a four-footed animal in general...(A141=B180)

Elsewhere he calls the understanding a faculty which gives us rules:

We have already defined the understanding in various different ways: as spontaneity of knowledge (in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments. All these definitions when they are adequately understood, are identical. We may now characterize it as the faculty of rules. This distinguishing mark is more fruitful, and approximates more closely to its essential nature. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but understanding gives us rules. (A126)

The fact that Kant says that there is a contrast between forms of intuition and rules strongly suggests that he is identifying concepts and rules, for in other places in the Critique one finds the same contrast drawn between forms of intuition and concepts. Further evidence that Kant thinks of concepts as rules is that he switches between saying that synthesis takes place by means of concepts and saying that it takes place by means of rules. For instance he says

that it takes place by means of concepts at A111-112, A119, B143, and B143, while he says that it takes place by means of rules at A108, in many places in the Second Analogy, and at A302=B359, where he says "Understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules." It should be noted, however, that the characterization of concepts as rules does not appear in the material that Kant added in the second edition. Possibly this means that he lost interest in the metaphor, but maybe it's just that his most pressing concerns in revising the Critique didn't include a specification of the nature of concepts.

Kant's most explicit identification of concepts with rules is found at A106 where he writes:

But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances.

¹¹I. Rock, An Introduction to Perception, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975), p. 253-262. Good continuation and common fate are Gestalt rules for grouping in perception, rules we employ in perceiving whether certain units are perceived as part of a single group. Rock says "Good continuation, as a principle of organization, implies that there is a "preference" to perceive segments of lines that in some sense are smooth continuations of one another, as one line or form." (p.254). According to the principle of common fate, we perceive units that move together as a single group (pp. 257-8).

¹²It has been a subject of controversy whether Kant knew Hume's philosophy well enough to allow us to interpret a much of what he says in the Critique as directed against Hume. Recent findings indicate that Kant was quite well acquainted with Humean theory. Richard Popkin has found a copy of Hume's Treatise in Wolfenbuttel in which the writer of a preface reports having discussed the material of the Treatise with Kant. According to Popkin, recent research shows that the knowledge of Hume's philosophy in the German philosophical world of Kant's day is comparable to the knowledge of figures like Frege and Russell in the Anglo-American philosophical context today.

¹³For Hume, in any instance of association, no mind or a self which is distinct from atomistic, passively received representations or perceptions is a causal factor and such a self does not contribute any content to experience. Association is a relation among atomistic, passively received perceptions themselves; for Hume a self is just a collection of these perceptions, so there could be no source of content in a self which lies beyond them. No cause beyond the perceptions is involved in associating perceptions. The perceptions associate with one another all by themselves. This is indicated by Hume's way of speaking about association; the first sentence of Hume's chapter "Of the Association of Ideas" in the Enquiry reads:

It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. (S14, emphasis mine)

And he says in the Treatise:

...the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it and like a galley put into motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. (Treatise, p. 198)

This points out, I think, one of the deepest difference between Kant and Hume on these issues. Kant thinks that, for instance, our experiences of necessary connections are to be explained by a causal factor outside of the atomistic, passively received perceptions and that this factor contributes to the content of such experiences. Hume's official account, on the other hand, is that the genesis of our idea of necessary connection can be explained just in terms of atomistic, passively received perceptions and relations among them.

¹⁴Changed from Kemp-Smith due to inconsistent translation of 'wirklich'. 'Actual' may be a better translation of 'wirklich' given that Kant also uses the terms real and Realitaet. Nevertheless, the meaning of 'wirklich' is closer than that of Kant's word real to the meaning of our word 'real'. Kant's 'real' and 'realitaet' pertain to the Latin 'realitas', which has to do with amount of being. 'Realitaet' can come in degrees, as when God is called 'ens realissimum', i.e. 'most real being' (e.g. A 578=B606).

¹⁵Clear indications that Kant adheres to a type of phenomenalism can be found at A369-70 and at A491=B520ff. I am indebted to Robert M. Adams for this interpretation of Kant's phenomenalism and for the idea of the contrast between the British and the German varieties of phenomenalism. See Adams's paper "Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz" in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. VIII (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) pp. 217-257.

¹⁶It is important to Kant's theory of mental representation that there are two uses of concepts, one ordinary or analytic, the second extraordinary or synthetic. By means of the first use we can consciously pick out objects in and features of experience, by means of the second we organize disorganized matter for representations with the result that this organization can be consciously apprehended by means of the first use. (see e.g. A76-7=B102)

¹⁷Sentences describing causal and counterfactual relations among external objects can be intensional (see Dagfinn Føllesdal's "Quantification into Causal Contexts", Leonard Linsky, ed., Reference and Modality, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 52-62. All that my contention requires is that paradigmatic relations among

external objects, the ones one would ordinarily think of, are extensionally describable.

¹⁸Gottlob Frege, "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung", op. cit. n.1)

Chapter 7: The Transcendental Deduction: Arguments from Above and Some Remaining Issues of Interpretation.

As I pointed out in chapter 5, Kant never uses the phrase 'argument from above', but it is the obvious correlate of 'argument from below' (A119) and it quite naturally applies to the argument to be found at A115-A119. An argument from above proceeds from premises about self consciousness rather than premises about the objects of experience. My opinion is that whereas there is a complete argument from above in A, Kant does not intend there to be an argument from above in complete form in B. Rather, in the second edition a truncated argument from above appears in §§15-16 as prolegomena to an argument from below. I speculate that Kant did not complete the argument from above in B because he became skeptical as to whether the most prominent categories, those of cause and substance, could be proven objectively valid from considerations about self consciousness alone, whereas the proof of the objective validity of these two categories is much more naturally connected with the considerations to which the argument from below appeals. In the first two sections of this chapter I state and examine several strands of the argument from above. I will consider in some detail alternative structural readings of the deduction in B in the last two sections of this chapter, one of which casts the B Deduction, at least through §20, as an argument from above.

The main purpose of arguments from above, as was the case for those from below, is to argue against Hume that our mental repertoire

contains more than just Humean perceptions, passively received representations, but also modes of representation and organization which have their genetic source in the mind, the a priori concepts.

Since the arguments from above are complex, I have provided a map of their structure. On my view there are five interesting strands of the argument from above. (There are more strands, some of which I will mention, but I don't think that they are very interesting.) Three of the five, Strands 1, 2, and 3 proceed by arguing for the principle of the necessary unity of apperception, the principle that I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. Each of these three strands presents a different way of arguing for this principle. For the rest, these strands are identical. The first few premises of Strands 1 and 2 are alternative ways of interpreting the truncated argument from above in B, whereas Strand 3 is one representation of the argument that can be found in the A edition.

- (1, S1) I am capable of seeing that all of my representations are mine. (premise)
- (2, S1) If I am capable of seeing that all of my representations are mine, then I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)
- (1', S2) I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations. (premise)
- (2', S2) If I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations, then I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)
- (1'', S3) I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self. (premise)
- (2'', S3) If I am capable of seeing all of my representations as

constituting a unified empirical self, then I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)

- (3) If I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject, then I, this single subject, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)
- (4) If I, this single subject, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness, then I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations. (premise)
- (5) If I, this single self, apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations, then a priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (premise)
- (6) A priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (1-5)

The fourth and the fifth may be suggested in the letter to Herz of May 26, 1789; it is not clear that they are because of the vagueness of the text. They begin with the same premises as do Strands 1 and 3 respectively, but Strands 4 and 5 differ in that they don't proceed to the applicability of the categories by way of the principle of the necessary unity of apperception. Rather, they proceed directly from their first premises to a synthesis of representations:

- (1, S4) I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self. (premise)
- (2, S4) If I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self, then I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)
- (1', S5) I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations. (premise)
- (2', S5) If I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations, then I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)

- (3) If I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness, then I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations. (premise)
- (4) If I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations, then a priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (premise)
- (5) A priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (1-4)

In the next section we will discuss all of these strands of argument. In the subsequent section we will discuss and evaluate these various strands.

1. Five strands of the argument from above.

1.1 Showing that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is true.

The first three strands of the argument from above begin with an attempt to justify the principle of the necessary unity of apperception (B135), viz. that all of my representations, my "empirical consciousness" must be grounded "in pure apperception, that is, in the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations." What Kant means by this is that I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single self, as the subject of them, which is or can be conscious of these representations (A116, B131-2, B134, B135). Since this apperception is pure, it is not identical to the empirical self. Whereas I can have an intuition of my empirical self I am cannot be immediately aware of anything about this conscious self or subject except perhaps the fact that it is single or identical in all of my representations and that it is the

(at least potentially) conscious subject of them. I am not immediately aware of the subject as an object, I have no intuition of myself as subject; pure apperception is original in that "it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think' ... cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation." (B132). This is significant for Kant; it is an important part of his overall view that we have no intuition of the self as subject of representations; there is no basis in intuition for rational psychology. I don't have an intuition of a subject, like a Cartesian soul, in which all of my representations can be located. Rather, I am aware just of the fact that I can attach 'I think' to all of my representations, that I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, as single self, as subject of them. As Kant puts it in the Paralogisms:

The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition, distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition. Thus we can indeed perceive that this representation is invariably present in all thought, but not that it is an abiding and continuing intuition, wherein the thoughts, as being transitory, give place to one another. (A350)

The picture Kant gives us of this subject of apperception is that of a point at which all of our representations converge. He says near the beginning of the argument from above in A:

If, now, we desire to follow up the inner ground of this connection of the representations to the point upon which they have all to converge in order that they may therein for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception. (A116)

The picture is like that of a bicycle wheel, the representations being the spokes, and the subject being the hub. The analogy also breaks down because the hub is supposed to be (at least potentially) conscious of all the spokes.

The first three steps of Strands 1 and 2 are alternative interpretations of the argument in §16 of the B edition. At the beginning of this section Kant says:

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing in me. (B131-2)

Kant means a number of things by what he says in these passages, and as a result this is a place where strands of the argument from above, in particular Strands 1 and 2, divide. In Strand 1, which I think contains the most accurate representation of §16, the above passage is interpreted as saying that I couldn't regard all of my representations as mine if they weren't grounded in and self ascribable to a single subject of them. Kant summarizes this thought later on in §16:

I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. (B135)

In Strand 2 the sense in which intuitions would be nothing to us if they weren't grounded in and self-ascribable to a single subject is that the self wouldn't be conscious of them. Thus the grounding in a single subject is a condition of the self's consciousness, or, more accurately, of the self's potential consciousness of each of its

representations. We might think the second premise of Strand 2 as an embellishment of what Kant says in the passage quoted from B131-2 above which is inspired by the May 26, 1789 letter to Herz, although it is not explicit that Kant has the principle of the necessary unity of apperception in mind here. Kant writes:

For if we can demonstrate that our knowledge of things, even experience itself, is only possible under those conditions, it follows that all other concepts of things (which are not thus conditioned) are for us empty and utterly useless for knowledge. But not only that; all sense data for a possible cognition would never, without those conditions, represent objects. They would not even reach that unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of my self (as object of inner sense). I would not even be able to know that I have sense data; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. They could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence on my feeling and desire, without my being aware of my being (Dasein) (assuming that I am even conscious of each individual representation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their apperception). This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Z 153-4) 2

From this we might extrapolate that Kant has in mind in B131-2 that if I could not ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single subject which is conscious of them, then I can be "conscious of each individual representation," and they can be "connected according to empirical laws of association", but "I would not even be able to know that I have sense data" (emphasis mine), and consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing". It is one thing to be conscious, to have individual conscious representations. For this

to be true the principle of the necessary unity of apperception need not hold. But it is another thing to be conscious of one's representations, to make one's representations objects for one's consciousness. If this is possible, then one must be able to self-ascribe one's representations to a single conscious self. This seems right, for any of one's representations. If one can make a representation an object for one's conscious self, then it would seem to follow that one can ascribe it to one's single self as conscious subject of them. Given that it is possible that I now (or at any one time) regard all of my representations as objects for my consciousness, this yields the conclusion that I can ascribe each of the representations I regard as mine, (although not necessarily all of them at the same time, as is specified in Strand 1) to the same conscious self.

Strand 3 seems to represent part of what Kant has in mind in the first edition. Why is it that I must be able to ascribe all of my representations to myself, this single subject of apperception? Kant writes:

Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they may participate either directly or indirectly. In this way alone is any knowledge possible. We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. (A116)

I must be able to ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single subject of them because "in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected" (A116, emphasis mine). So only if I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single self as subject of them, is it possible to know or even to represent anything; in other words, the intentionality of experience is dependent on this being the case. It isn't obvious that I must be able to ascribe all of my representations to myself if my experience is to have some intentionality; if I couldn't ascribe some of the representations I've had to myself I suspect that I could still have representations of some objects. It would seem, therefore, that Kant's claim, as it relates to experiences of objects in general, intentionality in general, is too strong. Let us not, therefore, proceed on the course of investigation that this claim suggests. We have, after all, already examined the extent to which intentionality in general provides grounds for Kant's theory of concepts in the previous chapter.

Instead, let's consider whether it is true that only if I can ascribe all of my representations to myself is it possible for me to have knowledge of a special object, namely myself. In the letter to Marcus Herz of May 26, 1789 Kant may be taken as providing an elaboration on the above quotations from the A deduction, although, again, it is not obvious that he has the principle of the necessary unity of apperception in mind in this letter. To Herz Kant writes:

[experiential knowledge] depends on the uniting of the manifold in a consciousness, that is, according to the thinking both of the object and of the cognition. Only under these conditions, therefore, can we have experiences of objects; and consequently, if intuition (of objects of appearance) did not agree with these conditions, objects would be nothing for us, that is, not objects of knowledge at all; we should have knowledge neither of ourselves nor of other things. (Z 153; the letter continues with considerations relevant to the strand of argument which we will consider next.)

The knowledge of myself that Kant is concerned about here is the knowledge of my empirical self, myself as I appear to myself and not myself as subject, my self as it is in itself, for Kant thinks that "I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself." (B158)

What is my empirical self, my self as I appear to myself? One might expect it, in accordance with Kant's general conception of a recognition-transcendent object, to consist of the contents of my (and others') possible intuitions of my body and of my own mental states at the core, and in addition the bodily and mental states which are plausibly mine which are linked to these contents by the causal condition of the Second Postulate. Maybe this is what Kant in some sense should say, but from the text it seems that we must take away from this conception the content of my (and others') possible intuitions of my body and anything which is plausibly an aspect of my body which is causally linked to these contents. As Kant writes about it, the empirical self is known (directly) only through inner, not through outer sense. He says, for instance, "we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected..." (B153). So my empirical self would

seem the object which consists of the contents of all of my possible intuitions of my mental states, and of all of the states which are plausibly my mental states which are causally linked to them, like mental states of which we are in fact unconscious but of which we could or could have become conscious. Equivalently, my empirical self consists of all of my intuited and intuitable mental states -- representations, in Kant's terminology. Kant's notion of the empirical self is thus roughly the same as Hume's notion of the self. Consequently, the first (and third) strands of the argument from above might be viewed as an argument against Hume for the applicability of the categories from the representability of the self given Hume's own notion of what the self is. The third strand of the argument from above may thus be arguments from something that Hume explicitly accepts to the applicability of the categories to experience.

According to another strand of the argument for the principle of the necessary unity of apperception, this principle is analytic. Kant says in §16 in B:

This principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself, indeed, an identical and therefore analytic, proposition. (B135)

This is one of the strands of the argument that I want to dismiss because I think that Kant himself implicitly and correctly dismisses it in the May 26, 1789 letter to Herz. Kant's notion of an analytic truth is that of a propositions whose predicate is contained in its subject (A6=B10ff.). An analytic truth can be known by means of concepts alone. It would seem that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception could not be known by means of concepts alone

because on Kant's view in the letter to Herz it is at least possible that a being, for example an animal, not be self-conscious of its representations, and have merely conscious representation. One would have to examine one's experience to see whether one is self-conscious of one's representations; this is not included in the concept of 'representations' or of 'my representations'.³ This is not to deny that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is self-verifying in some sense; the point that I want to make is that it is not plausibly analytic given Kant's own notion of analyticity.

There is another line of argument for the principle of the necessary unity of apperception, a line which Kant doesn't separate from the initial stages of Strand 1 in the B deduction, which is also implicitly, and I think correctly, dismissed in the letter to Herz that we have been considering. This line is expressed in the following sentences from §16:

For the manifold of representations would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (B132-3)

But it does not follow from the mere fact that all of my representations belong to me that they must possibly stand together in one self-consciousness, that I must be able to ascribe all of my representations to myself as subject of them. For all of the representations of an animal undoubtedly belong to it, but it is, according to Kant, incapable of self-consciousness and self

ascription. The self ascribability of all of my representations rather follows from the fact that I can grasp all of my representations in one consciousness (B134), because I call all of my representations one and all my representations (B135). In other words, the principle of the necessary unity of apperception follows from the fact that I am capable of representing my unified empirical self to myself, not merely from the fact that I have a unified empirical self.

Another strand of argument might just assert the principle of the necessary unity of apperception. Such a strand could be as persuasive as any other since the principle of the necessary unity of apperception seems to be as plausible in its own right as any of the considerations Kant uses to sustain it. Kant does not seem to me, however, to argue this way.

1.2 Showing that a synthesis is required.

There are three ways of arguing for the necessity of a synthesis which I want to consider. The main one, employed in Strands 1, 2, and 3, the one of the Transcendental Deductions of both A and B, derives the necessity of synthesis from the principle of the necessary unity of apperception. This is the one we will consider first. The other two can possibly be found in the May 26, 1789 letter to Herz, in the passages we have already looked at. There Kant does not explicitly say that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is the necessary condition for having the ability to represent one's unified empirical self and one's own states as objects. Rather, there he may

be saying that it is the synthesis of our representations which is the necessary condition for the possession of these abilities.

But first let us consider the argument of Strands 1, 2, and 3. In the first edition Kant describes the unity of representation in one self-consciousness as synthetic, and then says

This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori.
(A118)

Let me make a initial comment about Kant's notion of a priori in this passage. By a priori synthesis Kant means a synthesis which is genetically independent of passively received representations, a process which is a function of the active self. But what does he mean when he says that the synthetic unity (the unity of apperception) is a priori necessary? If it can be inferred from this fact that the synthesis is a priori in the sense indicated above, it is unlikely that Kant means that one can know about the nature of the synthetic unity without appealing to the deliverances of experience in the justification of this knowledge. Rather he must mean that the synthetic unity is a necessary condition of experience, and that it is explained by the nature of the self and not with reference to the passively received representations.

The words 'synthetic' and 'synthesis' are closely related, but this may be misleading. Is what Kant says in the passage above obviously true? It doesn't seem as if Kant has, so far, provided the requisite argument. For why couldn't the self (at least potentially) ascribe each of its representations to itself as subject without some

special act of combining them? Couldn't I ascribe representations A, B, and C to myself without combining them, without seeing or experiencing them as related in any way? Kant provides no answer to these questions in A, but he does in the §16 of the B Deduction:

This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations. (B133)

Empirical consciousness in itself, the atomistic manifold of passively received representation, is diverse, not unified. But as long as each of the atomistic representations can be self-ascribed, we ask, why should they have to be unified through synthesis? Kant's answer is that in order for us to realize that all of our representations are self-ascribable, we must see or experience them as a unity. This is because otherwise I would have no reason to think that they are ascribable to a single subject. I cannot have an intuition, an immediate representation, of the subject being the same throughout all of our representations over time. As subject I am not immediately conscious of myself. It seems to be Kant's view that anything that could become an object for me is not me as subject. Thus as subject I

could not become an object for myself. Kant makes this point in §25 of the B Deduction, where he says:

...in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought not an intuition. (B157)

As subject I have no intuition of myself; I have no representation of myself as an object, either as an appearance or as a thing in itself. I merely have a propositional thought which is not the immediate representation of an object, the thought that I am.

Consequently, all I have to go on in now ascribing all of my representations to a single self is that I can now ascribe the whole collection to myself. But in order to be able to ascribe the whole collection of representations to myself, I must consciously think and experience them as a collection. As Allison puts it,

The awareness of the identity of the I that thinks A with the I that thinks B obviously requires an awareness of both A and B. This is because the I of the 'I think' has no determinate content, and thus cannot be characterized apart from its representations. Consequently, unless I can become aware of both representations together, I cannot become aware of the identity of the I that thinks the one with the I that thinks the other. 4

Furthermore, if this is true of any two of my representations, A and B, then it is true of all of my representations. Since in themselves passively received representations are not unified but I don't consciously experience them as disunified, I must have preconsciously exercised an ability to think and experience them as unified, which is what it is to have and exercise an ability to synthesize them. What all of this amounts to is that in order to self-ascribe all of my

representations I must have and preconsciously exercise an ability to think and experience all of my representations as constituting my empirical self.

In the passage from §16 quoted above Kant says:

This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. (B133, emphasis mine.)

This may seem strange since Kant has said in the metaphysical deduction that synthesis in general is "a blind but indispensable function of the soul...of which we are scarcely even conscious." (A78=B103) This strangeness can be resolved by noting, as Allison does,⁵ that the term 'synthesis' is ambiguous between the act and the product of the act. If, in the B133 passage above 'synthesis' means 'product of the act of synthesis', then what Kant is saying is that perceiving my representations as a unity is necessary for the possibility of self-ascription, and this is unproblematic. If by 'synthesis' he means the act itself, then the strangeness sets in. I would want to maintain that this second reading is not likely to be Kant's intention, but Allison thinks that it may have been. He says "my consciousness (apperception) that both A and B are my representations is inseparable from my consciousness of the act of thinking them together in a single consciousness."⁶ It seems to me that this isn't right, if the notion 'an act of thinking representations in a single consciousness' is taken, as Kant wants it to be taken, to be equivalent to his notion of an act of synthesis. We can consciously think two representations to belong together, but

Kant takes this to be an "analytic" thought, which must be underlain by a synthesis. Thoughts which are synthesis don't simply pick out unities, they produce them. The closest we come to this in ordinary experience is when we come to see inkblots, say, as a picture of something familiar. In synthesis, we come to think and experience previously disunified representations as unified in some way. And in the case of the synthesis of the empirical self, this is not an act of which we are conscious.

Kant may also think, and this is how what I call Strand 4 begins, that it follows not only from the principle of the necessary unity of apperception but also directly from the fact that I experience my empirical self that my understanding must synthesize my passively received representations into a unified empirical self. Kant says in the letter to Herz of May 26, 1789:

Therefore the form in which they are given depends on our understanding, on the one hand, on the subjective, that is, specific, manner of our intuition; on the other hand, it depends on the uniting of the manifold in a consciousness, that is, according to the thinking both of the object and of the cognition. Only under these conditions, therefore, can we have experiences of objects; and consequently, if intuition (of objects of appearance) did not agree with these conditions, objects would be nothing for us, that is, not objects of knowledge at all; we should have knowledge neither of ourselves nor of other things.

And he later adds:

...and all sense data for a possible cognition would never, without those conditions, represent objects. They would not even reach that unity of consciousness that is necessary for knowledge of myself (as object of inner sense). (Z 153)

It is not completely clear from this passage that Kant thinks that he can argue for synthesis directly, without arguing by way of the principle of the necessary unity of apperception, as in the first strand, for he may be assuming this principle as an intermediary step in the letter to Herz. Herz had access to the second edition of the Critique in 1789, and possibly what Kant says in this letter is meant only to be shorthand for the argument of §16. On the other hand, possibly Kant intended to present a slightly different argument. Since it is interesting, let us examine it.

In the above passage Kant also indicates that synthesis is required for the representation of any object, but we've already discussed this issue in the two preceding chapters on the arguments from below. Strand 4 of the argument is nevertheless similar to certain arguments from below in that it proceeds from unity in intuition to synthesis by means of the categories. As is the case for the arguments from below, Kant must show that the kind of unity in question, this time the unity of the empirical self, cannot be accounted for by Humean associationism. And the considerations relevant to this would seem to be the same as those relevant to the discussion of the arguments from below.

The most important reason that the case of the empirical self is different from that of objects of experience in general is that it leads to a more comprehensive result, namely that all of my representations must be subject to synthesis, and thus to the categories. It yields Kant's ideal of the comprehensive applicability of the categories. This is because all of my representations are

included in the empirical self. Another reason that the case of the empirical self is different from that of objects of experience in general is that the representations are not unified with respect to the same contents as they are in the case of these objects of experience. In the case of the intuition of a tree, my passively received representations are unified so that the intuition of a tree is produced. The production of an intuition of the empirical self is similar to this in the case of the sensations that form part of my empirical self. But my empirical self also contains intuitions of rocks and trees, thoughts of God and other transcendental selves, and judgments about many things. In these cases a higher order synthesis is required. In order to represent the empirical self I not only need to preconsciously exercise an ability to think and experience my sensations as partially constituting it, but I also must preconsciously exercise an ability to think and experience my representations of objects, the results of another synthesis as partially constituting my empirical self.

Kant may also indicate in the letter to Herz that he thinks the necessity of synthesis to follow from the fact that I can become conscious of each of my representations (not necessarily all together), and this is how Strand 5 arises. He says

...all sense data for a possible cognition would never, without those conditions [where synthesis by means of the understanding is understood to be of the conditions], represent objects...I would not even be able to know that I have sense data; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. (Z 153-4)

Again, Kant may intend this argument to go by way of the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception and thus be identical to Strand 2. But again, this is not obvious, while the new argument is interesting and its being a genuine argument of Kant's has support in §19 of the transcendental deduction in B. So let us consider it. It is not clear that Kant is claiming that all of my representations must be synthesized in the sense of being combined together in order for me to become conscious of any of them, to represent rather than merely possess any of them. There is something else that Kant seems to be getting at here. Part of his account of self-consciousness is that I must have and exercise an ability to think and experience all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self. This explains how I can represent my empirical self as a unity. But there is an aspect of self-consciousness that yet requires an explanation. This is the fact that I am able to become conscious of each of my representations. Kant thinks that in order for this conscious self-ascription to be possible there has to be an underlying act of my relating each of my representations to myself. This is what judgment, in one sense, is for Kant:

I find that judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. (B141)

Kant's thoughts are these: I have the capability of becoming conscious of each of my representations, I can make each of my representations an object for me. This fact must have an explanation, an underlying ground, as he might put it. If affection by passively received representations were the whole story, then my ability to make

each of my representations an object for me would have no explanation. There would be no ground for this ability. In this regard Kant says in the section of the letter to Herz immediately following the section of the letter quoted above:

[My representations] could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence on my feeling and desire, without my being aware of my being (Dasein) (assuming that I am even conscious of each individual representation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their apperception). This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Z 153-4) 7

What more than affection might there be to explain my ability, which the animals don't have, on Kant's view? I must be related to my representations in a different way from merely being affected. Kant's answer is that in me there is an underlying (typically) preconscious act of relating the passively received representation to myself as subject, an act which might be described as an act of acknowledgment of a representation. This is an underlying act of thinking or experiencing each representation to be something, an object which affects me.

1.3. The application of a priori concepts.

Kant thinks that synthesis, which, as we have seen, accomplishes two things, the unification or organization of a manifold of representations and the relation of the representations as objects to me as subject, must always take place in a certain mode or way. That

is, there must always be a certain way in which representations are organized through synthesis, and there must be a certain way in which each of my representations is related to me as subject. These ways are the concepts must have their genetic origin in the self. That is, they are a priori concepts, the categories. Kant writes in A:

In the understanding there are then pure a priori modes of knowledge [modes of knowledge = Erkenntnisse] which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances. These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding. (A119)

In the second edition Kant does not take this step in the argument at the end of the passage which corresponds to the deduction from above in A. This is not, to be sure, because he doesn't think that the synthesis he was talking about in §16 is a synthesis by means of concepts. I speculate, as I pointed out earlier, that this is because Kant did not think the argument from above to adequately establish the applicability of the categories of cause and substance. The organization of the representations in the empirical self is not clearly a causal one, and it is not obvious that the empirical self is a substance in the Kantian sense. Substances are, for instance, permanent on Kant's view and it is doubtful that Kant thinks of empirical selves as permanent. The arguments from below seem to have a better chance of establishing the applicability of these crucial categories, in particular that of cause.

In asserting that each representation of mine must be related to me under a certain concept Kant is saying that all relation of representations I have to me as subject is perspectival. There is no

relation of the subject to its representations, even as representations rather than as content of representations, which is not a relation in some way, under some concept. I am related to my own representations from a conceptual perspective, rather than in some extensionally describable way.

The final step for all of the strands of argument, as was the case for arguments from below, is that if a priori concepts are applied in synthesis then the ultimate conclusion of the argument, that a priori concepts are applicable in conscious thought, follows. And since it has been shown that a priori concepts apply in synthesis, the ultimate conclusion does follow. Kant thinks that this is because, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, if experience has been constructed with the use of certain representations, those same representations can be used in conscious thought to pick out certain features in the finished product.

2. Evaluation and discussion.

Let us evaluate and discuss each of the strands of argument. We will consider strands 1, 2, and 3 together and then Strands 4 and 5 together.

2.1 The first, second, and third strands.

For the sake of review, let me present Strands 1, 2, and 3 again. The difference between the three strands consists in their having different first and second premises.

(1, S1) I am capable of seeing that all of my representations are mine. (premise)

- (2, S1) If I am capable of seeing that all of my representations are mine, then I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)
- (1', S2) I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations. (premise)
- (2', S2) If I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations, then I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)
- (1'', S3) I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self. (premise)
- (2'', S3) If I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self, then I can ascribe all of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject. (premise)
- (3) If I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject, then I, this single subject, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)
- (4) If I, this single subject, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness, then I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations. (premise)
- (5) If I, this single self, apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations, then a priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (premise)
- (6) A priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (1-5)

It should be agreed that the first premises of all three strands are true; they report facts about the mental life that are evidently and indisputably true. Hume would or would have to consent to them all. One might doubt that he would assent to (1''), but he himself talks about the self being a bundle of perceptions and in this premise Kant is assuming no more than the fact that we can become conscious of such a bundle in our own case. The first controversial premises in the

arguments are (2), (2'), and (2''). The notion that the possibility of self-ascription, in some broad sense, follows from the fact that I am capable of seeing all or each one of my representations as belonging to me, or of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self, is also, I think, relatively uncontroversial. What is open for dispute, and what Hume would challenge, is Kant's idea of what the self-conscious subject, the agent of self-ascription, is. We saw that in the argument from below, although Kant seems to successfully argue against Hume that we must be capable of some kind of mental processing which adds formal content to experience, he never offered a good argument for the additional thesis that this processing is the spontaneous activity of an agent, a subject, rather than being a naturalistic process like the ones postulated by some functionalist theories of mind. If Kant can support his idea of what the conscious subject, the agent of self-ascription, is, then he will have taken a first step in showing Hume that this remaining thesis is true.

Hume attempts to do without Kant's active, spontaneous subject, the subject of which we have no intuition, which is not identical with any one or any group of one's representations, and to which all of one's representations can be ascribed. For Hume the mind is just a bundle of perceptions (Treatise, pp. 207, 251ff.) which can be intuited (in Kant's language) through introspection:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can

observe any thing but the perception...They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind. (Treatise, pp. 252-3)

Let us first consider Kant's premise (2'). Is there an argument for Kant's as opposed to Hume's notion of self-ascription implicit in this premise? On Hume's view, for me to self-ascribe mental state M is just to think of it as being a member of the bundle of perceptions which is me. Kant's first challenge to Hume might be this: When I become conscious of mental state M, there must be a subject which is conscious of M. When Hume looks inwardly at his perceptions, thereby becoming conscious of them, he is forgetting that someone is doing the introspection. This someone is me as subject. Hume would answer, however, that the consciousness of M is just another perception, a faded copy of M, perhaps, and thus need involve no subject of them which is not reducible to a bundle of perceptions.

Kant's reply, his next challenge to Hume, might be this: Hume's explanation does not adequately account for consciousness of one's mental states because it overlooks an aspect of the structure of this phenomenon. When I am conscious of a mental state, this consciousness (at least sometimes) cannot be a perception completely diverse from that mental state, like a faded copy of it. Consider my situation when I am looking at a plant and then become conscious of this perception. I continue having the perceptions (atomistic, on Hume's view) of the plant while being conscious of those perceptions. So this consciousness is irreducibly a consciousness of something else, the original perception of the plant, it can't be simply a faded copy of a perception of the plant. This consciousness of something else

requires a subject which is not reducible to a bundle of perceptions. To this one might think that Hume could reply that although he overlooked this structured feature of some perceptions, although some perceptions are irreducible perceptions of other perceptions, they need not involve a Kantian subject. They are just perceptions of other perceptions, and nothing more. No Kantian consideration has yet provided good reason to think otherwise. This answer, however, departs significantly from the Humean picture according to which all intentionality can be extensionalized (cf. ch. 6).

From the text of the Critique we can construct a third challenge to Hume which captures what may be one of Kant's deepest intuitions about this matter. Kant might say that typically in becoming conscious of one of my representations, it seems that I am performing an act, a spontaneous act, and this is something the bundle theory of the self could never capture. Kant says:

All the manifold of intuition has...a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. (B132)

What Kant is appealing to is a sense of agency in becoming conscious of one's representations. This sense of agency is readily overlooked in philosophical discussion, partly, I think, because there is so little to say about it. As a result, discussion quickly has a tendency to move on to other considerations rather quickly. But there being little to say about sense of agency makes it no less a significant philosophical datum. I think that if one takes it seriously, and doesn't overlook it, as I think Hume does, it proves to

be rather recalcitrant to reduction. If this sense of agency is not overlooked or reduced, then one may be led to the Kantian view that the self is a source of agency, and the subject of representations.

There is an argument for the idea that the subject is a spontaneous agent available to Kant. On Hume's view, perceptions either are originally received from without or are explained as arising from these original perceptions (impressions). But what resources can Hume appeal to in showing how the consciousness of perception M arises? It doesn't seem plausible to think that there would be an associationistic account that explains, say, how the consciousness of M arises from M. Perceptions of this sort aren't constantly conjoined. Given this lack of explanatory power of Hume's theory, the explanation that Kant give of the consciousness of a representation merits consideration.

Hume says that when he introspects he is conscious of nothing but perceptions, no irreducible subject of them. It is important to emphasize that Kant agrees with Hume on this. The difference between Kant and Hume is that whereas Hume concludes that there is no subject of perceptions extrinsic to the perceptions, Kant maintains that there is. Possibly another thing that lies behind Kant's view is just the belief that there are no perceptions without some subject that possesses them, and no consciousness of perceptions without a subject that is conscious of them. This has some plausibility. Kant maintains Hume's introspective observation by maintaining that the subject can never become an object for itself, that an intuition of the self as subject is impossible. This is what he means when he

calls apperception original, in that "it is that self consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think'...cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation." (B132)

Since possibility of consciousness of each of my representations is presupposed by the possibility of consciousness of all of my representations at one time, the above discussion of (2') is applicable to a consideration of:

- (2) If I am capable of seeing that all of my representations, as mine, constitute a unity, of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self, then I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject.
(premise)

In addition, (2) can be read as a first step in the Kantian account of the identity of the empirical self. Kant is saying that in order to see all of my representations as mine, in order to see them as constituting one empirical self, I must be able to ascribe each of them to myself, a single self as subject. Kant's account of the identity of the empirical self is primitive in a way that Hume's (and also Locke's) aren't. For Hume all there is to the identity of the empirical self (which is just the self) is the causal coherence of a group of perceptions. For Kant the unity of the empirical self consists in a kind of organization, but which representations make up the empirical self does not consist in this fact but in the fact that each representation in the empirical self belongs to a single subject which is distinct from the empirical self. The identity of the empirical self for Kant does not consist in anything intrinsic to the representations of the empirical self like causal coherence, or in

memory, as it does for Locke. Rather it consists in the primitive fact that each of its representations belongs to the single subject.

Even though Kant does not exploit it, this type of theory gains a certain plausibility because of the problems with the Lockean and Humean accounts. These problems have often been pointed out in the literature on personal identity. One problem for Hume is that it doesn't seem as if it can be specified which perceptions belong to the bundle which is me without making a question-begging reference to myself. A related problem is that Hume doesn't seem to have an account of what makes this causally coherent bundle of perceptions my perceptions and my self. Kant might be regarded as avoiding problems of this sort by his postulation of a single subject for all of the representations of the empirical self, which is distinct from all of these representations, a focus at which all of these representations converge.

The third premise in the first three strands of argument is

- (3) If I can ascribe each of my representations to myself, a single self, as subject, then I, this single self, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness.

What lies behind this premise is Kant's idea that my self as subject cannot have an intuition of itself and that therefore the only way in which I can tell that there is a single self which is the subject of all of my representations is if I experience all of my representations as a unity. And since the explanatory account of experience begins with atomistic and passively received representations, this unity is to be explained by a synthesis. Given Kant's account of the structure of the self, there is plausibility in the idea that to be able to

self-ascribe all of one's representations in Kant's sense one has to experience all of one's representations as a unity. If someone could have stretches of experiences not connected in any way at all, not causally, not by accompanying memories, it seems that it would not be possible for that person to sincerely ascribe all of his representations to a single self. If someone else described to him some past stretch of his past experiences which were disconnected in these ways, he could not sincerely attribute them to himself. He might, of course, perform the linguistic act of self-ascription, but that he could honestly believe that all of those experiences were his seems implausible. To be sure, we must make allowances for pathological cases.

This argument is particularly enlightening about Kant's notion of synthesis. Let us not discuss whether Kant is justified in positing a synthesis in this case. We have seen in our discussions of the arguments from below that if representational atomism is postulated as a starting point for explanation, some preconscious organizing process is reasonably postulated as explaining order in experience. We have also seen that Kant has reasons for thinking that this process could not be mere Humean association. But so far we've encountered no good reason to think that the process of organization couldn't be of the sort endorsed by some functionalist theories of mind--which could easily be a naturalistic process. (By naturalism I here mean the view that all explanation is natural scientific explanation or closely analogous to it, and that all entities are or are very similar to entities which are encountered in natural scientific theory.) We

have, so far, no reason to accept Kant's view that synthesis is a thoroughly irreducible mentalistic process, effected by the self as agent.

Let us first reflect back on Kant's historical milieu. Theories of mind which postulated extensive unconscious processing were not yet common, as they are today. Leibniz's theory claims unconscious mental states but not extensive processing in order to explain conscious experience. Empiricist theories like Berkeley's and Hume's, however, admit some subconscious inference, unconscious processing whose model, it should be noted, is ordinary mentalistic processes. Kant's theory, which claims much more unconscious processing, expands the empiricist theory and adheres to the same model. Since we are so used to non-mentalistic models for unconscious processing, we easily lose sight of what for these early theorists in the field must have seemed the obvious move to make: model unconscious mental processing after conscious mental processing. Consequently, given Kant's arguments as to the nature of conscious mental processing, arguments that this processing involves a subject as agent which is capable of judgment by means of concepts, we can suppose that it seemed natural to him to suppose that unconscious mental processing would also involve a subject as agent capable of judgment by means of concepts.

This isn't so much an argument as a picture, a picture which many philosophers and psychologists today don't regard as fruitful, at least to the extent that it is thoroughly and irreducibly mentalistic, that is, not even giving rise to any reason to think that this mental processing might actually be physical processing. The reason for this

may be similar to the reason Descartes, Galileo, and Boyle dispensed with the Aristotelian model for explanation in physics. The Aristotelian model for explanation in physics is mentalistic in some important ways; the notion of formal causation, which is at the center of the Aristotelian notion of physical explanation, is itself modeled on an idea in the mind causing matter to be formed in a certain way, as in the production of a statue. The problem with this type of explanation is that we have so little to say about explanations of this sort. (Recall Moliere's remark in The Misanthrope to the effect that all Aristotelians have to say about why opium causes sleep is that it possesses virtus dormitiva.) A similar problem with synthesis as an element in explanation is anticipated by Kant himself when he says:

The relation of sensibility to an object and what the transcendental ground of the [objective] unity may be, are matters undoubtedly so deeply concealed that we, who after all know even ourselves only through inner sense and therefore as appearance, can never be justified in treating sensibility as being a suitable instrument of investigation for discovering anything save always still other appearances--eager as we yet are to explore their non-sensible cause. (A278=B334)

Among other things, Kant is saying in this passage that we can have no insight into the transcendental ground of the unity in experience. This implies that we can have no insight into the nature of synthesis. On Kant's view we can characterize it as a mentalistic process, specify broadly what it organizes and more precisely what concepts are employed in the process, but beyond this we can have little knowledge of the process.

It is not surprising, then, that philosophers and psychologists have turned from very mentalistic to more naturalistic models for unconscious processing. Functionalism, for instance, models unconscious mental processing on computer processing. This is a naturalistic model in that computer processing is ultimately describable and explainable by natural science. Many today hold that naturalistic models in explanation, in general, have simply proven to be, at least in certain respects, more powerful and fruitful than any thoroughly irreducibly mentalistic models. This does not indicate that it is always true that in making the move to a naturalistic model the right move is made. There may be elements in the mental life, like consciousness and qualia, which limit the plausibility of the naturalistic model. If this is true, and if Kant is right about our lack of insight into the mental, then there are significant limits to the possibility of explanation of the mental life.

The last controversial premise in the first three strands of argument is:

- (4) If I, the single subject, must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness, then I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations.

Kant's thought is that the ways of organizing these representations cannot derive from the representations themselves, but must originate in the mind. Concepts that originate in the mind, whose content insofar as concepts have content is contributed by the mind, are a priori for Kant. Hume's view is that the modes of organization are dictated by the passively received representations themselves. Kant's best argument against this view, as we saw in the discussion of the

arguments from below, is that it does not explain why some particular modes of organization take hold rather than any other, or not at all, and why these particular modes are stable over time. As we will soon see, only the fourth strand of the argument from above reveals a new reason for thinking that some of the modes of organization are a priori.

Premise 4 reveals an interesting aspect of Kant's view of the human mind or understanding, that for him the human mind always "views" its objects, even if they are passively received representations, from a perspective. For Kant it is essential to the human mind that it views its objects from a conceptual perspective. God, by contrast, has cognition of objects which is not perspectival; he grasps them completely at once. For human beings, all cognitive processes, even the unconscious ones, employ modes or ways of cognizing. Whether this is defensible is hard to say; it is a result of Kant's modelling of unconscious on conscious mental processing.

2.2 The fourth and fifth strands.

Strands 4 and 5 differ only in their first and second premises:

- (1, S4) I am capable of seeing all of my representations as constituting a unified empirical self. (premise)
- (2, S4) If I am capable of seeing all of my representations as a constituting a unified empirical self, then I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)
- (1', S5) I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations. (premise)
- (2', S5) If I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my

representations, then I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness. (premise)

- (3) If I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness, then I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations. (premise)
- (4) If I apply ways of synthesizing, a priori concepts, to all of my representations, then a priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (premise)
- (5) A priori concepts are applicable to all of my representations in conscious thought. (1-4)

It must be kept in mind that we can't be sure that Kant wanted to argue in these ways as opposed to the first three strands. The fourth strand is, however, an argument clearly in the Kantian spirit. It is just like an argument from below, with the empirical self substituted in for objects of experience in general. For this reason, let us not discuss it in detail. For the most part, the same kinds of objections apply to it as to the arguments from below. As for the respects in which Strand 4 is special, we have already discussed the relevant issues in the last section.

The fifth strand of the argument is, however, more unique. The only premise of the fifth strand which hasn't appeared in previous strands is

- (2', S5) If I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations, then I must synthesize all of my representations in one consciousness.

If Kant indeed provides this strand of argument, then I think he can be viewed as attempting to explain the very possibility of our becoming conscious of our representations by means of synthesis. Another view of this argument might be that he is just trying to specify abilities which this characteristic presupposes, but it seems

to me that the presupposed abilities are meant to serve to explain the fact that we can become conscious of each of our representations.

Kant thinks that the fact that I am capable of becoming conscious of each of my representations is one thing that distinguishes me from the animals:

Without those conditions (which include synthesis) I would not even be able to know that I have sense data; consequently for me, as a knowing being, they would be absolutely nothing. They could still (I imagine myself to be an animal) carry on their play in an orderly fashion, as representations connected according to empirical laws of association, and thus even have an influence on my feeling and desire, without my being aware of my being (Dasein) (assuming that I am even conscious of each individual representation, but not of their relation to the unity of representation of their object, by means of the synthetic unity of their apperception). This might be so without my knowing the slightest thing thereby, not even what my own condition is. (Z 153-4) 8

In the fifth strand Kant can also, I think, be seen as offering an explanation in terms of synthesis for a characteristic, probably the most important characteristic, which distinguishes us from the animals.

Animals are at best simply conscious of objects; they are in no sense self-conscious, and particularly not in the sense that they can make each of their representations an object for themselves. One might think that this distinctive human ability has no explanation of the sort that Kant seems to want to give for it; that it is a brute mental ability and presupposes no other mental abilities. But Kant does not seem to think so. What Kant calls on to provide this explanation is what might be thought of as one of two aspects of synthesis. The aspect that is most important to the other arguments

and strands of argument is that it is a kind of unification or organization; in synthesis representations are organized into intuitions. The aspect that is most important to this argument is that synthesis creates a particular sort of relation between the self and a representation.

In an animal the relation between the self and a representation is just that of affection. There must be more to this relation if the possibility of making the representation an object for one's consciousness is to be explained. To achieve this "something more" Kant postulates that the subject not only unifies the manifold of intuition, but brings about their relation to original apperception, to the single subject.

All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which the manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity... (B132)

[Combination] is an affair of the understanding alone, which is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. (B134-5, emphasis mine.)

I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. It indicates their relation to original apperception, and its necessary unity. It holds good even if the judgment is itself empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for example, in the judgment, 'Bodies are heavy'. I do not here assert that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, in so

far as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations--principles which are all derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. (B141-2)

Especially in the last passages, Kant is clear that synthesis not only has the effect of unifying representations, but of bringing about a relation to original apperception, which I take to mean a relation to the single, self-conscious subject. What Kant seems to presuppose is that just as consciously noticing a unity presupposes an unconscious act of exercising an ability to think and experience the unity (B130, B133), so noticing that a representation is mine presupposes an unconscious act of thinking and experiencing it as mine. The deeper explanation for Kant holding to these parallel theses is another parallel set of theses. Just as the natural state of affairs for representations is to be disunified, the natural state of affairs for each representation is just to be an affection of the subject. So in order for the unity of representations to result a special act is needed, just as such an act must be supposed in order for a representation to be so related to the self that the self can become conscious of it.

What can we say about all of this? An alternative to Kant's view, as I've indicated, is that the ability to become conscious of one's representations is not something which requires an explanation of the sort that Kant provides. It is not clear that Kant provides an explanatory advance; it is not clear that saying that the self just has the ability to become conscious of the representations is any less satisfying than adding the theory that there is an unconscious act of

the self relating each of its representations to itself. It is not obvious, furthermore, that any other theory of unconscious processing, like the functionalist one, could provide an explanatory advance here. This is not to say that a satisfying theory of a physical basis for the ability to become conscious of one's representations couldn't be provided. It is just to say that it isn't obvious that any theory about the unconscious processing of representations could provide an advance in the attempt to explain this ability.

Since Kant thinks that all synthesis takes place by means of concepts, the act of relating one's representations to oneself also takes place by means of concepts. The fifth strand of the argument from above reveals another reason for thinking that some of the ways we have of representing representations are a priori in the sense that they have their genetic origin in the self. So far, all of the strands of argument from below and from above focus on synthesis as organization, and in this context the crucial issue in determining whether there are a priori modes of synthesis is whether these modes could plausibly be determined by the passively received representations themselves. In Strand 4 we are focussing on synthesis as a way of relating representations to the self as subject, not as an organizing activity. The picture is that each representation is taken up from a certain perspective, a conceptual perspective. Inherent in this picture is that there is something subjective, something dependent on the self in the modes in which representations are related to the self. The notion that these modes are a priori in this sense follows from the mentalistic, perspectival nature of the

relation of the self to its representations. This picture has no force if one rejects Kant's thoroughly mentalistic notion of unconscious processing.

3. An argument for the existence of objects?

I have assumed so far that the first edition of the Critique contains a complete argument from above at A115-119, and the second edition features only a curtailed version of this argument in §§15-16. On my reading, Kant does not draw the conclusion that synthesis employs a priori concepts at the end of his argument from above in B. Instead, he begins with an argument from below in §17, and as a result the function of §§15-16 is to sketch the interconnections among the notions of self-consciousness, apperception, and synthesis.

I think that good evidence can be found for this reading in §20, where his summary of the argument begins with the thesis of §17 and does not mention either §15 or §16. The main alternative reading of §§15-19 is that there Kant presents an argument in which he begins with an attempt to establish the self-ascribability of all of my representations, proceeds to show that synthesis is required, then to show that objects or some kind of objectivity is the result of synthesis, and finally to demonstrate the applicability of the categories. Although I think that the summary of §20 is good evidence that this is not the structure of the argument, let us examine a recent interpretation of this sort, that of Henry Allison.⁹

The crucial difference between my interpretation of the B deduction and one like Allison's lies in the interpretation of the

relation between §16 and §17. In particular it lies in the interpretation of what Kant says about objects in §17. On my interpretation Kant is just assuming that in §17 that our experience has a kind of objectivity, from which he shows that synthesis is necessary and subsequently that the categories apply. Allison's interpretation differs from mine in that he thinks that in §17 Kant is not simply assuming that our experience has a kind of objectivity, but he is showing that it does from what was demonstrated in §16. Allison says

The essential move in the first part of the Deduction is the attempt to establish a reciprocal connection between the transcendental unity of apperception and the representation of objects. I shall call this the "reciprocity thesis." It is the specific concern of §17. 10

Allison says that the argument for the reciprocity thesis is compressed into a single paragraph, which reads as follows:

Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding. (B137)

The crucial claim for Allison's interpretation is that the unity of consciousness is not only a necessary but also sufficient condition for the representation of an object. On my interpretation, Kant is only saying that the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition of the representation of an object.

Allison himself points out a problem for his view:

The crucial claim is that "it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes [ausmacht] the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity." Since Kant presents this claim as a direct consequence of the principle that "all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them," it might seem that he is guilty of a gross non sequitur. The problem is that this principle is only strong enough to licence the conclusion that the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for the representation of an object; it is not strong enough to prove that this unity is also a sufficient condition. In other words, we can infer from the apperception principle that there can be no representation of objects apart from the unity of consciousness, because without such a unity there can be no representation of anything at all. It would seem, however, that we cannot similarly infer that whenever there is a unity of consciousness there is a representation of an object. Yet this is precisely what Kant appears to be claiming. 11

I think that Allison's interpretation falters because when Kant says that "it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes [ausmacht] the relation of representations to an object" it is implausible to suppose that the former is asserted to be anything more than a necessary condition of the latter. On the one hand, if 'constitutes' is not intended to denote an action, then Allison's interpretation doesn't follow. If a physical process constitutes my thoughts, it doesn't follow that if there is a physical process present, then there is also a thought present. On the other hand, Allison's interpretation doesn't follow either if 'constitutes' is intended to denote an action. If an omnipotent being constitutes the physical universe, then it doesn't follow that if there is an omnipotent being, then there is a physical universe. The term

'alone', as I read this passage, doesn't indicate sufficiency either. Its function is to point out that the unity of consciousness is the sole source of the process that constitutes the relation of representations to an object.

One might think that the thesis that "whenever there is a unity of consciousness there is a representation of an object" follows from other things that Kant says in the above paragraph. Kant there says that the understanding is the faculty of knowledge, that knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object, and that the possibility of the understanding rests on the unity of consciousness. But all that follows from this is that whenever there is a case of understanding, there is a representation of an object and thus a unity of consciousness. It does not follow that whenever there is a unity of consciousness there is a case of understanding and consequently a representation of an object. In the above passage Kant does not rule out cases in which there is a unity of consciousness but no representation of an object. He might, if pressed, rule out this possibility, but there is no indication that he does so in the argument of the above passage. Furthermore, that he would rule out this possibility seems doubtful. What reason would he have for saying that any group of representations unified by means of synthesis constitutes an object?

Allison explains what according to him is Kant's claim that whenever there is a unity of consciousness there is a representation of an object by suggesting that in §17 Kant employs a very broad sense of 'object' namely that which is the result of any synthetic unity, or

equivalently for Allison, the referent of a subject term in a genuine judgment.¹² There is no problem with this claim, he says

if 'object' is taken in the broad sense indicated in §17. Since it follows from the apperception principle that the unity of consciousness is impossible apart from a synthetic unity of representations, and since this synthetic unity can only be achieved by uniting these representations under a concept, and since (by definition) any such synthetic unity counts as an object, it also follows that the representation of an object is a necessary condition for the unity of consciousness. But this is equivalent to saying that the unity of consciousness is a sufficient condition for the representation of an object, which is just what the reciprocity thesis asserts. 13

But Kant never says that any synthetic unification of representations under a concept is a representation of an object. Kant says that "an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united." (B137) Allison says that it follows from this definition "that whatever can be represented by means of the unification of a manifold of intuition under a concept counts as an object."¹⁴ Kant does not, however, say that synthesis under any concept results in the representation of an object. He just defines an object with reference to its concept. At most it follows from this that synthesis under the concept of an object results in the representation of an object.

Allison also cites a late Reflexion to support his case:

What is an object? That which is represented through a totality of several predicates which pertain to it. The plate is round, warm, tin, etc. 'Warm', 'round', 'tin', etc. are not objects, but the warmth, the tin etc. are.

An object is that in the representation of which other representations can be thought as synthetically connected.

Every judgment has a subject and predicate. The subject of the judgment, insofar as it contains different possible predicates, is the object.

'Warm', 'rectangular', 'deep', etc. are predicates. The warmth, the rectangle, the depth etc. are objects. The same applies to rational and reason. The determinable in a judgment, the logical subject, is at the same time the real object.

The subject of a judgment, in the representation of which is combined the ground of the synthetic unity of a manifold of predicates, is an object. (Reflexion 6350, Ak XVIII, 676) 15

But it doesn't seem to me that Kant says anything more here to indicate that he thinks that a unification of representations under any concept is (or produces) a representation of an object. Again, the 'of which' restriction is present in both the second and the last division of this Reflexion. Furthermore, the connection stated here between the notion of an object and that of a subject of a judgment would seem to do nothing more to strengthen Allison's case.

In addition, it is not clear that proving that there are representations of objects in this extremely weak sense adds anything to Kant's argument against Hume. Surely Hume can account for representations of objects in the sense of representations connected in some way or other with his associationistic theory. Let me also reiterate that my interpretation of the argument is consistent with Kant's summary of §20, whereas this passage would be a very strange one on Allison's interpretation. It would, if Allison were right, fail to state the first crucial steps, those of §§15-16, of the argument it allegedly summarizes.

4. The second step of the deduction in B.

The conclusion of the summary of §20 reads "Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories." (B143) It is tempting to think that this is precisely what Kant set out to show in the Transcendental Deduction, and that thereby the deduction proper is completed in §20. But in §21 Kant says:

Thus in the above proposition a beginning is made of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding; and in this deduction, since the categories have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must abstract from the mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition. In what follows (cf. §26) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category (according to §20) prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses, will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained. (B144-5)

Kant is saying here that only a beginning is made of the deduction in what precedes §21 and that what is missing will be provided or concluded in §26. An old and important question for the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason arises at this point: What is the nature of the stage of the argument that is found or is concluded in §26, the second step of the deduction in B?

The natural place to start in answering this question is with Dieter Henrich's famous article "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction."¹⁶ Henrich first rules out two longstanding

accounts of what is going on here. On Erdmann and de Vleeschauer's interpretation what precedes §21 is an argument from above while §26 constitutes an argument from below. Henrich, I think correctly, rules this out because the argument summarized in §20 is quite clearly an argument from below.¹⁷ The proposal of Adickes and Paton is that while what precedes §21 is an objective deduction, what one finds in §26 is a subjective deduction. This distinction has its source in the Preface to the first edition, where Kant says:

This enquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded, has two sides. The one refers to the objects of pure understanding, and is intended to expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts. It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests; and so deals with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it. For the chief question is always simply this:--what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not:--how is the faculty of thought itself possible? (Axvi-xvii)

Henrich first denies that there is anything to the Adickes/Paton proposal. The first reason he gives is that in §21 (in the second to last passage quoted above) Kant says that it is the demonstration of the validity of the categories which is completed in §26.¹⁸ It is quite clear in the above passage from the Preface to A that this is a task which belongs to the objective deduction.

On the other hand, §26, and especially §24, do contain material on the cognitive faculties upon which the pure understanding rests and on the possibility of the understanding, material which indicates how it is that the categories are related to the objects of experience.

Early on in his article Henrich denies that §26, in which he thinks the entire second step to take place, can be understood as an account of how the categories are related to the objects of experience:

...the text itself contains no reflections about the interconnections of our cognitive faculties. The little word 'how', which can indicate the distinction between a psychological and an epistemological investigation, a subjective and an objective deduction, only appears incidentally. 19

But later on Henrich says:

It is well known that Kant sought in the second edition to avoid the problems of the so-called subjective deduction. But that does not mean that he neglected the demand for an explanation of the possibility of relating the categories to intuitions. To be sure, Kant used the same words to distinguish between the two questions involved in the proof of the validity of the categories: the objective deduction is a proof that the intuitions are subject to the categories, while both the subjective deduction and the explanation of possibility are investigations of how they do this. But they are still two distinct investigations. Adickes and Paton have overlooked this distinction. For this reason they were obliged to consider the second step of the proof to be something which it clearly was not: a subjective deduction. At the same time, however, one may very well read the whole deduction as an explanation of the possibility of relating the categories to intuition. 20

The points I want to make here may be somewhat trivial, but I think that it can provide some defense for Adickes and Paton. First, throughout his article Henrich is supposing the the characterization of the subjective deduction is an investigation of the interrelation of our cognitive faculties, and that the explanation of the possibility of relating the a priori concepts to intuitions or to objects of experience is an aspect of the objective deduction. But in the passage in the Preface to A Kant says that a subjective deduction

contains not only this investigation concerning the cognitive faculties, but also an investigation of the possibility of the pure understanding, which must be an investigation of the relation of the a priori concepts of the understanding to intuitions or to the objects of experience. This is just the type of investigation Henrich says, at least in the second passage quoted above, can be found in §26. So if Henrich agreed that a subjective deduction also concerns explanation of the relevant possibility, he would also have to admit that §26 is in part a subjective deduction. Secondly, I think that it is natural to take §24, before the stars, as a prolegomenon to §26. §24 before the stars undeniably contains an investigation of the cognitive faculties associated with the pure understanding.

There is one more thing that Henrich says against the Adickes/Paton view which merits consideration:

What we find in the second edition is a proof of the validity of the categories which is at one and the same time an explanation of the possibility of their relation to sensibility, a proof which avoids taking up the problems of an analysis of the cognitive faculties. And this is equally true of both steps of the deduction--not merely the second part, which Adickes and Paton regard as a subjective deduction. 21

I don't think that Henrich provides any evidence for this last claim, and furthermore, it is misleading. There is far more investigation of how it is that the understanding is related to sensibility in §§24 and 26 than there is in §§15-20. This is clearly true of §24 before the stars, while Henrich himself agrees that the focus of §26 is an explanation of how it is that the understanding is related to intuitions or to the objects of experience.

Of the two parts of the second step of the deduction in B, §24 before the stars and §26, the former is most clearly part of a subjective deduction. Here Kant explores the relation between the understanding and objects of intuition in general. He connects the two through a priori intuition and the productive imagination. The focus of this section is on how, rather than on that, the categories are applicable to objects of intuition. §26 also makes an important contribution to a subjective deduction. That Kant has this in mind is suggested by the way in which he states the project of §26: "We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of the categories, whatever object may present themselves to our senses..." (B159) Henrich thinks that this explanation of possibility is inseparable from a proof of the objective validity of the categories and that therefore there is no special emphasis on the explanation of possibility in the second step of the deduction in B. He thinks that "it is easily shown that the proof of the validity of the categories must enter into the explanation of the possibility of their relation to intuition." ²² And this is what Henrich finds throughout the second edition deduction. Henrich is right, I think, in that what he says here reflects how Kant thought of the transcendental deduction. The first step in the proof undeniably makes many references to psychological faculties and how they operate. Yet I think that there is a difference in focus between the first and the second steps of the deduction. The focus of the first step is to demonstrate the objective validity of the categories, while the focus of the second step is to show how the categories are related to objects of

intuition. §26 fits this pattern in that it is where Kant presents his view that it is through a priori intuition the categories are related to objects of empirical intuition.

It is nevertheless significant that §26 does contribute something to the objective deduction, the proof of the objective validity of the categories, as was promised in §21. Kant says in §26 that

in the transcendental deduction we have shown [the] possibility [of the categories] as a priori modes of knowledge of objects of an intuition in general (cf. §§20, 21). We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of the categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses... (B159)

It is interesting to note that in this passage Kant seems to be thinking of the transcendental deduction as having been concluded in §§20-21, which suggests, in conjunction with what he says in §21, that he is not completely clear about the structure of his proof. I believe that the explanation for this may lie in the fact that he isn't clear about how much of what succeeds §21 is relevant to a demonstration of the objective validity of the categories, the objective deduction. What seems to be relevant to the objective deduction here is his thought that whereas in §20 he had shown that the categories provide a priori knowledge of objects of intuition in general, now he will show that the categories provide a priori knowledge of any object that presents itself to the senses.

From the point of view of the objective deduction, this would seem to require nothing more than a straightforward application of the result of §20 to any empirical intuition we have or can have. For the objects of the senses that Kant is talking about are by his own

characterization the contents of empirical intuition. Kant does not, as is of interest to the "explanation of possibility", make application of the conclusion of §20 in this way. Rather he proceeds, roughly, as follows: all of our representations are temporal and/or spatial; space and time are not only forms of intuition but also intuited in and of themselves; therefore the result of §20 applies to them. It thus seems to me that the second step is not of great interest to the objective deduction on my conception of what an objective deduction is. Henrich believes this as well--the chief interest he thinks there is in the second step is in the explanation of the possibility of the categories relating to the objects of the senses--which he thinks to be part of the objective deduction and I of the subjective deduction.²³

There is something else that the second step might contribute to the objective deduction. Henrich points out the language of §20 suggests that Kant is saying that if unity can be found in an intuition, then the categories apply to that intuition. And, as he says, this "does not yet clarify for us the range within which unitary intuitions can be found."²⁴ §26 then points out that unitary intuitions can be found in all of experience, because all experience is temporal and/or spatial, and these temporal and spatial elements are themselves intuitions in which unity is to be found. Thus the task of §26 in the B deduction is then show that the categories apply to all of experience; that the validity of the categories is comprehensive. Possibly this is right, and it fits with my suggestion that the B deduction contains only a truncated argument from above. A

finished argument from above shows that the validity of the categories is comprehensive; there is no representation I have which cannot be thought of as mine; there is no representation of mine which is not an aspect of my empirical self. If the B deduction up through §20 contains only (an) argument(s) from below, then a concern to adduce further considerations to indicate comprehensiveness makes sense. For arguments from below show that the categories apply to representations with certain kinds of unity of objectivity; they make no claim, in contrast to the arguments from above, as to whether the range within which unitary or objective intuitions can be found is limited.

Allison thinks that much more of a contribution is made to the objective deduction in the second step than I am suggesting. His way of putting it is that whereas the part of the B deduction up to the end of §20 is intended to demonstrate the objective validity (objective Gueltigkeit) of the categories the second step is intended to establish their objective reality (objective Realitaet).²⁵ (This formula, it should be noted, conflicts with Kant's statement in §21 that objective validity is a concern of §26 [B144-5].) For Allison, the difference between objective validity and objective reality is cashed out in terms of different notions of object to which the categories apply:

As already indicated, in the Transcendental Deduction, objective validity and objective reality are connected with different conceptions of an object. Since it is linked to judgment, objective validity goes together with a judgmental or logical conception of an object (an object in sensu logico). This is an extremely broad sense of 'object', which encompasses anything that can serve as the subject in a judgment. The term that Kant generally uses (at least in the Deduction)

for an object in this sense is Objekt. Correlatively, the notion of objective reality is connected with a "real" sense of object, that is, with an object in the sense of an actual entity or state of affairs (an object of possible experience). Kant's term for an object in this sense is Gegenstand. Invoking another formula that figures prominently in the argument of this chapter, we can say that the first part of the Deduction endeavors to establish the necessity of the categories with respect to objects in the sense of Objekt, and the second part endeavors to establish their necessity with respect to objects in the sense of Gegenstand. 26

I would like to make two points about Allison's proposal. First, it is important to Allison's view that in the Transcendental Deduction in B he can discern a fairly general pattern of the use of Objekt (for object up until §21) and the use of Gegenstand for object in the passages which explicate the second step of the deduction. There is indeed such a general pattern. But there are significant divergences from it. One problem with this is that Kant uses the term Gegenstand as well as Objekt in the paragraph in which he defines the notion of object in §17 (B137). A more dramatic difficulty for Allison's reading is that in §26, where Kant says "in the transcendental deduction we have shown [the] possibility [of the categories] as a priori modes of knowledge of objects of an intuition in general (cf. §§20, 21)", his word for objects is Gegenstaende! I think that Allison needs to make more of a case for his thesis that the difference between Kant's notions of Objekt and Gegenstand is as great as he thinks it is. In particular, as I have already suggested in the previous section of this chapter, he must make a better case for his idea that Objekt denotes only a logical sense of object.

But secondly, if the categories apply to Objekte, objects in the logical sense, don't they thereby apply to Gegenstaende, objects in a weightier sense? Surely all Gegenstaende are Objekte in Allison's sense; all Gegenstaende can serve as referents for subject terms in judgments. Yet Allison says:

[The first] portion of the Deduction establishes the necessity of the categories for representing an object in the judgmental or logical sense. Clearly, it does not follow from this alone that the categories have any application to the actual content of human experience. 27

Again, I don't think that Allison is right about this. If every member of a set is shown to have a certain property, it certainly follows that every member of a subset of that set has that property. And all Gegenstaende are Objekte. Thus even if Allison is right about the second step's concern with Gegenstaende, the result of the second step is a relatively simple application of the conclusion of §20, the conclusion of the first step.

So in summary, on my view the focus of the second step of the B deduction is on a subjective deduction, given Kant's definition of this notion in the Preface to the first edition. But it also embellishes the objective deduction, although as an objective deduction it contains only a fairly simple inference. Yet it also seems to be the case that in the B deduction, only in the second step does Kant indicate how the application of the categories is comprehensive. I am not so interested in this result in this inquiry since what I am most concerned with is whether Kant can show that we have Kantian concepts at all, yet it is something on which Kant places

a great deal of emphasis.

* * * * *

Let us quickly consider the remaining parts of the Deduction in B. §24 after the stars and §25 contain Kant's theory of the nature of the self, and §26 after the stars and §27 contain reflections on how nature is constituted by the categories and then some material on the origin of the categories on which we will touch in the next chapter. But what about §§22-23? In the material before §21 Kant showed that the categories are required for intuitions, for experience of objects, that intuitions without concepts are blind. In §§22-23 he wants to show that concepts without intuitions are empty, that all by themselves, without intuitions, concepts cannot provide cognitions or knowledge of objects. Kant's argument proceeds from the fact that concepts are mere forms of thought, and that therefore they are not by themselves representations of objects. Kant says:

For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. (B146)

This is Kant's fast argument against Leibniz and other rationalists who hold that pure intellectual or conceptual knowledge is possible for us. It assumes the Kantian notion of a concept, the notion of a concept as formal. But Leibniz and the other rationalists had a different notion of concept, and thus Kant's argument here has no force against them. It is not, however, that Kant neglects the task of showing the rationalists to be wrong; this he does in the section

of the Critique entitled 'The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection'.

In fact, the argument of the Amphiboly can also be seen as an argument for the Kantian notion of concept. We will explore all of this in the next chapter.

Footnotes to Chapter 7.

¹Henry Allison, in Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), identifies the many-coloured and diverse self with the conscious subject of apperception, but this identification is unlikely, since it hardly seems plausible that Kant would describe this subject as many-coloured (vielfarbigen). Allison translates 'vielfarbigen' as 'many', a translation which makes his interpretation more plausible.

²I have changed Zweig's translation of Dasein from 'them' (implicitly 'representations') to 'being'.

³In A Kant may be saying that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is synthetic. There he writes
The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general.
(A117n)

Evidence that this is the same principle as the principle of the necessary unity of apperception in B is that he here calls it the first principle of our thought in general, while in B the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is the principle the deduction starts out with. Evidence that the principle in A is different is that the word 'combined' is used in it. Possibly the principle in A expresses the necessity of a synthesis, which the principle in B does not. If this is the case then it is not obvious that Kant changed his mind about the analyticity of the principle of the necessary unity of apperception from A to B. If this is not the case and the two principles are the same, then on my view Kant should have maintained the view of the first edition that the principle is synthetic.

⁴Allison, p. 143.

⁵Allison, pp. 142-3.

⁶Allison, p. 143.

⁷See note 2.

⁸See note 2.

⁹Allison, pp. 137ff.

¹⁰Allison, p. 144.

¹¹Allison, pp. 145-6.

¹²Allison, pp. 27, 118-9, 135.

¹³Allison, p. 146.

¹⁴Allison, p. 145.

¹⁵Allison, p. 145.

¹⁶Dieter Henrich, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction", Review of Metaphysics 22 (1968-9), pp. 640-59. Reprinted in Kant on Pure Reason, R.C.S. Walker, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 66-81. The page numbers I cite are from the Walker anthology.

¹⁷Henrich, p. 69.

¹⁸Henrich, p. 68.

¹⁹Henrich, p. 68.

²⁰Henrich, pp. 74-5.

²¹Henrich, p. 75.

²²Henrich, p. 75.

²³Henrich, p. 79.

²⁴Henrich, p. 70.

²⁵Allison, p. 134.

²⁶Allison, p. 134.

²⁷Allison, p. 159, cf. pp. 168-171.

Chapter 8: Why Concepts Without Intuitions are Empty: Kant's Arguments Against Leibniz's Theory of Mental Representation.

We have seen how Kant tries to show that we cannot have cognitions without concepts to unify or organize that which is passively received, that intuitions without concepts are blind. Another part of Kant's project is to show that we cannot have cognitions by means of concepts without intuitions, that it is necessary to "add the object to them in intuition" (A51=B75). But what does Kant mean when he says things like this? An important passage to consider in this regard is §23 of the Transcendental Deduction in B, where Kant says that without intuitions pure concepts would lack Sinn und Bedeutung, sense and meaning:

...this extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition is of no advantage to us. For as concepts of objects they are then empty, and do not even enable us to judge of their objects whether or not they are possible. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, since we have no intuition at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and in being so applied determine an object. Only our sensible and empirical intuition can give to them sense and meaning (Sinn und Bedeutung). (B148-9)

For an interpretation of this, we might consider the suggestion often recently made, that Kant thinks that concepts and the thoughts or sentences which they constitute are cognitively meaningless, nonsensical, unless we have knowledge of the kinds of experiences which would fall under them or make them true. Bennett takes a line like this in his Kant's Dialectic. On his view

Kant would presumably agree that one can understand a given sentence only if one could make the judgment which that sentence expresses. That, together with concept-empiricism, entails meaning-empiricism—the thesis that one cannot understand a sentence of the statement-making sort unless one knows something about what kinds of intuitions would support or disconfirm it. Kant does not mention this implication, probably because he was like the rationalists and unlike the empiricists in having little interest in language. Still, I am sure that he would have agreed that any limit on the possibility of judgments generates a limit on the meaningfulness of sentences, and I shall sometimes find it convenient to equate Kant's concept-empiricism with this linguistic consequence of it. 1

Bennett's interpretation entails that on Kant's view we cannot utter meaningful sentences or have meaningful thoughts about anything of which we cannot have an experience or an intuition. That this position is incorrect as an interpretation of Kant is evident from the fact that he rather firmly states that we can have thoughts, and quite clearly meaningful ones, about things in themselves, even though we cannot have intuitions of them. He says this in a footnote in §27 of the B Deduction:

Lest my readers should stumble at the alarming evil consequences which may over-hastily be inferred from this statement, I may remind them that for thought the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of that which we think, the determining of the object, that requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, the thought of the object may still have its true and useful consequences, as regards the subject's employment of reason. The use of reason is not always directed to the determination of the object, that is, to knowledge, but also to the determination of the subject and of its volition--a use which cannot therefore be here dealt with. (B166n; cf. Bxxvi-xxvii, A96)

On Bennett's view Kant is much more of a positivist than he really is. But if Bennett is wrong, what does Kant mean when he says that without intuitions concepts would lack Sinn und Bedeutung? I think that the answer is that without intuitions concepts could not represent an object, that is, without intuitions they could not amount to what on Kant's view is a cognition or an Erkenntnis. That this is correct is evident from another Sinn und Bedeutung passage, from the chapter of the Critique entitled Phenomena and Noumena. Kant writes:

...all concepts, and with them all principles, even such as are possible a priori, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity, and in respect of their representations are a mere play of imagination or of understanding. Take, for instance, the concepts of mathematics, considering them first of all in their pure intuitions. Space has three dimensions; between two points there can be only one straight line, etc. Although all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself, are generated in the mind completely a priori, they would mean nothing, were we not always able to present their meaning in appearances, that is, in empirical objects. We therefore demand that a bare concept be made sensible, that is, that an object corresponding to it be presented in intuition. Otherwise the concept would, as we say, be without sense, that is, without meaning. (A239-240= B298-9; cf. A156=B195)

An important thing to notice about this passage is that the claim Kant makes about the validity of concepts is stronger than the one he makes in §23 of the B Deduction in two ways. On the one hand he seems to be making a claim about all concepts, not only the categories, and he also says that the intuition which gives them Sinn und Bedeutung must be empirical. On the other hand, what is most significant about the passage is that Kant says that if a concept is not made sensible by

having an object corresponding to it presented in intuition, it would have no Sinn und Bedeutung; Kant means to assert that Sinn und Bedeutung are acquired by a concept when it figures into a cognition of an object. A similar idea is present in the "Thoughts without content are empty..." passage:

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (A51=B75-6)

Although Kant often says that concepts lack meaning (Sinn or Bedeutung or both) without intuition (possibly the strongest statement of this sort appears at B308), he does not mean to say that thoughts about unexperientable things are meaningless. He rather wants to say that concepts require intuitions if they are to be involved in cognitions of objects. Saying what this means is one of the aims of this chapter. The other aim is to show why Kant says it about spatio-temporal, physical objects, why he says that intuitions are essential to cognitions of physical objects. I don't want to focus on why Kant thinks it about cognitions of the empirical self, nor about cognitions of things in themselves. This is another, lengthy, project.

As it turns out, this is also the project of showing how and why Kant changed his notion of what a concept or an intellectual representation is from a Leibnizian view to that of the Critical theory.

Kant's notion of a concept changed from that of a representation of a thing in itself to that of a form which needs to be supplied a content in order to amount to a genuine cognition. As we will see, the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection is the section of the Critique where an important part of this story is told in detail. The Amphiboly is a neglected part of the Critique; it deserves more attention because it presents some of Kant's most important reasons for thinking that concepts without intuitions are empty and also how the Kantian notion of a concept arose.

1. Experience, thought, and judgment.

It is important first of all to be clear on exactly what Kant means when he uses the terms 'experience', 'thought' and 'judgment'. On Kant's mature (1787, second edition (B)) view, 'experience' is defined as consisting in empirical cognitions, empirische Erkenntnisse, which I take it are the same as empirical intuitions in the sense of ordinary representations of particulars:

Experience is an empirical cognition, that is, a cognition which determines an object through perceptions. (B218; cf. B161, B166)

Kant thinks that outside of experience we could have no Erkenntnis of anything at all. In experience we have cognitions of things or objects, and there is no other way in which we can be presented with things or objects. He says that even pure intuitions organized by the categories, in isolation from experience, don't provide us with Erkenntnisse of things:

...the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to a priori intuitions, as in mathematics, yield knowledge only in so far as these intuitions--and therefore indirectly by their means the pure concepts also--can be applied to empirical intuitions. Even, therefore, with the aid of [pure] intuition, the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle experience. Our conclusion is therefore this: the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience. (B147-148; cf A156=B195)

This is one the statements in the Critique with a relatively strong empiricist flavor. Possibly Kant means full-fledged knowledge by Erkenntnis here; this would preserve the idea that pure intuitions by themselves constitute cognitions of objects in some sense.

The difference between Erkenntnis and thought is illustrated by Kant's contention that even though no Erkenntnis of things can be had without the applicability of the relevant concepts to intuition, thought of objects is possible by means of concepts alone. Such thought is possible, even though it would not be of any determinate object:

To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. (B146; cf A253-4=B309)

This passage also indicates Kant's view that concepts are the constituents of thoughts: "knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought...." Thoughts are collections of concepts (cf. A69=B94, A253-4=B309). Kant's contention that no cognition of objects can be had by means of concepts alone thus is equivalent to the contention that thoughts by themselves do not constitute cognitions of objects. This explains why he puts the point as follows: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us.... Thoughts without content are empty..." (A51=B75). I think it follows from this, and I think that Kant would want to say that considered in isolation a thought cannot constitute a cognition of an object, even if the thought is actually a component of a cognition of an object. In themselves thoughts have no content that could make them represent a genuine object. All of this constitutes the most important of Kant's anti-Leibnizian theses; we will soon explore it in detail.

A thought, to be sure, can be related to a particular object. Given that thoughts are constituted by concepts, the following passage indicates that it is Kant's view that a thought considered as actually relating to a particular object is a judgment, and what transforms a thought into a judgment is an act of the understanding, an act of applying or relating concepts to objects presented in intuition.

Judgment ... is the mediate knowledge of an object.... In every judgment there is a concept that holds (gilt) for many representations, and among them comprehends (begreift) a given representation which is immediately related to the object. Thus in the judgment, 'all bodies are divisible,' the concept of the divisible applies (bezieht sich) to various other concepts, but

is here applied (bezogen) in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us (vorkommende Erscheinungen). These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility. (A68-9= B93)

In order for the judgment 'all bodies are divisible' to be formed, the concepts contained in the corresponding thought have had to be related or applied to objects presented in intuition. It is quite clear that Kant is considering a case of perception in the above example; perhaps he would allow that people could judge that 'All bodies are heavy' even though they themselves are not having perceptions of heavy bodies, as long as they themselves have had perceptions of heavy bodies to which they have applied or are applying the relevant concepts, or they are suitably connected to others who have applied the relevant concepts to objects of intuition.

It is important to note that in the transformation of a thought to a judgment, neither an intuition nor an object of intuition becomes part of the judgment--Kant never speaks this way. Rather, in judgment concepts are applied to objects of intuition. This rules out the possibility of Kant accepting a de re belief of the Russell/Kaplan/Donnellan variety, in which the object is part of the belief. Kant holds that judgments consist in concepts, ways of representing objects, which are, at least in the paradigm case, actually applied to objects; judgments do not partially consist in the objects represented. This is not to say that judgments cannot contain representations of particular objects or terms which stand for intuitions. On my view, in perceptual situations, singular terms, and

demonstratives typically do. Manley Thompson, however, argues that on Kant's view there are no linguistic representations (and, presumably, no mentalistic analogues of linguistic representations) of intuitions:

If we ask what does constitute a linguistic representation of an intuition, the answer, I think, is simply that for Kant an intuitive representation has no place in language, where all representation is discursive. In language we presuppose intuitive and create discursive representations. When I judge that an object before me is such and such, I presuppose an intuitive representation (cognition) that I subsume under certain empirical concepts. I cannot give my intuition linguistic representation through a phrase such as 'spatiotemporal something'. Though I may say that my intuition is the immediate apprehension of an object simply as a spatiotemporal something, I cannot take the phrase 'spatiotemporal something' as representing my intuition. Such a phrase applies to the object of any intuition and is thus a general (conceptual, discursive) representation. No discursive representation can have the immediacy and singularity of an intuition. 2

Thompson is presupposing here that intuitions and concepts are mutually exclusive kinds of representations. But we have seen that this is not so;³ intuitions as ordinary representations of particulars are partially constituted by concepts. There is no reason to suppose that the concepts which partially constitute the intuition cannot count as linguistically representing, or perhaps more accurately, standing for the intuition, and linguistically representing its object. ('The Hollywood Bowl' could not plausibly be a linguistic representation of an intuition of the Hollywood Bowl, but is a linguistic representation of the Hollywood Bowl itself. But we might say, taking advantage of vagueness, that 'the Hollywood Bowl' could stand for an intuition of the Hollywood Bowl.) Thompson is also supposing that a linguistic representation of an intuition must have

the immediacy and singularity of an intuition. This is not so since intuitions contain mediate, general representations. None of this implies that concepts alone can somehow produce an intuition in us, or that cognitions of particulars can be had by means of concepts alone. It just means that given that we have intuitions, we can conceptually and linguistically represent the objects of those intuitions, and we can have conceptual and linguistic representations that stand for those intuitions.

If we consider only intuitions as pre-synthetic representations, however, and this is how he is considering them, Thompson is probably right. According to Kant we can have no conceptual representation of pre-synthetic intuitions considered by themselves. Kant never explicitly considers the nature of demonstratives, but possibly he would say that 'this' may sometimes represent a pre-synthetic intuition considered by itself. This would not be so if demonstrative thought always has conceptual backing, as for instance Tyler Burge has contended.⁴ But we are not even dealing with conscious thought here; this makes it hard to come to any interesting conclusions about the issue.

2. Why Kant came to believe that concepts without intuitions cannot provide cognitions of objects.

In his Leibnizian period Kant believed that intellectual representations or pure concepts represent intelligible entities or things as they are in themselves, whereas sensuous representations represent mere appearances. Possibly he held the view which he

ascribes to Leibniz in the *Amphiboly*, that the sensible is at best confused representation of things as they are in themselves. Kant's dissatisfaction with this view began to develop around the time of the writing of the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. Kant first discusses this dissatisfaction in an explicit way in his letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772:

In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. I had said: The sensuous representations present things as they appear, the intellectual representations present them as they are. But by what means are these things given to us, if not by the way in which they affect us? And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects--objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? And the axioms of pure reason concerning these objects--how do they agree with these objects, since the agreement has not been reached with the aid of experience? (Z 72)

The problem as Kant sees it is that he cannot see how intellectual representations or pure concepts can genuinely represent things in themselves since the concepts depend on the inner activity of the understanding and the things in themselves are really external to us. It is understandable that sensuous representations have objects that are external to us because sensuous representations arise as a result of objects affecting us. But intellectual representations are not sensuous, they have no relation to affection, so why should one think that they have a relation to any external object at all? If the object were created by the intellectual representation, in the way

that according to the Critique, particularly the second edition, God's representations have objects, then their relation to objects would be understandable. But our representations, or, more precisely, our understanding through our representations, is not the cause of objects, at least not in the relevant cases:

If a representation is only a way in which the subject is affected by the object, then it is easy to see how the representation is in conformity with this object, namely, as an effect in accord with its cause, and it is easy to see how this modification [Bestimmung] of our mind can represent something, that is, have an object. Thus the passive or sensuous representations have an understandable relationship to objects, and the principles that are derived from the nature of our soul have an understandable validity for all things insofar as those things are supposed to be objects of the senses. In the same way, if that in us which we call "representation" were active with regard to the object, that is, if the object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived as the archetypes of all things), the conformity of these representations to their objects could be understood. Thus the possibility of both an intellectus archetypi (on whose intuition the things themselves would be grounded) and an intellectus ectypi (which would derive the data for its logical procedure from the sensuous intuition of things) is at least intelligible. However, our understanding, through its representations, is not the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object [Gegenstand] the cause of the intellectual representations in the mind (in sensu reali). (Z 71)

The idea that we ourselves produce objects only through intellectual representations probably just seemed implausible to Kant, although it is also possible that he would think such a position to conflict with divine creationism. Another possibility that Kant considers is that God guarantees the conformability of intellectual representations to things in themselves, but he also rejects this view:

Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source of the pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles. Malebranche believed in a still-continuing perennial intuition of this primary being. Various moralists have accepted precisely this view with respect to basic moral laws. Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for the purpose of forming judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human soul just as they had to be in order to harmonize with things. Of these systems, one may call the former the influxum hyperphysicum and the latter the harmoniam praestabilitam intellectualem. But the deus ex machina is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the determination of the origin and validity of our knowledge. It has--besides its deceptive circle in the conclusion concerning our cognitions--also this additional disadvantage: it encourages all sorts of wild notions and every pious and speculative brainstorm. (Z 72-73; cf B167-8)

The circle Kant is talking about is probably the Cartesian circle. God himself would be an object of intellectual representation, so one couldn't use God to guarantee the validity of intellectual representation. Besides, such a hypothesis would not engender a constraint on claims to knowledge since for any representations, one could just as well claim one to be of divine origin as any other. I suppose that Kant could have avoided this problem by denying that we have intellectual representations at all, but Kant is inclined against this position and argues for his view as, we have seen, in the Transcendental Deduction.

Kant's ultimate answer to this problem is that concepts all by themselves cannot represent objects. They can only do so given that they have been used to synthesize representations of objects from passively received matter. On this theory Kant can avoid all of the problems of the theories he wants to reject. It is not true that concepts are merely the result of sensuous affection, and their

conformability to objects is not guaranteed by God. It is guaranteed by the fact that they are employed in the production of representations of objects, and since objects are the contents of representations, by the fact that they are employed in the production of objects themselves. Yet the intellectual representations do not by themselves produce objects, they merely form matter which is passively received from things as they are in themselves. Consequently the heretical conclusion that we create things in themselves is avoided, as is the sheer implausibility of the idea that we produce objects just by having intellectual representations.

The most important intuition at work here is one that Kant shares with the empiricist tradition, namely that human cognition is typically dependent for its content, its objects, on what is given to us by these objects, and that sensation is the paradigmatic medium for this relation. For the content of our cognitions of objects we are typically dependent on what we passively receive from those objects in sensation. This is, I think, the belief which lies at the root of Kant's anti-rationalist idea that intellectual cognition alone cannot represent objects all by itself.

In the letter to Herz Kant appeals to what can be thought of as external considerations, like the Cartesian circle and theological orthodoxy, against the idea that we can have genuine cognitions which are purely intellectual or conceptual. In the *Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection* Kant forwards an internal criticism against this theory. Here he argues that purely intellectual cognition cannot have the appropriate content to represent spatio-temporal, physical,

objects, all by itself (for the rest of this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, I will restrict the use the term 'object' to physical objects). The overall strategy of this argument is to indicate the implausibility of the idea that we have purely intellectual cognitions of objects by showing that the world picture which would result from such cognitions isn't anything like the one we think we in fact have. Kant argues that it is implausible to think that the system of objects which would be given by purely intellectual cognitions is our world of objects; he argues that the picture of the world of objects which results from this theory of concepts is not anything like the one we ordinarily think we are presented with in experience. What Kant takes to be Leibniz's theory of cognition must present us with Leibniz's system of monads. Kant believes that since the world of objects in space and time is nothing like the system of monads, Leibniz's theory of concepts must be mistaken. Since we have cognitions of the spatio-temporal world, and the intellect or the understanding is involved in these cognitions, concepts must work differently and in fact be different from the way they are in Leibniz's theory. One may doubt whether such a strategy will have any effect on Leibniz because he does admit that we have cognitions of objects in space and time. But as we shall see, Kant has something significant to say about this.

In the argument of the Amphiboly, Kant presents four ways in which the picture which results from Leibniz's theory of concepts is at odds with our picture of a world of spatio-temporal objects. He considers each of these four discrepancies three times in succession, once in the Amphiboly itself, and twice in the Note To The Amphiboly

of Concepts of Reflection. The four ways in which Leibniz's picture is strange are in respect of the notions of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, inner and outer, and the determinable and the determination or matter and form. These are ways in which the contents, i.e. the objects of representations, can be compared with one another (A262=B318), such that the comparison will reveal which faculty, understanding or sensibility or both, is involved in the representation of these objects. If the representation is ascribed to the wrong faculty or faculties, then the results of the four comparisons will be unintuitive. This type of comparison Kant calls transcendental reflection:

The act by which I confront the comparison of representations with the cognitive faculty to which it belongs, and by means of which I distinguish whether it is as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensible intuition that they are to be compared with each other, I call transcendental reflection. Now the relations in which concepts in a state of mind can stand to one another are those of identity and difference, of agreement and opposition, of the inner and the outer, and finally of the determinable and the determination (matter and form). The right determining of the relation depends on the answer to the question, in which faculty of knowledge they belong together subjectively--in the sensibility or in the understanding. For the difference between the faculties makes a great difference to the mode in which we have to think the relations. (A261=B317)

This reflection is transcendental because in this type of reflection one has stepped back to a point of view from which one can investigate the genesis of experience, how and to what extent it is produced by one's own cognitive faculties. But it is important to note that we cannot leave the empirical standpoint in this type of

reflection--our knowledge of how experience is produced by our cognitive faculties is not acquired by means of an intuition of this production. Rather, we can only intuit objects in space and time, and we make inferences about the nature of the relations between the self and its representations from the ways in which the spatio-temporal objects are identical and different, in agreement and opposition, etc. We are subject to the conditions on knowledge of the empirical standpoint--that all of our knowledge be based on the kinds of intuitions we in fact have. Transcendental knowledge can only be acquired while adhering to these conditions.

At this point I will discuss the four different ways of comparing the objects of our representations one by one. I realize that there are important questions that can be raised about what Kant is doing, but I will only consider them after presenting what Kant has to say. I will present the four ways, and I will consider the objection to the arguments that Kant anticipates from Leibniz and Kant's response to it. Subsequently, in the next section, I will try to assess Kant's claims, trying in particular to focus on the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representation.

(i) The first way of comparing objects of our representations is with respect to the notions of identity and difference. On Kant's view, according to Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, two things are identical whenever there is ultimately no conceptually discernible difference between them:

The principle of the identity of indiscernibles is really based on the presupposition, that if a certain distinction is not found in the concept of a

thing in general, it is also not to be found in the things themselves, and consequently that all things which are not distinguishable from one another in their concepts (in quality or quantity) are completely identical (numero eadem). (A281=B337)

Leibniz presents different motivations for adhering to this principle. One is that if two things differ, then there must be a reason for the difference, a reason which must be found in the things themselves. So if no difference can be found between what might be considered to be two things, then there could be no reason for the difference, and consequently there could be no difference at all (see "First Truths", L268). A motivation which would be more pertinent to the present discussion is that if cognitions (not only thoughts and judgments) of objects are purely intellectual or conceptual in nature and if it is possible for God to have complete cognitions of objects, or if it is in principle possible for us to have complete cognitions of objects, then there could not be a difference between objects which is not conceptually discernible. For otherwise God, or we, in principle, couldn't tell what the difference was. So from the principle that cognitions are purely conceptual and that it is in principle possible to have complete cognitions of objects, Leibniz's principle of the identity of the (conceptually) indiscernible follows. Because Kant thinks that from the falsity of Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles one can show that our cognitions of objects are not purely conceptual, I suspect that Kant thinks the principle is motivated in this way.

On Kant's own view this principle does not comport well with the nature of the spatio-temporal objects we experience. The reason is

that qualities of objects which we can grasp by means of concepts alone are for Kant inner or internal qualities, and differences between objects that can be grasped by means of concepts alone he calls inner or internal differences. One cannot give an example of what would really be an internal property of an object for Kant because he doesn't think that we have cognitions of any of them. But in presenting his argument regarding identity and difference Kant seems to grant Leibniz the point that the secondary and primary qualities intuitively within things (roughly qualitas et quantitas) are purely conceptually representable (A263=B319). The point Kant wants to make against Leibniz is that even if (what might be taken to be) two spatio-temporal objects of experience were identical with respect to the qualities within them, they might yet be numerically distinct. Kant presents this point as simply a fact about our experience; our experience is such that even if we couldn't come up with some purely conceptually discernible, completely describable difference between what might be taken to be two raindrops, they could still differ numerically. His explanation for why this is that they could yet be intuited at different points in space (or in time). Since the difference between the two raindrops wouldn't appear if all differences among objects had to be purely conceptually discernible, this spatio-temporal intuition has an ultimately nonconceptual aspect. Kant writes:

If an object is presented to us on several occasions but always with the same inner determinations (qualitas et quantitas), then if it be taken as object of pure understanding, it is always one and the same, only one thing (numera identitas), not many. But if

it is appearance, we are not concerned to compare concepts; even if there is no difference whatever as regards the concepts, difference of spatial position at one and the same time is still an adequate ground for the numerical difference of the object, that is, of the object of the senses. Thus in the case of two drops of water we can abstract altogether from all internal difference (of quality and quantity), and the mere fact that they have been intuited simultaneously in different spatial positions is sufficient justification for holding them to be numerically different. (A263-4=B319-20)

And again:

Certainly, if I know a drop of water in all its internal determinations as a thing in itself, and if the whole concept of any one drop is identical with that of every other, I cannot allow that any drop is different from any other. But if the drop is an appearance in space, it has its location not only in understanding (under concepts) but in sensible outer intuition (in space), and the physical locations are there quite indifferent to the inner determinations of the things. A location b can contain a thing which is completely similar and equal to another in a location a, just as easily as if the things were inwardly ever so different. Difference of locations, without any further conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects, as appearances, not only possible but also necessary. (A272=B328)

Things in themselves, as intelligible entities, would be cognized through concepts or intellectual representations alone if they were cognized at all. So if what might be taken to be two raindrops were things in themselves, then if there were no differences between them with respect to the properties within them they would really be identical. But it is just a fact about our experience that two raindrops could be qualitatively identical in this way and yet be numerically different. Consequently, our representations of raindrops are not purely conceptual. Kant makes the same point about the representation of a cubic foot of space:

The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and however often I think it, is in itself throughout one and the same. But two cubic feet are nevertheless distinguished in space by the mere difference of their locations (numero diversa); these locations are conditions of the intuition wherein the object of this concept is given; they do not, however, belong to the concept but entirely to sensibility. (A282=B338)

What Kant means to argue is possibly made clearer by this example.

One can experience two spatially distinct one cubic foot chunks of space as being numerically different. Yet it is impossible to come up with a difference between the one cubic foot chunks as regards the qualities within them. Consequently, there must be a nonconceptual aspect to our experience of them.

To Kant's argument one can reply that two raindrops or cubic feet of space that are identical with respect to the properties within them can be discerned as distinct in that one can be described, say, as two feet to the left of the other. Given that this is a describable difference it would also seem to be a conceptually discernible difference. But Kant would say to this that qualities like 'being two feet to the left of', as external, relational, qualities, qualities which are not intuitively internal to any genuinely single object, cannot be cognized by means of concepts alone, independently of intuitions. In fact, although Kant is allowing that what are actually external, relational qualities, but which seem to be within an object, are conceptually cognizable, he does not believe that even they really are. Given that we have intuitions of external qualities, we are able to form empirical concepts of them, but in isolation from intuition no ultimately external quality can be conceptually represented. So

Kant's claim about the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is dependent on the claim that only inner, internal, non-relational qualities are conceptually cognizable. Kant deals with this topic in the sections concerning the third way of comparing the objects of our representations in the Amphiboly, which turns out to be the way which is most significant.

An argument very similar to this one is contained within Kant's discussion of incongruent counterparts, an example of which is the right and left hands, which are, according to Kant, internally identical even though they are genuinely different. Kant discusses incongruent counterparts in several works, among them The Inaugural Dissertation and the Prolegomena. He does not discuss them in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant tries to make two different points with the use of incongruent counterparts, one against Leibniz's relational theory of space, and the other against the theory according to which all representations are ultimately intellectual. I want to consider only the latter.

In the Prolegomena Kant presents his argument in this way:

What can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear than their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the mirror in the place of its original; for if this is a right hand, that in the mirror is a left one, and the image or reflection of the right ear is a left one, which never can serve as a substitute for the other. There are in this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one (they are not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other. What is the solution? These

objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves, and as some pure understanding would cognize them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances, whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility. (Proleg. Ak IV, 286)

Again, in this passage there is an unclear point about what is inner or internal, which I will try to clear up later. Kant's argument here is similar to the raindrop and cubic foot arguments in that in experience there is a difference which wouldn't appear if our representations were all purely conceptual. Kant thinks that from the purely conceptual point of view the right and the left hands are identical, so on Leibniz's view there is no difference between a right and a left hand. Yet it is manifest in experience that a right and a left hand are different. A right hand cannot be superimposed upon a left hand; a right handed glove does not fit a left handed one. This argument differs from the raindrop and cubic foot argument in that whereas the latter is supposed to show that Leibniz would have to count certain particular spatio-temporal objects as identical even though they intuitively differ, the incongruent counterpart argument is supposed to show that Leibniz would have to regard certain kinds of spatio-temporal objects as identical even though they intuitively differ. If the argument from incongruent counterparts is sound, then Leibniz would be forced to hold that the kind 'left hand' is identical to the kind 'right hand'.

One can again reply to this that the relevant difference is conceptually discernible. There are many describable differences between a right and a left hand, for instance, when the palms of a

right and a left hand are facing you the thumb of the right hand is to the right of the fingers and the thumb of the left hand is to the left of the fingers. But again Kant would reply that qualities that are relational in that they are not internal to any genuinely single object, like 'being to the left of', cannot be cognized purely conceptually. So the point that Kant is making here about incongruent counterparts is also dependent on the claim which we will soon discuss, that by means of concepts alone we can have cognitions of internal but not of external qualities.

(ii) The second way of comparing objects of our representations is with respect to the notions of agreement and opposition. On Kant's view, according to Leibniz, there can be no genuine conflict among (and within) objects, there can be no cases of objects hindering each other's effects (or, presumably, an object hindering its own effects):

Agreement and Opposition--If reality is represented only by the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), no opposition can be conceived between the realities, i.e. no relation of such a kind that, when combined in the same subject, they cancel each other's consequences and take a form like $3 - 3 = 0$.
(A264=B320)

Kant is not completely clear in saying why he thinks that this follows from Leibniz's idea that all cognitions are purely conceptual, but some clues are given by the following sentences:

Similarly, there is no conflict in the concept of a thing unless a negative statement is combined with an affirmative; merely affirmative concepts cannot, when combined, produce any cancellation. (A282=B338)

...the principle that realities (as pure assertions) never logically conflict with each other is an

entirely true proposition as regards the relation of concepts, but has not the least meaning in regard either to nature or to anything in itself (of these we have no concept). (A272-3=B328-9)

From these sentences it is clear that Kant believes that on Leibniz's view any conflict among objects would have to be conceptual or logical in nature. I think that what is going on here is this: Kant thinks that if we had cognition of things in themselves we would have cognition of them by means of concepts alone. Again, this does not just mean that our thoughts and judgments about them would contain only concepts--Kant himself thinks that even this is true for appearances. It means that everything in our cognition of them would be intellectual or conceptual in nature. The crucial point may be this, and this could be what Kant has in mind: If there were something in cognition besides concepts, like an intuition in which the object was presented, then one could say that the truth or veridicality of the cognition consists (at least partly) in the concepts being valid of or representing the intuition. But if all cognition is ultimately purely conceptual, then no such model could hold and another picture of truth has to be found. The obvious candidate is the picture of purely conceptual or analytic truth, in which truth consists in concept containment. And indeed, Leibniz does think that all truth consists in concept containment. He says in his essay "First Truths" of c.1680-4:

First truths are those which predicate something of itself or deny the opposite of its opposite. For example. A is A, or A is not non-A; if it is true that A is B, it is false that A is not B or that A is non-B. Likewise, everything is what it is; everything is similar or equal to itself; nothing is greater or

less than itself. These and other truths of this kind, though they may have various degrees of priority, can nevertheless all be grouped under the one name of identities. All other truths are reduced to first truths with the aid of definitions or by the analysis of concepts; in this consists proof a priori, which is independent of experience. (L267)

Leibniz may be motivated by other reasons to accept the concept containment theory of truth. For instance, it is sometimes said that he may be motivated by the Principle of Sufficient Reason; if a proposition is true in virtue of concept containment then there would seem to be a sufficient reason in virtue of which it is true. But Kant is apparently assuming that the motivation that it naturally follows from the the thesis that all of our cognitions are purely conceptual is the deeper motivation. On Kant's view the central feature of Leibniz's system is his "intellectualism", which Kant takes to include the denigration of any mode of cognition other than the conceptual, which would thus include the denigration of Kantian sensation and Kantian intuition. This Kantian analysis of Leibniz's motivation may be supported by the fact that Leibniz says that he would not know what truth is other than concept containment:

You have insisted on the difficulty there would be in saying that if I do not take the journey which I should take, I am no longer myself, and I have explained the sense in which this can be said or not. Finally, I have always given a decisive reason, which I believe has the force of a demonstration. It is that always, in every true affirmative proposition, whether necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the notion of the predicate is in some way included in that of the subject. Praedicatum inest subjecto; otherwise I do not know what truth is. (to Arnauld, July 14, 1686; L337)

If the theory of truth is supposed to follow from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, then it seems that Leibniz would not say something like this. But it does not seem unlikely if he is assuming that not only our thoughts but even our cognitions are ultimately purely conceptual, since one can construe this as leading naturally to the concept containment theory of truth. Besides, there are places where Leibniz derives the Principle of Sufficient Reason from the theory of truth ("First Truths", L268). Russell and Couturat assumed that the most basic element in Leibniz's system is the theory of truth; this has since been criticized on the grounds that it seems unlikely that Leibniz's basic insights for his whole system are logical. On what I am taking to be Kant's view the theory of truth has a certain central role to play in the system as a whole, but I do not think that it is just a logical insight. Rather, the theory of truth is a natural companion of the thesis that all of our cognitions are ultimately purely conceptual.

In "First Truths" Leibniz goes on to say that many of the important features of his metaphysical system follow from the idea that the truth of any cognition consists in concept containment. Among these features are the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and more pertinent to the issue at hand, the principle that there are ultimately no extrinsic denominations--that there are no ultimately relational properties. This latter principle follows from the thesis that all truth in cognition consists in concept containment because "The concept of the denominated subject necessarily involves the concept of the predicate"

(L268). In other words, if the truth of any cognition consists at bottom in nothing but concept containment, then anything about which a given cognition is true has to actually contain the predicate or more accurately, the quality corresponding to the predicate, within it and wholly within it.

Leibniz also concludes that the "complete or perfect concept of an individual substance involves all its predicates, past present and future" (L268). A cognition involving a future predicate of an object is now true of that object, and a cognition involving a past predicate of an object is now true of that object. So now all of the past and future and of course the present predicates are contained within the concept of the thing, and the qualities which correspond to these predicates are now contained within the thing itself. But from this it can be shown that "no created substance exerts a metaphysical action or influence upon another." Leibniz thinks that this follows because since all of a thing's predicates are contained within its concept, anything that happens to it is already present in its own concept. Consequently it can be said that anything that happens to a thing follows from its own concept and is independent of anything else. Leibniz also thinks that the idea of one (created) substance causing an effect in another is imperspicuous and ununderstandable, but the conclusion of this reasoning, that ultimately no one (created) substance can exert any metaphysical action or influence upon another, is supposed to follow independently of this assumption.

One should note that here Leibniz is identifying metaphysical action or influence with a logical relation, namely necessary

connection. In one way this is typical of the modern period; in this period philosophers are looking for a perspicuous model for real influence or causation and settle on the idea of necessary connection. Yet one might expect Leibniz to honor a distinction between the necessary connection between a cause and an effect and the necessary connection between a concept or proposition and what is entailed by it. Since relations between individual concepts and what follow from them conform to the latter and not to the former model, one might wonder why Leibniz thinks he can conclude that all metaphysical influence is within created substances. The reason seems to be that Leibniz thinks that substances are ontological correlates of concepts, alike in structure, and that relations within and per impossible among substances are analogous to the logical relations among concepts. Possibly this conclusion is dictated by the thesis that all cognition is purely conceptual and the thesis that there are minds which can or could cognize things as they are in themselves completely. For complete cognition of these things in themselves is possible by means of concepts alone, and if a cognition is veridical if it conforms or corresponds to a thing, then the thing might have to have a structure which is analogous to the structure of concepts in the mind.

There is a way in which things might conflict or a thing might conflict with itself which is left open by Leibniz's theory, and that is logical contradiction. As Kant puts it in the quotations above, on Leibniz's view "there is no conflict in the concept of a thing unless a negative statement is combined with an affirmative." But since "the principle that realities...never logically conflict with each another

is an entirely true proposition as regards the relations of concepts...", there can be no logical conflicts within or among substances. Consequently, there can be no conflicts within or among substances at all.

There is, however, a significant problem in all of this as an interpretation of Kant's reasons for thinking that on the Leibnizian view that all cognitions are purely conceptual, there can be no genuine conflict among the spatio-temporal objects of experience. The link in my account which Kant does not mention is the concept containment theory of truth, and Kant could not have read 'First Truths', the Arnauld correspondence, nor any work of Leibniz's in which this theory of truth is clearly presented, because none of them had been published when Kant wrote the Critique. But Wolff, Leibniz's most significant disciple, held the concept containment theory of truth, and Kant had access to the writings in which this theory appears. In his Logica, Wolff defines truth as "the determinability of the predicate by the notion of the subject" (§513), and he also says that

...he understands the truth of a proposition who perceives how the predicate is determined through those things which are contained in the notion of the subject. (Logica §516)

It is evident that Kant was acquainted with Wolff's thought and regarded him as someone who transmitted Leibnizian thought. Kant, therefore, may easily have come to know what Leibniz's theory of truth was through an acquaintance with Wolff's Logica. Moreover, Leibnizian philosophy was so prevalent in the Germany of Kant's time that this

theory may well have been in the air in much the same way as Frege's theory of Sinn is in the air in contemporary Anglo-American philosophical circles.

On this reconstruction, then, Kant's view is that Leibniz thinks it to follow from the fact that all of our cognitions are ultimately conceptual that all truth of cognition consists in concept containment, and that it follows from this that there is no real metaphysical action or influence of one substance upon another. And since logical conflict among or within substances is impossible, any conflict with or among substances is impossible. Kant apparently believes these inferences to be valid. But, he says, our experience presents us with genuine conflicts among substances; we know that objects of experience can cancel each other's effects. Consequently, one must reject the premise that ultimately all of our cognitions are purely conceptual in nature.

On the other hand, the real in appearances (realitas phaenomenon) may certainly allow of opposition. When such realities are combined in the same subject, one may wholly or partially destroy the consequences of another, as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line, in so far as they either attract or impel a point in opposite directions, or again in the case of a pleasure counterbalancing pain.
(A265=B320-1)

For real conflict certainly does take place; there are cases where $A - B = 0$, that is, where two realities combined in one subject cancel one another's effects. This is brought before our eyes incessantly by all the hindering and counteracting processes in nature, which, as depending on forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General mechanics can indeed give the empirical condition of this conflict in an a priori rule, since it takes account of the opposition in the direction of forces, a condition totally ignored by the transcendental concept of reality.

Although Herr von Leibniz did not indeed announce the above proposition with all the pomp of a new principle, he yet made use of it for new assertions, and his successors expressly incorporated it into their Leibnizian-Wolffian system. (A273=B329)

Kant thinks that when two spatio-temporal objects of experience, like two billiard balls, collide, then the one has real causal influence on the other. Merely temporal things like pleasure and pain can also have genuine effects on each other. Kant thinks that shows that at least certain kinds of objects (appearances) can conflict with one another and that therefore Leibniz must be wrong about all of our cognitions of objects ultimately being purely conceptual.

To this one can make a response similar to those made to the other arguments; it would seem that one can indeed conceptually apprehend real conflicts among objects of experience. This is just what Kant himself is doing in describing such conflicts. But Kant would again reply that we have such cognitions only in virtue of the fact that we have empirical intuitions of external qualities. We could never purely conceptually cognize any quality that was not internal to some genuinely single object; we could never purely conceptualize an effect one object is having on another. So again the discussion hinges on what Kant has to say about the relation between purely conceptual cognition and internal qualities on the one hand, and external qualities on the other. We have already touched on this issue since it is involved in the derivation of the "no metaphysical influence" from the "cognitions are purely conceptual" thesis. But now we will discuss it in detail.

(iii) Kant's third pair of notions with respect to which objects of our representations can be compared is the inner and the outer. What is at issue here is whether these objects can have ultimately extrinsic or only ultimately intrinsic denominations. That is to say, what is at issue is whether objects of our representations can have ultimately external, outer, or relational qualities or only internal, inner, or non-relational qualities. An intrinsic denomination or an internal or an ultimately non-relational quality is, intuitively, a quality that makes an internal difference to something which possesses it. The paradigm example of an internal property is a thought; a thought had by a soul makes an internal difference to the soul. Extrinsic denominations or external or ultimately relational qualities are those which are not intrinsic denominations; they are qualities which are not such that they make an internal difference to something which has them. In the following passages Leibniz explicates this distinction:

[Sturm] rejects as wrongly ascribed to him by his opponent the opinion that God moves things as a woodchopper moves his ax or a miller controls his mill by shutting off the water or turning it into the wheel. But this explanation does not seem to me to do justice to the truth. For I ask whether this volition or command, or if you prefer, this divine law once established, has bestowed upon things only an extrinsic denomination or whether it has truly conferred upon them some created impression which endures within them, or as Mr. Schelhammer, who is as distinguished in judgment as in experience, very well puts it, an internal law from which their actions and passions follow, even if this law is mostly not understood by the creatures in which it inheres. The former view seems to be that of the authors of the system of occasional causes, especially of the ingenious Mr. Malebranche; the latter is the accepted view, and I believe the truest. (On Nature Itself 5, L500.)

It follows further that there are no purely extrinsic denominations which have no basis at all in the denominated thing itself. For the concept of the denominated subject necessarily involves the concept of the predicate. Likewise, whenever the denomination of a thing is changed, some variation has to occur in the thing itself. ("First Truths" L268.)

Besides providing a characterization of intrinsic and extrinsic denominations these passages also indicate that Leibniz is opposed to the idea that there really are extrinsic denominations. The type of purportedly extrinsic denomination or external quality that is most important to Kant's discussions are the primary qualities out of which Cartesian matter is constituted: extension, duration, direction, shape, size, and motion. As we will see more clearly soon, Leibniz thinks that on Descartes's view all of these qualities are external or are constructed out of external qualities. Extension, as Leibniz puts it, "can be resolved into plurality, continuity, and coexistence of parts at one and the same time." (De Volder correspondence, L516, 519). On the Cartesian view, the fact that one part of extension is continuous with or separated from another makes no internal difference to either part. Size and shape, as constituting the extension of a spatial object, also consist in such relations among parts, and thus are also external qualities, or rather, are constructed out of external qualities. Duration, as Leibniz says, is to time as extension is to space (Conversation of Philarete and Ariste, L621-22). On the Cartesian view, whether one temporal part is continuous or separated from another makes no internal difference to the temporal parts. Spatial and temporal location are external in that they presuppose other things or a frame of reference in relation to which

they have a location. Motion is an external quality because the motion of one thing is always motion relative to some other thing, thus whether something is moving would seem to make no internal difference to it (e.g. Specimen Dynamicum L445). Whether motion is relative or absolute makes no difference as to whether it is external in this sense; even if it is absolute, the motion of something is motion relative to absolute space, thus whether something is moving would seem to make no internal difference to it.

On Kant's view of Leibniz, his thesis that there are ultimately no external qualities follows, again, from the thesis that our cognitions of objects or substances are ultimately purely conceptual. He writes:

According to mere concepts the inner is the substratum of all relational or outer determinations. If, therefore, I abstract from all conditions of intuition and confine myself to the concept of a thing in general, I can abstract from all outer relation, and there must still be left a concept of something which signifies no relation, but inner determinations only. From this it seems to follow that in whatever is a thing (substance) there is something which is absolutely inward and precedes all outer determinations, inasmuch as it is what first makes them possible; and consequently, that this substratum, as no longer containing in itself any outer relations, is simple. (A283=B339, cf. A265=B321, A274=B330)

If cognition were purely conceptual, one would have to think of the objects of cognition, substances, as containing something inward and non-relational which is the foundation of all of its (apparently) relational qualities. On Leibniz's view these substances, the monads, ultimately contain no relational qualities like shape and extension,

and because they contain only non-relational qualities they are simple substances with perceptual states.

Leibniz's view can be seen as developing in two steps. First, he opposes what he thinks to be the Cartesian theory that primary qualities are external in the strong sense that they do not genuinely have a subject at all, that, for instance, there is nothing in body prior to extension. In the Conversation of Philarete and Ariste he says this against what he thinks to be Malebranche's Cartesian view:

So I merely insist on my earlier remark--that extension is nothing but an abstraction and demands something which is extended. It needs a subject; it is something relative to this subject, like duration. In this subject it even presupposes something prior to it. It implies some quality, some attribute, some nature in the subject which is extended, which is expanded with the subject, which is continued. Extension is the diffusion of that quality or nature. For example, there is in milk an extension or diffusion of whiteness, in the diamond an extension or diffusion of hardness, in body in general an extension or diffusion ofantityp or of materiality. You will thus see at once that there is something in body prior to extension. (L621)

It's not completely clear that Descartes's actual view is the one which Leibniz attributes to him, but it may be. This view is that body consists just in extension, a view which is suggested by Cartesian statements like the following:

A space, or intrinsic place, does not differ in actuality from the body that occupies it; the difference lies simply in our ordinary ways of thinking. In reality the extension in length, breadth, and depth that constitutes the space is absolutely the same as that which constitutes the body. (Principles II X, AG 202, cf. Principles XI-XV).

Leibniz's view is that extension is a quality that must belong to something; it can't just exist all by itself. What is extended on his view is force. Leibniz writes to De Volder:

...I do not think that substance is constituted by extension alone, since the concept of extension is incomplete. Nor do I think that extension can be conceived in itself, but I consider it an analyzable and relative concept, for it can be resolved into plurality, continuity, and coexistence or the existence of parts at one and the same time. Plurality is also contained in number, and continuity also in time and motion; coexistence really applies to extension only. But it would appear from this that something must always be assumed which is continuous or diffused, such as the white in milk, the color, ductility, and weight in gold, and resistance in matter. For by itself, continuity (for extension is nothing but simultaneous continuity) no more constitutes substance than does multitude or number, where something is necessary to be numbered, repeated, and continued. So I believe that our thinking is completed and ended in the concept of force rather than in that of extension. (L516, cf. Specimen Dynamicum L435).

Leibniz continues this passage by saying "And we need seek no other concept of power or force than that it is the attribute from which change arises, and whose subject is substance itself." Force ultimately is possessed by monads themselves.

Leibniz's second step is to say that there are ultimately no extrinsic denominations, that consequently the primary qualities not only do not exist outside of some subject, but what underlies them in reality is completely internal. Why does Leibniz take this second step? As we've already seen (pp. 23-27), the thesis that all truth for cognitions consists in concept containment may follow from the notion that all of our cognitions are purely conceptual. Furthermore, Leibniz argues in "First Truths" that the thesis that there can be no

ultimately extrinsic denominations follows from truth in cognition consisting in concept containment. Just as all predicates true of a substance must be contained within the concept of the substance, so all of the qualities denoted by the predicate, whether internal or apparently external, must ultimately be contained within the substance itself.

Leibniz is now in need of some model of a thing whose qualities are ultimately inner or non-relational. The model Leibniz chooses is that of a soul, which is, among other things, simple; he consequently thinks of all substances on the model of these simple souls. Leibniz often talks as if substantial forms are his model for monads, but it is also clear that Leibniz thinks of the soul as the paradigm case of a substantial form (DM 12, L309-10; New System, esp. 3, 4, 11, L454-7). Kant offers the following diagnosis of Leibniz's choice:

As object of pure understanding, on the other hand, every substance must have inner determinations and powers which pertain to its inner reality. But what inner accidents can I entertain in thought, save only those which my inner sense presents to me? They must be something which is either itself a thinking or analogous to thinking. For this reason Leibniz, regarding substances as noumena, took away from them, by the manner in which he conceived them, whatever might signify outer relation, including also, therefore, composition, and so made them all, even the constituents of matter, simple subjects with powers of representation--in a word, MONADS. (A265-6=B321-2, cf. A274=B330, A283-4=B339-40)

Kant thinks that for Leibniz the only absolutely inner qualities of which we can have cognitions are our own representations. Leibniz gives his substances properties typical to souls, like perceptions and simplicity, because souls are the only objects of which we have cognitions that have only inner qualities. Another possible reason for

Leibniz thinking of all substances on the model of souls has to do with his rationalist belief that objects of unconfused intellectual cognition are ultimately real. Souls, on his view, are metaphysically real things with which we have a clear acquaintance. With regard to other created things it is difficult to get beyond the phenomena. God might be a candidate for a metaphysically real thing with which we are acquainted; Leibniz says that "God is the only immediate object of our perceptions which exists outside of us" (DM 28, L321). But since God is also a mind with perceptions he would provide the same model for a thing in itself as the soul does.

Kant agrees with Leibniz that if concepts alone provided cognitions of objects, then these objects could not possess ultimately external qualities without anything non-relational to serve as the foundation for the relations:

Through mere concepts I cannot, indeed, think what is outer without thinking something that is inner, and this for the sufficient reason that concepts of relation presuppose things which are absolutely given, and without these are impossible. (A284=B340)

I suggest that the connection Kant thinks there is between purely conceptual cognition and the completely inner nature of the objects of these cognitions is the connection we found in Leibniz's philosophy itself.

At this point Kant's own view of what cognitions of bodies are like enters into the argument. First of all, Kant thinks that it is simply clear that bodies, or matter, consists in nothing but external qualities not inhering in any Leibnizian substance and not founded in anything internal. He writes:

All that we know in matter is merely relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward only in a comparative sense), but among these relations some are self-subsistent and permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object. (A285=B341)

There is a problem here, however. Kant, as does Leibniz, thinks that force is what is extended in matter. Kant's view, as we have seen in chapter 1, is presented in the Metaphysical Foundations of Nature. One might have suspected that for him force is ultimately internal, as it is for Leibniz (e.g. Specimen Dynamicum, L445). But this is not the case. Kant says:

In an object of the pure understanding that only is inward which has no relation whatsoever (so far as its existence is concerned) to anything different from itself. It is quite otherwise with a substantia phaenomenon in space; its inner determinations are nothing but relations, and it itself is made up entirely of relations. We are acquainted with substances in space only through forces which are active in this and that space, either bringing objects to it (attraction), or preventing them penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability). (A265=B321)

All qualities in matter, substantia phaenomenon, are relational or external, even its apparently internal properties are external. But Kant mentions force as something in matter, so force must, contra Leibniz, also be an ultimately external quality. He seems to be thinking of force as something which does not ultimately inhere in a thing in itself. Kant holds the view that if we abstract from intuition and think of concepts alone as representing things, we would have to think of those things as having an absolutely inner nature. But without abstracting from intuition the objects of our cognition contain no absolutely inner qualities at all and consist just in

relations. The fact that this view may seem strange can partially be explained by the fact that matter and bodies are only appearance:

It is certainly startling to hear that a thing is to be taken as consisting wholly of relations. Such a thing is, however, mere appearance, and cannot be thought through pure categories; what it itself consists in is the mere relation of something in general to the senses. (A285=B341)

Kant evidently thinks that the view that matter consists only of external qualities is the scientific one, and I suspect that he also thinks that it is the ordinary view. The conclusion to this argument is that since Leibniz's view conflicts with this ordinary and scientific one, the thesis from which it is engendered, that all of our cognitions are purely conceptual, must be rejected.

Yet there is a pull to supposing that there must be relations to fill in the relations or for the relations to have a foundation; it seems that on Kant's view physical objects would be mere airy nothings. But Kant diagnoses even this complaint as a vestige of intellectualism. He says:

The absolutely inward [nature] of matter, as it would have to be conceived by pure understanding, is nothing but a phantom; for matter is not among the objects of pure understanding, and the transcendental object which may be the ground of this appearance that we call matter is a mere something of which we should not understand what it is, even if someone were in a position to tell us. For we can understand only that which brings with it, in intuition, something corresponding to our words. If by the complaints--that we have no insight whatsoever into the inner [nature] of things--it be meant that we cannot conceive by pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are entirely illegitimate and unreasonable. For what is demanded is that we should be able to know things, and therefore to intuit them, without senses, and therefore that we should have a faculty of knowledge altogether different from the

human, and this not only in degree but as regards intuition likewise in kind--in other words, that we should be not men but beings of whom we are unable to say whether they are even possible, much less how they are constituted. (A277-8=B333-4)

Kant maintains the position that experience presents us with bodies which consist of relations and with apparently inner qualities that are reducible to relations. He thinks that to want matter to be more than this is to succumb to rationalist pressures, ultimately to succumb to the pressure to want all cognitions to be purely intellectual or conceptual, rather than partly sensual. This is to want to be more than human, possibly to be like God, or at least to be like some superbeing.

Kant also provides an interesting analysis of this human limitation. The following passage immediately succeeds the one above:

Through observation and analysis of appearances we penetrate to nature's inner recesses, and no one can say how far this knowledge may in time extend. But with all this knowledge, and even if the whole of nature were revealed to us, we should still never be able to answer those transcendental questions which go beyond nature. The reason of this is that it is not given to us to observe our own mind with any other intuition than that of inner sense; and that it is yet precisely in the mind that the secret of the source of our sensibility is located. The relation of sensibility to an object and what the transcendental ground of this [objective] unity may be, are matters undoubtedly so deeply concealed that we, who after all know even ourselves only through inner sense and therefore as appearance, can never be justified in treating sensibility as being a suitable instrument of investigation for discovering anything save always still other appearances--eager as we yet are to explore their non-sensible cause. (A278=B334)

What is the mechanism of their production that explains why bodies consist in relations without relata? We can't answer transcendental

questions like this because we don't have intuitions of the self as it is in itself. We may have some transcendental knowledge of the self as it is in itself, but to know exactly what the mechanism of the production of our intuitions is, we would need to know more. We would have to have immediate cognitions of the self as it is in itself; for even if all of nature were revealed to us, we couldn't infer enough about this self to answer transcendental questions like those above.

Kant's argument might have been stronger had he not insisted that spatio-temporal objects of experience ultimately consist in nothing but relations, but just that they have some irreducibly relational qualities. Berkeley, for instance, since he thinks that secondary qualities are irreducibly non-relational, could then concur with Kant. This new argument would have had just as much effect against Leibniz, since he agrees that the thesis that ultimately all of a substance's qualities are non-relational or inner follows from cognitions of objects being at ultimately purely conceptual. Yet many philosophers in that time (and today) exclude primitive secondary qualities from the physical world, so Kant probably saw no need to argue on the basis of a premise that makes a less spectacular claim.

(iv) The fourth pair of concepts of reflection Kant identifies as determination and the determinable or as form and matter. His discussion of this pair is really not very different from that of the inner and the outer. Kant himself is apparently aware of this; in the last set of presentations of the arguments the discussion of the inner and the outer is run together with that on matter and form (A283-6=

B339-42). The basic idea in the discussion on matter and form is that if our cognitions were purely conceptual then something determinable, i.e. matter in the logical sense, would be given logically prior to its having determinations, prior to its having form. The way in which Kant applies this to Leibniz's philosophy is by pointing out that for Leibniz (absolutely) given, by implication purely inner, things in themselves have to precede outer spatial and temporal relations:

...in the concept of the pure understanding matter is prior to form; and for this reason Leibniz first assumed things (monads), and within them a power of representation, in order afterwards to found on this their outer relation and the community of their states (i.e. of the representations). (A267=B323)

The reason Kant gives for Leibniz thinking this is almost identical for the reason he gave for the inner being the foundation of the outer. In arguing, in the "the inner and the outer" section, that if cognitions are purely conceptual then the inner is the foundation of the outer Kant said:

Through mere concepts I cannot, indeed, think what is outer without thinking something that is inner; and this for the sufficient reason that concepts of relation presuppose things which are absolutely given. (A284=B340)

Now he argues that if cognitions are purely conceptual, then

The understanding, in order that it may be in a position to determine anything in a definite fashion, demands that something first be given, at least in concept. (A267=B323, cf. A285=B342)

If cognitions are purely conceptual, then something genuinely substantial, with purely inner determinations, has to be the foundation of outer relations or spatio-temporal form. Why Kant thinks there is this connection is not completely evident from the text. One might

hold that he thinks it is obviously there, but again, it would seem as if Kant would have to show why the doctrine that something absolutely given has to logically precede its relational properties follows from cognitions being purely conceptual. And again, one might suspect that a story like that gleaned from "First Truths" is on Kant's mind here. If cognitions are purely conceptual, then there are ultimately no outer or relational qualities in what is represented, so all apparently outer or relational qualities in these things would have to be reduced to or founded upon inner or non-relational qualities.

The next step in the argument as Kant presents it is not clearly effective against Leibniz given that it rests on the doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic, as Parkinson points out.⁵ Kant writes:

Space and time--the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations among themselves--were thus, on this view, possible as grounds and consequents. This, in fact, is how it would necessarily be, if the pure understanding could be directed immediately to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things-inthemselves. But if they are only sensible intuitions, in which we determine all objects merely as appearances, then the form of intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) is prior to all matter (sensations); space and time come before all appearances and before all data of experience, and are indeed what make the latter at all possible.
(A267=B323; cf A285=B341-2)

The argument of this passage proceeds as follows: On Leibniz's view, space and time, as forms, are made possible in the way that grounds make consequents possible; they are the consequents of monads, which are the grounds or foundations which constitute the matter relative to space and time. This, according to Kant, follows if cognitions of objects are purely conceptual or intellectual. But if the doctrine of

the Transcendental Aesthetic is correct, then in appearances form, namely space and time, precedes any matter, and in particular it precedes what is in this case the relevant matter, namely sensation. So Leibniz is wrong in thinking that all of our cognitions of objects are purely conceptual.

This argument is of course as effective against Leibniz as the other three are if the argument of the Transcendental Aesthetic is sound. But given that the Aesthetic is involved and controversial, one might have hoped for an argument independent of the Aesthetic. Kant could have argued in roughly the same way as he did for the inner and the outer; he might have said that experience presents us with nothing inner or substantial in Leibniz's sense, no matter, but that it presents us only with what are ultimately mere relations, form. Possibly, given that he has just given this argument, he is tacitly presupposing it in these considerations on the topic of matter and form.

* * * * *

Kant says that the concepts of matter and form "underlie all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with all employment of the understanding" (A266=B322). Indeed, considerations regarding the status of the forms of space and time are central to the other three arguments in the Amphiboly. The fact that Kant differs from Leibniz in that he thinks that a merely spatio-temporal difference is enough to make a real difference is manifest in the fact that he rejects Leibniz's principle of the the identity of the conceptually indiscernible, in that he regards apparent opposition among

spatio-temporal objects as genuine, and in that he thinks that the spatio-temporal character of objects of experience is primitive and need not be founded on ultimately inner characteristics of substances. So the arguments associated with each of the other three pairs of concepts of reflection rest on some aspect of the spatio-temporal character of the objects presented in experience. At this point we can make it clear why Kant has not yet won a victory over Leibniz. The trouble with the arguments of the Amphiboly is that Leibniz would admit that the spatio-temporal character of the objects presented in experience is at least roughly what Kant says it is. He would say that this is so because what we are presented in experience is phenomena or appearance, and not things as they are in themselves. Despite Leibniz's pleasure at M. d'Alvanslebe not being able to find two identical leaves in the garden at Hanover, he could allow that there might not be humanly discernible differences between two objects of appearance,⁶ that objects of appearance have physical but not metaphysical influence on each other (as he says they do (e.g. L269)) and, most fundamentally, that in objects of appearance there are genuinely outer relations, even though they do not exist in the monads which appear. But Kant anticipates this reply, and the deeper disagreement he has with Leibniz in the Amphiboly is evident from the way in which he formulates it:

That which space and time seem to possess as proper to themselves, in independence of things, he ascribed to the confusion in their concepts, which has led us to regard what is a mere form of dynamical relations as being a special intuition, self-subsistent and antecedent to the things themselves. Thus space and time were for him the intelligible form of the connection

of things (substances and their states) in themselves; and the things were intelligible substances (substantiae noumena). And since he allowed sensibility no mode of intuition peculiar to itself but sought for all representation of objects, even the empirical, in the understanding, and left to the senses nothing but the despicable task of confusing and distorting the representations of the former, he had no option save to treat the [intellectualised] concepts as being likewise valid of appearances. (A275-6=B331-2)

As I indicated in chapter 3, Kant thinks that Leibniz holds that spatial and temporal objects are intentional objects of confused intellectual representations, representations of things in themselves. Consequently what I've called the resolution thesis holds for our representations of spatial and temporal objects, that if only these representations would become more distinct they would resolve into representations of things in themselves. Kant wants to reject this. I suggested that Kant's deepest motivation for rejecting the resolution thesis is his intuition (or desire) that the objects of experience and of science have an integrity of their own, a status higher than that of mere intentional objects of confused representations. I also tried to show that Kant's best argument for rejecting the resolution thesis is that it is hard to see how spatial and temporal objects can be appearances of aspatial and atemporal monads unless something like Kantian forms of intuition are part of the account of their genesis. Leibniz, as far as I can see, has no genetic explanation of how the aspatial and atemporal can appear as spatial and temporal. Kant explains this possibility by means of the forms of intuition, and these are precisely what give spatial and

temporal objects an integrity of their own, what account for the fact that the resolution thesis does not hold for them.

So the overall dialectic of the Amphiboly has the following structure: Kant presents four consequences of the thesis that all of our cognitions of objects are purely conceptual. In the first three cases, he argues against the truth of the consequences on the basis of the nature of the objects of experience, and in the last one he argues on the basis of doctrines of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant concludes that all of our representations of objects are not purely conceptual; in fact he concludes that no representations of spatial and temporal objects are purely conceptual. Kant anticipates that Leibniz will reply that the objects of experience are intentional objects of confused conceptual representations, representations of things in themselves. Kant replies to this by saying that it is intuitively plausible that spatial and temporal objects have a greater integrity than this, and further, that Leibniz cannot provide a genetic account of representations of spatial and temporal objects, which is a telling point.

There are two problems with Kant's Amphiboly argument that need to be considered. First, one might ask why Kant doesn't simply attempt to refute the confused concept theory and excise the discussion of the four pairs of concepts of reflection from the Amphiboly? I think that the answer to this is that Kant believes the four arguments regarding the concepts of reflection do a great deal of damage to the Leibnizian position, and that the "confused concept" reply is just a weak comeback. That Kant thinks it to be weak is

manifested by his disdainful treatment of it in the Amphiboly. This judgment of weakness is probably shared by anyone who thinks that spatial and temporal objects possess more integrity than mere intentional objects of confused representations of monads do. Even though one may not think that Kant himself captures the widespread intuition that there is a strong sense in which objects of typical intuitions are real, this is his motivation in rejecting Leibniz's theory in the Amphiboly.

Secondly, it is clear that one of the central steps, if not the central step, of Kant's argument in the Amphiboly is the inference from purely conceptual cognition to the completely inner nature of the objects of these cognitions. Even though a case can be made for Leibniz's endorsing this inference, one should wonder whether it is a good one. For if Leibniz is wrong, then Kant's argument will not work. In a way the inference is difficult to assess since it is not easy to grasp the nature of a purely conceptual cognition and of a substance that is purely inner, let alone what the relationships between them would be. But one might try to see the matter historically. A hallmark of rationalism is the denigration of sensation and an exaltation of intellection as kinds of veridical representation. In Plato, for instance, the Forms, the ultimately real things, are objects of the intellect whereas a mixture of sensation keeps one from being able to contemplate them. One of Descartes's projects is to find a notion of body which is perspicuous to reason and on his view that which is paradigmatically perspicuous to reason is mathematics. Consequently, he eliminates from body any

thing (e.g. prime matter) and any quality (e.g. colour and smell) which is not straightforwardly mathematical in nature; all of the Cartesian qualities of body are straightforwardly geometrically representable and mathematically tractable. But Leibniz is not satisfied with the idea that these mathematical properties are perspicuously apprehended by reason or the intellect alone. One thing that may have bothered Leibniz is the fact that the previous model of purely rational cognition seems to model reason on sensation. Platonic cognition of forms doesn't seem to be unlike sensation in nature. There is also a problem is also for Descartes, who wants to say that there is a sense in which spatial properties like shapes and sizes can be apprehended by the intellect alone. To make the case that there is no sensation involved in such cognition would seem to be quite difficult, especially in the face of a Lockean account according to which sensation is involved, against which it seems difficult to make telling points.

As a result Leibniz needs a different notion of purely rational or intellectual cognition. What he does is he makes the objects of purely intellectual cognition conform as exactly as possible to the nature of such cognitions. The only available model for the truth of apparently intellectual cognition is that of concept containment; a purely intellectual cognition is true if its subject concept contains its predicate concept. Therefore their objects, the ultimately real objects, contain all of their characteristics in a way which is similar to the way in which subject concepts contain predicate concepts. For Leibniz the best model for this is that of a mind

containing its thoughts, thus for him the ultimately real objects are simple monads containing perceptions.

Consequently, if Kant can show that there is something wrong with this picture of what the objects of our cognitions are like, he will have shown that there is something wrong with possibly the best model to date of purely intellectual cognition (its rivals may be models on which sets or possible worlds are the objects of the purely intellectual cognitions). The problem Kant points out is not that this is a poor model of purely intellectual cognition, but that the objects of our experience are implausibly the objects of such purely intellectual cognition. So he concludes that Leibniz is wrong about the nature of our cognition. One might object that there is a better model of purely intellectual cognition than Leibniz's, but this is not clearly the case. It might be argued that one should have to produce a better model if one were to refute Kant on this issue.

3. A new notion of concept and the nonconceptual in cognition.

Upon rejecting the idea that concepts alone constitute cognitions of objects, Kant had to find a new notion of concept, a notion of concept which differs from Leibniz's in that a concept or a group of concepts does not represent an object in isolation from some non-intellectual type of representation. Kant, to my knowledge, never represents himself as having to find or as actually finding a new notion of concept. All he actually says is that his theory is unique in the modern period because for it concepts alone cannot constitute cognitions, but sensibility is required as well (A270-1=B326-7). But

Kant had to find and did find a new notion of concept which fits this picture, a notion of concept such that concepts together with non-intellectual stuff, stuff passively received from outside of oneself, constitute cognitions. The form/matter model is the one that the history of philosophy provides for two distinct elements constituting a single thing, and is the one that Kant hits upon; concepts become the form and the passively received stuff the matter. Thus the Amphiboly is not only the story of how Kant came to reject the theory that cognitions of objects are purely conceptual, but also the story of the genesis of Kant's notion of concept.

From Kant's point of view, however, there is a significant continuity between the Leibnizian notion of concept and his new notion. This is evident from the fact that there is no indication that Kant thinks that there is much of a difference, if any, between saying that Leibnizian concepts alone cannot constitute cognitions of objects and that his own type of concept cannot. One might take this to be Kant's confusion or oversight, but this is not correct. Even though there are differences between the two notions of concept, they are the same in that they are both intellectual representation. The two notions converge in that they are both notions of representation which have their source in the intellect or understanding. So in saying both that Leibnizian concepts cannot constitute cognitions of objects and that his own cannot Kant is asserting that representations which have their source in the intellect cannot constitute cognitions of objects. Thus, since if it is successful the argument of the Amphiboly shows that intellectual representations alone cannot constitute cognitions

of objects, it also, if it is successful, shows that Kantian concepts fail to do so.

Exactly what nonconceptual elements are required for cognition of physical objects? Kant's answer is the passively received matter of empirical intuition or sensation on the one hand, and the forms of intuition on the other. In the following passage Kant contrasts receptivity and intuition with spontaneity and concepts, and then specifies two kinds of intuition pure intuition and the empirical sort, which are differentiated by the fact that the empirical sort contains sensation:

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical. When they contain sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object), they are empirical. When there is no mingling of sensation with the representation, they are pure. Sensation may be entitled the material of sensible knowledge. (A50=B74)

This passage is most plausibly read as indicating that Kant thinks both pure intuition and sensation to be or at least to contain nonconceptual elements. Why does he think this? First, as we have seen, Kant's arguments in the Amphiboly convinced him that what is represented by pure intuition, space and time and spatial and temporal qualities, is nonconceptual at its basis, and it is its externality

which is responsible for this. If space and time and spatial and temporal qualities are ultimately cognized purely conceptually, then they cannot consist in the external qualities which in fact constitute them. Consequently, they can only be a feature of the intentional content of confused representations, and besides being implausible this does not comport well with the integrity of science. Secondly, Kant thinks that sensation is nonconceptual; I think that what marks its nonconceptual nature for Kant is its being passively received. I don't think that Kant presents any explicit arguments in favor of this idea; there are, for instance no explicit arguments for it in either the Aesthetic or the Amphiboly. The explanation for Kant asserting it may lie in the strangeness of the main alternative for him, the idea that sensations are only components of confused representations of things in themselves, together with his attraction to empiricism, from which the idea is plausibly borrowed. Thus on Kant's view there are two factors, the externality of space and time and spatio-temporal qualities and the passively received character of sensation, which are responsible for the fact that our cognitions of physical objects must have a nonconceptual element.

Let us now critically examine these ideas about what it is that is responsible for the nonconceptual element in cognition. There is an idea about what the nonconceptual in cognition is which I think we can grasp more easily than the notion of what objects would be like if they were cognized purely conceptually. As the conceptual is closely related to the verbal and the descriptive the nonconceptual is closely related to the irreducibly indexical. Typically, when one possesses a

concept of some feature of experience, one can associate a word or a description with it. When one cannot associate a word or description with an element that is cognized we can say that the awareness of that feature is indexical; one can only point to or ostend the feature. But such awareness is not necessarily irreducibly indexical, it may be possible to conceptualize the relevant feature. Not having a word or description for some element which is cognized does not always show that the cognition of that element is not in fact conceptual. If a person is able to recognize the precise colour of something and able to discriminate it from other nearby hues and shades, the possession of a certain colour concept can be ascribed to that person even though he may not possess a word or description for the colour so as to have the verbal ability to distinguish it from nearby hues and shades. In such a case all that one may lack are appropriate words, otherwise the possession of a concept is cast into doubt. But a case in which recognitional and discriminatory abilities are present and the mastery of just one more thing, like the word 'sepia', or some new introduction into the language, or the description 'the colour of the jacaranda trees outside', would make possible the association of a word or description with the colour, is, I think, a case in which a colour concept can be ascribed. But an element of a cognition is nonconceptual and irreducibly indexical when one cannot master a word or description for an element of what is to be cognized; it is irreducibly indexical when the element of what is to be cognized can only be demonstrated or ostended.

Spatial and temporal cognitions, I want to argue, have an irreducibly indexical element, and I think that indeed part of the explanation for this is the externality of some of the qualities apprehended in spatial and temporal cognitions. Perceptual cognitions of location which involve judgments like 'There is a fig in front of me', 'Dover is on the English Channel', and 'FDR was last elected President forty years ago' are like this. People having cognitions of these sorts cannot have enough in their descriptive or conceptual repertoire to specify the relevant locations, even though the cognitions may include the specification of these locations. First, a cognition of the spatial location of an object relatively close to one's body typically involves an irreducibly indexical, nonconceptual awareness of the location of one's body, or of one's eyes or some point behind the eyes for objects very close by. One can have at least partially descriptive, conceptual cognition of the location of an object relative to oneself, like that of a pen being one foot directly in front of one's eyes, but this presupposes the cognition of a reference point, namely my eyes. The aspects of cognition of location that we might allow, for now, to be purely conceptual are the distances and the directions of objects from one another (although, as I will indicate in greater detail soon, I believe that these aspects are not really purely conceptually cognizable). But even if one had all the purely conceptual cognition there is to have about distances and directions among things, then one still would lack cognition of the spatial locations of things. The reason is that one does not have a cognition of where one's self is, and one cannot therefore locate

things relative to oneself. Since this cognition is not included among those which can be purely conceptual, it must have an irreducibly indexical element.

One might say to this that one could have purely descriptive, conceptual cognitions of the locations of objects in a fictional story. This may be, but this does not show that this is true of objects in our own space. But one might subsequently object that even in our own space one may have purely descriptive, conceptual cognition of the location, say, of one's pen in one's purse, not knowing where the purse is. Indeed there is in this case a sense in which one has a purely conceptual cognition of the location of the pen, but not in the strongest sense of 'having a cognition of spatial location'. There is an important sense in which one does not have a cognition of the location of the pen, and this is because one does not have a cognition of it relative to one's body or eyes; one does not have a cognition of it, as Gareth Evans puts it, in egocentric space.⁷

Secondly, one may have a cognition which involves a description of the spatial location of something in some region of space far removed from one's body, and the description may not involve an explicit reference to one's body. For instance, one may have a cognition, upon looking at a map, of the location of Santa Barbara. It may be claimed that such a cognition does not involve an irreducibly indexical element, supposing again that distances and directions among objects can be cognized purely descriptively and conceptually, which I believe to be false. It may not, but only if the cognition is not taken to be of where Santa Barbara is relative to

oneself, in egocentric space. If the cognition is taken to be a cognition of where Santa Barbara is in egocentric space, then the cognition must involve an irreducibly indexical, nonconceptual specification of some point of reference, typically, again, that of one's body, or maybe of one's usual environment, which is dependent on a nonconceptual cognition of one's body, possibly together with a 'cognitive map', "a representation in which the spatial relations of several distinct things are simultaneously represented".⁸ Purely conceptual cognitions of any spatial location do not include the cognition of a reference point, the cognition of which consequently has an irreducibly indexical, nonconceptual element.

Cognitions of temporal location have similar characteristics. Cognitions of events proximate to the present, like one of some children having walked out of town five minutes ago, must involve an indexical, nonconceptual specification of some point of reference, typically of one's own temporal location. Cognitions of events farther away in time, which don't involve an explicit reference to the present, like one of the Pied Piper leading about 130 children out of Hamelin in 1284, if they are taken as cognitions of temporal location in the strongest sense, of the temporal location of events in the presentcentered temporal framework, also involve an irreducibly indexical, nonconceptual specification of some point of reference. Typically this point of reference will be again the present moment, or something broader which is itself dependent on the nonconceptual cognition of the present moment, like the present year or the present era. So purely conceptual cognitions of any temporal locations also

cannot include the cognition of the present moment as a reference point, the cognition of which consequently also has an irreducibly indexical, nonconceptual element.

There are two aspects to the location of an object in egocentric space, the distance or extent the object is from oneself and the direction it is away from oneself. Likewise, there are two aspects to the location of an object in present-centered time, the temporal distance or extent the object is from the present and direction in time the event is away from the present. All of these properties are external, first, in that they presuppose the existence of other objects in space or an absolute space, or the existence of other events in time or an absolute time, and second, in that they presuppose the existence of oneself or the present as a reference point. It seems that the second, but not the first kind of externality in part accounts for the irreducible indexicality of cognitions of spatial and temporal location. Spatial and temporal distances and directions among objects and events considered apart from oneself and the present are not really purely conceptually cognizable, as we shall have occasion to discuss soon, but it doesn't seem to be their externality which explains this. If we consider what distance and direction are like to be purely conceptually cognizable, then there doesn't seem to be any obstacle to maintaining that the distances and directions among objects and events, considered apart from their relation to the self or the present moment, can be cognized purely descriptively or conceptually. But the fact that these qualities are external or relational in that they presuppose the self

or the present moment as a reference point does explain the existence of an irreducibly indexical and nonconceptual element in their cognition. It seems, therefore, that there is indeed something to Leibniz's and Kant's thesis that external qualities are not purely conceptually cognizable, although it now appears as if their claim may have to be limited.

The fact that cognitions of location, of distance and direction have nonconceptual elements is, I think, part of Kant's reason for thinking that our cognition of space and time is intuitive. Kant does not mean to say that we have no concepts of space and time and of spatial and temporal qualities, but just that our cognitions of them must have nonconceptual elements. According to Kant, the characteristic of space and time and of spatial and temporal qualities that excludes the possibility of their being cognized purely conceptually is their externality. But this is not the whole story. It is also important to see that cognitions of spatial and temporal qualities like extension, direction, and duration are also irreducibly indexical in that one could not know what they are like by means of concepts alone. Just as is the case for (other) sensory qualities, if one never had a cognition of extension, direction, or duration one could not come to know what they are like in a purely descriptive or conceptual manner. It has been held that one can have cognitions of qualities like shape and extension by means of the apprehension of mathematical formulae alone, but this is implausible. One can understand $(x-a)^2+(y-b)^2=r^2$ without knowing what a circle is like at all.

Cognitions of sensory qualities, like colour, taste, smell, and pain have a nonconceptual element because knowledge of what they are like can come only through immediate awareness. When I have a cognition of a red object in front of me I think of it as red. The thinking of it as red is a descriptive, conceptual element of my cognition. But I have a cognition of a particular shade of red, which I can only demonstratively indicate as that shade of red. But I may be able to say that it is the same colour as the bougainvillea flowers on the trellis, and this at least sounds descriptive or conceptual. But it is not purely descriptive or conceptual. My cognition of the shade of red of the bougainvillea flowers itself is not purely conceptual or descriptive because I cannot specify it with some description; even if I can liken it to the color of something else the chain has to end somewhere. We typically learn color words by having the word said while the appropriate color is ostended; one cannot learn to use color words, nor the names of any sensory qualities in a purely descriptive way. They ultimately have no non-indexical descriptions; our cognition of them must ultimately have an indexical and nonconceptual element, that is, our cognition of them must be intuitive in the sense of atomistic, passively received representation.

Although what I have to say about it is limited and unclear, I think that the thesis that what a quality is like is partially responsible for the irreducible indexicality of a cognition of it may be related to Kant's idea that sensation is nonconceptual in that it is passively received. Passive reception, as Kant thinks of it, suggests

opposition, resistance to, conceptualization. Sensation on Kant's view, and in the rationalist tradition, is something which is given, rather than being produced by and completely in the control of the intellect or the understanding. It is plausible that there would be some general feature of sensation which explains the fact that Kant and others think it to be opposed to the conceptual. What a quality is like seems to be a good candidate for this feature. Possibly Kant actually had this feature of qualities in mind in connection with notion of the the passively received.

Thus on Kant's view any spatial or temporal cognition, and any sensory cognition, ultimately involves a nonconceptual element. For Kant this means that all of our cognitions of physical objects are partly nonconceptual. What about other types of cognitions? One might be tempted to say that cognitions in mathematics and geometry are purely conceptual, but Kant thinks that they involve pure intuitions, which contain a nonconceptual element partly because they represent external qualities, and besides they don't count as Erkenntnisse unless they can be applied to empirical intuitions. Kant also makes it clear that the apprehension of analytic truth doesn't count as Erkenntnis or cognition, even though he might count it as knowledge if he used the word 'knowledge' with our meaning. Lastly, Kant does not think that we can have any cognitions of the self, the world as a whole, or of God which are purely conceptual. He argues for this in the sections of the Critique entitled the Paralogisms, the Antinomy, and the Ideal.

Footnotes to Chapter 8.

¹Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 27.

²Manley Thompson, "Kant and Singular Terms", Review of Metaphysics 1973, p. 333.

³In chapter 1, I argue that in Kant's usage the term 'intuition' is ambiguous; on the one hand he uses it to refer to ordinary representations of particular things which have already been synthesized by the categories, and as a result have conceptual content (A79=B104-5, B135, B143, B144), and on the other hand he uses it to refer to representations which precede all activity of the understanding, representations which have not yet been subjected to synthesis by means of concepts (B67, A51=B75, B132, A258=B314).

⁴Tyler Burge, "Belief de Re", Journal of Philosophy 74, 1977, pp. 338-362.

⁵G. H. R. Parkinson, "Kant as a Critic of Leibniz: The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, v. 35, n. 136-7, 1981 fasc. 2-3, p. 313.

⁶Parkinson, p. 310.

⁷Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 151-170, esp. pp. 151-4.

⁸Evans, p. 151.

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